ConLaw 1

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Description and Tags

Final Exam Prep - all key documents/cases (including key dissent points)

45 Terms

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Magna Carta

A foundational document signed in 1215 that limited the powers of the king and established certain legal rights for subjects, influencing constitutional law and individual rights; 1297 is the version to be cited

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English Bill of Rights

A criminal indictment filed against the king (Glorious revolution overthrew James II and replaced him with William III and Mary II); parliament passing judgement on the king which marks a major power shift establishing a movement away from absolute monarchy

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John Locke’s Social Contract

Wrote about natural rights (inalienable, inherently possessed) which the people entrust to the government when forming/entering political society; while the people retain sovereignty, the power is entrusted to the government to ensure greater security and protection of fundamental rights; people have the authority to take power back from the government

Main point: government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed; the government is not the ultimate sovereign

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Blackstone

Power is transferred not retained/people give it up when they establish a government; law obtains its highest formal authority through Parliament (making that the legally supreme body)

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Locke’s 3 Powers

1) Legislative - body that makes the laws and has the power to determine how the force of the commonwealth will be used to preserve the community and its members; separating this from the executive gives lawmakers the incentives to make laws for their own interest and abide by them; should not be a standing body

2) Executive - power to carry out the standing laws; must be standing to ensure constant administration and enforcement

3) Federative - power to manage foreign affairs (war, peace, alliances, etc.); distinct from the executive power, but should be held by the same party

Does not include judicial power

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Locke’s Right of Rebellion

Grounded in natural law and the sovereignty of the people; state is at fault if it puts itself at a state of war by breaching the trust of the people; De Facto dissolution of the government occurs when those in power breach the trust of the people; if the majority of the people think their inalienable rights are being abused it is their duty to rebel (must be a significant pattern of abuse); each must judge for themselves (crucial to our understanding of the 1st Amendment)

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Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)

Criminal complaint written 1 month before the DoI; based on the English Bill of Rights; VA asserts the same rights that were violated in the colonial experience (including no standing army as it could lead to a violation of the rights of the people); precursor to the DoI and Constitution

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Declaration of Independence

Locke parallel - people taking up their duty to rebel in the face of the government’s violation of trust; principle of equality “all men are created equal”; influenced by the VDoR

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Articles of Confederation

Failed but are used in purposive/original intent arguments; first attempt to set up a new system of government;

Art. II: Federal powers are “expressly” enumerated; all other powers remain with

the states.

■ 10th A. drops “expressly” → keep this change in mind when you are

interpreting the 10th A.

○ Art. III: creates a “firm league of friendship” among the states

■ The states promise to assist one another against foreign attacks

○ Art. IV: privileges and immunities

○ Art. V: freedom of speech and debate in Congress + equal representation for states

■ Purpose: Protect the power to disagree because that’s how we grow and

make good laws

■ History: Without the protection, we have Charles I all over again and

people will be too scared to disagree

○ Art. VI: Congress has the exclusive power to enter treaties and alliances, but it

lacks a general power to regulate foreign or interstate commerce.

○ Art. VIII: Congress cannot tax individuals directly but requisitions money from

the states

○ Art. IX: Congress determines when at peace and when at war

○ Art. XIII: Amendment requires approval by congress and confirmation by every state legislature

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Federalist 21 (Problems with the AoC)

No enforcement mechanism: 1) states could ignore legislation without serious repercussions 2) Congress could neither exact obedience nor punish disobedience 3) Reading an enforcement mechanism into the Articles would undermine their text (as Article II reserves to the states every power not “expressly delegated” to Congress 4) Every other country’s national government possessed the power to enforce its laws

No guarantee of state government: National government relied on state militias (could undermine the other states as federal gov had no way to compel states to help one another); no mutual guarantee requiring national gov and other states to protect a state’s lawful gov (Domestic threat - Shay’s Rebellion; Foreign threat - British invasion); Constitutional parallel is the guarantee clause

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Federalist 22 (More Problems with AoC)

No commerce, foreign affairs, or judicial power; ratified or repealed by the states (should be by the people); Congress cannot directly raise a national army

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Federalist 47 (Madison - Checks and Balances)

There should be a partial overlap between the three branches rather than a strict separation; need to bump up against each other

Anti-Federalists: Constitution threatens liberty because it does not keep the legislative, executive, and judicial branches completely separate and they could be in cahoots against the people

