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terms and defs
what does IFF mean
If and only iff. Meaning that both statements are either true together or false together
IFF conditions
IF (sufficient condition)-: P if Q means that if q happens, its is enough to guarantee that P is also true. Only if (necessary condition). P only if Q means that P can’t possiblyh be true unless Q is true.
IFF example
"You are a legal driver in this state if and only if (iff) you hold a valid driver's license."
This implies two things simultaneously: If you have a license, you are a legal driver (sufficient). If you don't have a license, you cannot be a legal driver (necessary).
Locke main thesis
Something existing at one time is the same person as something existing at another time iff the memory criterion is met.
Locke: identity and non persons
identity conditions for various objects: wanted to clarify what makes something the object that it is at a time and over time
Locke: Mechanism at a time
A collection of molecules composes a clock if and only if they are arranged in a way that actually allows them to tell time, meaning that both the specific structure and the ability to function are absolutely required for the clock to exist.
Locke: mechanism over time
An object persists over time if and only if its parts change gradually and it maintains a working, functional structure at every single moment.
Locke: plant and animals
This passage applies John Locke’s theory of identity to living things, asserting that a dog or a human persists over time if and only if their physical parts change gradually and maintain the specific functional organization of life at every moment.
By framing this with an if and only if (iff), Locke establishes that biological identity is fundamentally about functional continuity rather than keeping the exact same matter.
locke distinction
separates "Man" (the biological human animal) from "Person" (the thinking, conscious self).
The Human Animal ("Man"): Identical over time iff it maintains this unbroken biological functional organization.
The Person: Identical over time iff it maintains continuity of consciousness and memory. (For example, if a prince and a cobbler swapped memories, the human animal stays the same, but the person inside changes)
Locke personal identity step 1: what is it for a person to be the object that it is at a time
it is by virtue of having the capacity for consciousness that a person is the
object that it is. (Restated: the objects we call “persons” exist at a time iff, and because, they have the
capacity for consciousness.)
Locke: reflective awareness
self-awareness = introspective access to our mental life
Locke personal identity step 2: what is it for a person existing at one time to be identical to something existing at another time?
a person at one time is identical to something at another time iff the consciousness of the
one thing is the same consciousness as that of the other.
Locke personal identity step 3: ‘When is the consciousness of something at one time the same as that of something at another?’
memory criterion: the consciousness of something existing at one time
is the same as the consciousness of something existing at a later time iff the thing existing later can
remember being reflectively aware of an experience that the earlier thing was reflectively aware of.
2. We can restate the memory criterion: a person existing at one time is identical to something existing at a
later time iff the latter can recall being aware of some experience the former was aware of.
L what are persons composed of
Locke understood “spirits” (souls) to be immaterial beings—objects composed of immaterial stuff;
2. and a human being (human animal)--what Locke calls a “man”--is a composition of material things that
exhibits the functional organization peculiar to human bodies.
3. So suppose some dolphin turned out to be self-aware. That dolphin would be related to a person in the same
way a human animal is related to a person. Now suppose that the only objects that are self-aware are what
Locke called “spirits.” Then these would be the only persons. Assuming that spirits can be moved around,
from one human animal to another, then persons would go with those spirits to other animals
L artifacts (clocks, ship, cars)
distinctive arrays of molecules that confer the ability to perform a specific function (e.g. telling time). Incremental/no change in parts from moment to moment while maintaining functional organization (matter/molecules)
L: Living Things (Plants, animals, human animals)
Distinctive arrays of molecules that confer the ability to function in ways peculiar to that species. A "continuity of imperceptibly succeeding parts"; molecules change by vital processes only incrementally.
L: persons
Possessing the capacity for consciousness, defined as self-(reflective) awareness
(introspective access to mental life). Meeting the memory criterion: an
object can recall being reflectively aware of an experience acquired earlier
Parfit main thesis
Animalism, which says we are human animals, is false. We are the conscious part of an animal.
P what are substance sortals
Label in the sense that they apply to some persisting entity whenever it exists aka a dog will always be a dog
P what are phase sortals
which apply to some entity, in the present tense, only while this
entity has certain properties. Two such phase sortals are ‘teenager’ and ‘caterpillar’. When we reach the age of 20, we cease to be teenagers, but we don’t thereby cease to exist
what do animals think about human animal and person
Animalists think that “human animal” is a substance sortal. Parfit does not dispute this. But animalists can add that “person” is a phase sortal. Parfit here rejects that claim
P; how is persistence determined
mostly by psychological features and relations among them
P: psy connectedness
certain direct relations between features. For example, having an experience and later remembering having that experience are connected; forming an intention and later acting on that intention are connected; also, having a character trait, and retaining it until later, constitute connectedness.
