CH7: Movement of Labour and Migration

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17 Terms

1
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Why is labour mobility a fundamental EU freedom, and why is its use limited?

• Art. 45 TFEU grants EU workers access to jobs, residence and equal treatment in pay and employment conditions; Arts 45–48 underpin coordination.

• Economic rationale (Spaak Report): workers moving to higher-productivity locations improve EU-wide labour allocation.

• Legal freedom does not imply that people will move: family, language, home ownership, attachment to place and partners’ careers matter.

• Migration decisions compare expected disposable real earnings and non-monetary welfare, not gross wages alone.

• Low migration can therefore reflect rational choices as well as institutional obstacles.

2
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How extensive is intra-EU labour mobility, and what does the comparison with the US reveal?

• About 3–4% of working-age EU citizens live/work in another Member State; roughly 3% of EU employment is held by nationals of other Member States (figures in lecture).

• Around 30% of Americans live outside their state of birth; not strictly comparable because this is a lifetime stock measure.

• EU mobility tends East→West and South→North, but includes circular, return and between-rich-country migration.

• Luxembourg is atypical due to high cross-border employment and commuters who reside in neighbouring countries.

• Language, institutions and geography help explain stronger US mobility; the headline figures require denominator caution.

3
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Why do nominal wages and GDP per capita give an incomplete picture of migration incentives?

• Nominal pay ignores destination prices; real wages and PPP/PPS adjust for purchasing-power differences.

• GDP per capita is not an individual wage or living standard; multinationals and commuters inflate figures for Luxembourg/Ireland.

• Actual individual consumption per capita can better represent material living standards than GDP alone.

• High pay abroad can be offset by housing, childcare, taxes, commuting and other living costs.

• Productivity (capital, technology, skills, firm organisation) and institutions (bargaining, wage floors) explain lasting wage differences.

4
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What are the main types, directions and determinants of migration in Europe?

• Migration can be rural–urban, backward→advanced region, poorer→richer country, or between similarly prosperous places; it can be temporary, circular or permanent.

• Push forces: weak employment prospects, low income, insecurity, regional decline; pull forces: jobs, expected earnings, education and networks.

• Family, lifestyle and other non-economic motivations also have economic consequences.

• Networks, language, history, sectoral demand and business cycles determine actual flows.

• Catch-up at home can encourage return migration even before home incomes equal rich-country incomes.

5
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Why do substantial wage gaps coexist with low labour mobility?

• Direct relocation costs: travel, deposits, accommodation, language learning and job search.

• Indirect/social costs: family separation, partner employment, community ties, culture, housing and uncertainty.

• Administrative barriers: professional recognition, taxation, healthcare, benefits and pension portability.

• Eurobarometer examples: “home is here” 39%; language difficulty 52% among practical obstacles (2009 survey).

• Formal legal equality cannot itself eliminate these costs; mobility rates alone cannot reveal which barrier dominates.

6
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How does the immigration-surplus diagram show winners and losers?

• With homogeneous workers, competitive markets and fixed capital, labour demand is downward-sloping MPL.

• Immigration shifts vertical supply from S at L to Sᴹ at Lᴹ; the wage falls from W⁰ to Wᴹ.

• Competing native workers lose the rectangle (W⁰−Wᴹ)×L; native employers/capital owners gain this rectangle plus a triangle.

• The rectangle cancels within native welfare: net immigration surplus IS = ½(W⁰−Wᴹ)(Lᴹ−L). Migrants receive wages Wᴹ(Lᴹ−L).

• The triangle is theoretical, not an EU estimate; complementarity, capital adjustment and public-finance effects can change distribution.

7
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How does the Harris–Todaro model explain migration and unemployment?

• Workers compare expected destination earnings E(W)=Pₑ×Wᵤ with home/rural earnings Wᵣ rather than wages alone.

• Migration occurs if PₑWᵤ>Wᵣ and stops when PₑWᵤ=Wᵣ (basic model).

• Urban unemployment can persist in equilibrium: with Wᵤ=€2,000 and Wᵣ=€1,200, Pₑ=0.6 suffices.

• As people arrive, the urban job probability can fall; extra urban jobs may attract more migrants.

• For EU applications, incorporate net earnings, housing costs, information, risk aversion and household circumstances.

8
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What does the Polish two-region welfare graph show about labour reallocation?

• Advanced/urban region has higher MPL and initial wage Wᵁ; backward/rural region has lower MPL and wage Wᴿ.

• Workers migrate toward the advanced region: its MPL/wage fall while the sending region’s MPL/wage rise, approaching W⁰.

• In the slide, advanced region gains triangle KED; migrants gain rectangle EDCJ relative to old rural wage.

• Sending region loses FGJ (=EJC); combined net welfare gain = KED + EDCJ − EJC (labelled EKDC).

• This is a neoclassical MPL reallocation diagram applied to Poland, NOT the Harris–Todaro expected-wage equilibrium graph.

9
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How does neoclassical theory predict wage equalisation through migration?

• Workers move from low-wage A to high-wage B where their marginal product is greater.

• Emigration reduces labour in A and raises its MPL/wage; immigration increases labour in B and lowers its MPL/wage.

