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Four questions for every immigration case
(1) Source: where the power comes from (statute or Constitution, and which power); (2) Scope: what the power permits; (3) Limits: what constitutional constraints apply; (4) Institution: who makes the rule (Congress), who enforces it (the executive), and what role the courts play.
Last-in-time rule (treaty vs. statute)
A treaty stands on the same footing as an act of Congress. A later federal statute controls over an earlier treaty as domestic law (the Scott Act overrode the U.S.-China treaties in Chae Chan Ping).
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889): source of the exclusion power
Congress may exclude noncitizens, including returning residents with valid certificates, as an inherent incident of sovereignty. Enumerated powers (foreign commerce, naturalization, war, treaties) are evidence; the real basis is structural inference from sovereignty, self-preservation, and security.
Chae Chan Ping: the return certificate
A return certificate is a revocable license, not a vested right, so revoking it triggered no due process, property, or contract protection.
Chae Chan Ping: role of the courts
The exercise of the exclusion power is a political question for Congress, and courts will not second-guess it. This is the origin of the plenary power doctrine.
Two reasons courts decline to review immigration decisions
(1) A statute limits or strips review; (2) the Court views the power as inherently political. These are different reasons and should be kept separate.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893): the deportation power
The power to deport is as absolute as the power to exclude; the federal power applies in the interior as at the border. Congress may condition or revoke residence and provide for removal without a judicial trial.
Fong Yue Ting: deportation is not punishment
Deportation is a civil method of enforcing the immigration laws, not punishment. No criminal trial or jury is required, the executive may decide it, and no punishment analysis applies.
Consequences of the civil label for deportation
No right to appointed counsel, no jury right, no criminal-form Miranda rights, and a different exclusionary rule. Because removal is civil, deportation and immigration detention also may not be used as punishment.
Fong Yue Ting dissents (Brewer, Field, Fuller)
Border/interior line: once lawfully admitted, a resident has full constitutional protection. Deportation is punitive banishment, so Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment protections should apply.
Trop v. Dulles (1958)
Taking away a native-born citizen's citizenship for wartime desertion is cruel and unusual punishment.
Exclusion vs. deportation
Exclusion keeps people out at the border; deportation expels people from the interior. Since 1996 both run through a single removal proceeding.
Unlawful entry as a crime
Unlawful entry is a separate federal misdemeanor (about six months maximum for a first offense). Deportation runs as a separate civil proceeding.
Four factors shaping constitutional protection for noncitizens
(1) Who acts (state/local or federal, and which branch); (2) where the person is (border, interior, or legal threshold); (3) status and ties (entry, lawful residence, unlawful presence, community ties); (4) what action (regulation, detention, punishment, exclusion, removal).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)
The Fourteenth Amendment protects "any person within its jurisdiction," including noncitizens. A facially neutral law administered unequally by national origin violates equal protection. Local action and economic regulation get less deference than federal immigration regulation.
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)
Read equal protection into the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, so it binds the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment binds only the states.
Wong Wing v. United States (1896)
Temporary detention to carry out exclusion or removal is civil and permissible without a trial. A fixed term of hard labor is infamous criminal punishment requiring full Fifth and Sixth Amendment process. Punishment cannot be made part of deportation proceedings.
Yamataya v. Fisher (1903)
A person who has entered the United States may not be removed arbitrarily; due process requires an opportunity to be heard. How much process is due depends on the nature of the case, the person's interests, and the charges. Counsel, translation, and a judicial trial were not required.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy (1950)
For a person at the threshold seeking initial admission, whatever procedure Congress authorizes is due process. Exclusion on undisclosed confidential information without a hearing was upheld.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei (1953): the entry fiction
A person on the threshold has not legally entered, even if physically in U.S. custody (Ellis Island), and receives no due process beyond what Congress provides. Legal classification controls over physical location.
Mezei: prior residence
A long absence (19 months) severed Mezei's claim to be treated as a returning resident despite 25 years of residence, so he was treated as a new entrant. Today INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(ii) treats an LPR absent too long as seeking admission.
