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Critical period
Strict biological window where experience-expectant neuroplasticity occurs, the only opportunity for certain abilities (ex. language) to be developed: if missed, it becomes impossible to develop them
Sensitive period
More flexible windows where acquisition of an ability is easier or better than if it occurs outside that window (ex. second language acquisition)
Experience-expectant neuroplasticity
Neuroplasticity that occurs when certain common experiences (ex. exposure to language) are “expected” by the brain, so they are “anticipated” by overproducing synapses related to that experience and then pruning unused ones; encoded in DNA to happen when the brain can benefit most
Experience-dependent plasticity
New synapses are constructed based on how often neurons are fired together as a result of a specific experience (ex. second language acquisition, skill learning); neuroplasticity that happens throughout life for learning
Werker et al. (1981)
Infants were able to distinguish Hindi phonemes as well as Hindi-speaking adults, but English-speaking adults could not, indicating that language-sound-related synapses were pruned after infancy; implies that infancy is a sensitive/critical period for language
Blakemore & Cooper (1970)
Kittens were placed in restricted vertical or horizontal striped cylinders; kittens’ visual neurons only learned to fire when something was moved in the same direction as the stripes in their cylinder (vertically or horizontally). Their brains pruned visual neurons related to other movement because they were never used (experience-expectant neuroplasticity)
Genie case study (Curtiss, 1977)
“Genie”, a severely abused and neglected child who was discovered at age 13, had never been exposed to significant language and as a result never acquired a first language. Once placed in other care she picked up nonverbal communication and basic social skills, but never acquired spoken language, suggesting a critical period for language exists in childhood.
Theory of Mind
The ability to understand that others have distinct mental states, beliefs, and desires separate from one’s own
False-belief understanding
The ability to recognize that another person can hold a belief about the world that is factually false. Children with underdeveloped ToM cannot understand that others don’t share their knowledge because of egocentric thinking; evaluated with tasks like the “Smarties” task
Implicit ToM
Eye-tracking based on predictions of intentions; appears early (7-18 mos), unconscious and automatic, does not require logical reasoning
Explicit ToM
Explicit verbal false-belief responses; develops later (~4 yrs), conscious and analytical, requires logical reasoning about someone’s intentions, goals, desires, and beliefs
Temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
Meeting point between the temporal and parietal lobes of the brain, primary neuroanatomical region localized for ToM tasks. Integrates internal and external information; plays a critical role in social cognition and the left TPJ is critical for ToM
Meltzoff (1995)
18-month-old infants could infer human actors’ intended actions (even when they failed) but not wooden hands’ failing the same actions; indicates that infants can differentiate surface behaviors from intentions/goals
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)
Both most 4-yo neurotypical children and 4 yos with Down syndrome passed Sally-Anne false-belief tasks, but most 4 yo autistic children and even older autistic children failed
Sally-Anne task
After introducing the dolls, the child is asked the control question of recalling their names (the Naming Question). A short skit is then enacted; Sally takes a marble and hides it in her basket. She then "leaves" the room and goes for a walk. While she is away, Anne takes the marble out of Sally's basket and puts it in her own box. Sally is then reintroduced and the child is asked the key question, the Belief Question: "Where will Sally look for her marble?" To pass, they must indicate that Sally believes that the marble is in her own basket, which is continuous with Sally's perspective, but not with the participant's own. If the participant cannot take an alternative perspective, they will indicate that Sally has cause to believe that the marble has moved. Passing the test is seen as the manifestation of a participant understanding that Sally has her own beliefs that may not correlate with reality.
Saxe & Kanwisher (2003)
fMRI showed the TPJ was only activated for ToM tasks and was doubly dissociated from body-perception areas nearby (EBA)
Internal Working Model
Bowlby theorized that children form a model for relationships based on their attachment and relationship with their primary caregiver
Contact comfort
Baby monkeys prefer a soft cloth mother without food to a wire one with food, indicating that comfort is a primary drive and not secondary to hunger
Type A attachment (Insecure-Avoidant)
Minority attachment style; child is detached from caregiver, does not care about separations or reunions in a Strange Situation, results from consistent caregiver neglect
Strange Situation
Devised by Mary Ainsworth to test attachment; infants are put through a series of separations from and reunions with their primary caregiver
Type B attachment (Secure)
About 70% of people; “normal” attachment, children display normal distress when separated and joy when reunited, results from consistent responsiveness and care from guardian
Type C attachment (Insecure-Resistant or ambivalent)
Minority; children display extreme distress when separated and are both clingy and push caregiver away when reunited, results from inconsistent treatment by the caregiver
Monotropy vs. multiple caregivers
Bowlby theorized attachment is based on a child’s relationship with one primary caregiver, but in some cultures babies are cared for by many adults which shapes attachment differently
Harlow (1958)
Cloth vs. wire mother experiment, open-field fear tests; infant monkeys use mother as a secure base to explore unfamiliar situations and return to her when faced with alarming stimuli
Van Ijzendoorn & Kroonenberg (1988)
32-sample cross-cultural meta-analysis comparing attachment distribution across 8 countries; found intracultural variation was greater than intercultural variation, and that secure attachments were generally most common in all countries but which insecure attachment was more common varied by country