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what are the 5 branches of competition law
article 101: restrictive agreements and practices
article 102: abuse of dominance
merger control
articles 107-108: state aid
article 106: state owned enterprises; services of general economic interests
3 aspects of the field of application
ratione personae
ratione materiae
ratione loci
Hofner and Elser c-41/90
an undertaking is “every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed”
criteria determining the existence of an entity
degree of independence or autonomy it enjoys in terms of its market conduct
degree of financial risk it bears
Viho Europe (Parker Pen) C-73/95
a parent subsidiary constitute 1 undertaking if the parent exercises decisive control over its subsidiaries’ commercial activities, including prices, discounts, sales targets and marketing
when self employed persons benefit from the labour exemption
if they are false self employed (c-413/13 FNV kunsten):
economically dependent
working side by side with workers or
working through digital labour platforms
the labour exemption
2 cumulative conditions must be satisfied: (C-67/96, Albany)
nature: the agreement must result from collective negotiations between employers and employees, or their representative organisation
purpose: the agreement must directly improve working or employment conditions, including remuneration and pensions
economic activity
an activity is economic when it consists in offering goods or services on a given market, the profit motive is not decisive (c-475/99 ambulanz glockner)
activities which are considered non-economic
activities connected with the exercise of public/state powers are deemed not economic, even if they have been privatised (c-343/95 Diego Calì)
solidarity-based social security
publicly funded education (c-74/16 CEPPB)
association of undertakings
an organisation or body bringing together undertakings that coordinates or represents their commercial interests
ratione personae
determines the existence of an undertaking based on:
entity
economic activity
rationae materiae
material scope
areas excluded from ratione materiae
agriculture and transport
essential security interests
ratione loci
cumulatively:
requires trade between 2 or more MSs
may effect or may be likely to effect
effect on trade has to be appreciable
c-22/98 Becu
workers acting within an employment relationship, under the direction of their employer and without independent economic autonomy, are workers rather than undertakings
structure of article 101
first paragraph: prohibition in principle
second paragraph: sanction
third paragraph: exception
field of application of article 101 TFEU
"
parties (undertakings)
behaviour (agreements, decisions by associations, concerted practices)
object or effect (prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition)
trade between MSs (may) be affected
agreement definition
requires a concurrence of wills between at least two parties to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (c-211/22 super bock)
horizontal or vertical
decision by an association of undertakings definition
collective will of an association of undertakings intended to influence the market conduct of its members, regardless of its legal form or whether it is legally binding
concerted practice definition
form of coordination between undertakings which, without reaching the stage of a formal agreement, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation for the risks of competition by coordinating their market behaviour
restriction by effect
where the agreement is not sufficiently harmful by its nature, its actual or potential effects must be assessed against the competitive conditions that would exist without it
restriction by object
the agreement reveals, by its very nature and in its legal and economic context, a sufficient degree of harm to competition, meaning its effects do not need to be established
de minimis standard
threshold for when a restriction can fall under article 101
only for by effect restrictions
horizontal agreements: 10%> combined
vertical agreements: 15%> individually
ancillary restraints
“any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main operation”
“necessary” = objectively necessary + proportionate
“directly related” = subordinate to the implementation of the operation + have an evident link with it (usually same parties)
exceptions to article 101
"article 101(3): cumulative conditions:
efficiency gains
fair share with consumers
does not eliminate competition in the relevant market
indispensable: no other way the result could be achieved
individual v. block exemption
individual exemption: the undertaking demonstrates that its particular agreement satisfies all four conditions of Article 101(3)
block exemption: a category of agreements is exempted collectively through a Commission regulation, provided the agreement satisfies the regulation's requirements
block exemption
Commission regulations that automatically exempt specified categories of agreements from Article 101(1) under Article 101(3), provided they meet prescribed conditions
offer an alternative to proving the four Article 101(3) conditions individually
block v. de minimis exemption
de minimis: the agreement is too insignificant to appreciably restrict competition in the first place
block exemption: the agreement does restrict competition, but is exempt because it is considered to generate sufficient economic benefits under Article 101(3), provided it meets the relevant conditions
application of the VBER (steps)
is it a vertical agreement
does it contain a vertical restraint falling within article 1(1) VBER
does it satisfy the market share thresholds (article 3)
does it contain hardcore restrictions (article 4)
are there excluded obligations (article 5)
c-74/14 eturas
its presumed to be a concerted practice if there is awareness, acceptance and participation
a mere automatic recognition or knowledge doesnt constitute acceptance
an undertaking may participate in a prohibited agreement without having expressly consented because they did not distance themselves from the conduct
nature of digital platforms
"all digital platforms are VERTICAL (with an element of horizontal)"
maxima latvija c-345/14
restriction by object requires a sufficiently serious degree of harm inherent in the agreement
if this threshold is not met, a restriction by effect must be established through an assessment of the economic and legal context and the agreement's actual or potential impact on competition
super bock c-211/22
minimum resale price maintenance can constitute a restriction by object under article 101(1)
the existence of an agreement requires proof of a concurrence of wills between the supplier and distributors
wouters c-309/99
ancillary restraints doctrine: even where professional rules restrict competition, they may fall outside Article 101(1) if:
the measure pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest
the restriction is inherent in achieving that objective
the restriction is proportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary
european superleague v. FIFA & UEFA c-333/21
associations of undertakings exercising regulatory powers cannot restrict competition through rules that lack transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
international skating union v. commission c-124/21
associations of undertakings exercising both regulatory and commercial functions create a potential conflict of interest, and their market-access rules must be governed by transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria to avoid restricting competition by object
european commission – car manufacturers emissions cleaning cartel
coordination between competitors to limit technical development and innovation can constitute a restriction by object under Article 101(1)(b) TFEU, even without price-fixing or market-sharing.
