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Substance Dualism
There are mental substances and physical substances.
Substance dualism is the claim that there are two distinct kinds of substances in the world — mental substances and physical substances.
(Descartes’ argument)
Property Dualism
There are two distinct kinds of fundamental properties in the world — mental properties and physical properties.
Compatible with there being only one kind of substance (e.g., physical substance).
If property dualism is true, there could be only physical substances with two kinds of fundamental properties.
So, property dualism does not entail substance dualism.
(However, substance dualism logically entails property dualism).
Materialism/physicalism
Roughly, the view that the only fundamental properties of the world are physical properties (and only physical substances exist).
((A)Type-physicalism/identity theory/reductive physicalism and (B) Token physicalism/non-reductive physicalism)
Type-identity theory
(A) Every mental property is identical to some physical property.
In other words, every type of mental state is identical to some type of physical state or other.
(Also called “identity theory”, “type physicalism”, or “reductive physicalism”).
If (A) is true, then any given type of mental feature is identical to some type of physical feature. So, if (A) is true, for instance, being in pain is identical to some physical property P1 (e.g., having C-fibers firing). Seeing a blue after image would be identical to some other physical property P2.
And, for every other mental property Mn, there is some physical property Pn, such that Mn = Pn.
Functionalism
Each and every mental state is constituted solely by its functional role, which means its causal relation to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs.
PUTNAM:
Functionalism gives us one way of understanding the realization relation. The functional profile of a
mental property defines it via its causal or functional role, and the mental property will be realized by
any property that plays that causal role, while also perhaps having a broader functional profile. In other
words, on this understanding, the functional profile of a realized property is a subset of the functional
profile of its realizer(s) (or, as Horowitz and others, say its “realization”).