Madison’s response to this: partial overlap is the very thing that creates checks and balances; no existing state constitutions have kept the 3 completely separate

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Federalist 48 (Parchment Barriers are insufficient to protect the rights of the people)

Simply defining each branch’s powers on paper does not prevent one branch from encroaching on the others “mere parchment barriers”; Constitution must be capable of withstanding each branch’s attempts to expand its own authority

Assumption that politicians are ambitious and will attempt to expand their power (the legislative poses the greatest risk of this as it controls the purse and the laws —> powers associated with tyranny in England)

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Federalist 49 (Stable political institutions should be used to channel the voice of the people)

Jefferson’s proposal is that the people should be able to regularly call a constitutional convention to amend the Constitution as they are the sovereign; Madison says NO! People must maintain an avenue for constitutional change on special occasions, but it would create 1) instability and disorder 2) less respect for the government 3) allow passion rather than reason to control constitutional decisions if constitutional questions were referred to them

People need stability to determine their will and implement it; the government must provide this

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Federalist 51 (Ambition checks ambition)

Constitution sets the ambition of all of the branches against each other (prevents any one branch from accumulating enough power to encroach upon rights; each branch has 1) Constitutional means to resist the other branches 2) Personal motives to defend its own authority)

People’s Passion - institutions help balance the anger and emotions that can overcome reason

The people remain the ultimate check on the government (voting)

Public anger, protest, and political mobilization provide necessary checks when every branch shares the same ambitions (but we want to avoid the chaos in Shay’s rebellion)

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Federalist Thoughts on the Bill of Rights

Textual: Art. 1.8 - federal gov possesses only limited, enumerated powers, so a separate BoR is necessary (any unlisted powers withheld from Congress); Constitution already protects certain rights such as Habeas corpus, jury trials, narrowly defines treason, etc.

Policy: Should not attempt to define terms such as “justice” too narrowly because their meaning evolves with society (would restrict individual rights by allowing future interpreters to deny rights that were not expressly included); attempting to enumerate every possible right could unintentionally narrow individual liberty (adding BoR could shift assumption from “gov lacks this power” to “individual must prove that the asserted right is enumerated”

Structural: Horizontal separation of powers creates checks and balances that protect individual rights; Constitutional structure also operates before the violation by dividing power and enabling each branch to prevent the others from infringing individual rights

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Anti-Federalist Thoughts on the Bill of Rights

Textual: Enumerated powers are broad and ambiguous (what is ‘commerce’; N&P can be interpreted broadly; Article III grants vaguely defined exec powers; certain expressed rights are expressed insufficiently; if Constitution expressly protects some rights, why doesn’t it just express them all

Policy: Establishes a constitutional floor (adding additional rights can be done via amendments); ambiguity cuts both ways - ambitious politicians may interpret broad language narrowly to serve their own interests

Structural: Express constitutional rights are necessary to protect minorities; vertical federalism means that state bills of rights cannot adequately protect individuals from the federal gov; elections occur after violations of rights take place, so it’s not an adequate check to allow rights to be violated and then remove after the fact

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Alien Friends Act

President can, at any time during this act order all aliens he thinks are 1) dangerous or 2) has “reasonable grounds” to expect are dangerous to leave the US —> because of “or” all that’s actually required is for the president to think someone is dangerous (very broad sole discretion)

President may order an alien already imprisoned under the Act to be removed from the US whenever he deems removal necessary for “public safety” —> public safety is a much broader category than national security, all determination is left to the President (nemo iudex in causa sua concern)

Return after removal if an alien voluntarily returns to the US without presidential permission = imprisonment for as long as the President thinks is necessary for public safety (unlimited duration)

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Alien Enemies Act

During a time of declared war OR time of foreign threat, the President may apprehend, restrain, secure, or remove alien male enemies aged 14+; only limits are they must be a 14+ male and a denizen (member of a hostile foreign nation) and that the President must make a public proclamation

Lower floor for “foreign threat” - way too much power in the hands of the President

Court has limited power - just carry out and enforce what the President has determined/prescribed; cannot really check the President

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Sedition Acts

High misdemeanor to “combine or conspire…with intent to oppose any measure” of the government'; 5k fine + 5 years imprisonment; extremely broad characterization (could be applied to a protest for example)

