Criminal Law Y2S1 Week 9: L17 Defences (Self-defence, Coercion, Necessity, Automatism & Mental Disorder)

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Key terms and cases from my OneNote notes. 34 cards. 'Added' notes are from outside the notes.

34 Terms

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General defences: what are they, and how does the burden of proof work?

General defences are AFFIRMATIVE (supervening) defences: they exclude liability EVEN THOUGH the accused committed the offence ('yes, I did it, but…'). They apply to almost ALL offences: • self-defence; • necessity; • coercion; • automatism; • mental disorder. These differ from diminished responsibility and provocation, which apply only to MURDER and only reduce it to culpable homicide. BURDEN: • The accused bears an initial EVIDENTIAL burden: they must lead some evidence to make the defence a LIVE issue. • The PROSECUTION must then DISPROVE it beyond reasonable doubt. • EXCEPTIONS: MENTAL DISORDER and DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY, which the accused must PROVE on the BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES, because sanity is presumed.

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Justifications, excuses and denials of responsibility: what is the difference, and why does it matter?

• JUSTIFICATION: the act was RIGHT or permissible in the circumstances. SELF-DEFENCE is treated as a justification. • EXCUSE: the act was wrong, but the ACTOR is not blamed. COERCION and NECESSITY are treated as excuses. • DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY: the accused was not a RESPONSIBLE AGENT at the time (automatism, mental disorder), and unfitness can even bar a trial. Why it matters: e.g. THIRD PARTIES. Others may lawfully assist a JUSTIFIED actor, but they cannot rely on another person's EXCUSE, such as their provocation or coercion.

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Self-defence: what are the three requirements? (HM Advocate v Doherty)

Self-defence is the use of force against an aggressor in defence of oneself or OTHERS. HM Advocate v Doherty 1954 JC 1 sets out three requirements.

  1. IMMINENT DANGER to life or limb of the accused or a third party. It must be SERIOUS and IMMEDIATE (not a future threat) and CONTINUING (Lawson v HMA 2018).
  2. NECESSITY of response: there was no REASONABLE opportunity to ESCAPE or retreat, so there is a DUTY TO RETREAT (McBrearty v HMA 1999).
  3. PROPORTIONATE (reasonable) force. Historically no 'CRUEL EXCESS' of violence was allowed (Fenning 1985). The modern framing asks whether the force was REASONABLY NECESSARY (McCallum 2019). It is a weighing exercise, and allowance is made for the heat of the moment. It is most often pleaded in serious assault and homicide. Your notes say it cannot be used for the s.38 offence (threatening or abusive behaviour, Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010) and cite 'Erkhart'; check the case name.
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Self-defence to murder: is a threat of serious injury enough? What about a threat of rape?

Where the charge is HOMICIDE, the threat must generally be to LIFE. A lesser threat (e.g. an indecent assault) does not justify killing (McCluskey 1959). The EXCEPTION is that a WOMAN may kill in self-defence against a threat of RAPE (recognised in McCluskey). The Scottish Law Commission considered whether this should extend to ALL persons threatened with rape or be abolished, but called it a difficult POLICY question for the legislature. Where self-defence fails because of excessive force, PROVOCATION may still reduce murder to culpable homicide.

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Mistaken self-defence: can you rely on self-defence if you wrongly believed you were in danger?

YES, but ONLY if the mistake was REASONABLE (Owens v HMA 1946; Lieser v HMA 2008). The accused must have honestly believed, on REASONABLE GROUNDS, that they were in imminent danger. An unreasonable mistake does not support the defence.

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Coercion vs necessity: how do they differ from each other and from self-defence?

Both involve the accused being COMPELLED to commit a crime because of a THREAT. • COERCION: the threat is made by ANOTHER PERSON: 'do X or else'. • NECESSITY: the threat arises from the CIRCUMSTANCES (which can include people), e.g. a medical emergency or escaping an attack. • Test: WHO determines the action? A threat demanding a particular crime is coercion; a predicament the accused responds to is necessity. Unlike SELF-DEFENCE, which strikes at the SOURCE of the threat, coercion and necessity direct the crime ELSEWHERE, usually against an innocent party.

