European Competition Law

0.0(0)
Studied by 0 people
call kaiCall Kai
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
GameKnowt Play
Card Sorting

1/85

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

86 Terms

1
New cards

what are the 5 branches of competition law

  • article 101: restrictive agreements and practices

  • article 102: abuse of dominance

  • merger control

  • articles 107-108: state aid 

  • article 106: state owned enterprises; services of general economic interests


2
New cards

3 aspects of the field of application

  • ratione personae

  • ratione materiae

  • ratione loci


3
New cards

Hofner and Elser c-41/90

an undertaking is “every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed” 

4
New cards

criteria determining the existence of an entity

  • degree of independence or autonomy it enjoys in terms of its market conduct

  • degree of financial risk it bears


5
New cards

Viho Europe (Parker Pen) C-73/95

a parent subsidiary constitute 1 undertaking if the parent exercises decisive control over its subsidiaries’ commercial activities, including prices, discounts, sales targets and marketing


6
New cards

when self employed persons benefit from the labour exemption

if they are false self employed (c-413/13 FNV kunsten):

  • economically dependent

  • working side by side with workers or

  • working through digital labour platforms


7
New cards

the labour exemption

2 cumulative conditions must be satisfied: (C-67/96, Albany)

  • nature: the agreement must result from collective negotiations between employers and employees, or their representative organisation

  • purpose: the agreement must directly improve working or employment conditions, including remuneration and pensions


8
New cards

economic activity

an activity is economic when it consists in offering goods or services on a given market, the profit motive is not decisive (c-475/99 ambulanz glockner)

9
New cards

activities which are considered non-economic

  • activities connected with the exercise of public/state powers are deemed not economic, even if they have been privatised (c-343/95 Diego Calì)

  • solidarity-based social security

  • publicly funded education (c-74/16 CEPPB)



10
New cards

association of undertakings

an organisation or body bringing together undertakings that coordinates or represents their commercial interests

11
New cards

ratione personae 

determines the existence of an undertaking based on:

  • entity

  • economic activity


12
New cards

rationae materiae

material scope

13
New cards

areas excluded from ratione materiae

  • agriculture and transport

  • essential security interests 


14
New cards

ratione loci

cumulatively:

  • requires trade between 2 or more MSs

  • may effect or may be likely to effect

  • effect on trade has to be appreciable


15
New cards

c-22/98 Becu

workers acting within an employment relationship, under the direction of their employer and without independent economic autonomy, are workers rather than undertakings

16
New cards

structure of article 101

  • first paragraph: prohibition in principle

  • second paragraph: sanction

  • third paragraph: exception


17
New cards

field of application of article 101 TFEU

"

  • parties (undertakings)

  • behaviour (agreements, decisions by associations, concerted practices)

  • object or effect (prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition)

  • trade between MSs (may) be affected


18
New cards

agreement definition

  • requires a concurrence of wills between at least two parties to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (c-211/22 super bock)

  • horizontal or vertical


19
New cards

decision by an association of undertakings definition

collective will of an association of undertakings intended to influence the market conduct of its members, regardless of its legal form or whether it is legally binding

20
New cards

concerted practice definition

form of coordination between undertakings which, without reaching the stage of a formal agreement, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation for the risks of competition by coordinating their market behaviour

21
New cards

restriction by effect

where the agreement is not sufficiently harmful by its nature, its actual or potential effects must be assessed against the competitive conditions that would exist without it

22
New cards

restriction by object

the agreement reveals, by its very nature and in its legal and economic context, a sufficient degree of harm to competition, meaning its effects do not need to be established

23
New cards

de minimis standard

  • threshold for when a restriction can fall under article 101

  • only for by effect restrictions

  • horizontal agreements: 10%> combined

  • vertical agreements: 15%> individually


24
New cards

ancillary restraints

  • “any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main operation”

    • “necessary” = objectively necessary + proportionate

  • “directly related” = subordinate to the implementation of the operation + have an evident link with it (usually same parties)


