Plato's Republic: Justice and the Soul

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Last updated 7:06 PM on 10/8/26
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201 Terms

1
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Plato's main question on justice

What is justice, and why is being just good even when wrongdoing seems rewarding?

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Plato's definition of justice

Each part of a person or city doing its proper job without taking over another's work.

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Three parts of the soul

Reason, spirit, and appetite.

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Function of reason in the soul

To think, judge, and benefit the whole person.

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Function of spirit in the soul

To supply courage, anger, and concern for honor, supporting reason.

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Function of appetite in the soul

To seek pleasures, money, and satisfaction under the limits of reason.

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Plato on having desires

Having desires is not unjust, provided they accept limits set by reason.

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Distinguishing reason and appetite

A person can want to drink while judging that drinking would be harmful.

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Distinguishing spirit and appetite

A person can feel angry at their own desire, showing spirit opposing appetite.

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Three main functions in the city

Rulers decide, defenders protect, and producers supply goods and services.

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City and soul correspondence

Rulers match reason, defenders match spirit, and producers match appetite.

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Reason for forming a city

Cooperation and specialized work let people provide what they cannot meet alone.

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Wisdom in the city

The rulers' understanding of what benefits the city as a whole.

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Courage in the city

Defenders holding correct beliefs about what should be feared under pressure.

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Moderation in the city

Agreement among parts about which part should rule.

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Why justice benefits a person

It creates inner order and health, guided by reason rather than competing desires.

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Ring of Gyges test

Tests whether justice is worth choosing when one can do wrong without getting caught.

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Who should rule and why

Properly educated philosophers, because government needs understanding of the good.

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Why wealth does not qualify to rule

Money does not prove knowledge of governing any more than it makes a good ship captain.

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Why intelligence alone is insufficient

Clever people can use their ability badly; rulers need understanding and a good character.

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What the Allegory of the Cave shows

People can mistake familiar appearances for truth until education turns them toward understanding.

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Why the philosopher must return to rule

Their education was supported by the city, and their knowledge should benefit others.

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Why reluctant rulers are better

They govern out of duty rather than seeing office as a route to wealth or domination.

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Political role of education

It shapes what people admire, fear, and desire, making strength serve the common good.

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Restricting guardians' wealth and family

Prevents private gain and relative loyalty from turning protectors into exploiters.

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Purpose of the myth of the metals

To support unity and acceptance of roles based on different abilities.

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Women as guardians

Relevant ability, not sex alone, should determine the job; reproductive differences do not bar defense.

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Plato's view on equal political roles

He assigns functions by ability and gives rule to the knowledgeable, not total political equality.

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Plato's regime sequence

Ideal guardians, then honor, wealth, unrestrained freedom, and finally tyranny.

30
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Connection between The Prince and Discourses

The Prince focuses on rulers, while the Discourses focuses on republican institutions and liberty.

31
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Effectual truth

Looking at how politics actually works rather than assuming ideal behavior always succeeds.

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Danger of conventional goodness

Others may be dishonest or violent, so a ruler who refuses to adapt can lose the state.

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Limits of necessity

It concerns political survival and consequences, not mere personal desire.

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Virtu

Political skill: judgment, courage, initiative, preparation and effective action.

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Fortuna

Changing circumstances and events outside a leader's full control.

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Flooding-river example

Prepare defenses before danger arrives to reduce damage from unpredictable events.

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Cause of leader failure

Conditions change while the leader keeps using the same habits.

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Difficulty of reform

Beneficiaries of the old order strongly resist while potential beneficiaries support it weakly.

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Armed and unarmed prophets

A founder needs the ability to maintain a new order when opponents resist.

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Cruelty well used

Harsh action concentrated in securing power, then stopped and followed by benefits.

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Danger of apparent mercy

Refusing to stop disorder can expose many people to ongoing violence.

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Why generosity causes hatred

Lavish spending uses up resources, leading to heavy taxes on subjects.

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Fear versus love

Fear depends more reliably on expected punishment, which the ruler can influence.

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Why fear must avoid hatred

Hatred gives people reasons to conspire or resist through attacks on property and families.

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Fox and lion

The fox detects traps and uses cunning; the lion uses strength.

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Why appearances matter

People judge visible conduct and outcomes because they cannot observe everything.

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Breaking a promise

Justified by necessity when supporting conditions disappear, though it threatens trust.

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Unreliability of mercenaries

Their interests may not match the state's, leading them to abandon costly fights.

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Danger of auxiliary troops

They belong to another ruler, leaving the state dependent even after victory.

