Lecture 6 Sociology: Experience and governance of return migration and reintegration

According to Sinatti (2015), the 'triple-win' discourse on return migration claims that sending states, receiving states, and migrants all benefit. What is her primary critique of this discourse?

A. It accurately reflects the interests of all parties but fails to account for the economic costs of return.

B. It oversimplifies the meaning of return and serves political agendas; in reality, the policies of origin and host countries are driven by conflicting aims that serve state interests before migrants' interests.

C. It is a purely economic model that ignores the cultural and social dimensions of reintegration.

D. It accurately reflects the goals of the EU, but ignores the fact that Senegal wants permanent return rather than virtual return.

It oversimplifies the meaning of return and serves political agendas; in reality, the policies of origin and host countries are driven by conflicting aims that serve state interests before migrants' interests

Sinatti describes different interests in return migration. How does the Senegalese government primarily view return, compared to the EU's view of permanent removal?

A. Senegal favors selective or 'virtual' return, relying heavily on financial remittances and the transfer of skills, rather than promoting immediate physical return.

B. Senegal demands the immediate physical return of all low-skilled migrants to boost its labor force.

C. Senegal shares the EU's view that return should be a permanent removal and a tool for border control.

D. Senegal prioritizes the return of highly skilled professionals only, rejecting low-skilled migrants.

Senegal favors selective or 'virtual' return, relying heavily on financial remittances and the transfer of skills, rather than promoting immediate physical return

Cerase (1974) categorizes return migration. Which category describes migrants who remain abroad until they can return to improved conditions, which they evaluate on the basis of the values of their homeland society?

A. Return of failure.

B. Return of innovation.

C. Return of conservatism.

D. Return of retirement.

Return of conservatism

According to Cerase's (1974) typology, what characterizes the 'return of innovation'?

A. Migrants who were unsuccessful in adapting to the host society and resume the life they led prior to departure.

B. Migrants returning at the end of their working lives.

C. Migrants who bring back new values and ideas, with return aspirations qualitatively different from those held at departure.

D. Migrants who return only to find that their homeland values have changed, causing them to re-emigrate.

Migrants who bring back new values and ideas, with return aspirations qualitatively different from those held at departure

In the lecture slides on Burawoy's (2005) division of sociological labor, which type of knowledge is associated with an 'extra-academic audience' and a 'reflexive' approach, such as questioning the commonly accepted assumptions about the 'voluntariness' of return?

A. Professional.

B. Policy.

C. Public.

D. Critical.

Critical

According to the lecture slides, how does 'repatriation' differ from 'voluntary return'?

A. Repatriation involves the return of a foreign national who has no legal obligation to leave (e.g., in case of illness or after a conflict ceases), whereas voluntary return involves migrants without a residence permit complying with a legal obligation to return, assisted by states or NGOs.

B. Repatriation is a forced removal, whereas voluntary return is entirely independent and involves no state authorities.

C. Repatriation applies only to highly skilled migrants, whereas voluntary return applies only to rejected asylum seekers.

D. Repatriation involves the return of citizens to their country of origin, whereas voluntary return involves the return of undocumented migrants to a third country.

Repatriation involves the return of a foreign national who has no legal obligation to leave (e.g., in case of illness or after a conflict ceases), whereas voluntary return involves migrants without a residence permit complying with a legal obligation to return, assisted by states or NGOs

According to Kanstroom (2002), deportation can be understood through two logics. Which of the following represents the logic of 'post-entry social control'?

A. Corrective enforcement of conditions of admission/arrival after unlawful entry, tied to the border.

B. Disciplinary social control, ensuring non-citizens 'play by the rules'.

C. The externalization of border control through readmission agreements with third countries.

D. The use of return hubs outside the EU to process asylum seekers.

Disciplinary social control, ensuring non-citizens 'play by the rules'

The lecture slides mention 'externalised dimensions' of deportation. Which of the following is an example of this externalization?

A. The use of detention centers within the host country.

B. The 2015 EU-Turkey agreement and the failed UK-Rwanda deal, where third countries are used to manage or host migrants.