Unlawful to “write, print, utter, or publish…any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the federal government”; punishment up to 2k + 2 years imprisonment (major 1st A concern)

Constitutional issues here - 1st A; Congress has only powers granted by the constitution, no enumerated power allows them to criminalize criticism/opposition of the government

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Lyon

Lyon (VT congressman and Jeffersonian Republican) was prosecuted under the Sedition Act for criticism of Adams: 1) publishing libelous statements 2) publishing a letter from France 3) Assisting in publication of the material

Art 1.5.2 - Congress has the power to expel one of their members with a 2/3 vote

Judge instructed jury not to consider the constitutionality of the statute itself

Arguments for jury authority: Textual - Constitution does not expressly give only courts the power to interpret it; also not restricted to courts because the constitution enumerated to other branches the power to interpret it (Congress before passing, President before signing); Structural - jury nullification is a way for people to check the government; ultimate sovereignty is with the people (the jury is another institution of constitutional judgement)

Arguments against jury authority: allowing every jury to independently interpret laws would create anarchy/chaos; people should use Madisonian check (voting) —> response to that is jury participation does not mean pure anarchy, juries already exercise judgment over both law and fact within a structured court proceeding

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Callendar

Was prosecuted for Anti-Adams publications; Justice Chase instructed the jury to determine the facts and determine if they fell within the statute and he made an argument against jury determination of constitutionality:

Textual/Structural - A 3 vests the judicial power in federal courts and extends that power to cases arising under the Constitution/federal law (so the power of interpretation rests with the judiciary)

Historical - English petit juries did not possess authority to invalidate legislation (response is that American constitutional structure differs from England’s - written constitution, separation of powers, etc.)

Purpose - Congress expressly allows juries to determine “the law and the fact” but did not expressly say that juries could determine the constitutionalist of the statute itself; Chase says this means Congress intended constitutional review to remain for the courts

Policy - Congress would never do anything unconstitutional (response —> people are ambitious and power hungry)

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Virginia Resolution (Madison)

Alien and Sedition Acts are unconstitutional - Congress exceeded its delegated powers; Sedition Act directly contradicts with the 1st A’s protection of speech and press; Separation of powers is non-existent in them as the President has the legislative and judicial power; concerns about foreign-affairs is insufficient for expanding federal power over domestic affairs

Role of the states - States are parties to the constitutional compact and retain powers not delegated to the federal government; state officials have a duty to respond when the federal government exceeds its constitutional authority (vertical federalism - states serve as an additional structural check on federal overreach)

Elections are one check but Madison’s resolution argues that states may also “interpose” when the federal government exercises powers that are “deliberate, palpable, and dangerous” and not constitutional

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Kentucky Resolution (Jefferson)

Alien and Sedition Acts are void -

compact theory (the constitution is a compact among the states to which each one is a party;

the federal government breaches the compact when it exercises undelegated power - nemo iudex in causa sua);

10th A (powers not delegated to the federal govt is reserved to the states);

enumerated crimes (constitution gives Congress power over crimes such as treason, counterfeiting, and piracy/felonies on the high seas SO expresio unius est exclusio alterius - specifying those crimes suggests other criminal matters remain with the states);

speech/press: no general federal power over speech or press was delegated and 1st A expressly prohibits Congress from abridging them (regulations of those matters remain with the states or people)

state authority; alien friends are under jurisdiction and protection of the state in which they reside, so Jefferson argued that no general federal power over them had been delegated

concentration of power; based on the Acts’ statutory language, the Commonwealth is giving themselves unlimited powers (authorizing exec as judge, jury, and executioner)

States’ rights/duty - states as party to the constitutional compact retain a role in judging whether the federal government had exceeded its delegated powers; state may declare an unconstitutional federal act void and of no force within Jefferson’s compact theory

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Other State Responses to VA Resolution

DE - rejected them as “an unjustifiable interference” with federal gov and warned that the theory was dangerous; basic objection was that states should not interfere with the operation of the constituted federal authorities

RI - structural (constitutionality of federal laws is for the federal judiciary, not state legislatures - states taking it on would collapse the distinction between legislative and judicial power) policy (states are not competent tribunals for resolving federal constitutional questions, allowing each state to decide constitutionality risks many competing interpretations and the undermining of the Union)

MA - Constitutional questions belong within the federal gov; a number of text supporting federal power (N&P, Commander in Chief, Arising under, Insurrection/Guarantee Clauses, Supremacy Clause, Law of Nations power); need a uniform national interpretation, gov must retain ability to function and protect itself against unlawful attacks, states cannot simply declare a federal law void because they disagree with it, there are other mechanisms for change)

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Departmentalism

theory that every branch of government gets to interpret the Constitution (Congress must pass Constitutional laws, exec can veto unconstitutional Congressional laws, judiciary decides the constitutionality of the law)

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Is Judicial Review necessarily implied by departmentalism?