P: psych cont
overlapping chains of strong connectedness
P defending views that we are lockean persons
brain based and personhood/biological animal
brain based
If just one future person would be psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, enough of the same brain, this person would be me. In all other cases it is not true that this person would be me.
“entities that can think about themselves.
a human embryo is not a person, but is, or becomes, a human animal. the animal’s body later becomes the body of a lockean person
Problems for lockeans
Too many thinkers problems:if a person and a human animal are two different things in the same place, both would use the same brain to think every single thought
Epistemic problem: if we are 2 conscious beings then how can i know which one I am
too many persons problems: If the human animal is self-aware, rational, and thinks, then by John Locke’s own definition (a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection), the human animal qualifies as a person.
This creates a bizarre metaphysical pile-up where two distinct persons occupy the exact same space, think the exact same thoughts, and share the exact same experiences.
Problems for animalist
Transplanted Head: My head is grafted onto Williams’s headless body. On Williams’s view, Williams would wake up with my head, but “nearly all believe that the person with my head would be me.” (=Transplant Intuition) Possible response: Animalists might say, in the case of human beings, that the animal goes with the brain,…[so] that, in Transplanted Head, the resulting person would be me
probs for animalist
If my brain stem is left hebind, only my head and cerebrum are grafted onto wills brain stem and body. with brain stem retained, my body would then continue to be the body of a living though unconscious animal, it would be implausible to claim that this would now be a different animal.
animalist ultimatally think that the human animal stays alive wherever its brain-stem is at. And in doing so you are forced to disconnect who we are from what we think. so then this would mean that we are not different animals
problems for animalist
now say that my cerebellum is kept alive. Acc to a lockean, since i have consciousness, it would still be me. But in an animalist pov it would be hard to defend the claim that this would be a conscious being whose physicla basis is only a cerebellum (an animal) and the same animal is me. Is this because im missing the stuctural component of the brain stem
P solution to the too many thinkers problem: the embodied part view
we arent human beings. we are the conscious, thinking, controlling parts of human beings. Animals digest their food by having a part that does the digesting, and breathe by having a part that does the breathing. these facts dont create a too many digesters or breathers problems. Similarly human animals think by having a part that does the thinking: us
The Direct Thinker: You are the Thinking Part (the Lockean person). You experience the thoughts directly.
The Indirect Thinker: The Human Animal only "thinks" indirectly (or derivatively), simply because it happens to house you. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Bernat: whole-brain concept of death remains public policy
the best option is to bease public policy on the whole-brain death criterion for death: which is death is the permament and irreversible loss of the critical functions of the organism as a whole (consciousness, control of circ, respiration, and intergrating and controlling systems)
What are the 7 presuppositions about death
death refers to the cessation of human beings life
death is fundamentally is a biological phenomenon and not a social contrivance
all members of higher vertebrate species die in the same sense
death applies to all but only to organisms, persons cant die becuase personhood is a social construct
an organism is their alive or dead cant be both
death is an event not a process
death is irreversible
Bernat: rejects
view that death is the irreversible loss of that which is considered to be essentially significant to the nature of man since it fails the first assumptions
bernat definition of death
the permanent and irreversible loss of the critical functions of the organism as a whole adding that the salient functions include, consciousness, control of circulation, respiration, temp, etc
bernat: criterion for death meaning
the general and measurable condition that satisfies the definition of death by being both necessary and sufficient for death ( If x them death = x suffices for death; If death then x = x is necessary for death)
bernat: criterion for death meaning, candidates
whole-brain, higher-brain, brain-stem
bernat defends what
whole-brain criterion: it provides a failsafe mechanism to eliminate false-positive brain death determinations and assure the loss of the critical functions of the organism as a whole.
the brain stem criterion leaves open the possibility of misdiagnosis and is not sufficient for death
Bernat: public policy
his analysis is imperfect but is the best basis for public policy. he distinguishes between providing a criterion for death that is accurate versus one that can be translated into successful public policy. We must make compromises or approximations to achieve acceptable practices and lows and that utility such as the importance of harvesting organs for transplantation can justify accepting a defective criterion.
