PHILOS 555 Midterm

0.0(0)
Studied by 0 people
call kaiCall Kai
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
GameKnowt Play
Card Sorting

1/35

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

36 Terms

1
New cards

The original position

A hypothetical choice situation in which free and equal ppl choose principles of justice to govern society under fair conditions. The parties represent citizens are rational and interested in securing the conditions necessary to pursue their lives, must choose without knowing their own social positions, talents, or conceptions of the good.

2
New cards

The veil of ignorance

A restriction on info in the original position that prevents parties from knowing their class, race, gender, natural talents, social status, or particular conception of the good. It prevents them from tailoring principles to favor themselves and encourages principles that protect citizens regardless of their eventual position in society.

3
New cards

Reflective equilibrium

A method of moral justification in which we adjust our considered judgements about particular cases and our general principles until they fit together coherently. We may revise either principles or our initial judgements in response to conflicts, rather than assuming either is automatically correct.

4
New cards

Perfect procedural justice

A type of justice in which there is an independent criterion for the correct outcome and a procedure that guarantees that outcome. Ex: dividing a cake equally when the person who cuts it receives the last piece, giving that person an incentive to cut equally.

5
New cards

Imperfect procedural justice

A type of justice in which there is an independent criterion for the correct outcome, but no procedure guarantees it. Example: a criminal trial aims to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, but even a fair trial can produce an incorrect verdict.

6
New cards

Pure procedural justice

A type of justice in which there is no independent criterion for the correct outcome apart from the outcome produced by a fair procedure. Example: a fair lottery for allocating a scarce prize, assuming everyone has an equal claim to participate.

7
New cards

Conception of the good

An individual's ideas about what makes life valuable, including personal goals, commitments, relationships, and religious or philosophical beliefs. Rawls's principles must be acceptable to citizens with different conceptions of the good.

8
New cards

The basic structure of society

The major social institutions that distribute fundamental rights, duties, and life prospects, including the constitution, legal system, economy, property arrangements, and family. Rawls focuses on this structure because its effects are pervasive and shape people's opportunities from the beginning of life.

9
New cards

Deontological theory

A moral theory that does not define the right entirely as maximizing some independently specified good. Rawls's theory is deontological because principles of justice constrain how social benefits may be distributed, rather than allowing aggregate welfare to justify every distribution.

10
New cards

Teleological theory

A moral theory that defines the right in terms of maximizing the good, with the good specified independently of the right. Classical utilitarianism is Rawls's central example: it judges institutions by whether they maximize aggregate utility.

11
New cards

Hypothetical contract theory

A theory that justifies principles by asking what people would agree to under a specified hypothetical choice situation, rather than requiring an actual historical agreement. Rawls uses the original position to model fair agreement among free and equal citizens.

12
New cards

Actual contract theory

A theory that appeals to an agreement people actually made or would make in a real-world contractual situation. Unlike Rawls's hypothetical agreement, an actual contract depends on real parties and circumstances, which may involve unequal bargaining power.

13
New cards

Ideal theory

The part of a theory of justice that identifies principles for a well-ordered society under favorable conditions and assumes general compliance with those principles. Rawls uses ideal theory to establish what a just society should look like before considering how to address noncompliance and injustice.

14
New cards

Strict compliance

The assumption in ideal theory that everyone complies with the principles of justice and that institutions are arranged accordingly. It simplifies the task of identifying a just social order, although real societies frequently fail to meet this assumption.

15
New cards

Fair equality of opportunity (FEO)

Rawls's requirement that people with similar talent and willingness to use it should have roughly equal prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin. It goes beyond formally opening careers to everyone by requiring institutions to counteract the effects of socioeconomic background.

16
New cards

Primary goods

Things citizens generally need to pursue their different conceptions of the good, including basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and occupational choice, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. Rawls uses these goods to assess people's social positions without requiring agreement about what makes an individual life valuable.

17
New cards

Libertarianism

A political philosophy that gives strong priority to individual liberty and property rights, especially rights against coercive interference. Nozick argues that individuals have rights that restrict what the state may do to them, even to achieve desirable social outcomes.

18
New cards

Anarchy

A condition without a centralized state. Nozick begins by asking whether individuals could protect their rights through voluntary associations and protective agencies and whether a minimal state could emerge without violating anyone's rights.

19
New cards

The minimal state

A state limited to protecting people against force, theft, fraud, and breaches of contract. Nozick considers this state morally permissible but rejects a more extensive state that coerces people to redistribute holdings or impose a preferred pattern of distribution.

20
New cards

Entitlement theory of justice

Nozick's theory that holdings are just if they arise through just acquisition, just transfer, or rectification of past injustice. Whether a distribution is just depends on the history of how holdings came about, not on whether the resulting distribution fits a preferred pattern.

21
New cards

Patterned theories of justice

Theories that judge distributions according to whether they fit a particular pattern, such as equality, need, merit, or maximizing welfare. Nozick objects that maintaining any such pattern requires repeated interference with people's voluntary choices.