Mezei: "free to depart"
Confinement on Ellis Island was attributed to exclusion plus other countries' refusals to take him, not treated as U.S. detention.
Mezei: Jackson dissent
Separates substance from procedure. There is no substantive right to enter, but potentially indefinite confinement deprives liberty and requires notice and a hearing. The liberty interest grows with the length of detention.
Bosniak: hard outside, soft inside
Citizenship is exclusionary at the border (sovereignty) and equality-based in the interior (universal rights). Equal protection depends on personhood, not citizenship.
INA and U.S. Code citations
Courts usually cite 8 U.S.C.; agencies cite the INA. INA § 101 = 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (definitions); § 202 = § 1152 (per-country caps); § 203 = § 1153 (preferences); § 208 = § 1158 (asylum); § 212 = § 1182 (inadmissibility); § 245 = § 1255 (adjustment).
DHS components
USCIS adjudicates benefits (petitions, adjustment, naturalization, affirmative humanitarian applications). CBP inspects at ports and polices the border. ICE handles interior enforcement, and its OPLA attorneys prosecute removal cases.
DOJ, State, HHS, and DOL roles
DOJ's EOIR houses the immigration judges and the BIA (not Article III courts); DOJ's OIL defends petitions for review. State Department consular officers decide visas abroad. HHS's ORR cares for unaccompanied children. DOL handles labor certification.
Regulations
Codified in 8 C.F.R. and generally binding, usually adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Challengeable as contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious.
Precedent decisions
Published BIA or Attorney General decisions bind immigration judges and DHS adjudicators; the AG may modify or overrule the BIA. Circuit precedent governs within the circuit. Supreme Court decisions bind everyone.
Loper Bright (2024)
Overruled Chevron. Courts no longer defer to an agency's reading of an ambiguous statute; they interpret it independently. Agency views may inform but do not bind.
Guidance and executive orders
Memos and policy manuals change with administrations and are harder to challenge than regulations. Executive orders generally are not final agency action, but agency decisions implementing them may be.
Nonimmigrant vs. immigrant
A nonimmigrant must fit an enumerated temporary class in INA § 101(a)(15) for a specific purpose and period. "Immigrant" is the residual definition (everyone who is not a nonimmigrant), seeking permanent stay as an LPR on a statutory basis.
Four pathways to permanent residence
Family (immediate relatives, § 201(b); preferences, § 203(a)); employment (five preferences, § 203(b)); diversity (§ 203(c)); humanitarian (refugees and asylees, §§ 207 to 209).
Immediate relatives, INA § 201(b)
U.S. citizen petitioner only: spouse, child under 21, or parent (the citizen must be at least 21 to petition for a parent). No numerical cap, so no line for a visa number.
Family preference categories, INA § 203(a)
F1: unmarried son or daughter 21+ of a USC. F2A: spouse or child under 21 of an LPR. F2B: unmarried son or daughter 21+ of an LPR. F3: married son or daughter of a USC. F4: brother or sister of a USC who is 21+.
Relationships with no family category
LPRs have no parent or sibling category and must naturalize first. Grandparents, grandchildren, and in-laws have no category at all.
Derivatives, INA § 203(d)
A preference principal's spouse and children share the principal's category, status, and order. Immediate relatives have no derivatives, so each person needs a separate qualifying petition.
Stepchildren
A spouse's child is the petitioner's stepchild and counts as a "child," so the stepchild can be the beneficiary of the petitioner's own petition.
Per-country cap, INA § 202
Immigrant visas to natives of any single country under the family and employment preferences may not exceed 7 percent of those visas in a fiscal year. It is a ceiling, not an entitlement, and does not apply to immediate relatives.
Priority date
The filing date of the relevant petition (the I-130 in family cases). It stays the same throughout the process and is used for both Visa Bulletin charts.
Visa Bulletin: dates for filing vs. final action dates
Dates for filing: when the next application stage may begin. Final action dates: when the visa may issue or adjustment may be approved. A priority date is current when it is earlier than the listed cutoff. "C" means current; "U" means unavailable.
