Week 11 - Interpretation Dworkin

Dworkin idea of Law is Interpretation, rejection of other arguments

Law Is Interpretation Dworkin argues that practicing law is an act of interpretation, and that this makes law political in the sense of political theory, but not partisan politics. He suggests that comparing law with interpreting literature will help us understand both law and interpretation in general.

The Central Puzzle Lawyers constantly make statements about what the law is, ranging from broad rules to very specific claims about who owes whom money. The puzzle is what these statements are really about and what makes them true or false.

The Positivist Answer Legal positivists say a statement of law is true only if some official lawmaking event, like a legislature passing a statute, actually happened. That works in simple cases, like a state law requiring three witnesses for a will.

Where Positivism Breaks Down In hard cases, such as whether an untested affirmative action plan is constitutional, lawyers who know all the same texts and court rulings still disagree. So the answer can't come from historical facts alone.

Two Other Options Rejected One view says such statements just express what the speaker wants the law to be, and another says they describe an objective moral "natural law". Dworkin rejects both, because people making these claims mean to describe the law as it actually is, even when they dislike it.

A Better Answer, Interpretation Statements of law are neither pure history nor pure value judgments; they interpret legal history, which mixes description and evaluation. Lawyers already talk about interpretation, but usually mean figuring out what the authors of a statute intended.

Dworkin’s Literary Interpretation

Interpreting Past Court Decisions In judge-made (common) law, a court might have to decide whether an earlier ruling for a mother who saw her child hit also covers an aunt who heard about it by phone. Skeptics say the earlier judge had no theory that covers the aunt, so the new judge is really making new law.

We Need a Broader Idea of Interpretation If interpretation just means finding the author's intent, it becomes another version of positivism. Lawyers should therefore study interpretation as a general activity in other fields.

Learn From Literary Criticism Literary critics disagree about interpretation even more than lawyers do, which is exactly why they're worth studying. They have developed theories that challenge the strict divide between describing and evaluating that has weakened legal theory.

What Kind of Literary Interpretation Matters Dworkin isn't interested in what an author meant by a single word, but in claims about the meaning of a whole work. Examples include claims about Hamlet's feelings or the play's theme, and such claims can guide performances and deepen our understanding of culture.

The "Aesthetic Hypothesis" Interpreting a literary work means finding the reading that shows it as the best work of art it can be. Different schools disagree because they hold different views about what literature is for and what makes it good.

Dworkin’s Sticking to the Text

Answering the Relativism Worry Critics may say this idea confuses interpreting with judging, or means there is no single best interpretation. Dworkin says the idea is not as wild, weak, or relativistic as it looks.

Interpreting Versus Changing a Work Showing a work as the best it can be is different from turning it into a different, better work. Shakespeare might have written a better play with a more forceful hero, but that doesn't make Hamlet that play.

The Text as a Constraint Most theories treat the fixed text as binding, so every word must be accounted for and none may be changed. That rule isn't unavoidable; a joke, for example, can be told many ways and still be the same joke.

Coherence Matters An interpretation fails if it makes most of the text irrelevant, which is why an Agatha Christie mystery can't be read as a deep treatise on death. Raymond Chandler's thrillers can be read as more ambitious works, and Christie's can't, which shows the limit that coherence imposes.

Dworkin’s Disagreement about Art

Disagreement About What Counts as Unity Critics still disagree about which kinds of unity matter, such as whether sound effects or shifting readings add to a poem or detract from it. Schools of interpretation rise or fall depending on how they answer these questions about art.

Bigger Disagreements About Art's Purpose The main splits are over what art is for: teaching us something, communicating the author's message, or enriching readers' lives. Each answer leads to a different style of interpretation, such as psychoanalytic, author-focused, or reader-focused.

Theories Need Not Be Fully Formed Views about art are tied to wider beliefs in philosophy, religion, and language, but interpreters don't need a complete, conscious theory. The best critics deny that literature has just one purpose.

Interpreters Still Rely on Beliefs Every interpreter relies on beliefs about the form of art and about what makes art good, even if those beliefs go unspoken. They are real beliefs because they show up consistently and can be argued over.

The "It's Trivial" Objection Someone might say it's obvious that interpretive styles reflect theories of art, and that the hypothesis does nothing to defeat relativism. Since views about good art are subjective, the objection goes, objectivity seems lost.

Why the Hypothesis Still Matters The hypothesis treats theories of interpretation as competing answers to a real question, not as definitions of the word "interpretation". It also blurs the sharp line between interpreting a work and criticizing it, since judgments about value enter both.

Objectivity Whether judgments about art can be true or false is an open philosophical question. No interpretation can be proven to everyone, but that doesn't mean no theory is better than another.

Dworkin’s Explanation of the Author’s Intention Approach

Rejecting Hirsch's Approach E. D. Hirsch claims that only his author-focused theory makes interpretation objective, and Dworkin calls that a mistake. We shouldn't assume in advance what validity requires; we should look at how people actually give reasons in practice.

Theories Support Each Other Theories of art and theories of interpretation depend on each other in both directions. That mutual dependence is no reason for skepticism, just as linking our idea of objects to our theory of knowledge isn't.

Testing Author's-Intention Theories If interpretation rests on a theory of art, theories focused on author intent can be criticized through the theory of art behind them. Those theories assume that a work's value is limited to what the author narrowly intended, which is a doubtful idea.

The Intentionalist Reply Intentionalists say they only explain what a work means, not what makes it valuable. Dworkin asks what question their theory actually answers better, since it isn't a dictionary definition or a description of what all critics do.

Why Intent Would Matter The intentionalist may say that knowing the author's intent is important for other purposes. But that importance assumes value lies mainly in what the author intended, which is itself a disputed theory of art.