C. The physical deportation of migrants on state-chartered flights.

D. The use of 'voluntary return' counseling sessions by street-level bureaucrats.

The 2015 EU-Turkey agreement and the failed UK-Rwanda deal, where third countries are used to manage or host migrants

Why does the 'deportation gap' (low return rates of rejected asylum seekers) exist, according to the lecture slides?

A. Because states do not want to deport anyone, so they grant amnesty to all rejected asylum seekers.

B. Because of resistance from individuals and support networks, the reluctance of origin states to cooperate on forced return, and the interests of states in keeping undocumented migrants 'deportable' for exploitation.

C. Because international law strictly forbids the deportation of any asylum seeker, regardless of the outcome of their case.

D. Because all rejected asylum seekers voluntarily return to their countries of origin without needing state intervention.

Because of resistance from individuals and support networks, the reluctance of origin states to cooperate on forced return, and the interests of states in keeping undocumented migrants 'deportable' for exploitation

In Cleton and Chauvin (2020), what is the main reason that 'voluntary return' is promoted by liberal democracies, despite often being coercive in practice?

A. Because it is a cheaper alternative to deportation flights.

B. Because it serves as an emblem of better government, allowing liberal democracies to execute power without recourse to sovereign violence.

C. Because international law requires states to prioritize voluntary return over forced return.

D. Because it ensures that migrants can immediately re-enter the country legally if they change their minds.

Because it serves as an emblem of better government, allowing liberal democracies to execute power without recourse to sovereign violence

Cleton and Chauvin (2020) draw on the concept of 'governmentality' (Rose). What does this concept refer to in the context of return counseling?

A. The use of physical force and detention to force migrants onto planes.

B. Governing through freedom and responsibility, where the migrant is treated as if they are freely choosing to return, even though their options are bounded and geared towards return.

C. The process by which the state takes full responsibility for the migrant's reintegration.

D. The legal obligation of the state to provide housing and food to undocumented migrants.

Governing through freedom and responsibility, where the migrant is treated as if they are freely choosing to return, even though their options are bounded and geared towards return

What are 'rituals of freedom' in the context of return counseling?

A. Scripted interactions in which return is presented as voluntary, forcing the migrant to perform agency even though their options are constrained; 'free choice' becomes the definition of the situation.

B. Ceremonies organized by NGOs to celebrate migrants who successfully return to their home countries.

C. The legal rights of migrants to choose their destination country.

D. The practice of allowing migrants to leave detention centers for a few hours to celebrate national holidays.

Scripted interactions in which return is presented as voluntary, forcing the migrant to perform agency even though their options are constrained; 'free choice' becomes the definition of the situation

In the Cleton & Chauvin reading, street-level bureaucrats use emotional labor. What is the difference between 'surface acting' and 'deep acting' (Hochschild)?

A. Surface acting involves displaying genuine empathy, whereas deep acting involves faking emotions.

B. Surface acting involves faking expressions (strategic empathy) while internal feelings remain intact, whereas deep acting involves altering one's internal feelings to align with expectations, sometimes producing genuine emotional displays.

C. Surface acting is used only by NGO workers, whereas deep acting is used only by government employees.

D. Surface acting is a formal policy, whereas deep acting is an informal, unofficial practice.

Surface acting involves faking expressions (strategic empathy) while internal feelings remain intact, whereas deep acting involves altering one's internal feelings to align with expectations, sometimes producing genuine emotional displays

How does Cleton and Chauvin describe the concept of 'constrained choice' in return counseling?

A. The migrant is given a choice between different voluntary return packages with varying financial benefits.

B. The migrant has the absolute freedom to choose whether to stay or leave, without any consequences.

C. Options are presented, but it is clear to state employees that the ultimate goal is return, and the only real options are 'voluntary return' or deportation.

D. The migrant is forced to choose a destination country from a list provided by the state.

Options are presented, but it is clear to state employees that the ultimate goal is return, and the only real options are 'voluntary return' or deportation

What does the term 'soft deportation' (Leerkes et al.) mean?