25
New cards

exceptions to article 101

"article 101(3): cumulative conditions:

  • efficiency gains

  • fair share with consumers

  • does not eliminate competition in the relevant market

  • indispensable: no other way the result could be achieved


26
New cards

individual v. block exemption

  • individual exemption: the undertaking demonstrates that its particular agreement satisfies all four conditions of Article 101(3)

  • block exemption: a category of agreements is exempted collectively through a Commission regulation, provided the agreement satisfies the regulation's requirements


27
New cards

block exemption

Commission regulations that automatically exempt specified categories of agreements from Article 101(1) under Article 101(3), provided they meet prescribed conditions

offer an alternative to proving the four Article 101(3) conditions individually

28
New cards

block v. de minimis exemption

  • de minimis: the agreement is too insignificant to appreciably restrict competition in the first place

  • block exemption: the agreement does restrict competition, but is exempt because it is considered to generate sufficient economic benefits under Article 101(3), provided it meets the relevant conditions


29
New cards

application of the VBER (steps)

  • is it a vertical agreement

  • does it contain a vertical restraint falling within article 1(1) VBER

  • does it satisfy the market share thresholds (article 3)

  • does it contain hardcore restrictions (article 4)

  • are there excluded obligations (article 5)


30
New cards

c-74/14 eturas

  • its presumed to be a concerted practice if there is awareness, acceptance and participation

  • a mere automatic recognition or knowledge doesnt constitute acceptance

  • an undertaking may participate in a prohibited agreement without having expressly consented because they did not distance themselves from the conduct


31
New cards

nature of digital platforms

"all digital platforms are VERTICAL (with an element of horizontal)"

32
New cards

maxima latvija c-345/14

  • restriction by object requires a sufficiently serious degree of harm inherent in the agreement

  • if this threshold is not met, a restriction by effect must be established through an assessment of the economic and legal context and the agreement's actual or potential impact on competition


33
New cards

super bock c-211/22

  • minimum resale price maintenance can constitute a restriction by object under article 101(1)

  • the existence of an agreement requires proof of a concurrence of wills between the supplier and distributors


34
New cards

wouters c-309/99

ancillary restraints doctrine: even where professional rules restrict competition, they may fall outside Article 101(1) if:

  1. the measure pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest

  2. the restriction is inherent in achieving that objective

  3. the restriction is proportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary


35
New cards

european superleague v. FIFA & UEFA c-333/21

associations of undertakings exercising regulatory powers cannot restrict competition through rules that lack transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.

36
New cards

international skating union v. commission c-124/21

associations of undertakings exercising both regulatory and commercial functions create a potential conflict of interest, and their market-access rules must be governed by transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria to avoid restricting competition by object

37
New cards

european commission – car manufacturers emissions cleaning cartel

coordination between competitors to limit technical development and innovation can constitute a restriction by object under Article 101(1)(b) TFEU, even without price-fixing or market-sharing.

38
New cards

structure of article 102

  • relevant market definition

  • dominance

  • abuse

  • forms of abuse

  • objective justification


39
New cards

relevant product market

comprises all products or services that are regarded as sufficiently interchangeable or substitutable by customers because of their characteristics, prices, intended use, and other competitive parameters

40
New cards

3 sources of competitive constraint on product market

  • demand substitution: whether consumers would switch to alternative products in response to a deteroriation in competitve conditions

  • supply-side substitution: whether other suppliers could rapidly and credibly begin offering the product without substantial additional investment or risk

  • potential competition: relevant where undertakings not currently active in the market are capable of exerting competitive pressure through future entry


41
New cards

SSNIP & SSNDQ

  • SSNIP: asks whether a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but lasting price increase

  • SSNDQ: platform economy: asks whether users would switch platforms due to a decrease in quality


42
New cards

geographic market

encompasses the area in which the undertakings concerned compete under sufficiently homogeneous conditions of competition and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where competitive conditions differ appreciably