Argument - courts decide which cases arising under the Constitution + the Constitution is the supreme law; when a statute conflicts, Constitution is supreme

Response - Art. 3 may only give courts jurisdiction over cases in which constitutional questions arise; it does not expressly give them a general power to invalidate legislation

Oath Response - judges are not the only officials who swear to uphold the Constitution, the Pres and Congress members also do this; if the oath itself creates a power to determine constitutionality, that reasoning supports constitutional interpretation by all three branches, not just the judiciary

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Brutus XI (Judicial Review)

  • Independent judiciary is dangerous because judicial independence may allow courts to expand fed power without meaningful accountability

    • Courts can make bad decisions, but judges cannot be removed simply because of that; removal is limited to impeachment for treason, bribery, or other high crimes/misdemeanors

    • Where law is ambiguous, courts may rely on purposive reasoning which could lead to an expansive interpretation of federal power

  • judicial power will expand the scope of the federal government; can mold the government into whatever shape it wants; decisions are binding on the other branches

  • Federal judicial power will subvert state judiciaries by implicitly favoring federal power instead of state authority

  • Ways he got it right

    • Judges are insulated from accountability for their decisions (H’s counter - judges can still be removed for serious misconduct, and institutional checks remain even if ordinary errors are not grounds for removal)

    • Structural: justices may be beholden to the President because the President participates in appointing them (H’s response - life tenure breaks that dependence after appointment)

    • Brutus predicts courts will develop doctrines not expressly discussed in the Constitution through their discretion to interpret


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Federalist 78 (Hamilton)

  • Judges hold their offices during good behavior; life tenure creates an important barrier against legislative encroachment and protects judicial independence

    • gives judges the independence to stand up to the political branches and enforce constitutional limits

    • Prevents judges from being swayed by political/popular pressure

    • protects private and minority rights against unjust or biased laws

  • Judiciary will always be the least dangerous branch (exec has the sword, legislature has the purse and pen); judiciary has “neither force not will, but merely judgement”

  • Judiciary protects rights against legislative overreach; external check on legislatures by refusing to enforce laws contrary to the Constitution; legislature cannot be the sole judge of its own powers (nemo); concern that legislators may interpret constitutional limits in ways that favor their own institutional interests

  • Judiciary is the weakest branch and therefore needs independence to protect itself

  • What he got right

    • Historical: experience suggests that independent judges can serve as important protectors of rights, British experience as support for judicial tenure and independence


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Marbury v. Madison (Opinion - Marshall)

Main takeaway: Marshall loses the battle but wins the war; Marbury doesn’t get his commission, but the Court establishes its power of judicial review

Issue:

  • Does Marbury have a right to the commission? - Yes

    • Congress created the office

      • Congress had the constitutional authority to do that - Art 1.8.17 - Congress has exclusive legislative power over DC which includes the authority to create local judicial offices

    • Marbury’s appointment was valid

      • An appointment is complete when the President signs the commission and SoS affixes the seal

      • Once Adams signed Marbury’s commission and the seal was affixed, Marbury had a vested legal right to the office

      • Once the appointment was complete, the President’s power over the office ended where the officer was not removable at the President’s will

  • Do the laws give Marbury a legal remedy? - Yes

    • “Ubi ius ibi remedium” (where there is a right, there is a remedy)

    • Jefferson’s argument - Court has not authority to examine or control the President’s exercise of executive power

    • Marshall’s reponse - not all exec actions are the same; there are two types

      • Acts where law gives President the discretion about what to do (origin of political question doctrine; courts avoid matters committed to political discretion)

      • Acts where the law imposes a specific duty and leaves the executive officer no discretion about whether to perform it (ministerial task); when an individual right depends on that duty, courts may require the officer to perform it

    • key Marshall move here - limiting the Court by conceding it can’t review genuine executive discretion so that he can preserve judicial authority over exec officials who fail to perform legally required duties

  • Is Marbury entitled to the remedy he applies for?