McMahan: an alternative to brain death thesis
if we were organism, we would have their biological death. We are not,so death for us is nonbiological
McMahan: we are embodies minds not organisms
we go with our brains when these are transplanted. we can exist separately from out organisms
in cases of dicenphalus, there is only 1 organism, but two persons. Both cannot be that organism, so neither is. But we are the same kind of objects as these people so we are not organism
because we are not organisms. and because we would cease to exist if our brains lost the capacity for consciousness, we would be embodied minds
McMahan: nonbiological death for us
Okay so McMahan argues that there are technically 2 deaths> one is biological death which is the death of an organism so when a body completely ceases functions as an integrated system, the person already ceased to exist long before. And then the nonbiological which is the death of self/person. In this case it is irretrivable loss of function in higher brain since this is where consciousness is realized so the human organism survives but not the person
McMahan really simplified thought on why were not organisms
McMahan's core argument is that we cannot be identical to our biological organisms. If you were to transplant my head onto a new body, my consciousness and identity would go with my head, leaving the original human animal behind on the operating table. Because 'I' can be physically separated from the original organism and continue to exist, I cannot fundamentally be that organism. Instead, I am the specific, thinking part of the brain that generates consciousness
composition control
one key different between an armadillo and a clock is that the 2 objects that are not alive cant control what their constituents are nor how these are arrayedl living things can
Autarkic control
self-sufficient control is made possible by the activities of the molecuels that compose living objects. these molecules engage in an array of of activities by which they remain bonded toghether, or increase their ranks by molecules building fresh molecules to themselves, or decrease by arranging themselves into various structures. (vital activities like photosynthesis)
Autarkic control living things
Autarkic control is a concept in the philosophy of biology that means an organism is internally self-governing and controls its own life processes from the inside out. [1, 2]
You are completely right that it is closely tied to the idea of self-sufficiency. The word comes from the Greek roots autos (self) and arkein (to suffice or ward off). In biology, it describes how a living creature functions as an independent, self-maintaining machine
death
the loss of life account says dying is ceasing to be alive. Dying is losing capacity to engage in Autarkic activities
death vs dying.
event by which the capacity to engage in vital activities is loss of one thing, and the state of affiars of its having been lost is another. Capacity may be lost gradually, so its reasonable to speak of a process of dying, sometimes its complicated
how animialist resist death criteria
since the vital activies of human beings whose entire brains have ceased to function can continue without cardiopulmonary assistance. focus purely on the life of the biological organism as a whole
mindist and personist deny criteria by
Mindists and Personists resist the legal, whole-brain criterion for death (which requires the brainstem to stop working). [1]
They resist it precisely because an intact brainstem allows a person's entire mind and psychological features to be completely destroyed while leaving a living, breathing biological body behind
Epicurus and death thesis
death is nothing to us, we should not be afraid of it.
Epicurus argument
Epicurus breaks his argument down into a perfectly logical trap:
The Core Rule: Something can only be good or bad for you if you can feel it (sense-experience).
The Definition of Death: Death is the complete and permanent end of all sense-experience.
The Conclusion: Therefore, death cannot be bad for you when you are alive (because it hasn’t happened yet), and it cannot be bad for you when you are dead (because you no longer exist to feel it).
Epicurus: existence criteria
only what occurs what we exist is good/bad for us (yet death and existance dont overlap)
epicurus: experience req
only what we experience is good/bad for us (yet we dont experience death)
What is intrinsic hedonism
pleasure or pleasant experiences is the only thing that is intrinsically good for us, while pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad for us (bad in itself)
Assumption of death and existence
Epicurus concludes that a persons death does not cause her to have any experiences (sensations) —>death is to be deprived of sensations
argument only considering intrinsic hedonism
intrinsic hedonism is true. so something is intrinsically good or bad for a person only if it is an experience. a persons death itself is not an experience, so a persons death is not intrinsically good/bad for her so it is neither good or bad
Objection to epicurus argument
Doesn’t this argument overlook the fact that some things are extrinsically good/bad? Perhaps a person’s death is extrinsically bad for her. Something is extrinsically good (bad) for us iff the benefit (harm) it provides us is something other than itself. But in what does such a benefit consist? The answer Epicurus appeared to accept was extrinsic instrumentalism
extrinsic
Extrinsic Value (Good or Bad Because of What It Leads To)
Something has extrinsic (or instrumental) value if it is only a tool to get you something else. On its own, it is completely neutral, but it becomes good or bad based on what it causes.