43
New cards

market definition

  • product market

  • geographic market

  • temporal market


44
New cards

temporal market

competitive conditions may vary over time in connection w/ seasonality, demand fluctuations, peak and off-peak usage patterns, or short term capacity constraints

45
New cards

notion of dominance

c-27/76 united brands: a dominant position is a position of economic strength that enables an undertaking to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market, by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately its consumers

46
New cards

factors relevant to determining single dominance

  • market shares

  • barriers to entry or expansion

  • branding, reputation

  • regulatory barriers (eg. licenses)

  • duration of dominance


47
New cards

platform definition

a platform is an intermediary operating in a 2 sided market, faciliating interaction btwn 2 user groups that provide each other with network effects

48
New cards

direct network effects

arise when the value of a service increases with the number of users on the same side of the platform

49
New cards

indirect network effects

arise when growth on one side of the platform increases value on another side, such as between app developers and smartphone users

50
New cards

factors determining dominance in a platform economy

  • network effects

  • economies of scale

  • access to data

  • switching costs

  • ecosystem strategies (interconnected products such as apple)


51
New cards

collective dominance

where two or more legally independent undertakings present themselves or act together on the market as a collective entity and are able to behave independently of competitors, customers and consumers (C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge)

52
New cards

conditions for finding collective dominance based on tacit coordination

t-342/99 airtours:

  • a common understanding on the terms and conditions

  • the ability to monitor adherence (transparency)

  • a credible deterrence mechanism

  • external stability, meaning that actual or potential competitors and customers cannot jeopradise the result


53
New cards

exploitative abuse

involve the direct exploitation of consumers or trading partners, for example through excessive pricing or unfair trading condition

54
New cards

exclusionary abuse

impair the ability of actual or potential competitors to compete effectively, thereby risking harm to consumers indirectly through reduced competition, higher prices, lower quality, or less innovation in the longer term

55
New cards

2-limb analysis of exclusionary abuse

  • departs from competition on the merits

  • capability to produce exclusive effects


56
New cards

AEC principle

competition law should normally protect competitors that are as efficient as the dominant undertaking, not less efficient rivals

57
New cards

AEC test

seeks to determine whether a hypothetical competitor that is as efficient as the dominant undertaking, but does not enjoy its dominant position, could compete profitably

58
New cards

predatory pricing

dominant undertaking deliberately sacrificing profits in the short term by charging exceptionally low prices in order to exclude competitors or deter entry

59
New cards

akzo c-62/86

cost based framework that assesses predation:

  • prices below average variable cost (AVC) are presumed abusive

  • prices between average variable cost and average total cost (ATC) may be abusive where they form part of a strategy to eliminate a competitor


60
New cards

margin squeeze

occurs when a vertically integrated dominant undertaking sets its wholesale and retail prices so that the difference is insufficient for equally efficient downstream competitors to compete profitably

61
New cards

rebates

no prohibition on rebates as such; concern arises where a dominant undertaking uses rebates to discourage customers from switching to rivals and thereby foreclose competition

62
New cards

categories of rebates

  • quantity rebates: linked exclusively to the volume purchase: normally reflect economies of scale or transaction cost savings, they are generally considered compatible with competition on the merits

  • exclusivity rebates: conditional on customers purchasing all or most of their requirements from the dominant undertaking

  • loyalty inducing rebates: neither pure quantity rebates nor formal exclusivity rebates but nevertheless create incentives for customers to concentrate purchases with the dominant undertaking


63
New cards

what did Post Danmark I c-209/10 establish about low pricing?

low prices are not automatically abusive; assess whether they are capable of excluding competitors, particularly equally efficient competitors

64
New cards

what did Post Danmark II c-23/14 establish about rebate schemes?

rebate schemes must be assessed in light of all circumstances to determine whether they are likely to produce exclusionary effects
the AEC test is not mandatory