structure of article 102
relevant market definition
dominance
abuse
forms of abuse
objective justification
relevant product market
comprises all products or services that are regarded as sufficiently interchangeable or substitutable by customers because of their characteristics, prices, intended use, and other competitive parameters
3 sources of competitive constraint on product market
demand substitution: whether consumers would switch to alternative products in response to a deteroriation in competitve conditions
supply-side substitution: whether other suppliers could rapidly and credibly begin offering the product without substantial additional investment or risk
potential competition: relevant where undertakings not currently active in the market are capable of exerting competitive pressure through future entry
SSNIP & SSNDQ
SSNIP: asks whether a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but lasting price increase
SSNDQ: platform economy: asks whether users would switch platforms due to a decrease in quality
geographic market
encompasses the area in which the undertakings concerned compete under sufficiently homogeneous conditions of competition and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where competitive conditions differ appreciably
market definition
product market
geographic market
temporal market
temporal market
competitive conditions may vary over time in connection w/ seasonality, demand fluctuations, peak and off-peak usage patterns, or short term capacity constraints
notion of dominance
c-27/76 united brands: a dominant position is a position of economic strength that enables an undertaking to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market, by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately its consumers
factors relevant to determining single dominance
market shares
barriers to entry or expansion
branding, reputation
regulatory barriers (eg. licenses)
duration of dominance
platform definition
a platform is an intermediary operating in a 2 sided market, faciliating interaction btwn 2 user groups that provide each other with network effects
direct network effects
arise when the value of a service increases with the number of users on the same side of the platform
indirect network effects
arise when growth on one side of the platform increases value on another side, such as between app developers and smartphone users
factors determining dominance in a platform economy
network effects
economies of scale
access to data
switching costs
ecosystem strategies (interconnected products such as apple)
collective dominance
where two or more legally independent undertakings present themselves or act together on the market as a collective entity and are able to behave independently of competitors, customers and consumers (C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge)
conditions for finding collective dominance based on tacit coordination
t-342/99 airtours:
a common understanding on the terms and conditions
the ability to monitor adherence (transparency)
a credible deterrence mechanism
external stability, meaning that actual or potential competitors and customers cannot jeopradise the result
exploitative abuse
involve the direct exploitation of consumers or trading partners, for example through excessive pricing or unfair trading condition
exclusionary abuse
impair the ability of actual or potential competitors to compete effectively, thereby risking harm to consumers indirectly through reduced competition, higher prices, lower quality, or less innovation in the longer term
2-limb analysis of exclusionary abuse
departs from competition on the merits
capability to produce exclusive effects
AEC principle
competition law should normally protect competitors that are as efficient as the dominant undertaking, not less efficient rivals
AEC test
seeks to determine whether a hypothetical competitor that is as efficient as the dominant undertaking, but does not enjoy its dominant position, could compete profitably
predatory pricing
dominant undertaking deliberately sacrificing profits in the short term by charging exceptionally low prices in order to exclude competitors or deter entry
akzo c-62/86
cost based framework that assesses predation:
prices below average variable cost (AVC) are presumed abusive
prices between average variable cost and average total cost (ATC) may be abusive where they form part of a strategy to eliminate a competitor
margin squeeze
occurs when a vertically integrated dominant undertaking sets its wholesale and retail prices so that the difference is insufficient for equally efficient downstream competitors to compete profitably
rebates
no prohibition on rebates as such; concern arises where a dominant undertaking uses rebates to discourage customers from switching to rivals and thereby foreclose competition
categories of rebates
quantity rebates: linked exclusively to the volume purchase: normally reflect economies of scale or transaction cost savings, they are generally considered compatible with competition on the merits
exclusivity rebates: conditional on customers purchasing all or most of their requirements from the dominant undertaking
loyalty inducing rebates: neither pure quantity rebates nor formal exclusivity rebates but nevertheless create incentives for customers to concentrate purchases with the dominant undertaking
what did Post Danmark I c-209/10 establish about low pricing?