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Coercion: what are the requirements? (Thomson v HM Advocate 1983)

  1. IMMEDIATE danger of DEATH or SERIOUS INJURY to the accused or a third party. Future threats do not count (Thomson; Trotter 2001; Van Phan 2018).
  2. NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE course of action, e.g. going to the POLICE (Trotter).
  3. The threats must have OVERCOME the accused's WILL. The test is OBJECTIVE: 'such threats as would overcome the resolution of an ordinarily constituted person of the same AGE and SEX as the accused'. Low IQ or suggestibility is IRRELEVANT (Cochrane 2001).
  4. No defence if the accused VOLUNTARILY exposed themselves to the risk of coercion, e.g. joining a gang (compare R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, [2005] 2 AC 467).
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Necessity: what are the requirements? (Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 2000))

Necessity was first recognised in Moss v Howdle 1997 and developed in Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 2000) 2001 JC 143. (Your notes sometimes say 'No 1 of 2001'; it is No 1 of 2000.)

  1. IMMEDIATE threat of DEATH or SERIOUS INJURY to the accused or a third party, based on a REASONABLE BELIEF as to the circumstances.
  2. The threat CONSTRAINED the accused to break the law: there was NO LEGAL ALTERNATIVE (Moss v Howdle).
  3. The threat DOMINATED the accused's mind and was the OPERATIVE reason for the act (Dawson v Dickson 1999).
  4. OBJECTIVE test: a SOBER person of REASONABLE FIRMNESS, sharing the accused's characteristics, would have responded in the same way.
  5. The act must have had a REASONABLE PROSPECT of REMOVING the danger. For THIRD-PARTY necessity there must be a specific connection between the accused and the person threatened; general claims about danger to the public are not enough.
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Are coercion and necessity defences to MURDER?

The common law suggests NOT. The law should not allow people to CHOOSE between innocent lives, and sometimes the law expects 'heroism' (to die rather than kill). • Necessity: R v Dudley & Stephens (1884). • Duress: R v Howe [1987] AC 417. • But compare Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2001] Fam 147 (your notes cite '[2001] WLR 480'), where separation was permitted in very specific circumstances. Two judgments relied on necessity. These are ENGLISH authorities. The point has not been definitively settled in Scotland.

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CASE: HM Advocate v Doherty 1954 JC 1

Issue: What are the requirements of SELF-DEFENCE in Scots law? Facts (your notes): the accused was attacked with a weapon. He had a means of escape but instead stabbed and killed the attacker. Check the facts against the report. Held: Lord Keith's charge to the jury is the classic statement: (1) imminent danger to life or limb; (2) no reasonable means of escape or retreat; and (3) the violence must not be excessive. For example, 'if a man strikes you with his fist, that is no justification for using a knife'.

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CASE: Lawson v HM Advocate 2018 SCCR 76

Issue: Must the threat be CONTINUING when the accused responds? Facts: The accused's partner SLAPPED him, and he then PUSHED her. Held: There was no self-defence. The push was angry RETALIATION, not a response to CONTINUING danger. Self-defence wards off an ongoing threat; it does not cover retaliation after the threat has passed. If escape is reasonably possible, it must be taken.

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CASE: McBrearty v HM Advocate 1999 SLT 1333

Issue: Must the jury be told that the opportunity to escape has to be REASONABLE? Facts: The accused STABBED a man who was chasing him and grabbed him by the shoulder. The trial judge did not direct that any means of escape had to be reasonable. Held: The test is whether there was a REASONABLE opportunity to escape or retreat, not merely any opportunity. The appeal FAILED because the facts did not raise the point, but the court confirmed the test.