    • Is asking for a write of mandamus the correct legal remedy? - Yes

      • Requirements 1) writ must be directed to an officer legally subject to it 2) the plaintiff must have no other specific legal remedy

      • Under Blackstone’s description of mandamus, Marbury’s case fits the bill

    • Does SCOTUS have the power to issue the writ of mandamus? - No

      • Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred original jurisdiction on SCOTUS to issue writs of mandamus

      • Marshall reads A3 as setting complete limits on SCOTUS jurisdiction (Congress cannot give the court original jurisdiction where the constitution only provides appellate jurisdiction; if Congress could alter that division, the Constitution’s jurisdictional limits would be “form without substance”; expressio unius est exclusio alterius - by specifying where original jurisdiction does exist, A3 explains that it does not exist elsewhere

      • Constitution must be supreme - justices’ oath is to uphold the Constitution, must be able to interpret statutes and refuse to apply conflicting laws; structural - Constitution comes before ordinary federal statutes and limits what Congress may do; an act repugnant to the Constitution cannot become the law of the land


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Structural Protections and Democratic Design

Central Point: the actions of the legislature and constitutional limits on Congress affect the scope of Executive power

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Youngstown Key Points (aside from opinions)

  • Truman claimed source of his power to direct seizure of steel mills during a time of national defense requiring it came from A2 Sections 1-3

    • Nemo concern - If the Pres can both declare an emergency and determine the additional powers such an emergency would give him, what prevents him from eliminating any boundaries of his own authority?

  • Steel Companies’ argument that there was 1) no congressional authorization for the seizure, and it exceeded the constitutional powers granted to the president 2) this was a legislative decision not the execution of an existing law 3) national emergency is not sufficient grounds for the Pres to have unlimited power, federal government’s powers must be exercises via Constitutional allocation of authority 4) Concentration of power in other countries illustrates why constitutional limits matter during emergencies

  • Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills?

  • Holding: NO (6-3)


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Youngstown Majority Opinion (Black)

  • Nemo!! President should not be conclusively determining the scope of his own authority; Presidential authority comes from 1) the Constitution itself or 2) a Congressional statute

  • Congressional authorization - Congress expressly rejected amendment which would allow authorization of emergency seizure of plants (when debating Taft-Hartley Act)

    • Counter to this is that rejection of the proposition is not the same as an affirmative prohibition; there could be reasons for the rejection besides the content itself (constituent pressure, etc.) - rejection is probative but not conclusive of opposition

  • Constitution

    • Vesting Clause - vesting does not give the President legislative power to establish his own policy for steel mill seizure

    • CinC - seizure of mills to resolve a domestic dispute is not the same as directing military operations during war; mill’s importance to the war effort does not make their seizure a military decision - this is a task for Congress

    • Take Care - Pres must faithfully execute NOT make laws; no statute expressly or impliedly authorized this seizure


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Youngstown Concurrence (Jackson) - framework for separation of powers

  • Expressio is true, but enumeration does not resolve every question about overlapping congressional and presidential authority —> Jackson recognizes these gray areas and concludes that presidential power fluctuates depending upon whether Congress authorizes, remains silent about, or opposes President’s action

  • Three ebbs of presidential power - all dependent on Congress’ actions

    • Maximum power - President acts pursuant to Congress’ express or implied authorization

    • Zone of Twilight - Congress has neither denied not granted authority; Pres relies on his independent powers, congressional and presidential authority may overlap or distribution may be uncertain

    • Least power - President acts incompatibly with Congress’ express or implied will; to prevail, must establish that the Constitution gives him exclusive authority that Congress cannot restrict

  • Application - Truman was in the lowest ebb has Congress had adopted statutory policies inconsistent with his actions; vesting, CinC, and Take Care

  • Brings in other sovereign (Germany) as its constitution was designed to protect individual liberty but allowed temporary presidential suspension of individual rights during emergencies

    • Calling emergency powers “temporary” does not prevent permanent abuse, their control must rest outside the executive exercising them


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Youngstown Concurrence (Frankfurter) - “The gloss of life through government practice” (context changes the meaning of the text)

  • If Presidents have exercised a particular power consistently for a long time, and Congress knew about it and accepted it, that history helps show that the power belongs to the President BUT