Chargeability
The country the visa counts against, usually the country of birth. It determines which Visa Bulletin column applies.
Seven-step immigrant visa analysis
(1) Category; (2) petition (valid petitioner or self-petition); (3) priority date; (4) chargeability; (5) visa number availability; (6) admissibility; (7) next step: consular processing or adjustment of status.
Employment-based preferences, INA § 203(b)
EB-1: extraordinary ability, outstanding professor or researcher, multinational manager. EB-2: advanced degree or exceptional ability. EB-3: professionals, skilled workers, other workers. EB-4: special immigrants (religious workers, SIVs, SIJ). EB-5: investment creating at least ten jobs.
Who petitions in each EB category
EB-1A self-petitions; EB-1B and EB-1C need an employer. EB-2 usually needs an employer, but a national interest waiver (NIW) may self-petition. EB-3 needs an employer and usually labor certification. EB-5 investors self-petition. EB-1A needs no PERM; EB-2 and EB-3 usually require it; EB-4 and EB-5 mostly do not go through PERM.
Marriage-based petitions: four questions
(1) Is there a legally valid marriage? (2) Does federal law nevertheless decline to recognize it? (3) Was it bona fide when entered? (4) Does the relationship still exist when the benefit is conferred?
Place-of-celebration rule
The validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where it was celebrated, based on comity.
Valid marriages federal law will not recognize
Polygamous marriages (public policy); ceremonies where the parties were not physically present together, unless consummated (INA § 101(a)(35)); sham marriages; and marriages barred by other federal law (DOMA until Windsor).
Sham marriage, INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(III)
The marriage must not have been entered into "for the purpose of procuring admission as an immigrant."
Bark v. INS (9th Cir. 1975)
The sham marriage test is whether the couple intended to establish a life together at the time of marriage. Mixed motive is permitted. Later separation is evidence of intent but is not the test.
Bona fide marriage: burden and evidence
The petitioner bears the burden. No single item is required beyond a valid marriage; evidence is cumulative: shared residence, commingled finances, joint lease or property, children, third-party affidavits, photos, travel, and duration of the marriage.
The marriage must exist when the benefit is conferred
Separation does not end eligibility but may prompt closer review. Divorce before residence is granted ordinarily ends the spousal basis (subject to the § 216 waivers). Divorce after the benefit is received does not affect it.
Conditional residence, INA § 216
A marriage-based principal (USC's spouse or F2A spouse) whose marriage is under two years old when residence is acquired gets conditional LPR status for two years. The two years run from acquiring residence, not from the marriage.
Conditional residence: who is and is not covered
A spouse who is a derivative on another petition (employment, F4) is not conditional on that basis. Stepchildren who immigrate through a conditional marriage are conditional; a legally adopted child is not.
Removing conditions, Form I-751
Filed in the 90 days before the second anniversary of acquiring residence, either jointly by both spouses or by the conditional resident alone with a waiver.
§ 216(c)(4)(A) waiver: extreme hardship
Removal would result in extreme hardship. The relevant circumstances must arise during the conditional-residence period (8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(1)).
§ 216(c)(4)(B) waiver: good faith plus termination
The marriage was entered in good faith, was terminated (other than by death), and the conditional resident is not at fault for failing to meet the requirements. No need to show the petitioning spouse was at fault in the divorce. The marriage must actually be terminated.
§ 216(c)(4) waiver: battery or extreme cruelty
A good-faith marriage, and the conditional resident or their child was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the petitioning spouse, whether or not the marriage ended. Extreme cruelty includes threats and psychological abuse; physical violence is not required (8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i)).
Intended-spouse abuse waiver
A VAWA route where a marriage defect (for example, the abuser's bigamy) prevents the ordinary qualifying relationship, combined with battery or extreme cruelty.
EB-1A extraordinary ability standard
INA § 203(b)(1)(A): sustained national or international acclaim, recognized through extensive documentation. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h): one of the small percentage at the very top of the field. Initial evidence: one major international award or at least 3 of 10 regulatory criteria.