extrinsic instrumentalism
something is extrinsically good (bad) for a person only if it makes her have things other than itself that are intrinsically good (bad) for her. B. Epicurus’s argument, supplemented On the strength of both intrinsic hedonism and extrinsic instrumentalism, Epicurus inferred that a person’s death is neither good nor bad for her, as it does not make her to have any intrinsic goods or bad
Money isn't intrinsically good (it's just paper), but it is extrinsically good because it allows you to buy food and comfort (which are intrinsically good)
hedonist view of happiness
Epicurus equated happiness, thought of as ataraxia, with tranquility, the absence of suffering or mental turmoil.
positive analysis
In some passages he equates our happiness with our pleasure (or pleasant experience), the one thing that is intrinsically
good for us, and together with the absence of suffering, the only thing intrinsically bad for us
negative analysis
hat is intrinsically bad for us, and nothing is intrinsically good for us. In the following passage (Letter), Ep suggests that
the good life is one as free as possible from pain, and pleasure is important only insofar as we find it painful to be without
pleasure:
the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the
soul is quieted; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for
anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the
absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure.
even more negative
he adopts what we may call a negative analysis of pleasure: pleasure is the
absence of pain. (In the first of the following passages he is responding to the criticism that he advocates a lifestyle that
we moderns call 'epicurean.')
By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. (Letter)
The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. (Principal Doctrines)
Epicurus reserves
As your quote from his Principal Doctrines proves, Epicurus believed that unfulfilled desires are the number one source of human unhappiness. [1]
If you want a mansion, you will stress yourself out trying to get the money. If you get the mansion, you will stress out worrying about losing it. His solution is simple: shrink your desires down to the absolute basics. If you only desire bread and water, you will never be disappointed, because bread and water are easy to find
Feldman: some puzzles thesis
dying at a time t is bad (good) for a person iff, and to the extent that, it makes that person’s lifetime welfare level lower (higher) than it otherwise would have been.
Feldman assumptions
A. possible worlds: Feldmand (F) assumes that there are possible worlds. It is complete way things might have been
Fred Feldman uses the idea of "Alternative Timelines" (Possible Worlds) to mathematically prove that death can be bad for you.
Here is the simple breakdown:
• 🌍 The Actual World: The timeline you are currently in, where you die early (e.g., at age 20).
• 🔮 The Nearest Possible World: The alternative timeline most similar to ours, except the cause of your death never happens, allowing you to live a long, happy life (e.g., to age 80).
axiology
theory of value. Possible worlds can have values, say measured in terms of some intrinsic good(s) they contain. Also, a
possible world can have a person-relative value: the value it has for a particular person. For a hedonist, it is
measured by summing her pleasure (minus pain) over a lifetime in that world. This value can be
symbolized as follows: V(s,w). V(s,w) = world w’s value V for subject s. F also says V = s’s welfare level
in w
Feldman hedonism
F takes exclusive hedonist on board, but only for the sake of argument— only so he can show that death may be bad for those who die even if we adopt a hedonist view of goodness. he assuems that ones welfare level over some period of time is the sum of ones pleaure and pain over that period of time.
feldman: intrinsic vs overall good ( = good all thing considered)
a. Intrinsic Goodness: This defines intrinsic good as something that is valuable for a person strictly for its own sake, rather than as a means to get something else (instrumental good).
b. Overall (All Things Considered) Good/Bad: This establishes a counterfactual comparative account of overall welfare. An event is good for you if your total lifetime well-being is higher with it than without it, and bad if it lowers your total lifetime well-being.
c. Possible Worlds Framework: This translates the counterfactual account into modal logic. To determine if an action (like Dolores moving to Bolivia) is bad for someone, you compare two scenarios: the closest possible world where she moves to Bolivia versus the closest possible world where she stays. If her life has less value in the moving world, the move is overall bad for her.
feldman criticisms: under what conditions and in what sense is death (at some given time) bad?
dying at time t is (overall) bad (good) for me if and
only if (and to the extent that) the nearest world in which I die at t has less (greater) value for me than the
nearest world in which I do not die at t. That is, dying at t is bad (good) for me iff my lifetime welfare level
would be lower (higher) if I died at t than it would be if I did not die at t.
feldman: at what time do we incur the misfortune of death
F equates this question with, When is it
true that the value of the nearest world in which one dies is lower than the value of the nearest world in
which one does not die? The answer is: it is true “eternally”
Lucretius argument
F also offers a reply to Lucretius: for some of us, the good an early death deprives us of is greater than the
good a late birth deprives us of, since in either case we’ll live only a fixed time (we don’t hold the deathdate
constant). He assumes it is better for us if our lives take place in a modern era
Mill and utilitarianism thesis
argues that human pleasures are qualitatively superior to animal pleasures if people who have experienced both consistently prefer them over any amount of lower, sensory gratification.