    • a few isolated presidential actions are not enough and practice cannot override the Constitution or a statute

  • Take Care Clause is not a blank check, but a limitation on presidential power; must carry out the legal framework created by Congress


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Youngstown Concurrence (Douglas) - Structural protections triumph over efficiency

  • An emergency does not create a new power

  • We must accept the costs of checks and balances (including delays as concentrating power risks tyranny)

  • Even though President can act faster, separation of powers exists for a reason (preventing arbitrary rule) not to maximize efficiency; rule of law requires respecting those limits


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Youngstown Dissent (Vinson)

  • Congress had supported the defense effort via appropriations to carry out defense programs

    • Counter - funding an objective does not authorize every means of achieving it; otherwise, appropriations could become a source of nearly unlimited executive authority

  • Congress passed the Defense Production Act

  • Truman notified Congress and for 12 days, they did nothing

    • Counter - silence does not mean approval; under the opposing view, the President must establish authority beforehand, Congress need not enact a prohibition afterward

  • Mills were seized for public use

  • Take Care Clause = duty to act; Vinson says Truman needed to prevent a steel stoppage from undermining military procurement and economic stablization

  • Taft Hartley Act does not explicitly prohibit seizing mills

    • Counter - absence of prohibition does not supply authorization; presidential powers are enumerated and limited

  • Historical argument : Previous presidents had acted without specific statutory authorization during crises

    • Counter - Frankfurter distinguished sustained practice accepted by Congress from isolated actions; Black emphasized that presidential power must come from either the Constitution or Congress


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CNN v. Trump (Central Point: actions of the legislature and constitutional limits on Congress affect the scope of executive power)

  • Constitutional Principles Implicated

    • Viewpoint discrimination - government cannot discriminate against a journalist just because it dislikes their viewpoint or message (Rosenberger - gov generally cannot regulate speech based on the speaker’s opinion; rationale - allowing gov to favor or supress viewpoints creates a serious risk of censorship

    • Qualified First A Right of Access - once gov opens press access, it cannot exclude journalists arbitrarily or based on viewpoint

    • Public Forum Doctrine - government’s ability to regulate speech depends on the type of forum it has created or opened for expression (forum = physical or digital and Packingham recognizes social media as an important modern space for 1st A activity)

    • Chilling Effect - gov action creates a chilling effect when it deters people from exercising protected right out of fear of punishment (in this case speech)

    • 1st A Liberty Interest + DP - when govt action burdens a protected 1st A interest, DP may require fair procedures before that interest is taken away

    • What is speech? - not always verbal, conduct can communicate ideas too


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Appointment and Removal Power - Contours of Exec Power

  • Textual

    • 2.1 - Vesting Clause creates a unitary executive; 3 ways to interpret 1. expansive (grants a unitary exec all the executive power) 2. limited (power to execute the laws that the legislature passes) 3. Jacksonian - we have 1 president

    • 2.2 - CinC clause describes and clarifies exec power

    • 2.3 - Take Care Clause imposes duties upon the president

    • 2.4 - impeachment clause

  • Historical/Hamiltonian - President needs energy, independence, unity, and accountability

    • President lacks monarchical power: 1) Fed. 67 (fears of an overly powerful Pres are overblown because the Pres’ authority is constitutionally limited and constrained by the other branches, unlike the broad hereditary powers of a monarch 2) Fed. 69 (Pres is not like the British King because of limitations on its power - 4 year terms, impeachable, veto can be overridden, etc.)

    • Structural protections on election:

      • Fed 68 - electoral college was created to make a buffer between popular elections and the final selection of the President; electors could exercise independent judgement, helping guard against bribery, corruption, misinformation, or temporary popular passions

        • Shay’s Rebellion reflects broader founding-era concern that temporary passions and political chaos should not overwhelm stable Republican government

        • Counter - if electors vote against the people’s choice, they may seem to act against popular sovereignty

    • Requirements for an energetic executive

      • Fed. 70 - Unity (single executive promotes energy, decisiveness, and accountability)

        • plural exec can diminish responsibility and conceal fault which would weaken the Madisonian check; can also make action slower/less decisive (ex. Shay’s rebellion - gov was not able to respond effectively in the face of a crisis)