22
New cards

Historical theories of justice

Theories that judge holdings by the process through which they arose. Nozick's entitlement theory is historical because a distribution is just when each person's holdings result from just acquisition, just transfer, or appropriate rectification, regardless of the resulting pattern.

23
New cards

The Lockean proviso

Locke's restriction on appropriation: acquiring previously unowned resources must leave “enough and as good” for others, or otherwise satisfy the relevant proviso. Nozick develops a version that constrains acquisition when appropriation worsens others' positions, raising difficult questions about property rights and the effects of scarcity.

24
New cards

Negative rights

Rights that require others not to interfere with a person's protected actions or holdings. For Nozick, rights against force, theft, and fraud limit the state's authority to take people's legitimately acquired resources for others' benefit.

25
New cards

Rectification

The principle that injustices in past acquisition or transfer create obligations to correct their effects. Nozick recognizes rectification as part of entitlement theory, although determining what correction is owed when historical facts and consequences are uncertain is difficult.

26
New cards

How does Rawls define the circumstances and the concept of justice? Why does this matter?   What objections might be brought to this?

Rawls describes the circumstances of justice as conditions under which cooperation is both possible and necessary: people have roughly similar needs and are vulnerable to one another, but resources are moderately scarce and individuals have conflicting interests. His concept of justice concerns principles for assigning basic rights and duties and determining the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Justice is particularly important because people must cooperate while disagreeing about their goals and competing for limited resources. One objection is that Rawls's account may not adequately capture extreme scarcity, unequal power, or relationships involving dependency, such as those within families, where people do not always resemble independent and roughly equal cooperators.

27
New cards

Explain the role of the original position and reflective equilibrium in Rawls's argument. Why would contractors choose his principles? How is this supposed to justify the principles? How might you criticize this?

The original position is a hypothetical choice situation in which representatives of free and equal citizens choose principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance, without knowing their social positions, talents, or conceptions of the good. Rawls argues that rational parties who must protect their interests without knowing where they will end up would choose equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle rather than risk being disadvantaged under an unjust arrangement. The original position is supposed to justify the principles by showing that they emerge from a fair procedure of choice, while reflective equilibrium tests and revises these principles against our considered moral judgments. A criticism is that the result may depend on how Rawls designs the original position: if the information restrictions or assumptions already favor his principles, the argument may not independently establish their correctness.

28
New cards

Why does Rawls reject utilitarianism?

Rawls rejects utilitarianism because maximizing total or average social welfare can permit serious sacrifices of individual rights and opportunities when those sacrifices benefit others. Utilitarianism aggregates welfare across people, potentially treating a loss to one person as justified by sufficiently large gains to many others. Rawls argues that people are distinct individuals, so society should not treat the sacrifice of one person's basic liberties as equivalent to an ordinary cost that can be offset by other people's benefits. His principles instead protect equal basic liberties and require inequalities to benefit the least advantaged.

Example: Imagine a society could increase total happiness by restricting a minority's religious freedom because the majority dislikes that religion. A straightforward utilitarian calculation might permit the restriction if aggregate welfare rose sufficiently. Rawls's first principle rules out this kind of sacrifice of equal basic liberties.

Key distinction: Rawls does not reject all concern for welfare or economic improvement. He rejects making the maximization of aggregate welfare the ultimate standard of justice.

29
New cards

To what does Rawls's theory of justice apply? What is its scope? What is excluded? Is this problematic?

Rawls's primary subject is the basic structure of society: the major institutions that distribute rights, duties, opportunities, and life prospects, including the constitution, economy, property system, and family. These institutions profoundly influence individuals' lives and opportunities, so Rawls argues that justice must regulate their design. His theory is not primarily a complete account of individual morality or the justice of every personal interaction, and his original framework treats the family as part of the basic structure but does not fully develop the implications of gendered family relations. This creates a problem because inequalities within supposedly private institutions can shape public opportunities and may undermine the principles that govern society as a whole.

Okin argues that Rawls cannot consistently defend fair equality of opportunity while ignoring inequalities within families. A child whose family provides more time, support, education, and connections may have substantially better prospects than another child. Similarly, unequal divisions of domestic labor can affect adults' careers and economic independence.

The broader lesson is that the boundary between private life and public justice cannot simply be assumed; it must itself be examined.

30
New cards

How does Okin think justice applies to the family? What problem does she raise with the public/private distinction, historically and in Rawls? Why does she think marriage creates vulnerability?

Okin argues that the family is a fundamental social institution that must be subject to principles of justice because it shapes people's opportunities, well-being, and social development. Historically, the public/private distinction has treated family life as outside political scrutiny, allowing unequal gender roles to persist even while public institutions claim to treat men and women equally. Okin criticizes Rawls for not sufficiently incorporating gender justice within the family into his account of the basic structure. Marriage creates vulnerability when women perform a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic work and caregiving, potentially sacrificing earnings, career advancement, and financial independence while becoming dependent on their partners.