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CASE: McCluskey v HM Advocate 1959 JC 39

Issue: Can self-defence justify KILLING in response to a threat that is not a threat to life? Facts: The accused killed a man who allegedly tried to commit sodomy on him (a 'homosexual panic' claim). Held: The defence was REFUSED. There was no threat to LIFE, and in homicide the threat should be a fatal one to justify killing. The court declined to extend the special rule allowing a WOMAN to kill to resist RAPE.

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CASE: Fenning v HM Advocate 1985 SLT 540 and Moore v MacDougall 1989 SCCR 659

Issue: When is the force used in self-defence EXCESSIVE? Facts: • FENNING: added: the accused used substantially more violence than the threat warranted. • MOORE: the accused, punched and kicked by an attacker, STABBED him with a small pair of SCISSORS. Held: • Fenning: the defence is NOT available where the accused used a 'CRUEL EXCESS' of violence. Provocation may still be considered. • Moore: the response was EXCESSIVE. Proportionality is a weighing exercise in the circumstances.

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CASE: McCallum v PF Edinburgh 2019 JC 125

Issue: How should proportionality be assessed when resisting UNLAWFUL ARREST, and is 'cruel excess' the right test? Facts: Two police officers tried to remove a woman from her home WITHOUT a warrant, and it was accepted that they acted unlawfully. She resisted, and the sheriff convicted her on the basis that her force was excessive. Held: APPEAL ALLOWED. The sheriff had fixated on the accused's actions and considered irrelevant matters. The correct test is whether the force used was REASONABLY NECESSARY to prevent the complainers' actions. This marks a move away from the 'cruel excess' terminology.

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CASE: Owens v HM Advocate 1946 JC 119 and Lieser v HM Advocate 2008 SLT 866

Issue: Can a MISTAKEN belief in imminent danger support self-defence? Facts: Added: in Owens, the accused stabbed a man he believed was coming at him with a knife; no knife was found. Held: Yes, but only if the belief was honestly held on REASONABLE GROUNDS (Owens). Lieser confirmed that an UNREASONABLE mistake does not found self-defence: only a reasonable mistaken belief will do.

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CASE: Thomson v HM Advocate 1983 JC 69

Issue: What are the requirements of COERCION? Facts: Added: the accused took part in an armed robbery and said he was coerced by threats from the other robbers. Held: Coercion requires: • an IMMEDIATE danger of death or serious injury; • an inability to resist the violence, with no reasonable opportunity of escape or alternative; and • a backward or limited role. The danger must be immediate and bearing on the accused at the time; future threats are insufficient. The resolution must be that of an ordinarily constituted person.

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CASE: Trotter v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 296

Issue: Is a threat of FUTURE harm enough for coercion? Facts: Trotter's father was in prison. Trotter was approached and told to smuggle items (drugs) into the prison, under threat, and was caught. Held: NO defence. The threats were of FUTURE harm, and he had OTHER OPTIONS, such as going to the police, which he did not take.

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CASE: Cochrane v HM Advocate 2001 SCCR 655

Issue: Is the accused's low IQ or suggestibility relevant to whether threats OVERCAME their will? Facts: Cochrane's lawyer led evidence that he had a very LOW IQ and was easily manipulated, and said a co-accused's threats had overcome his will. Held: The test is OBJECTIVE: an ordinarily constituted person of the same age and sex. Low IQ or suggestibility is IRRELEVANT, and future threats do not count.

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CASE: Van Phan v HM Advocate 2018 JC 195

Issue: Could a TRAFFICKED person working on a cannabis farm rely on coercion? Facts: Added: a Vietnamese national found tending a cannabis cultivation said he had been trafficked and held there under threat. Held: The defence was DENIED. Coercion requires an IMMEDIATE danger of death or serious injury and no reasonable alternative, and that was not established on the facts. Check the exact reasoning.

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CASE: Moss v Howdle 1997 JC 123

Issue: Does Scots law recognise a defence of NECESSITY? Facts: Driving on the motorway, Moss's passenger cried out in sudden pain. Moss thought it was a medical emergency and SPED to the next services instead of stopping on the hard shoulder. Held: Necessity IS recognised, on the same principles as coercion, but it FAILED here. He was not CONSTRAINED to break the law because he could simply have stopped, and there was a legal alternative.

