Socratic Ethics, Moral Psychology, and Virtue in Plato's Republic, Gorgias, and Euthyphro

Vocabulary flashcards covering core ethical concepts, definitions of virtue and pleasure, and dialogues in Plato's Republic (Book IX), Gorgias, and Euthyphro.

Intermediate state (calm of the soul)

A neutral state between pleasure and pain that appears pleasant when juxtaposed with pain, and painful when juxtaposed with pleasure, leading inexperienced people to mistake mere painlessness for true fulfillment.

Pleasures of smell

A prime example of pure pleasures that arise suddenly with great intensity without being preceded by pain and leave no pain behind when they cease.

True filling up

Nourishing the soul with that which partakes of pure being—such as true belief, knowledge, understanding, and virtue—which participates more in truth and being than bodily replenishment like food and drink.

Shadow-paintings of true pleasures

Illusory pleasures mixed with pains experienced by those lacking reason or virtue, whose intensity is merely an optical illusion produced by juxtaposition with pain.

Phantom of Helen

An allusion to the poet Stesichorus' story of the phantom fought over at Troy, used by Socrates to illustrate how foolish people fight over mere images and shadows of true pleasure.

Spirited part (moral psychology)

The part of the soul driven by love of honor and victory, which becomes envious and violent when pursuing the satisfaction of anger without calculation or understanding.

Doing what one sees fit vs. Doing what one wants

Socrates' distinction in Gorgias demonstrating that agents desire the good end for the sake of which an action is done, meaning tyrants who commit unjust acts without intelligence do what they see fit, but not what they truly want.

The greatest of evils (Socrates)

Doing what is unjust, which Socrates argues is worse than suffering what is unjust.

The superior and better (Callicles' view)

Those individuals who are intelligent in the political affairs of the city and courageous, possessing the competence to rule and justly claim a greater share of goods than their inferiors.

Self-control (Callicles' view)

A trait Callicles equates with stupidity and unmanliness, invented by the weak majority who praise restraint only because they lack the courage and power to satisfy immense desires.

Excellence and happiness (Callicles' view)

Allowing one's appetites to grow as large as possible without restraint, and having the bravery and intelligence to supply them with complete fulfillment.

Jar (pithos) allegory

A mythological image from a Sicilian or Italian thinker in which the appetitive, persuadable part of the soul is likened to a jar, which in fools is leaky and impossible to satisfy.

Sieve allegory

An allegorical representation of the soul of an undisciplined fool, which fails to retain anything due to untrustworthiness and forgetfulness, carrying water into a leaky jar in Hades.

Stone-curlew

A bird of messy habits cited by Socrates to depict Callicles' ideal of an appetitive life that consists of having as much flowing in as flows out through gaping holes.

Callicles from Acharnae and Socrates from Alopece

The formal attributions of citizenship and demes used by Socrates when documenting Callicles' claim that pleasure and the good are identical, contrary to Socrates' view.

King-archon's court

The Athenian magistrate's office where preliminary inquiries and indictments regarding religious offenses, piety, and murder trials were formally registered.

Meletus

A young, unknown citizen from the Pitthean deme with long hair, sparse beard, and an aquiline nose who formally indicted Socrates on charges of corrupting the youth and inventing new gods.

Pollution (miasma)

A religious defilement contracted by committing murder or by living and eating with an unpurified killer without bringing him to justice.

Socratic standard / Form of piety

The single, universal model or appearance present in all pious actions by virtue of which all pious actions are pious and distinct from the impious.

Euthyphro Dilemma

The central philosophical problem posed by Socrates: 'Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?'

God-loved vs. Pious

A distinction established by Socrates showing that the 'god-loved' is in a state of being loved because the gods love it, whereas the 'pious' is loved by the gods because of its intrinsic nature.

Daedalus (conversational metaphor)

The mythical sculptor whose animated statues would not stay still, invoked by Socrates and Euthyphro when their dialectical arguments and propositions move around in circles.

Piety as a part of justice

The Socratic definition proposing that piety is the specific part of justice concerned with the care of the gods, while the remaining part concerns the care of fellow men.

Care of the gods (service / hyperetike)

A proposed definition of piety conceived not as an art that improves or benefits the gods, but as a form of subordinate service analogous to how slaves assist their masters.

Trading skill (piety as)

An inadequate definition of piety as an art of mutual exchange between gods and men, consisting of begging for what mortals need through prayer and giving gifts through sacrifice.

Proteus

The elusive mythological sea god who constantly changes shape, to whom Socrates compares Euthyphro when refusing to let him leave until he reveals the true nature of piety.