Mill: principle of utility (PU) and justice
Mill's main concern in Cp. V is to discuss the relationship between the PU and justice.
1. Moral Rights
a. To say that I have a moral right to X is to say that in order to meet the demands of the PU, society ought to
punish (using legal sanctions or moral opinion) people who interfere with my doing or having X.
b. M is advocating that society as a whole adopt a rule utilitarianian policy. Society will find it useful to set up
rules that protect people in their attempt to do and possess various things. I have a moral right to X whenever
soc ought to adopt a rule that protects me in doing or having X.
c. I have a moral duty to do X, according to M, whenever the PU requires that society punish me if I don’t do X.
(i) So my having a right imposes a duty on others: the duty not to interfere with what I have a right to.
(ii) But while someone's having a right imposes a duty on others, someone's having a duty need not give
others any rights. According to Mill, I have the duty to be generous (since by the PU soc ought to punish
me if I'm not), but not to any particular ("assignable") person. Hence no particular individual has a right
to my generosity.
Mill: justice
Justice is the bundle of moral rights. "Justice implies something. . .which some individual person can claim from
us as his moral right."
Mill: justice and PU
The bundle of rights that constitutes justice is based on the PU.
Mill: what is utilitarianism
1. A teleological theory is one that defines the good independently of the right and the right in terms of the good. E.g., Classical Utm is hedonist; it defines the good as happiness (boosted by pleasure, lowered by pain). By contrast, preferential Utm says the good is desire fulfillment. 2. Contrast deontological theories, such as Kant’s, which can be defined as non-teleological: either they don’t define the good independently of the right, or don’t define the right in terms of the good
Mill classical principle of utility
Stated: maximize the total amount of utility (=happiness) summed over all individuals concerned. 2. Classical Utm is a form of Act Utm: it says: of all actions open to you, choose the one that maxes utility. 3. Contrast Rule Utm: act as required by the best set of rules or principles. A set of rules is best if, of all those possible, it is the one that, if followed by everyone, results in the greatest sum of utility
Mill principle of average utility
aims to maximize the per-person happiness level, meaning it opposes adding new people to a population if their presence lowers that overall average, whereas total utilitarianism welcomes any new population growth that increases the absolute sum of happiness
Standard Reservations about Classical Utm
1. Strict Impartiality
Strict impartiality implies it is wrong to give special consideration to our own interests and those of our friends
and loved ones. Some utilitarians say that it is wrong to treat human beings better than animals.
2. Forcible Harm to Some to Benefit Others
The Case of the Ruthless Mayor: Here utility is maxed by framing an innocent person.
McFall v Shimp 1978: ruling against compelling anyone to provide lifesaving tissues for others.
Rule Utm seems to rule out framing the innocent, but might not rule out forcibly harvesting tissues.
Kant thesis
tries to establish the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative
Kant: Prudence
hypothetical imperatives when they apply to us only on condition that
we have certain desires. Hypothetical imperatives help us to fulfill our desires and make ourselves happy
kant: morality
insofar as we are purely prudent beings, desire fulfillment is our concern; but insofar as we are also reasonable, or moral, beings, our highest priority is meeting our obligations. The principles that set out our obligations bind us unconditionally, so they cannot be hypothetical imperatives. The directives issued are categorical. This is true of all moral principles.
Kant: interpreting the categorical imperative
there is “only one categorical imperative,” he presents different formulations of it
Kant: first formulation Universal law
It is permissible to act as we intend only if the maxim expressing the intended policy behind our action is
universalizable. We are to avoid policies from which we mean to exempt ourselves.
Universal law steps
. State the intention behind our proposed action in the form of a maxim: I am to do X in C in order to bring about Y.