A. The deportation of vulnerable migrants who are not physically restrained during the flight.

B. A process with deportation-like properties (placing responsibility for leaving on the migrant), but which depends less on force and deterrence than 'classic' deportations.

C. A policy where migrants are deported to a third country instead of their origin country.

D. The gradual withdrawal of welfare benefits to encourage migrants to leave.

A process with deportation-like properties (placing responsibility for leaving on the migrant), but which depends less on force and deterrence than 'classic' deportations

Why is 'non-deportability' a significant issue, and what lengths do some migrants go to avoid it?

A. Deportation requires origin states to accept the returnee, but migrants may resort to 'identity stripping' (e.g., destroying passports or fingerprints), forcing officials to go 'embassy shopping' to establish nationality.

B. Deportation is impossible because international law does not allow origin states to accept returnees.

C. Non-deportability occurs because states lack the financial resources to buy plane tickets, and migrants do not need to do anything to avoid deportation.

D. Migrants avoid deportation by applying for voluntary return programs, which automatically grants them citizenship in a third country.

Deportation requires origin states to accept the returnee, but migrants may resort to 'identity stripping' (e.g., destroying passports or fingerprints), forcing officials to go 'embassy shopping' to establish nationality

According to Schuster and Majidi (2013) on deported Afghans, why does deportation often fail to result in permanent reintegration and instead lead to re-migration?

A. Because the Afghan government provides too many economic opportunities, making migrants want to return to Europe to compare.

B. Because deportation makes adjustment, integration and reintegration impossible, creating additional reasons to re-migrate: loss of economic opportunities/debt, transnational/local ties elsewhere, and shame/difficulty 'fitting in'.

C. Because deported Afghans are immediately recruited into the military upon arrival.

D. Because international law forces deported migrants to be re-admitted to the EU within one year.

Because deportation makes adjustment, integration and reintegration impossible, creating additional reasons to re-migrate: loss of economic opportunities/debt, transnational/local ties elsewhere, and shame/difficulty 'fitting in'

According to Schuster and Majidi (2013), what is required for successful reintegration after return?

A. Immediate physical removal by the state and no contact with the host country.

B. Return preparedness (ability to prepare return) and resource mobilisation (ability to convert/send assets home and build opportunities/support structures).

C. Complete assimilation into the homeland culture, including changing one's dress and behavior.

D. The presence of an international NGO to monitor the returnee's daily life.

Return preparedness (ability to prepare return) and resource mobilisation (ability to convert/send assets home and build opportunities/support structures)

According to the interactive presentation, how does the concept of 'return preparedness' relate to the experiences of deported Afghans?

A. Deportees are often completely unprepared, leading to an impulse to re-emigrate to achieve goals interrupted by forced return.

B. Deportees are given ample time by the state to prepare their return, which guarantees successful reintegration.

C. Preparedness only matters for voluntary returnees, not for deportees.

D. Return preparedness is solely about learning the language of the origin country.

Deportees are often completely unprepared, leading to an impulse to re-emigrate to achieve goals interrupted by forced return

In the lecture notes, the '3 Rs model' (Papademetriou and Martin) is mentioned as influencing economic development in labour-exporting countries. What do the 3 Rs stand for?

A. Recruitment, Remittances, and Return.

B. Reintegration, Re-admission, and Repatriation.

C. Recession, Re-migration, and Readmission.

D. Retention, Repatriation, and Re-employment.

Recruitment, Remittances, and Return

In the EU-Senegal Cooperation Agreement (2008-2013), what was the Senegalese government's stance on how return should be addressed?

A. It insisted that return must be addressed along three forms of movement (departure, overseas sojourn, and voluntary or forced return) and that it is not limited to irregular migrants.

B. It argued that return should be strictly limited to irregular migrants and rejected any development aid linked to readmission agreements.

C. It demanded that all Senegalese migrants abroad return immediately to boost the national labor force, regardless of their skills.

D. It stated that return is solely a matter for the European Union and that Senegal would not intervene in any return negotiations.