Visinscaia v. Beers (D.D.C. 2013)
EB-1A is a two-step test: (1) threshold evidence (major award or 3 of 10 criteria); (2) merits: the whole record shows sustained acclaim at the very top of the field. Meeting three criteria does not compel approval; the merits step is discretionary and reviewed deferentially under the APA.
Labor certification ground, INA § 212(a)(5)(A)
A noncitizen seeking to enter to perform skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible unless DOL certifies (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers able, willing, qualified, and available at the time and place, and (2) the employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.
EB-2 and EB-3: eligibility vs. admissibility
Eligibility asks whether the worker fits the § 203(b) category. Admissibility asks whether labor certification overcomes the § 212(a)(5) labor ground.
PERM steps
(1) Real permanent full-time job with actual minimum requirements; (2) DOL prevailing-wage determination; (3) recruit to test the labor market; (4) ETA 9089 filed with DOL; (5) I-140 petition with USCIS; (6) visa number; (7) adjustment or consular processing.
PERM recruitment rules
Requirements must be those normally required for the occupation, not tailored to the beneficiary, and may not exceed the O*NET SVP level unless business necessity is shown. U.S. applicants may be rejected only for lawful, job-related reasons, considering whether reasonable on-the-job training would qualify them.
Business necessity, 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)
Requirements beyond the normal level must (1) bear a reasonable relationship to the occupation in the context of the employer's business and (2) be essential to reasonable job performance (usually the harder prong).
Matter of Digital Technology Solutions, LLC (BALCA 2019)
Conclusory assertions that requirements are needed fail business necessity. Specific links between each requirement and job performance (here, an expert's explanation) satisfy it.
PERM: who decides what
Employer: presents a real job and keeps a recruitment record. DOL: prevailing wage and labor-market findings. USCIS: EB classification, beneficiary qualifications, and ability to pay. State Department or USCIS: the final visa or adjustment.
Nonimmigrant categories, INA § 101(a)(15)
Statutory exceptions to the presumption that every noncitizen is an intending immigrant. The letter names (B, F, H, J, L, O) refer to the subparagraph where each category lives.
B visitor, INA § 101(a)(15)(B)
A noncitizen with a foreign residence they have no intention of abandoning, visiting temporarily for business (B-1) or pleasure (B-2). Excludes study and skilled or unskilled labor.
F-1 student, INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i)
A bona fide student with a foreign residence they have no intention of abandoning, entering temporarily and solely to pursue a full course of study at an established academic institution or accredited language program.
Nonimmigrant category framework
For each category ask: (1) activity and purpose; (2) process and agency; (3) labor-market protection and cap; (4) nonimmigrant intent, dependents, path to LPR, and enforcement.
Classification, visa, and status steps
(1) Classify; (2) supporting document (I-129, I-20, DS-2019); (3) State Department visa; (4) travel to a port; (5) CBP inspection; (6) I-94 records class and period of stay; (7) maintain, extend, change, or depart.
Visa validity vs. lawful status
The visa is a State Department entry document; its expiration alone does not end an admitted stay. Status governs the person after admission (shown on the I-94) and can be violated while the visa is valid. The authorized stay tracks the classification, not the visa.
Consular officer vs. CBP
The consular officer decides classification, inadmissibility, and intent under INA § 214(b). CBP separately decides admission and the authorized period of stay at the border.
Visa Waiver Program (ESTA)
A travel authorization, not a visa and not an admission, for stays of up to 90 days with limited review rights. Overstaying generally forfeits future use of the program.
INA § 214(b) presumption
Every applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant.
Matter of Hosseinpour (BIA 1975): dual intent doctrine
A desire to remain permanently in accordance with law, should the opportunity arise, is consistent with nonimmigrant intent, so long as present intent includes complying with status and departing if the temporary stay ends.
USCIS vs. State Department on dual intent
USCIS applies the dual intent doctrine by policy (it will not deny a student extension merely for marriage or employer sponsorship). The State Department is not bound, so travel abroad with a pending immigrant petition risks a visa refusal.