65
New cards

price discrimination

occurs where a dominant undertaking charges different prices or applies different conditions to comparable transactions

66
New cards

what did Hoffmann-La Roche c-85/76 establish about exclusivity rebates? 

exclusivity rebates by dominant undertakings are presumptively abusive due to their potential to foreclose competitors

67
New cards

what did Intel c-413/14 establish about exclusivity rebates?

if the dominant undertaking submits evidence that its rebates are not capable of producing exclusionary effects, the Commission must assess all relevant circumstances
includes AEC test where possible

68
New cards

tying definition

conditioning the purchase of one product (tying product) on the purchase of a separate product (tied product)

69
New cards

bundling definition

offering two or more separate products together as a package, rather than individually, potentially foreclosing competitors in one or more markets

70
New cards

microsoft v. commission t-201/04 on tying and bundling

tying and bundling generally capable of constituting an abuse where:

  • undertaking is dominant in the tying product market

  • product are distinct (separate consumer demand for each)

  • practice is capable of foreclosing competition in the tied market, tying market, or both


71
New cards

bronner test c-7/97: when is refusal to supply abusive? essential facilities doctrine

cumulatively:

  1. must be indispensable with no alternative

  2. refusal must be likely to eliminate competition

  3. no objective justification


72
New cards

google android autos c-233/23 expansion of the bronner test

  • where a dominant undertaking develops a platform not solely for its own needs, refusal to grant access may be abusive even if access is not indispensable

  • sufficient that access is capable of making the downstream undertaking's product more attractive to consumers


73
New cards

leveraging definition

dominant undertaking uses advantages from its position in one market (leveraging market) to obtain, strengthen or protect market power in a neighbouring market (leveraged market)

74
New cards

self-preferencing definition

occurs where a dominant platform favours its own products or services over competing businesses that depend on the platform

75
New cards

what did Google Shopping (C-48/22 P) establish about self-preferencing?

abuse is an objective concept: dominant undertakings may abuse Article 102 by favouring their own services where conduct departs from competition on the merits and is capable of producing exclusionary effects

76
New cards

naked restrictions definition

conduct inherently harmful to competition:

  • whose only plausible purpose is to restrict competition

  • difficult to explain by legitimate commercial objectives



77
New cards

3 main exploitative abuses

  • excessive or unfair prices (article 102(a) tfeu)

  • unfair trading conditions (article 102(a) tfeu)

  • price discrimination (article 102(c) tfeu)


78
New cards

objective justification of article 102

  • two recognised defences:

    1. objective necessity

    2. efficiency gains


79
New cards

objective necessity (article 102)

conduct must be objectively necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim

80
New cards

google android auto c-233/23 on objective justification

  • genuine security concerns, technical impossibility or risks to platform integrity may justify refusal to ensure interoperability

  • justification cannot extend beyond what is necessary to address those concerns


81
New cards

efficiency gains (article 102)

"cumulatively:

  1. conduct achieves verifiable efficiencies

  2. efficiencies counterbalance negative effects on competition and consumers receive a fair share of the benefits

  3. conduct is indispensable to achieving the efficiencies

  4. conduct does not eliminate effective competition


82
New cards

what did commission v alrosa (c-441/07 p) establish about abuse of dominance

article 102 does not prohibit a dominant undertaking from strengthening its market position through ordinary commercial conduct; strengthening dominance is not abusive unless the undertaking uses methods incompatible with competition on the merits

83
New cards

what is a cartel

an anti-competitive agreement, concerted practice, or arrangement between two or more independent competitors designed to restrict, distort, or eliminate competition

84
New cards

united brands test: when pricing becomes exploitative

  • are the prices excessive within themselves?

  • is it excessive in comparison to comparable products in the market?


85
New cards

when are dawn raids permissible and which article of which instrument justifies them?

where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a serious infringement and where there is a risk evidence will be lost

article 20 regulation 1/2003

86
New cards