BLAW - CASES

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (2013) - Chapter 4

KEY FACTS: Bartlett took Mutual's generic version of a brand-name drug (Clinoril); The generic label warned of "severe skin reactions," and the package insert listed the condition she got; Her failure-to-warn claim was dismissed because her doctor admitted he never read the label; She won over $21 million on a design-defect claim under New Hampshire law; Federal rules require a generic drug to have the same design and the same label as the brand-name drug. Mutual was not allowed to change either one. ISSUE: Whether holding Mutual liable under New Hampshire's design-defect law violates the Supremacy Clause, when federal law forbids generic drug makers from changing a drug's design or label. RULE: The Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption: federal law is the supreme law of the land, and a state law that conflicts with it must yield. WHO WON: Mutual Pharmaceutical. WHY: It was impossible for Mutual to obey both laws. New Hampshire law effectively required Mutual to make the drug safer, while federal law barred it from changing the drug at all. When the two conflict, federal law wins, so the state claim was preempted. The Court rejected the argument that Mutual could just stop selling the drug, because then impossibility preemption would never apply to anyone. Two dissents argued that compliance wasn't truly impossible and that federal and state law should work together.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) - Chapter 4

KEY FACTS: The individual mandate required most Americans to carry minimum health insurance; The people affected were not buying insurance. They were doing nothing; The government argued that people without insurance shift costs onto everyone else, which affects interstate commerce; Challengers included the National Federation of Independent Business and state attorneys general. ISSUE: Whether requiring individuals to buy health insurance violates the limits of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. RULE: The Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8): Congress may "regulate commerce" among the states. WHO WON: The National Federation of Independent Business and the states, on the Commerce Clause question. WHY: The power to regulate commerce assumes there is already commercial activity to regulate. The mandate didn't regulate activity. It forced people who were doing nothing to enter the market. If Congress could regulate people for doing nothing, it could make them buy anything; under the government's logic, Congress could make everyone buy vegetables to cut health costs. That would give Congress control over what people don't do and change the relationship between citizens and the federal government. (Outside your excerpt: the mandate was upheld anyway as a tax, so the law itself survived.)

New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dept. v. Barnesandnoble.com (2013) - Chapter 4

KEY FACTS: Bn.com had no property or employees in New Mexico; Barnes & Noble Booksellers, a separate company with the same parent and same trademarks, ran three New Mexico stores; The stores sold gift cards printed with bn.com's web address that could be used online; They sold a loyalty program that also gave discounts on bn.com; They shared customer e-mail addresses with bn.com; They accepted returns of online purchases, and bn.com advertised this along with a store locator; New Mexico taxed bn.com's sales from 1998 to 2005. ISSUE: Whether New Mexico's tax on Barnesandnoble.com's online sales violates the Commerce Clause, when bn.com had no physical presence of its own in the state. RULE: The Commerce Clause and the Quill test: a state may tax interstate commerce only if there is a substantial nexus with the state, the tax is fairly apportioned, it doesn't discriminate, and it's fairly related to state services. WHO WON: The New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department. WHY: A company has a substantial nexus when in-state activities are "significantly associated with its ability to establish and maintain a market" there. The stores did that for bn.com. Customers saw the two as one company, and the gift cards, loyalty program, shared e-mails, and in-store returns gave bn.com an advantage over online competitors. So the tax was allowed. Other courts had ruled the opposite way on similar facts, and South Dakota v. Wayfair (2018) later dropped the physical-presence requirement entirely.

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The petition asked the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles; The EPA took more than 50,000 public comments, then denied the petition in 2003; The EPA's two reasons: (1) the Clean Air Act didn't authorize it, and (2) regulating would be unwise because of scientific uncertainty; The Clean Air Act defines "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent" that enters the air; The EPA also argued that the Department of Transportation already sets mileage standards. ISSUE: Whether the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars violates the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the Clean Air Act. RULE: The Administrative Procedure Act (APA): courts set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Also the Clean Air Act. WHO WON: Massachusetts and the other states. WHY: The Clean Air Act's definition of air pollutant is broad and clear, and greenhouse gases fit within it, so the EPA had authority to regulate them. The EPA could refuse only if it found greenhouse gases don't contribute to climate change, or if it gave a reasoned explanation based on the statute. Leftover uncertainty and policy preferences weren't enough, and DOT's role didn't excuse the EPA from its own job. Because the EPA gave no reasoned explanation, its refusal was arbitrary and capricious. The dissents argued the states had no standing to sue and that courts should defer to the agency's judgment.

Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar (2010) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The Interior Department did a 30-day study after the Deepwater Horizon explosion; It ordered a six-month moratorium on new deepwater permits and on the 33 already-permitted rigs, covering wells deeper than 500 feet; The report claimed it was peer-reviewed by seven National Academy of Engineering experts; The experts said that claim was a "misrepresentation." The blanket ban was added after their review, and they opposed it; The report focused only on BP's rig, and it defined "deepwater" inconsistently (1,000 feet vs. 500 feet); The Department considered no alternatives, such as suspending only rigs that weren't in compliance. ISSUE: Whether the Interior Department's six-month blanket moratorium on deepwater drilling violates the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious. RULE: The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) arbitrary and capricious standard. A rule fails if the agency relied on factors Congress didn't intend, ignored an important part of the problem, gave an explanation that runs against the evidence, or reached a result too implausible to be agency expertise. WHO WON: Hornbeck Offshore Services and the other drilling-support companies. (They won a preliminary injunction.) WHY: The court couldn't find any connection between the report's findings and the huge scope of the ban. The report was about one rig's failure, but the moratorium assumed that every rig drilling deeper than 500 feet was an immediate danger. It ignored the other rigs' safety records, misrepresented what the experts approved, and didn't consider narrower options. The harm to the companies and the Gulf economy outweighed an unsupported decision, so the moratorium was blocked.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations (2012) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The broadcasts were fleeting, unscripted expletives from Cher and Nicole Richie on Fox, plus seven seconds of nudity on ABC's NYPD Blue; The 2001 FCC policy in force at the time asked whether the material "dwelled on or repeated" indecency; After the broadcasts, the FCC's Bono decision declared any F-word use indecent; The FCC found Fox and ABC in violation. ABC's fine was about $1.24 million; In 2009, the Supreme Court said the FCC's policy change wasn't arbitrary and capricious, and sent the case back. The lower court then held the policy too vague. ISSUE: Whether the FCC punishing Fox and ABC for fleeting expletives and brief nudity under a policy announced after the broadcasts violates due process (the Fifth Amendment requirement of fair notice). RULE: Due process / void for vagueness: a law or regulation must give people fair notice of what is forbidden before they can be punished. WHO WON: Fox Television Stations and ABC. WHY: When the shows aired, the FCC's own policy focused on repeated or drawn-out indecency, so nothing warned the networks that a single fleeting word or a few seconds of nudity could be punished. The government even admitted Fox had no reasonable notice. Punishing someone without fair notice violates due process, so the FCC's orders were set aside as vague. The Court noted the FCC is still free to adopt a clearer policy going forward.

NFIB v. OSHA (2022) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The rule covered employers with 100+ employees, about 84 million workers; Workers had to get the vaccine or test weekly at their own expense and wear a mask at work; OSHA issued it as an emergency temporary standard, which skips the normal notice-and-comment process; That emergency power had been used only 9 times before, never this broadly; Congress had declined to pass a similar measure. ISSUE: Whether OSHA's vaccine-or-test mandate violates the limits of its authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. RULE: The Occupational Safety and Health Act, which lets OSHA set occupational safety standards, together with the major questions idea: a power this large needs clear authorization from Congress. WHO WON: The National Federation of Independent Business and the states. (The Court stayed the rule.) WHY: OSHA's job is protecting workers from workplace hazards, not regulating public health in general. COVID is a risk everywhere: at home, at school, and at the store, the same way crime and air pollution are. Ordering 84 million people to get vaccinated is a huge public-health measure, and Congress never clearly gave OSHA that power. Three justices dissented, arguing that COVID spreads at work and that OSHA was within its expertise.