Okin's argument is structural, not a claim that every marriage is exploitative.

  1. Women disproportionately perform unpaid care and domestic work.

  2. This work can reduce their paid employment, earnings, seniority, and retirement savings.

  3. The resulting economic dependence weakens their bargaining position within marriage.

  4. If the marriage ends, they may face lower earning capacity and fewer resources than their partners.


The family can therefore generate gendered inequalities that persist outside the home.

31
New cards

How do Brighouse and Swift think the family disrupts fair equality of opportunity? Why isn't redistributing money enough to preserve FEO?

Brighouse and Swift argue that families disrupt fair equality of opportunity because parents inevitably influence their children's prospects through attention, encouragement, education, cultural resources, and personal connections. Redistributing money alone cannot eliminate these advantages because parental involvement and relationships themselves shape children's skills, confidence, preferences, and opportunities. Yet abolishing the private family would sacrifice important goods associated with intimate relationships and parental love. They therefore explore how institutions might limit the effects of family-based inequalities while preserving the valuable features of family life.

32
New cards

What is Nozick's entitlement theory, and why is it historical rather than patterned? What does he think about redistributive taxation?

Nozick's entitlement theory holds that a person's holdings are just if they arise through just acquisition, just transfer, or rectification of past injustice. It is historical rather than patterned because justice depends on how holdings were acquired and transferred, not on whether the resulting distribution matches a desired pattern such as equality or need. Voluntary exchanges can disrupt any existing distributional pattern, so maintaining that pattern would require repeated interference with people's choices. Nozick therefore rejects redistributive taxation designed to impose a preferred pattern, arguing that it infringes individuals' rights to their legitimately acquired holdings.

33
New cards

What account of property rights does Nozick describe? What challenges do labor-mixing, rectification, and the Lockean proviso raise?

Nozick treats property rights as arising from just acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification of past injustice, rather than from a requirement to maintain a particular distribution. However, explaining how people can justly acquire previously unowned resources raises difficulties: Locke's labor-mixing account does not clearly explain why adding one's labor should generate ownership of an entire resource. The Lockean proviso further limits acquisition when taking resources worsens others' positions, creating questions about scarcity and the effects of appropriation. Finally, rectification is difficult because historical injustices, missing evidence, and the long-term effects of past wrongs make it hard to determine what a just correction would require.

34
New cards

How does Waldron apply Nozick's theory? What does he argue about rectification in cases of territorial sovereignty? How does Nine respond?

Waldron applies the problem of rectification to historical territorial injustice, arguing that an earlier injustice does not necessarily establish an indefinitely enduring claim to restore the original distribution of land. In some cases, circumstances change so substantially that the original claim is superseded by new needs, patterns of dependence, and legitimate interests that have developed over time. His watering-hole examples illustrate how a claim grounded in an earlier allocation may be affected when circumstances and people's needs change. Nine responds that Waldron fails to distinguish the right to territorial sovereignty from the individual right to reside in a territory: even if individuals have legitimate interests in continuing to live somewhere, those interests do not necessarily extinguish an Indigenous people's claim to govern its territory.

35
New cards

What concepts does Tsosie's article add to the Nine-Waldron debate? What complications does she discuss regarding cultural rights and group sovereignty? What does Waldron leave out?

Tsosie adds an account of Indigenous rights grounded in sacred obligations, cultural survival, collective identity, and relationships with ancestral lands, rather than treating land only as an object of ownership or a resource for meeting material needs. Indigenous claims may involve obligations to protect places, practices, and relationships for present and future generations, making them difficult to reduce to individual property or residence rights. Her approach complicates the debate because territorial claims can involve collective self-determination and responsibilities that do not fit neatly into standard individual-rights frameworks. Waldron's discussion can therefore leave out the cultural, spiritual, and intergenerational dimensions of Indigenous territorial claims when it focuses primarily on changing circumstances and competing material needs.

36
New cards

What is the UBI? What arguments does van Parijs give in favor of it? What objections could be raised?

A universal basic income is a regular cash payment provided to individuals regardless of their income, employment status, or willingness to work. Van Parijs argues that a basic income can promote real freedom by giving people the material resources to pursue their conception of the good, refuse undesirable employment, and make meaningful choices about their lives. Because formal liberties are insufficient when people lack the resources to exercise them, an unconditional income can expand the range of opportunities actually available to individuals. Objections include the cost of financing a sufficiently generous payment, concerns about work incentives and fairness to people who work, and the possibility that a basic income alone would not correct inequalities arising from education, wealth, family background, or social power.

A further issue is how the UBI is financed. Van Parijs's argument includes the idea that income can be distributed from resources and economic opportunities that people do not individually create, including the value of scarce assets. A defensible UBI therefore requires attention to the institutional arrangements that generate and distribute income, not just the size of the payment.