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CASE: Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 2000) 2001 JC 143

Issue: Could anti-nuclear protesters who damaged property rely on NECESSITY (or on international law)? Facts: 'Trident Ploughshares' protesters damaged equipment on a barge connected with the Trident nuclear submarine programme, claiming this was necessary to prevent the crime of threatening nuclear war. The sheriff directed the jury to acquit. Held: Necessity was NOT available. The court set out the requirements: an immediate danger of death or serious injury, no legal alternative, the danger dominating the mind, an objective test, and a reasonable prospect of removing the danger. There was no immediate danger, and general concern for others without a specific connection is insufficient.

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CASE: Dawson v Dickson 1999 JC 315

Issue: Must the threat be the OPERATIVE reason for the offence? Facts: Dawson had been DRINKING at a fire station. In an emergency he drove the fire engine and, while moving it to let an ambulance pass, crashed. Other (sober) drivers were available. Held: Necessity FAILED. The emergency did not DOMINATE his mind or COMPEL him to drive. Others could have driven, so the threat was not the operative reason.

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CASE: R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273

Issue: Is NECESSITY a defence to MURDER? Facts: Shipwrecked sailors adrift for weeks killed and ate the dying cabin boy (Richard Parker) to survive. They did not wait for him to die naturally. They said this followed a 'custom of the sea'. When rescued, they admitted what they had done. Held: Guilty of MURDER, and necessity was rejected. No one may choose to take an innocent life to save their own. (The death sentence was commuted.)

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CASE: R v Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL)

Issue: Is DURESS (coercion) a defence to MURDER? Facts: Added: the accused took part in torturing and killing victims under threats of death from a violent co-accused. Held: NO. Duress is not a defence to murder, whether as principal or secondary party. The law expects a person to sacrifice their own life rather than kill an innocent person, as a matter of 'heroism'. It should not let people choose between innocent lives.

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CASE: Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147 (CA)

Issue: Could doctors lawfully separate conjoined twins when the operation would inevitably KILL one (Mary) to save the other (Jodie)? Facts: Without separation, both twins would die. Mary depended on Jodie's heart and lungs. The parents refused consent, and the hospital sought a declaration. Held: The operation was LAWFUL. The three judges gave different reasons, but two relied on NECESSITY. It was confined to very SPECIFIC circumstances (killing one to save the other where the one was doomed anyway). It is not a general necessity defence to murder.

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Automatism: what are the requirements?

Automatism applies where the accused lacked CONSCIOUS CONTROL over their acts because of an EXTERNAL factor (Ross v HMA 1991). The requirements are:

  1. TOTAL ALIENATION OF REASON. Partial loss, or a VOLITIONAL impairment ('I knew it was wrong but couldn't stop'), is insufficient (Cardle v Mulrainey 1992).
  2. Caused by an EXTERNAL factor, e.g. spiked drinks, or a reaction to insulin (MacLeod v Mathieson 1993). INTERNAL causes (epilepsy, tumours) fall outside automatism, and the internal/external line can be hard to draw (e.g. diabetes).
  3. NOT SELF-INDUCED: voluntary intoxication is no defence (Brennan v HMA 1977 JC 38; your notes say 1997; Finegan v Heywood 2000). Prescribed drugs taken as advised may be different.
  4. The accused was NOT BOUND TO FORESEE the loss of control (Ebsworth 1992; Finegan). The result is a complete ACQUITTAL.
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The mental disorder defence (s.51A Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995)