West Virginia v. EPA (2022) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The Clean Power Plan targeted carbon dioxide from existing coal and gas power plants; It relied on "generation shifting": forcing the national power grid to move from coal to other energy sources; Before 2015, the EPA had only required individual plants to operate more cleanly; The expected effects were billions in costs, dozens of coal plants retired, and tens of thousands of jobs lost; The EPA used a little-used section of the Clean Air Act (Section 111(d)). ISSUE: Whether the EPA's Clean Power Plan, which forced a nationwide shift away from coal, violates the limits of the EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act. RULE: The major questions doctrine: when an agency claims power over a decision of vast economic and political significance, it needs clear authorization from Congress. Also the Clean Air Act. WHO WON: West Virginia and the other states. WHY: The EPA had never before used this section to restructure the entire energy industry; its role had always been to make individual plants cleaner. Deciding how much of the nation's electricity should come from coal is a decision with huge consequences for the economy and the country. It is "highly unlikely" Congress would quietly hand that decision to an agency through vague language. A choice that big belongs to Congress or requires a clear grant of power, and the EPA had neither.

Biden v. Nebraska (2023) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The HEROES Act lets the Secretary "waive or modify" student loan provisions during a national emergency; Before COVID, its "modifications" were minor and mostly procedural, such as payment pauses; In 2020, the Department's own lawyers said the Secretary had no authority for mass cancellation. A new opinion in 2021–22 reversed that; The plan canceled up to $10,000 (or $20,000 for Pell recipients) for borrowers earning under $125,000; Total cost was about $430 billion, covering about 98.5% of borrowers; Six states sued, and the Eighth Circuit blocked the plan nationwide. ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Education's cancellation of $430 billion in student loans violates the limits of the HEROES Act. RULE: The HEROES Act ("waive or modify" authority), read alongside the major questions idea and separation of powers: only Congress has the power of the purse. WHO WON: Nebraska and the other states. WHY: "Modify" means making moderate or minor changes, not rewriting a program from the ground up. The Secretary didn't adjust the rules. He effectively wrote a brand-new loan forgiveness program covering almost every borrower in the country. The Court said the question wasn't whether something should be done, but who has the power to do it, and spending of this size belongs to Congress. It even quoted Nancy Pelosi: the President can postpone or delay loan payments, but debt forgiveness takes an act of Congress.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) - Chapter 6

KEY FACTS: The law was the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which governs fishing up to 200 miles offshore; The agency required monitors on 50% of Atlantic herring trips; If no government monitor was free, the boat had to hire and pay one, at up to $710 per day, or 20–25% of trip revenue; The statute was silent or ambiguous about whether fishermen had to pay; Lower courts deferred to the agency under Chevron. ISSUE: Whether the National Marine Fisheries Service's rule making herring fishermen pay for federal monitors violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and whether courts must defer to the agency's reading of an ambiguous statute under Chevron. RULE: The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which assigns courts the job of deciding questions of law, and Chevron deference (1984), which the Court reconsidered. WHO WON: Loper Bright Enterprises and the fishing companies. WHY: The Court overruled Chevron. Under the APA, it is the courts' job, not the agencies', to decide what a law means. An unclear statute is not a hidden grant of power to the agency. Chevron let agencies change positions whenever they wanted, which left businesses in an "eternal fog of uncertainty." From now on, courts must use their own judgment about what a statute means instead of deferring to the agency. The case was sent back to be decided under that new approach.

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (1986) - Chapter 7

KEY FACTS: What was searched: Dow's 2,000-acre industrial plant, an outdoor business complex; Dow refused the EPA's request for an on-site inspection; Dow had heavy ground-level security, but the plant was open to view from above; The EPA hired a commercial aerial photographer using a precision mapping camera, the kind available to the public; The plane stayed in public, navigable airspace; The photos showed buildings and equipment, not intimate details. ISSUE: Whether the EPA's aerial photography of Dow's plant without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. RULE: The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, which applies only where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. WHO WON: The United States (the EPA). WHY: The photographs were not a search at all. A large open industrial complex is more like an "open field" than the private space around a home, so a business has a much lower expectation of privacy there. The EPA flew in public airspace that anyone could use and used a camera anyone could buy. As your textbook puts it, a company has no right of privacy from low-flying planes, much like the plain view exception. Contrast this case with Kyllo, which involved a home and special technology.