low prices are not automatically abusive; assess whether they are capable of excluding competitors, particularly equally efficient competitors
what did Post Danmark II c-23/14 establish about rebate schemes?
rebate schemes must be assessed in light of all circumstances to determine whether they are likely to produce exclusionary effects
the AEC test is not mandatory
price discrimination
occurs where a dominant undertaking charges different prices or applies different conditions to comparable transactions
what did Hoffmann-La Roche c-85/76 establish about exclusivity rebates?
exclusivity rebates by dominant undertakings are presumptively abusive due to their potential to foreclose competitors
what did Intel c-413/14 establish about exclusivity rebates?
if the dominant undertaking submits evidence that its rebates are not capable of producing exclusionary effects, the Commission must assess all relevant circumstances
includes AEC test where possible
tying definition
conditioning the purchase of one product (tying product) on the purchase of a separate product (tied product)
bundling definition
offering two or more separate products together as a package, rather than individually, potentially foreclosing competitors in one or more markets
microsoft v. commission t-201/04 on tying and bundling
tying and bundling generally capable of constituting an abuse where:
undertaking is dominant in the tying product market
product are distinct (separate consumer demand for each)
practice is capable of foreclosing competition in the tied market, tying market, or both
bronner test c-7/97: when is refusal to supply abusive? essential facilities doctrine
cumulatively:
must be indispensable with no alternative
refusal must be likely to eliminate competition
no objective justification
google android autos c-233/23 expansion of the bronner test
where a dominant undertaking develops a platform not solely for its own needs, refusal to grant access may be abusive even if access is not indispensable
sufficient that access is capable of making the downstream undertaking's product more attractive to consumers
leveraging definition
dominant undertaking uses advantages from its position in one market (leveraging market) to obtain, strengthen or protect market power in a neighbouring market (leveraged market)
self-preferencing definition
occurs where a dominant platform favours its own products or services over competing businesses that depend on the platform
what did Google Shopping (C-48/22 P) establish about self-preferencing?
abuse is an objective concept: dominant undertakings may abuse Article 102 by favouring their own services where conduct departs from competition on the merits and is capable of producing exclusionary effects
naked restrictions definition
conduct inherently harmful to competition:
whose only plausible purpose is to restrict competition
difficult to explain by legitimate commercial objectives
3 main exploitative abuses
excessive or unfair prices (article 102(a) tfeu)
unfair trading conditions (article 102(a) tfeu)
price discrimination (article 102(c) tfeu)
objective justification of article 102
two recognised defences:
objective necessity
efficiency gains
objective necessity (article 102)
conduct must be objectively necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim
google android auto c-233/23 on objective justification
genuine security concerns, technical impossibility or risks to platform integrity may justify refusal to ensure interoperability
justification cannot extend beyond what is necessary to address those concerns
efficiency gains (article 102)
"cumulatively:
conduct achieves verifiable efficiencies
efficiencies counterbalance negative effects on competition and consumers receive a fair share of the benefits
conduct is indispensable to achieving the efficiencies
conduct does not eliminate effective competition
what did commission v alrosa (c-441/07 p) establish about abuse of dominance
article 102 does not prohibit a dominant undertaking from strengthening its market position through ordinary commercial conduct; strengthening dominance is not abusive unless the undertaking uses methods incompatible with competition on the merits
what is a cartel
an anti-competitive agreement, concerted practice, or arrangement between two or more independent competitors designed to restrict, distort, or eliminate competition
united brands test: when pricing becomes exploitative
are the prices excessive within themselves?
is it excessive in comparison to comparable products in the market?
when are dawn raids permissible and which article of which instrument justifies them?
where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a serious infringement and where there is a risk evidence will be lost
article 20 regulation 1/2003