Statutory dual intent, INA § 214(h)
For H-1B and L, being the beneficiary of a preference petition or otherwise seeking permanent residence is not evidence of intent to abandon a foreign residence. Strength: H-1B and L (statute, strongest); O-1 (regulations, intermediate); B, F, J (USCIS policy only, weakest).
Dual intent vs. adjustment
Dual intent answers whether a person can maintain status. Whether the person may adjust inside the United States is a separate question, complicated by the 2026 USCIS policy favoring consular processing.
B-1 business visitor rules
Permitted: meetings, conferences, negotiating contracts, consulting, commercial litigation, installing equipment under a sales contract. No local employment or labor for hire (22 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)). Paid by a foreign source; only reimbursement of expenses from U.S. sources.
Matter of Hira (BIA 1966)
B-1 status was allowed for labor (measuring for custom suits) that was a necessary incident to commercial activity based abroad.
International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese (N.D. Cal. 1985)
B-1 cannot be used for foreign workers performing construction. Congress protects U.S. skilled and unskilled labor through the H-2 process.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(b)(5)
B-1 entry is permitted to supervise or train workers in building or construction, but not to perform the building or construction work itself.
Specialty occupation, INA § 214(i)(1)
An occupation requiring (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (B) a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry.
H-1B: two questions
(1) Is the position a specialty occupation? (2) Does this worker meet the position's requirements (degree or equivalent, licensure if required)?
H-1B institutional stages
The employer files the LCA and petition. DOL reviews the LCA attestations only for completeness and obvious errors. USCIS decides specialty occupation and worker qualifications. State decides the visa, and CBP admits and issues the I-94.
Labor condition application (LCA)
An attestation, not a shortage finding: the required wage and working conditions, notice to employees or their bargaining representative, and no strike or lockout. No general recruitment requirement, except added duties for H-1B dependent employers.
H-1B cap, duration, and AC21
Cap of 65,000 plus 20,000 for U.S. advanced degrees; exemptions for higher education and nonprofit or government research employers. Up to 3 years, extendable to 6. AC21 allows extensions beyond 6 years for backlogged green-card applicants and job portability. H-4 dependents.
H-2A, INA §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 218
Temporary or seasonal agricultural labor. Generally uncapped, with no pathway to citizenship.
H-2A certification, INA § 218(a)(1)
DOL must actually find (1) insufficient U.S. workers able, willing, qualified, and available at the time and place, and (2) no adverse effect on wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Findings, not attestations.
H-2A required terms, 8 C.F.R. § 655.122
Required wage; the three-fourths guarantee; free compliant housing when required; transportation; employer-provided tools; no recruitment fees; written terms and records; parallel terms for corresponding U.S. workers.
H-2A enforcement
Only DOL may enforce the H-2A statute and regulations; there is no private right of action. Workers instead sue under contract (the job order), the FLSA, the TVPRA (forced labor, 18 U.S.C. § 1595), and state law.
Gomez-Echeverria v. Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC (6th Cir. 2026)
TVPRA, FLSA, and state-law awards for H-2A workers were affirmed. Passport seizure supports a forced-labor claim because a worker without a passport cannot leave.
H-2B
Temporary nonagricultural service or labor. Subject to a statutory cap, and the employer must prove a temporary need.
H-2B temporary need
Turns on the employer's need, not the occupation or how long a worker stays. Four types: one-time occurrence, seasonal, peakload, and intermittent. A year-round labor shortage is a permanent need.
L-1 intracompany transferee
Transfer to a U.S. branch, subsidiary, or affiliate as a manager or executive (L-1A) or with specialized knowledge (L-1B). Requires 1 year of continuous employment abroad within the prior 3 years. Up to 3 years initially, extendable to 7 (L-1A) or 5 (L-1B). Dual intent under § 214(h); L-2 spouses get work authorization.
Fogo de Chao v. DHS (D.C. Cir.)
Specialized knowledge acquired through cultural background and life experience is not automatically disqualifying for L-1B.
"Unauthorized migrant"
Not an INA term or status. Covers entry without inspection, overstays and status violations, temporary protection without status (TPS, DACA), and pending applications such as asylum. Authorized stay and lawful status are not always the same.