Kyllo v. United States (2001) - Chapter 7

KEY FACTS: What was searched: the heat coming from inside Kyllo's home; Agents used a thermal imager from a car across the street, without a warrant; The device was not in general public use; The scan showed the garage roof and a side wall were unusually hot, consistent with grow lamps; The scan, plus informant tips and utility bills, was used to get a warrant; The search found 100+ marijuana plants. ISSUE: Whether using a thermal imager on Kyllo's home without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. RULE: The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. The home gets the strongest protection, under the Castle Doctrine. WHO WON: Danny Kyllo. WHY: Using technology that the public doesn't normally have to learn details about the inside of a home, details that would otherwise require going inside, is a search. The home is the most protected place under the Fourth Amendment, so the agents needed a warrant before using the device. Because they didn't have one, the scan was an unconstitutional search. Contrast this case with Dow, which involved a business and an ordinary camera.

United States v. Heckenkamp (2007) - Chapter 7

KEY FACTS: What was searched: Heckenkamp's personal computer, first remotely over the network and then in his dorm room; The intruder had root access to the Mail2 server, with 60,000 accounts during finals; Savoy blocked the computer, but it reappeared at a new IP address; The FBI asked Savoy to wait for a warrant. He acted anyway, to protect the university; He logged in remotely for about 15 minutes, looking only at a temporary folder and changing nothing; He and campus police entered the open, empty dorm room and unplugged the computer; Heckenkamp voluntarily gave his password, waived Miranda, and agreed to a copy of the hard drive; The university had no announced monitoring policy; The FBI got a warrant the next day. ISSUE: Whether the university investigator's warrantless remote search of Heckenkamp's computer and the entry into his dorm room violate the Fourth Amendment. RULE: The Fourth Amendment, the special needs exception (no warrant is needed when needs beyond normal law enforcement make a warrant impractical), and the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule. WHO WON: The United States (the government). WHY: Heckenkamp did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer. Plugging into the school network didn't erase it, because the school had no policy saying it would monitor students' computers. But the remote search fell under the special needs exception. Savoy was protecting the university's e-mail system, not gathering evidence for police, and his search was short and limited. The court assumed the dorm room entry was illegal, but the evidence still came in under the independent source exception, because the FBI had enough other evidence to get its warrant anyway.

Georgia v. Randolph (2006) - Chapter 7

KEY FACTS: What was searched: the Randolphs' shared home, specifically Scott's bedroom; Janet, the wife, consented to the search; Scott was physically present and expressly refused consent; Police searched anyway, without a warrant, and found a straw with cocaine residue; There was no emergency and no risk of evidence being destroyed. ISSUE: Whether a warrantless search of the Randolphs' home, based on Janet's consent while Scott was present and refusing, violates the Fourth Amendment. RULE: The Fourth Amendment and the consent exception to the warrant requirement, as applied to co-occupants who share a home. WHO WON: Scott Randolph. (5–3 decision) WHY: The Court looked at what ordinary people expect. No sensible guest would walk into a home because one resident says "come in" while another resident at the door says "stay out." Neither co-tenant outranks the other, so a disputed invitation gives police no right to enter. A present co-occupant's clear refusal overrides the other's consent. Limits: consent is still valid if the other occupant is absent or asleep, unless police removed them on purpose to avoid an objection. Police can also still enter to protect someone from domestic violence. The dissent argued the ruling could hurt domestic violence cases.

United States v. King (2007) - Chapter 7

KEY FACTS: What was searched: files on King's laptop, viewed over the base network; All network users had signed agreements that their network use could be monitored; King's hard drive was set to "shared," so it was open to everyone on the network; King had installed security settings and claimed he didn't know the files were shared; An airman searching for music found the files, and a computer specialist confirmed them without any special access; A later warrant search of his home found 30,000+ illegal images. He was sentenced to 108 months. ISSUE: Whether the military's viewing of King's shared computer files over the base network without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. RULE: The Fourth Amendment and the reasonable expectation of privacy test: a person must have a subjective expectation of privacy that society accepts as objectively reasonable. WHO WON: The United States (the government). WHY: King believed his files were private, as his security settings showed, but society wouldn't accept that belief as reasonable. His files were open to thousands of people on the network, and the investigators used no special tools to see them. The court treated it as a search of the military's network, not King's private room, and compared the files to belongings left in an apartment building's unlocked common area or trash put in a public dumpster. Because there was no violation, the later warrant was valid too. Contrast this case with Heckenkamp, where there was no monitoring policy and the files weren't shared.