The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 ABOLISHED common law INSANITY and inserted statutory provisions into the 1995 Act, following the SLC Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 195, 2004): the mental disorder defence (s.51A) and UNFITNESS FOR TRIAL (s.53F). s.51A(1): 'A person is not criminally responsible for conduct constituting an offence, and is to be acquitted… if the person was at the time of the conduct UNABLE by reason of MENTAL DISORDER to APPRECIATE the NATURE OR WRONGFULNESS of the conduct.' • MENTAL DISORDER means mental illness, personality disorder or learning disability (s.307 1995 Act; s.328 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003). It EXCLUDES drug or alcohol dependency alone. • 'APPRECIATE' is wider than 'know'. It covers someone who knows the act is legally wrong but, because of illness, believes it is right. • s.51A(2): no defence if the disorder consists ONLY of a personality disorder marked by abnormally AGGRESSIVE or seriously IRRESPONSIBLE conduct (e.g. antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy). • s.51A(4): the ACCUSED must PROVE it on the BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES. • The result is ACQUITTAL, but the court has DISPOSAL powers such as hospital orders and supervision (s.57).

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CASE: Ross v HM Advocate 1991 JC 210

Issue: Can a person be convicted if, through no fault of their own, an EXTERNAL factor deprived them of the ability to form mens rea? Facts: Ross's beer was SPIKED (added: with LSD and temazepam) without his knowledge. Within an hour he ran amok with a knife, seriously injuring several people. Held: NO conviction. Where, through no fault of their own, a person suffers a TOTAL ALIENATION OF REASON from an EXTERNAL cause, they cannot form mens rea, so they are acquitted. This founded the modern AUTOMATISM defence. It is better understood as a supervening defence.

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CASE: Cardle v Mulrainey 1992 SLT 1152

Issue: Is a partial or VOLITIONAL impairment enough for automatism? Facts: The accused's drink was spiked (added: with amphetamine). He tried to break into cars and drove off, and he knew what he was doing was wrong but said he could not stop himself. The sheriff acquitted. Held: CROWN APPEAL ALLOWED. The defence requires TOTAL ALIENATION OF REASON. He RETAINED reasoning powers (he knew it was wrong), and a volitional failure is not enough.

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CASE: MacLeod v Mathieson 1993 SCCR 488 (Sh Ct)

Issue: Can HYPOGLYCAEMIA be an external factor for automatism? Facts: Added: a diabetic accused, driving while hypoglycaemic after taking insulin, lost conscious control. Held: The sheriff ACCEPTED that hypoglycaemia caused by INSULIN (an external substance) could ground automatism, even though such conditions had previously been treated as internal. This shows that the internal/external boundary is difficult.

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CASE: Finegan v Heywood 2000 JC 444

Issue: Can SLEEPWALKING brought on by drink ground automatism? Facts: After drinking heavily, the accused, while apparently SLEEPWALKING (parasomnia), took a friend's car keys and committed driving offences. Held: NO defence. The condition was SELF-INDUCED through VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION, and he knew alcohol could trigger it, so he was bound to FORESEE the risk. Automatism requires a cause that is not self-induced and not foreseeable.

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CASE: HM Advocate v Sharp 1927 JC 66

Issue: What did the old common law INSANITY test require? Facts (your notes): a man with a large family and financial difficulties decided to kill his children to ease the burden on his wife after he left her. Held: The common law test was a TOTAL ALIENATION OF REASON. Your notes suggest it could exist where he understood the nature of his acts but had lost the sense of their moral WRONGFULNESS. This is now replaced by s.51A. Check the details against the report.

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CASE: Mackay v HM Advocate [2017] HCJAC 44

Issue: How should juries be directed on the s.51A mental disorder defence? Facts: Mackay, a former soldier who had served in Afghanistan, was convicted of a threatening 999 call, possessing a machete (religiously aggravated) and possessing pyrotechnics. He argued that PTSD and delusional disorder meant he could not appreciate the WRONGFULNESS of his conduct. The experts disagreed. He said the sheriff narrowed the defence (treating 'nature AND wrongfulness' conjunctively) and should have used the SLC report's definitions. Held: APPEAL DISMISSED. s.51A is a modern, distinct STATUTORY test that supersedes common law insanity. Judges should use the STATUTORY WORDING without adding glosses, and the sheriff's directions were sou