• In the frictionless diagram, migration continues to a shared wage W⁰ at the intersection of both MPL schedules.

• Remaining workers in A benefit, A’s employers may lose; B’s competing workers lose, B’s employers gain; total production increases.

• Skill differences, technology, capital movements and institutional frictions mean full wage convergence is only a benchmark.

10
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How do migration costs and minimum wages affect wage convergence?

• Moving has monetary and non-monetary cost m: migration stops when the remaining expected wage advantage is no greater than m.

• Thus a positive wage gap persists even with no formal border restriction; who pays the cost affects incidence.

• A binding destination minimum wage holds wages above market clearing and can create unemployment/limited formal vacancies.

• A higher legal wage boosts earnings conditional on employment but can lower migrants’ job probability (Harris–Todaro).

• In the source country, higher minimum pay may lower the push to migrate but lost employment can increase it; effects are conditional on market structure and enforcement.

11
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What do Pelkmans’ diagrams and political-economy analysis add to wage-convergence theory?

• Pelkmans’ Figure 10.1 aggregates A’s excess labour demand with B’s excess supply; movers GH=DE equalise wages at Pᴵᴹ.

• Total efficiency gains are the designated triangular areas CDE+GHF; gains are not shared equally.

• High-wage-country workers and low-wage-country employers may lose; migrant/remaining low-wage workers and high-wage employers gain.

• A destination minimum wage Pmin cuts potential movement from GH to small QR — his “fortress” effect.

• He stresses that these stylised, static models work best for comparable unskilled labour, not all jobs or long-run adjustments.

12
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How can trade, capital flows and regional policy substitute for—or complement—labour mobility?

• Capital/FDI flowing to poorer regions may create employment locally instead of requiring workers to relocate.

• Trade can narrow factor-price gaps (Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson), reducing the incentive for migration.

• FDI can also complement movements of skilled labour, management, technology and intra-firm trade.

• Cohesion investment can lessen regional disparities; but agglomeration and cumulative causation can draw skilled workers and investment from weaker regions.

• Consequently factor flows are not simply interchangeable: geography, skill and technology determine effects.

13
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Why does Pelkmans argue that free movement does not amount to a single EU labour market?

• Art. 45 protects access and non-discrimination, but national labour markets still differ in institutions, pay setting and social protection.

• Host-country control applies local wages/working conditions, leaving incoming low-skilled workers little room to compete by accepting lower pay.

• Pelkmans calls this “social protectionism” or a “fortress”: local skills, language, networks and customs then preserve domestic advantages.

• Posted-worker rules extend applicable host-country remuneration and core conditions to employees temporarily sent abroad; he argues this weakens low-wage competition.

• The contrary policy rationale is fair treatment and prevention of social dumping; a true EU labour market would also need recognition, portable protections, flanking policies and more regulatory compatibility.

14
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How is workers’ free movement protected by EU primary and secondary law?

• Art. 45 TFEU: right to seek and undertake employment and equal treatment irrespective of nationality; limited exceptions for genuine public-authority jobs.

• Regulation 492/2011 implements access to employment and non-discrimination in working conditions and social advantages.

• Directive 2004/38/EC governs movement, residence and family rights of EU citizens.

• Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 coordinate national social-security schemes; they do not replace them with one EU system.

• Posting directives (96/71/EC, 2018/957 and enforcement rules) establish a distinct regime for temporary cross-border assignments.

15
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What did key CJEU judgments contribute to workers’ mobility?

• Levin: genuine and effective part-time work can qualify as employment; Lawrie-Blum: services under direction of another for remuneration defines a worker.

• Antonissen: jobseekers enjoy mobility rights subject to reasonable conditions.

• Bosman: private football-transfer rules can impede mobility even without direct nationality discrimination.

• Angonese: non-discrimination can apply to private employers; Graf cautions against effects too indirect or uncertain.

• The case law develops from nationality-based discrimination toward unjustified restrictions, analogous to goods and services freedoms.

16
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Why is recognition of professional qualifications essential but contentious?

• Formal access to employment is ineffective if national licensing prevents trained workers from practising.

• Directive 2005/36/EC provides automatic recognition for harmonised professions and a general assessment system for others.

• Where substantial training differences exist, host authorities can impose proportionate aptitude tests or adaptation periods.

• Pelkmans criticises the old diploma-by-diploma harmonisation approach as regulatory failure and highlights potential professional-association barriers.

• Consumer safety and language competence matter, but disproportionate checks suppress mobility; academic degree recognition differs from professional authorisation.

17
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Which rights and remaining reforms determine whether EU labour mobility is genuinely effective?

• Workers receive equal treatment in access to jobs, pay, working conditions and applicable social advantages; qualifying family members have derived rights.

• Directive 2004/38 permits short residence with limited conditions, status-dependent longer residence and permanent residence after five lawful years.

• Social-security coordination can aggregate insurance periods and preserve/export certain benefits, but not all benefits are portable.

• Persistent problems: housing, language, information, qualification delays, tax complexity, social protection and uneven enforcement; EURES helps match jobs and workers.

• Normative aim is secure, informed choice to move or stay—not maximising migration regardless of family and regional welfare.