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Need for ruler judgment with advisers

Without judgment, the ruler cannot tell good advice from flattery or manipulation.

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Desires of people versus nobles

Nobles seek domination; the people mainly seek not to be dominated.

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How conflict protects liberty

Institutions can turn resistance to elite domination into laws and protections.

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Mixed government

Elements of rule by one, few, and many can restrain each other to prevent dominance.

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Corruption in a republic

Public roles become tools of private advantage when citizens lack supportive habits.

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Republic adaptability

They can use different leaders with different methods as conditions change.

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Republican liberty and prosperity

Secure work and possessions encourage investment and productive effort.

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Core Machiavellian argument

Political action must fit real circumstances; skill and fear management matter.

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Hobbsian main problem

How people obtain reliable peace when nobody has final authority to enforce agreements.

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Locke's starting question

How can anyone have legitimate political power over people who are naturally free and equal?

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Natural equality in Locke

Nobody is born with a natural political right to rule another.

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Natural law requirements

Do not harm others in their life, health, liberty, or possessions.

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Lockean freedom

Protection from another person's arbitrary will within natural and standing laws.

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State of nature vs state of war

Nature means no common political superior; war means wrongful force or intention.

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Why establish government?

To supply common rules, impartial judgment, and reliable enforcement.

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Three state of nature inconveniences

Lack of a settled standard, impartial judge, and sufficient enforcement power.

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Powers given to political society

Private punishment and personal freedom to act for preservation are transferred to common institutions.

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Punishment vs compensation

Punishment restrains violations for public preservation; compensation addresses the injured person's loss.

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Failure of absolute monarchy

Subjects have no impartial appeal against a monarch judging their own case.

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Labor and property

Using labor to gather or improve common resources can create ownership.

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Spoilage limit

Do not take resources that will spoil unused.

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Enough-and-as-good limit

Appropriation should leave adequate opportunity and access for others.

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Role of money in property

Money allows exchanging perishable surplus for durable currency, enabling larger holdings.

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Improvement argument

Productive labor can increase useful goods, making society materially better off.

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Absolute vs relative improvement

Absolute means having more goods than before; relative means having less than someone else.

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Servant's turfs significance

Raises the question of whose labor produces whose property through the service relationship.

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Necessity of majority rule

A community needs a way to decide and act without requiring unanimous agreement.

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Limits on majority power

Majority decisions remain limited by natural law, rights, and the purpose of political society.

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Express consent

An explicit agreement to become a member of the political community.

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Tacit consent

Enjoying territory or benefits creates obligations while that enjoyment lasts.

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Government as a trust

Power is given for a specific purpose and its authority is conditional on serving it.

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Main legislative limits

Use standing laws, pursue public good, respect rights, and obtain taxation consent.

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Consent for taxation

Government protects property, so taking it arbitrarily undermines its foundational reason.

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Prerogative

Executive discretion for the public good where law is silent or strict wording causes harm.

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Justification of resistance

When rulers seriously and systematically violate their trust or attack rights.

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Responsibility for rebellion

Abusive rulers are responsible because they introduce wrongful force and break the legitimate order.

86
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Parental power limits

Serves children's care and developing reason, ending with maturity rather than being absolute.

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Locke's whole argument

Equal people have rights, consent creates institutions, and serious trust breaches justify replacing rulers.

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Hobbes's main problem

How can people obtain reliable peace when nobody has final authority to enforce agreements?

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Natural equality in Hobbes

People are roughly equal in vulnerability because even a weaker person can threaten a stronger one.

90
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Three causes of conflict

Competition for goods, distrust about safety, and concern for reputation or status.

91
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Why peaceful people fight

They cannot trust others to remain peaceful, making striking first seem necessary for survival.

92
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Hobbesian state of war

A condition of known danger and readiness for conflict without reliable assurance of peace.

93
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Right of nature

The liberty to use one's power for self-preservation.

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Laws of nature

Reason's instructions for seeking peace, accepting mutual limits, and keeping valid agreements.

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Why promises fail

Without enforcement, people cannot be sure others will keep agreements.

96
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Sovereign authorization

Individuals agree to authorize a person or assembly to act for them and enforce peace.

97
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Sovereign form in Hobbes

It can be one person or an assembly as long as it has sufficiently strong final authority.

98
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Opposition to divided authority

If rival powers hold the last word, disputes lack dependable settlement and insecurity returns.

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Rejection of revolution right

Allowing everyone to decide when final authority counts causes reliable enforcement to collapse.

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Remaining liberties under sovereign

Freedom where laws leave choices open and resistance to immediate threats to one's life.