2. Work out the world paired to the maxim—that is, work out how the world would be if: (a) everyone acted in accordance with the generalized version of our maxim, and (b) the fact that everyone did so was public knowledge. 3. Then test our maxim: it’s universalizable if and only if it is possible to “will” the world paired to the maxim, which means the paired world meets two tests: (a) A contradiction in conception would occur if it is not one in which everyone can act from the maxim (this test identifies “perfect” duties). (b) A contradiction in will would occur if it is not one in which everyone can attain their rational ends (the persistence and happiness of moral agents) (this test identifies “imperfect” duties).
Kant: second formulation
e gist is that we respect moral agency, our own as
well as others’. Moral agency consists in the capacity to recognize and act from duty, together with autonomy (or self determination), the ability to choose values, set ends for oneself, and shape of ones life
kant: second formulation implications of moral agency
we have the duty to perfect ourselves, to develop our moral capacities as well as we can
we cant interfere with ppls freedom to choose their ends and values and to design their own lives in responsible ways. it is always acceptable to reason with them in hope of influencing their decisions
must treat people as if they were not self-determining. we may not act as if someone were a midnless object or tool, may not manipulate people. We may ask or hire people to perform services; in that case we are not using others as mere means, because
we engage with them as fellow moral beings: we let them consider their own priorities and freely accept—or
reject—our plans.
laws of a just state should limit our freedom to pursue our life plans only to permit
others to exercise the same freedom. Legislators should maintain rules by which people may pursue
happiness as they wish, so long as they do not infringe on “another's right to do whatever can coexist with
every man's freedom under a possible universal law.
kant what if they try to kill themselvs
Kant’s argument hinges on the idea that rational agency is intrinsically valuable and must always be protected. Because a person possesses this agency, they have a strict perfect duty to themselves to preserve it. Damaging or destroying your own body or mind to escape pain uses your rational agency to destroy your rational agency, which Kant views as a logical contradiction.
To Kant, you do not "own" your personhood like a piece of property that you can damage at will; your agency is something you are morally required to respect and protect at all costs.
kant: the third formulation autonomy
act always on the maxim of such a will in us as can at the same time look upon itself as making universal law. Moral agents are able to impose rules upon themselves. Viewing ourselves as giving the moral law to ourselves allows us to see ourselves as free
kant: intentions
Having moral merit, being a good person (which is the “highest good”), consists not just in being a moral agent, but also in following moral duty (in that sense having the proper intentions). It does not require performing actions that have good consequences
Rawl, a theory of justice main idea
his main idea as the general conception of justice (which applies the DP to all social goods):All social values. . .are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage. Injustice. . .is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all
Rawls: 2 principles (1 trumps 2)
Social primary goods (PGs) which are all-purpose means such as rights, powers, income and wealth, whose distribution is directly influenced by social arrangements (contrast natural goods such as talents which are not directly under social control)
two principles expanded
1. Each will have the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. (Newer, revised version: each person has an equal right to a scheme of equal basic liberties that is fully adequate as well as compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.)
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. [(a) = Difference Principle (DP); the DP makes interpersonal comparisons in terms of PGs]
Rawls defense
Rawls derived this idea using a thought experiment called the original position. He argued that if people had to design a society without knowing what their own wealth, talents, or social status would turn out to be, they would choose rules that protect the worst-off person (a "maximin" approach
Rawls the original position
each member of society is to have a representative in a hypothetical situation to choose a
conception of justice on behalf of that citizen.
Rawls stipulations
Equal Standing (1): Every representative has the exact same bargaining power, ensuring a fair starting point.
Rational Disinterest (2 & 3): Reps do not care about helping or hurting other reps' wards. They are strictly focused on maximizing the interests of their own ward by selecting the best possible layout of the primary goods we just discussed.
The Veil of Ignorance (4): To eliminate personal bias, a "veil" blocks out all specific information.
By stripping away this specific knowledge, Rawls forces the representatives to be perfectly impartial. Since a rep doesn't know if their ward will be a wealthy genius or a disabled person living in poverty, they must choose rules that protect everyone—especially the least advantaged.
Rawls free market system
Rawls favors the free-market system since it efficiently allocates resources, determines supply in relation to demand, and sets prices, and because it protects key freedoms: “A significant advantage of a market system is that, given the requisite background institutions, it is consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Citizens have a free choice of careers and occupations.” (Chapter V, Section 42)
2. But it must be regulated (by background institutions) to conform to his two principles.
3. Justice is neutral on private v. public ownership of the means of production (assuming the publicly owned firms operate independently, and still compete in the market to determine supply, prices, and wages.)