It insisted that return must be addressed along three forms of movement (departure, overseas sojourn, and voluntary or forced return) and that it is not limited to irregular migrants

According to Sinatti (2015), what is the mismatch between Senegalese government policy and the reality of migrants' investments?

A. The government wants migrants to invest in large-scale industrial projects, but migrants prefer to invest only in European real estate.

B. The government assumes development may result from migration and underinvests in the preconditions for return, while migrants' personal development ambitions lead to investments (such as housing) that are distant from the government's economic growth aspirations.

C. The government wants migrants to focus on financial remittances, but migrants want to return immediately without saving any money.

D. The government insists on permanent return, while migrants refuse to ever return to Senegal.

The government assumes development may result from migration and underinvests in the preconditions for return, while migrants' personal development ambitions lead to investments (such as housing) that are distant from the government's economic growth aspirations

According to Sinatti (2015), how does temporary return constrain the economic activities of migrants in Senegal?

A. Temporary return prevents migrants from bringing any money with them, making it impossible to invest.

B. Temporary return helps revitalize linkages and stimulates local expenditure, but physical permanence is often necessary to establish a business, meaning temporary return can constrain the establishment of economic activities.

C. Temporary return is illegal under Senegalese law, so migrants cannot engage in any economic activities during their visits.

D. Temporary return forces migrants to spend all their savings on housing, leaving nothing for business investment.

Temporary return helps revitalize linkages and stimulates local expenditure, but physical permanence is often necessary to establish a business, meaning temporary return can constrain the establishment of economic activities

In the Cleton & Chauvin (2020) study on the Dutch deportation regime, what happened to the majority of the 93,000 migrants who applied for asylum in 2015-2016 and received a negative decision (44% negative)?

A. They were all successfully deported to their countries of origin within 30 days.

B. They applied for and received legal residency through a special amnesty program.

C. Most of those who did not qualify for asylum "left without supervision," either leaving the Netherlands independently or continuing to reside in the country without authorization.

D. They were all immediately placed in long-term detention centers and forcibly removed.

Most of those who did not qualify for asylum "left without supervision," either leaving the Netherlands independently or continuing to reside in the country without authorization

The interactive presentation mentions the role of NGOs in the Dutch deportation continuum. How does the presentation characterize the relationship between NGOs and the state?

A. All NGOs completely oppose state policies and refuse to cooperate with the government in any way.

B. NGOs act as government subcontractors (operating in agreement with the state) but also include organizations that challenge and oppose state policies.

C. NGOs have no role in return migration, as this is strictly a government function.

D. NGOs only work with the European Union, not with the Dutch national government.

NGOs act as government subcontractors (operating in agreement with the state) but also include organizations that challenge and oppose state policies

According to the interactive presentation on Cleton & Chauvin (2020), how is emotional labour extended beyond the dyadic relationship between the caseworker and the migrant?

A. The broader public is convoked in the social construction of voluntary return through documentaries, explanatory videos, collection of stories, and newspaper articles as part of voluntary return schemes.

B. The government forces the families of migrants in their origin countries to participate in emotional counseling sessions.

C. Caseworkers are required to express their emotions only in meetings with their supervisors, never in front of migrants.

D. NGOs are required to publish the names of migrants who refuse to return to publicly shame them.

The broader public is convoked in the social construction of voluntary return through documentaries, explanatory videos, collection of stories, and newspaper articles as part of voluntary return schemes

How do the lecture slides distinguish between the academic and policy categories of 'voluntariness'?

A. Academically, voluntary migration is an expression of an 'aspiration' to migrate, while policy often relies on a strict dichotomy between 'voluntary' and 'forced' return that does not reflect the real-world 'spectrum of voluntariness' (Sinnige et al. 2025).

