Learn: PHIL 340 Minds and Machines Midterm Prep

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Last updated 2:47 AM on 10/5/26
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75 Terms

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Necessary Condition

A condition that must be present for an event or property to occur.

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Sufficient Condition

A condition guaranteeed to produce the event or property if met.

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Valid Argument

An argument where if all premises are true, the conclusion must be true.

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Sound Argument

A valid argument with entirely true premises.

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Difference in Degree vs. Kind

A quantitative difference versus a fundamental qualitative difference.

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Modus Ponens

If P then Q; P; therefore, Q.

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Modus Tollens

If P then Q; Not Q; therefore, Not P.

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Hypothetical Syllogism

If P then Q; If Q then R; therefore, if P then R.

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Disjunctive Syllogism

P or Q; Not P; therefore, Q.

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Challenging a Premise

Offering a targeted counterexample or counterargument to undermine a premise.

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Turing's Imitation Game

A test where an interrogator tries to distinguish a human from a machine via text.

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Turing's Reframing

Replacing the vague 'Can machines think?' with the precise imitation game.

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Theological Objection Reply

Turing argues God could give a soul to a machine if He chose.

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Heads in the Sand Objection Reply

Turing rejects the wishful thinking that machines won't surpass humans.

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Argument from Consciousness Reply

Turing argues we can only ever know other minds via behavior.

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Arguments from Various Disabilities Reply

Turing argues we shouldn't confuse current limitations with permanent incapacity.

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Lady Lovelace's Objection Reply

Turing notes machines can surprise us by deriving unforeseen consequences.

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Unforeseen Consequences

Machines producing novel outputs that their programmers did not explicitly anticipate.

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Weizenbaum's ELIZA

An early natural language processing program simulating a Rogerian psychotherapist.

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ELIZA's Transformation Rules

Mechanisms that parse user input into template-based redirection and echoing.

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Descartes's Cogito

The foundational certainty that 'I think, therefore I am'.

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Thinking vs. Extended Substance

Res cogitans (immaterial mind) versus res extensa (physical matter).

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Descartes's Pineal Gland

The designated physical site where mind-body interaction supposedly occurs.

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Descartes's Evil Demon

A skeptical hypothesis used to doubt all sensory perceptions.

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Doubt-Based Mind-Body Argument

Since I can doubt my body but not my mind, they must be distinct.

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Descartes's Divisibility Argument

The mind is indivisible while physical bodies are divisible, proving distinctness.

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Doubt Objection to Descartes

Differing dubitability about two names does not prove the referents differ.

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Princess Elisabeth's Interaction Objection

Immaterial minds lack contact and extension, making physical causation impossible.

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Elisabeth on Bodily Movement

Moving a body requires physical push, which an unextended mind cannot supply.

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Dualism

The philosophical view that mind and body are fundamentally distinct substances.

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Reductionist Physicalism

The view that all mental states are strictly identical to physical states.

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Multiple Realizability

The thesis that a single mental property can be realized by various physical structures.

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Phenomenal Consciousness

The subjective, qualitative feel of experience (what it is like).

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Qualia

The internal, subjective component of sense perceptions.

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Homunculus Problem

An explanatory regress caused by postulating a tiny inner observer.

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Nagel's Bat Argument

An argument that physicalism fails because it omits subjective character.

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Nagel's Argument Premises

Facts have a subjective character accessible only from a specific point of view.

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Akins's 3-D Movie Theater Thought Experiment

A scenario illustrating the limits of human sensory imagination.

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Akins's Challenge to Bat Sonar

Challenging the claim that humans cannot experience anything remotely like bat sonar.

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Qualitative Sensation vs. Representational Content

Distinguishing the felt sensation from the information carried by the sensory state.

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Akins on Empirical Inquiry

Empirical science can teach us how to conceptualize unfamiliar sensory experiences.

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Birch's Two AI Challenges

Methodological hurdles in detecting genuine sentience in artificial systems.

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Persisting Interlocutor Illusion

The false impression that an AI conversational partner possesses inner mental life.

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Perceptual Illusions in AI

Cases where AI processing mimics perception without qualitative awareness.

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Psychological Continuity Theory

Personal identity consists of overlapping chains of memory and psychological connectedness.

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Parfit's Teletransporter

A thought experiment questioning whether a reconstructed copy is the same person.

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Flicker Hypothesis

The idea that AI consciousness might emerge intermittently or in flashes.

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Shoggoth Hypothesis

The idea that aligned AI facades mask alien, unpredictable underlying cognitive structures.

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The Gaming Problem

AI optimizing for test metrics without possessing the underlying intended capability.

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Global Workspace Hypothesis

Consciousness arises from information sharing across a centralized neural network.

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Dennett's Physical Stance

Predicting system behavior based on physical constitution and laws of nature.

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Dennett's Design Stance

Predicting behavior based on the purpose or function a system was engineered for.

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Dennett's Intentional Stance

Predicting behavior by treating a system as a rational agent with beliefs and desires.

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Intentional System

Any entity whose behavior is reliably predicted via the intentional stance.

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Dennett on Predictions vs. Internal States

Useful mental-state predictions do not settle whether internal states actually exist.

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Wilson's 6 Claims of Embodied Cognition

A taxonomy distinguishing various ways cognition is tied to bodily interaction.

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Situated Cognition

Cognition heavily reliant on real-time feedback from the immediate environment.

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Offline Cognition

Thought decoupled from current environmental inputs, such as memory or planning.

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Wilson's Warning on Situated Cognition

Situated approaches cannot fully explain planning or thought about distant things.

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Epiphenomenalism

The view that mental states are caused by physical states but have no causal efficacy.

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Structuring an Argument from Text

Extracting explicit premises and a single conclusion from a descriptive paragraph.

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Basic Turing Machine Components

An infinite tape, a read-write head, a state register, and an action table.

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Phenomenal vs. Access Consciousness

Distinction between sensory feel and availability for verbal report and reasoning.

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Dualism and Mental Causation

The persistent difficulty of explaining how non-physical minds affect physical bodies.

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Reductionist Physicalism Goal

To map every high-level mental property directly onto a specific neural property.

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Multiple Realizability Challenge

Showing that brain-specific physicalism is too narrow because minds can have varied substrates.

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Lovelace's Original Claim

Babbage's engine only does whatever we explicitly know how to order it to perform.

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Turing on Theological Objections

Dismissing dogmatic restrictions on divine creative power regarding machines.

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Psychological Continuity Core

Identity is preserved through causal links of psychological states over time.

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Teletransporter Challenge

Differentiating between psychological continuity via replication versus bodily survival.

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ELIZA's Illusion of Understanding

Tricking users into assuming deep comprehension via clever string manipulation.

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Nagel's Focus on Subjective Character

Emphasizing that reductionist science systematically leaves out the organism's perspective.

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Cartesian Standard for Certainty

Rejecting any belief that is open to even the slightest possible doubt.

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Elisabeth's Mechanical Contact Requirement

Insisting that moving matter requires direct surface contact and spatial extension.

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Dennett's Instrumentalism

Treating mental states as useful predictive tools rather than literal internal items.