Liberalism

Liberalism — core claim

Conflict under anarchy is not inevitable. States and individuals can build mutually beneficial institutions, and cooperation can produce absolute gains.

What makes liberalism 'liberal' in Schlickenmaier's lecture?

Freedom matters; contestation is not the same as conflict; regime type matters; mutually beneficial institutions are possible; absolute gains can exist internationally.

Absolute gains

A state asks whether it benefits from cooperation, even if the other state gains more.

Relative gains

A state worries about how much the other side gains compared with itself because unequal gains can shift future power.

Liberalism vs realism on anarchy

Realism sees anarchy as creating strong incentives for self-help and competition; liberalism accepts anarchy but argues institutions, interdependence, law, and regime type can make cooperation possible.

Why regime type matters to liberals

Different domestic political systems process information differently and create different incentives for transparency, accountability, and cooperation.

Schlickenmaier on illiberal regimes

Illiberal regimes are information-poor, can suffer information-processing pathologies, and often have weaker external information relationships.

Can authoritarian regimes cooperate at all?

Yes. Liberalism does not require all cooperation to occur among democracies; authoritarian states can create mutually beneficial institutions when cooperation serves their interests, though information and trust problems may be greater.

Organization

A concrete entity with institutional machinery and physical presence used to coordinate cooperation.

Regime

Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge.

Institution

The broader rules of the game that constrain and structure human interaction; institutions can be domestic or international.

Organization → Regime → Institution

Organization = body; regime = norms/procedures; institution = rules of interaction.

Why language is an institution

Language constrains and enables interaction; without communication, actors cannot coordinate or collaborate.

Institutions and collective-action problems

Institutions help actors cooperate by creating information, expectations, rules, monitoring, and repeated interaction that reduce incentives to defect.

Prisoner's Dilemma and institutions

Institutions can alter the strategic environment by increasing information, accountability, and repeated interaction, making cooperation more sustainable.

Keohane's response to Waltz

Keohane accepts anarchy and functional undifferentiation but argues cooperation still persists because institutions help states overcome collective-action problems.

After Hegemony — central puzzle

Why did U.S.-led cooperation persist even as American relative dominance weakened? Keohane's answer: institutions preserved cooperation beyond shifts in raw power.

Postwar institutional embedding

West Germany and Japan became stronger but were embedded in frameworks such as NATO, U.S. alliances, the G7, and IMF, reducing incentives to challenge the order.

Democratic Peace Theory — exact claim

There is something distinctive about democratic-democratic relations; the claim is not that democracies are peaceful toward every type of state.

DPT information mechanism

Democratic institutions generate stronger information flows within and among democracies, making intentions clearer and war between them less plausible.

DPT accountability mechanism

Democratic leaders face political and electoral costs for unpopular or costly wars, creating greater restraint.

Why DPT is prescriptive

If democratic-democratic relations are more peaceful, then spreading democracy appears to offer a pathway toward a more peaceful international system.

Rational institutional design

Institutions are often designed purposively to solve strategic problems; design differences are not simply random.

Rational choice and institution formation

Actors create institutions when rules and cooperation can produce outcomes they prefer over repeated unstructured competition or defection.

EU as a liberalism case

The EU demonstrates deep institutional cooperation, shared rules, and willingness to surrender some sovereignty, while crises and Brexit show institutions can still fail or unravel.

Sovereignty and the EU

States may voluntarily surrender some decision-making autonomy when the expected benefits of cooperation exceed the costs of retaining full independent control.

What EU sovereignty tells us about anarchy

Anarchy does not prevent states from voluntarily constructing binding institutions; sovereignty can be pooled even without a world government.

Two-level games

International outcomes result from bargaining at two levels simultaneously: negotiators bargain internationally while also facing domestic factions and constraints.

Why domestic politics matters to liberalism

State preferences are not produced by the international system alone; domestic groups, institutions, and political processes shape what governments want and can agree to.

Global governance

Liberalism questions strict state-centrism by examining institutions and networks that transcend states and allow cooperation to scale.

Interdependence

Mutual dependence raises the cost of breaking relationships, giving actors stronger incentives to maintain stable cooperation.

Milner-style interdependence and liberalism

Interdependence fits liberalism because it shows how strategic dependence and domestic interests can create incentives for cooperation even under anarchy.

US-China liberal strategy

Economic integration and institutionalization were expected to create interest groups that benefited from stable relations, contracts, and continued cooperation.

US-China liberal breakdown

If political liberalization stalls, commitments are violated, and interdependence weakens, trust falls and competition becomes more likely.

Taiwan/TSMC liberal logic

Deep economic and technological interdependence can raise the cost of war while institutional communication can reduce uncertainty and miscalculation.

Forward-looking implication of decoupling

If the U.S. and China reduce interdependence and institutional ties, the costs of conflict fall and competitive security behavior should become more likely.

Liberal hegemony

A hegemon can preserve leadership not only through force but by embedding its power in institutions that make its behavior more predictable and acceptable.

Organizations/institutions: mutual benefit or balance of power?

They can do both: institutions can create genuine mutual gains while their rules and influence may still reflect underlying power distributions.

21st-century pathway to hegemony

A liberal argument is that control over institutions, standards, finance, information, and rule-setting can extend influence more durably and cheaply than military coercion alone.

Ethical critique of liberalism

Prescribing liberal democracy risks turning an explanatory theory into a universal political project that may justify paternalism, coercion, or imperialism.

Universalism and imperialism critique

Liberal values may be presented as universally valid even when their promotion reflects the preferences and power of particular states.

Main strengths of liberalism

It allows for positive change, explains real cooperation in the international economy, and has substantial empirical support.

Main weaknesses of liberalism

It may be too optimistic, fragmented internally, and vulnerable to ethical critiques involving universalism and imperialism.