B. Academically, all migration is considered forced, while policy-makers believe all migration is voluntary.

C. Academically, voluntariness is only studied in refugees, while policy-makers only apply it to economic migrants.

D. Academically, voluntariness is defined by legal status, while policy defines it by the migrant's emotional state.

Academically, voluntary migration is an expression of an 'aspiration' to migrate, while policy often relies on a strict dichotomy between 'voluntary' and 'forced' return that does not reflect the real-world 'spectrum of voluntariness' (Sinnige et al. 2025)

According to the interactive presentation's recap of Sinatti (2014), how do the 'different cycles of return migration' vary?

A. They vary by the level of government involvement, the amount of remittances sent, and the migrant's level of education.

B. They vary by control over departure (self-directed, assisted/pressured, forced), duration (permanent, temporary, seasonal), and mobility pattern (circular return, repeated visits, return followed by re-emigration).

C. They vary by the migrant's age, gender, and religion.

D. They vary exclusively by the country of origin, with only economic migrants returning temporarily.

They vary by control over departure (self-directed, assisted/pressured, forced), duration (permanent, temporary, seasonal), and mobility pattern (circular return, repeated visits, return followed by re-emigration)

In the EU-Senegal Cooperation Agreement (2008-2013), the Senegalese government outlined specific policy objectives for migration. Which of the following best captures their specific objectives regarding the 'promotion of migrants'?

A. They wanted to support a transition from 'subsistence emigration' to an 'emigration of accumulation', focusing on productive investment rather than just poverty reduction through consumption.

B. They wanted to encourage all migrants to return permanently to Senegal immediately to boost the local labor market.

C. They wanted to prevent any Senegalese citizens from leaving the country to stop the brain drain.

D. They demanded that the EU provide direct cash payments to all Senegalese migrants living in Europe.

They wanted to support a transition from 'subsistence emigration' to an 'emigration of accumulation', focusing on productive investment rather than just poverty reduction through consumption

According to Sinatti (2015), how do Senegalese policies towards return characterize their stance on the temporalities of return?

A. They strictly require migrants to return permanently and reject any form of circular or temporary migration.

B. They adopt an elitist stance, refusing to distinguish between different temporalities of return and favoring mobility over permanent resettlement, assuming migrants can contribute to development regardless of whether they return temporarily or permanently.

C. They only allow temporary return for family visits and prohibit any economic activity during those visits.

D. They prioritize the return of low-skilled migrants to fill labor shortages in the agricultural sector.

They adopt an elitist stance, refusing to distinguish between different temporalities of return and favoring mobility over permanent resettlement, assuming migrants can contribute to development regardless of whether they return temporarily or permanently

In Cleton and Chauvin's (2020) discussion of 'honest information' in return counseling, what is the 'double agenda' they identify?

A. Caseworkers must honestly tell migrants that they will never be able to return to Europe, while secretly helping them apply for visas.

B. Caseworkers are instructed to provide 'honest' information about the obstacles to staying, but the very prospect of legalisation may ironically be deployed as a strategy to encourage voluntary return, framing it as a precondition for future legal entry.

C. Caseworkers are required to lie to migrants about the conditions in their home countries to make return sound more appealing.

D. The 'double agenda' refers to the fact that NGOs provide honest information, while the government provides false information.

Caseworkers are instructed to provide 'honest' information about the obstacles to staying, but the very prospect of legalisation may ironically be deployed as a strategy to encourage voluntary return, framing it as a precondition for future legal entry

In Schuster and Majidi's (2013) study on deported Afghans, they mention a specific Dutch policy regarding 'Westernised' women and girls. What does this policy highlight about the experience of return?

A. That 'Westernised' women and girls are automatically granted Dutch citizenship and never deported.

B. That return can be especially difficult for those who have adopted 'Western' dress or behaviour, as they may face shame and difficulties fitting in, highlighting the socio-cultural challenges of reintegration and the impossibility of simply resuming their prior lives.

C. That all Afghan women want to return to Afghanistan because of the excellent opportunities for women there.

D. That the Dutch government provides funding for women to open businesses in Afghanistan to prevent them from re-migrating.

That return can be especially difficult for those who have adopted 'Western' dress or behaviour, as they may face shame and difficulties fitting in, highlighting the socio-cultural challenges of reintegration and the impossibility of simply resuming their prior lives