Intent Sometimes Matters No sensible theory says intent never matters; it is central, for example, to what Shakespeare meant by "hawk". It is debatable, however, that we need to know Shakespeare's view of Hamlet's sanity to judge the play.

Authors Discover Things in Their Own Work Creators often notice something in their work they didn't know was there, as if their characters had minds of their own. John Fowles described a character in The French Lieutenant's Woman who seemed to choose his own path.

Changing Views Over Time Fowles changed his view of his story while writing it, and may have changed it again after seeing the film adaptation. The screenwriter and the actress were interpreting the novel, and their versions might have reshaped his own view.

Neither "Hidden Intent" Nor "New Intent" Intentionalists say the author either discovered a subconscious intention or formed a new one, and neither explanation works. Fowles's new views came from facing the work itself, which means he was interpreting it.

Authors Mean to Create Something Independent Authors can treat their work as a separate object and reach new conclusions about it. Fowles himself said a real created world must be independent of its creator.

Layered Intentions An author's intentions are layered, not a simple shopping list, and specific intentions depend on beliefs that can change. Fixing meaning by the author's beliefs at one moment ignores the deeper intention to create a work of art whose meaning isn't fixed that way.

Artists and Critics Overlap Artists interpret as they create, and critics create as they interpret. Still, there is a real difference between the two roles.

Dworkin’s Explanation of the Judge’s Actual Approach

The Chain Novel Imagine novelists writing one novel chapter by chapter, each adding to the same book rather than starting a new one. Each writer after the first must interpret what came before in order to continue it.

What Each Novelist Decides Each writer must decide what the characters are like, what the theme is, and which devices to keep or drop. No single author's intent controls, so the interpretation can't be tied to intent.

The Task Makes Sense The novelists must try to produce one unified novel, not a set of unrelated stories, even if the result turns out poorly. What matters is that each writer understands what he or she is being asked to do.

Judges Are Like Chain Novelists In hard common-law cases, a judge reads past decisions to figure out what earlier judges have collectively done. The judge must continue that history rather than strike out in a new direction.

The Aunt's Case The judge must choose between two theories: drivers are liable only to people in physical danger, or drivers are liable for any harm they could foresee. The aunt can recover only under the second theory, so the judge must decide which is the better reading of past cases.

Fit and Value A good legal interpretation must fit past practice and also show its value, as literary interpretation does. Because law is political rather than artistic, that value is measured by justice and good social order.

Interpreting, Not Inventing Judges must interpret the history they have, not invent a better one, and fit sets the limits. When statutes are involved, choosing which kind of legislator intent matters is itself a question of political theory.

Handling Mistakes Any interpretation will run into some past cases that point the other way, so it needs a way to treat some decisions as mistakes. Courts may say a case was wrongly decided or limit it to its own facts.

Integrity Constrains Judges That flexibility doesn't erase the line between interpreting and starting fresh. A judge's sense of law's coherence as an institution guides and limits how much of past law an interpretation must fit.

When Fit Isn't Enough Often two principles both fit past decisions, and in those cases political theory decides between them. Liability for foreseeable harm may be the better reading only because it is the fairer principle.

Judges' Legal Philosophies Judges build a political theory, which they call their legal philosophy, covering both fit and substantive values. For example, a judge focused on economics will see cost-cutting in accident law, while another will see ideas of fault and responsibility.

The Subjectivity Objection Some say this makes law just what judges personally prefer. Dworkin replies that interpretation is neither finding law ready-made nor making it up, so the objection misses the point.

Better and Best Interpretations Nothing in this account rules out one interpretation being better than another, or one being the best. We shouldn't demand impossible proof before calling a legal theory sound.

The Intent Objection in Law Some say legal interpretation is simply finding what lawmakers and judges intended. Dworkin treats that as one competing political theory of interpretation, not a rival to his overall view.

Abstract Versus Specific Intent A constitutional delegate might mean to ban discrimination in fundamental matters while not believing schools count as fundamental. Which version of his intent a judge follows changes the result on school segregation.

Choosing Requires Political Theory The choice between abstract and specific intent must rest on a theory of democracy, not on analyzing what an intention is. Dworkin knows of no compelling argument for deferring to the framers' specific intentions.

Intent Fails in Judge-Made Law Researching what every past judge thought would produce only a mass of psychological data. That data wouldn't tell a judge what the past decisions add up to, because that judgment requires fresh interpretation.

Picking a Few Judges Doesn't Help Focusing on one recent judge's intent treats that judge like a legislator and brings back the same problems. Justifying that focus would also require an interpretation of judicial practice as a whole.

Dworkin’s Belief that Politics impacts interpretation of law

Politics Shapes Views on What the Law Is If Dworkin is right, liberal and conservative lawyers should disagree about what the law is, not just what it should be, and they do. Debates over the Equal Protection Clause show this, since that clause can't be read without a theory of equality.

Conservatives' "Bluster" Conservatives pushed author's-intent readings and accused others of inventing law. Dworkin says this hid their own political choices, and that relying on political theory is part of interpreting, not a corruption of it.

Politics in Literary Interpretation Stanley Fish and sociologists study the "politics of interpretation," meaning the outside forces that make schools of interpretation rise and fall. Dworkin asks a different question: whether political principles can count as arguments for a particular reading.

Political Views Should Count Conference participants said commitments like feminism should affect how we judge literature. If so, those commitments must also affect which interpretation is best.

Shared Philosophical Roots Theories of art and theories of justice may rest on the same views about experience, values, and personal identity. Liberalism, for example, may depend on treating values as beliefs open to argument.

Conclusion It may be worth asking whether there are distinct liberal, Marxist, or other approaches to art grounded in shared philosophy. Dworkin ends by saying that politics, art, and law are somehow united in philosophy.