POL SCI 139 Midterm

POL SCI 139 (IR - Technology & Security) Midterm Flashcards

David Edgerton — Main Argument

Technological innovation does not automatically equal progress. Newer and more advanced technologies are not necessarily more significant than older alternatives.

Technological determinism

Technology develops by its own internal logic, then drives social change. Technology is the cause; society reacts.

Social shaping of technology

Technologies have no single fixed logic. Societies choose among alternatives and that choice reflects politics, economics, values.

Innovation-centric vs. use-centric analysis

Innovation-centric: Centers on the moment of invention. Use-centric: Centers on what people actually relied on. Significance is measured by diffusion, persistence, and scale.

Counterfactual analysis

Alter one variable in the past to see what would've happened. Compares a technology's actual effects with those of available alternatives.

Cost of substitution

If we took new technology away, what would actually change and what would it cost us to use an alternative technology?

Why does innovation-centricism dominate?

Powerful actors benefit from the myth. Nations: prestige; industries: patents and marketing; scientists: funding; media: a clear hero.

Three questions to ask of any technology

Who can hurt whom? What makes a state powerful? What states can see/know?

Stephen Walt — Main Argument

Realism remains the strongest general framework, but realism cannot explain everything. Each theory captures an important part of international politics.

Anarchy

No central international authority capable of protecting states. States must provide for their own survival.

Realism

International politics = struggle for power among self-interested states. States are the most important actors.

Defensive vs. offensive realism

Defensive: States primarily seek survival/security. Offensive: Anarchy encourages states to maximize their relative power.

Liberalism

More optimistic about international cooperation. Three major ways to promote peace: Economic interdependence, democracy, international institutions.

Constructivism

Focuses on ideas, identity, norms, beliefs, and discourse. State interests are not fixed and can change through historical and social processes.

Wendt — "Anarchy is what states make of it"

Anarchy does not automatically produce conflict. What matters is how states understand and respond to anarchy.

Charles Tilly — Main Argument

War makes states. Warfare encouraged extraction, bureaucracy, centralization, and the monopoly of violence.

Alex Roland — Main Argument

Military success depends on how technology is developed, organized, and used—not simply possessing superior technology.

Monopoly on violence

A defining feature of the modern state is its attempt to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.

War → Extraction → State Making

War creates demand for resources. Extraction creates institutions. Institutions increase state capacity. Greater state capacity allows more effective warfare.

Tilly's four activities of the state

War making: Eliminating rivals outside. State making: Eliminating rivals inside. Protection: Protecting supporters or clients. Extraction: Obtaining resources for the other three.

Stirrup thesis (technological determinism)

Stirrup → mounted lance fighting → expensive shock cavalry → land grants → feudalism.

Gunpowder revolution and Trace Italienne

Heavy cannon pounded old medieval stone castle walls into gravel. Trace Italienne: Massive sprawling star fortresses built to absorb artillery fire.

Robert Jervis — Main Argument

One state's efforts to increase its security can make other states feel less secure. The severity of the security dilemma depends on the offense-defense balance and differentiation.

Security dilemma

One state's efforts to increase its security decrease the perceived security of others, potentially producing arms races and conflict.

Three obstacles to international cooperation

The need for resources; the problem of the future; the security dilemma.

Offense-defense balance

Is it easier to conquer an opponent's territory, or to defend your own? Two things determine this balance: geography and technology.

Offense dominant vs. defense dominant

Offense: Attack is cheap, fast, and easy. War is more likely. Defense: Defending is much cheaper than attacking. Stability increases.

Offense-defense differentiation

Can you distinguish a defensive weapon from an offensive weapon? No differentiation: Every weapon looks threatening. Clear distinction: States can arm safely.

Jervis's four worlds

1. Offense advantage + indistinguishable: most dangerous. 2. Defense advantage + indistinguishable: security dilemma remains. 3. Offense advantage + distinguishable: aggression possible, but easier to recognize. 4. Defense advantage + distinguishable: safest.

Cult of the offensive (WWI)

Leaders believed offense was dominant and they needed to strike first or lose the advantage, but they believed incorrectly.