      • Fed. 71 - Duration (Pres needs a term long enough to provide stability and independence, but not so long as to diminish accountability to the people; hence 4 years)

      • Fed. 72 - Adequate provision of its support

        • reelection eligibility allows the country to retain an experienced and capable President, which can be especially valuable in emergencies

      • Fed. 73 - Competent Powers

        • exec needs to be able to defend against legislative encroachment (veto power); connected to Fed. 48 - separation of powers cannot depend on “mere parchment barriers”, each branch needs means to defend its constitutional role

    • President must remain answerable to the people

      • Fed. 77 - exec power is tempered by institutional cooperation and accountability


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Appointment and Removal Power - Textual, Structural, and Historical Backdrop

  • President’s Appoint/Removal Power

    • Textual: Vesting and Take Care Clause

    • Structural: built upon the clauses above; Pres relies on subordinates to faithfully execute the law; if POTUS cannot control/remove subordinates, they could frustrate execution of the laws and disrupt the Madisonian check

    • Exec. Power Theory - presidential power includes 1) direct, supervise, and control subordinates 2) remove subordinates at will


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Discussion of 1789

  • Question: if an officer is appointed by the Pres with the Senate’s advice and consent, can the President remove that officer alone?

  • Outcome: 10-10 tie; VP Adams cast the tie breaker vote in favor of recognizing presidential removal authority; Executive Power Theory wins

  • 4 Theories

    • Executive Power - Pres has this and must be able to remove officers who prevent him from faithfully executing the laws; comes with an accountability concern as it’s hard to know where the fault lies

    • Advice and Consent Theory - Pres appoints officers with Senate’s advice and consent; removal should likewise require Senate advice and consent

    • Congressional Delegation Theory - Congress may determine by statute when and under what conditions the Pres may remove an officer

    • Impeachment Theory - Since Congress has the power to impeach and remove officers —> removal is primarily a legislative function


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Myers (postmaster case)

Issue: Does the President have the power under A2 to remove an executive officer without the advice and consent of the Senate?

Majority Opinion (Taft)

  • Historical - Decision of 1789 (early Congressional debate settled on exec power theory that removal power belongs to the Pres)

  • Textual

    • Vesting Clause (2.1) - Exec power is vested in the Pres; removal is part of the President’s control over exec administration

    • Take Care Clause (2.3) - POTUS must have removal ability in order to fulfill this clause (needs to have some way to keep subordinates in line)

    • Advice and Consent Clause (2.2) - advice and consent is an express limitation on appointment, not a limitation on exec power

    • Appointments Clause (2.2) - designed as a check on presidential appointment power; appointment structure also reflected concerns about preventing large states domination in the selection of federal officers

  • Practice: past presidents had sole removal power


Dissent (Holmes)

  • Congress created the postmaster office —> they should determine the terms and conditions of the office

  • President’s duty to execute the laws does not give him authority beyond what Congress has lawfully established


Dissent (Brandeis)

  • Textual - Vesting Clause does not inherently include an unlimited removal power; Take Care Clause imposes a duty to execute the laws but does not itself grant removal authority

  • Historical - decision of 1789 does not conclusively resolve removal of lower-level officers like postmasters


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Humphrey’s Executor (FTC Commissioner Case)

Issue: Does the President’s removal power recognized in Myers extend to officials serving on an independent agency exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions?

Holding: NO (9-0)

Majority Opinion (Sutherland)

  • Precedent - limits Myers by arguing that it only applies to officers exercising purely executive functions; does not establish an unlimited presidential removal power over every federal officer (key - FTC commissioner is quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative)

  • Structural - FTC is not an arm of the executive, it performs mixed duties and therefore must be able to act independently of POTUS; separation of powers requires each branch to remain free from the control of others (POTUS cannot become master over institutions exercising legislative or judicial type functions)

    • Congress may impose for-cause removal protections when necessary to preserve the independence of such officers


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SEC (independent agency official fired by Trump despite statutory for-cause removal protection)

  • Kagan: HE was still binding, Court should apply that until formally overruling it

    • By granting the stay (allowing the firing to stand during litigation); SCOTUS gave POTUS unrestricted removal power that existing statutes and precedent denied him without first deciding merits

    • HE also supports an entire model of independent, bipartisan expert agencies - undermining it at the stay stage casts doubt on the validity of similar removal protections across many other independent agencies


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Trump v. Slaughter