Three major eras of naval warfar

Galleys (oars), sailing ships (wind), and steamships (engines).

Gigantism

The tendency to build increasingly large and powerful weapons. Japan's Yamato and Musashi battleships were sunk by much smaller aircraft during WWII.

Technological lock-in / path dependence

Once institutions invest heavily in a technology, changing directions becomes difficult.

Total war

Encompassing all aspects of society.

Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald — Main Argument

Autonomous systems are most valuable when they make warfare cheaper and more sustainable. Reducing economic and political costs allows states to fight longer.

Harvey Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro — Main Argument

The U.S. may have the military power to win wars but lack the political willingness to accept the casualties and costs required to fight them.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) vs. Military Revolution

• Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): A change in technology or tactics that improves battlefield performance.

  • Examples: More accurate weapons, faster vehicles, and improved firepower.

  • Usually creates shorter-term military advantages.

• Military Revolution: A larger transformation that changes how states organize and sustain warfare.

  • Creates long-term advantages by changing the economic and political costs of war.

Economic vs. political costs of war

Economic: Can you afford to build, field, and sustain this force over time? Political: Can your society bear the war—the taxes, conscription, casualties, domestic dissent?

Casualty aversion and capital for labor

Casualty aversion: Reluctance to accept deaths during military conflict. Capital for labor: Replacing human exposure to danger with expensive technology and equipment.

Sapolsky & Shapiro's three traps

Ratchet: If the previous war was bloodless, the next one must be too. Exploitation: Enemies exploit U.S. casualty aversion. Manhunt: Clean war collides with the fact that war requires killing. If you could talk your way out of war, you would do so, instead use of force = killing. To justify war, countries need to inflate the stakes

Richard Price — Main Argument

The chemical weapons taboo wasn't organic but was built through politics and historical timing. It was constructed by the powerful.

Taboo and genealogy

Taboo: A strong moral rule against certain behavior. Genealogy: A method of studying how beliefs and moral rules develop through history.

Why is the chemical weapons taboo a constructivist argument?

Material facts don't carry their own meaning. Shared ideas assign meaning. What makes a weapon acceptable is shaped by politics and society, not just technology.

Three explanations for chemical weapons nonuse in WWII

Deterrence: Fear of retaliation. International norms: Chemical warfare considered morally wrong. Military unpreparedness: Armies lacked preparation. Price argues deterrence alone is insufficient

Thomas Schelling — Main Argument

Military power is not just about defeating enemies; it can also influence their decisions. Threatening violence can be more effective than actually using it. Military strategy has become the diplomacy of violence

Bernard Brodie — Main Argument

Nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the purpose of military power. Militaries previously focused on winning wars; now their most important objective is preventing wars. Bombs not more destructive but make the destructive faster.

Brute force vs. coercion

Brute force: Physically defeating or controlling an enemy. Coercion: Using threats to change an enemy's behavior.

Deterrence and credible threats

Deterrence: Preventing an enemy from acting by threatening unacceptable consequences. Credibility: Whether an enemy believes a threat will be carried out (2nd strike capability)

Compression of Destruction

Nuclear weapons compressed destruction from years to days or minutes. No time to mobilize, out-produce an adversary, or shelter a population.

First-Strike vs. Second-Strike Capability

First-strike: Attack first and destroy an adversary's ability to retaliate. Second-strike: Absorb an attack and then retaliate.

Strategic Stability

When both sides have second-strike capability and neither has first-strike capability.

What makes deterrence effective?

Threat of retaliation must have a good chance of success, and that chance must be evident to the other side.

What makes a threat successful? (Schelling)

Anticipated: Adversary must see it coming. Avoidable: Comply and pain is withheld. Not completely opposed interests: You want compliance more than pain.

Deterrence vs. Compellence

Deterrence: Keep an adversary from starting something. Compellence: Make an adversary undo what they started.

How did nuclear weapons change the relationship between victory and destruction?

Before the bomb: Hurting required winning first, and only for the winner (militaries had to first win by beating other militaries on the frontlines). After the bomb: Hurt without defeating first, for winner and loser (no winning first)