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World War II: a war in two theatres between two coalitions
World War II was fought in two principal theatres:
European war: 1939–45
Asian-Pacific war: 1937–45
The main Axis powers were Germany, Italy and Japan.
The principal Allied powers were France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. After the war, these five victors became the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The largest and most destructive war in history
The largest armed conflict in history
• The only truly global war
• Larger than any previous war in size, scope and destruction
Industrial warfare
• Manpower still important, but secondary to firepower
• Military outcomes depended on industrial potential
The most destructive war ever
• Extensive battlefronts
• Huge destruction behind enemy lines (aerial bombardment)
• Civilian casualties equalled or outnumbered military casualties
The human toll
Total casualties
• Almost 60 million globally
• c. 40 million in Europe
• 26 million Soviet citizens
Civilian casualties
• Most in Eastern Europe and East Asia
• Genocide more than collateral damage: 6 million Holocaust victims
Military casualties
• Concentrated on two fronts
• Overwhelmingly Soviet, Chinese, German and Japanese
The economics of total war
Mobilisation: Governments converted civilian industry to the production of weapons and ammunition and concentrated production in large plants: push for mass production
Economic warfare aimed to destroy the enemy’s productive potential through:
Submarine warfare
Strategic bombing
Blockades and resource deprivation
The war accelerated technological development in:
Mass production methods
Diesel engines
Aerospace
Communication technology
Advances in science: Computers, Nuclear energy, Air conditioning, Radar, Linear programming
Industrial warfare and mass production
The United States possessed the most advanced mass-production system:
Ford’s Willow Run aircraft plant
Henry Kaiser’s mile-long shipbuilding lines in Richmond, California
Weapons were produced like standardized consumer goods.
-European factories relied more heavily on batch production. Strategic bombing disrupted the continuous flow of inputs required for mass production, forcing European factories to disperse into smaller, camouflaged sites.
-The war therefore widened the productivity gap between American mass production and European batch methods.
-Weapons were produced in unprecedented numbers: tanks, aircraft and ships came off assembly lines like consumer goods.
-Mobilisation drew new workers, notably women, into war industry.
Military power came down to industrial capacity: the war was a production race.
Military expenditure
• Germany mobilised early: 17% in 1938, peak of 76% in 1943.
• USSR matched Germany's peak from a much poorer economy.
• US mobilised late (2% in 1940) and peaked at 45%, a smaller share of by far the largest economy.
• At their peak, the major powers devoted 45–76% of national product to the war
• Demobilisation was rapid: e.g. US from 38% to 5%.
International mobilization and exploitation
Inter-Allied aid
• US transfers of food and munitions to Britain and the Soviet Union
• Imports from non-combatant allies on credit
Division of labour
• Rich countries specialised in producing war material
• Poor countries specialised in providing manpower
Exploitation of occupied lands
• Germany and Japan extracted food and raw materials
• German trade with its allies intensified during the war
Thus, wartime coalitions operated as multinational production and resource systems.
Allied economic superiority
The United States was by far the world’s largest economy. Germany was the largest Axis economy and approximately comparable in size to the Soviet Union.
Combined, the economic resources of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, China and the British dominions greatly exceeded those of Germany, Italy and Japan.
Because World War II became an industrial production race, the Allies’ larger combined GDP and industrial potential were decisive advantages.
Distribution of military deaths
The Soviet Union suffered by far the largest military losses.
Germany, China and Japan followed.
Britain, France, Italy and the United States experienced substantially smaller military losses.
The distribution of burdens was therefore unequal:
The United States provided enormous industrial output but suffered relatively limited military losses.
The Soviet Union and China provided much of the Allied manpower.
The slide’s figures include military deaths only. Civilian losses were especially concentrated in Eastern Europe and East Asia.
Economic consequences of the war
Physical destruction
Damage varied significantly between countries and was concentrated in civilian infrastructure rather than industrial productive capacity.
Population loss
Eastern Europe experienced approximately three-quarters of all European casualties. Human-capital losses were therefore geographically concentrated. Post-war expulsions and resettlements added further disruption.
Trade disruption
Border changes, wartime controls and policies of national self-sufficiency disrupted established trade relationships.
End of empire and rise of the superpowers
Collapse of empires
• The world wars were motivated by colonial ambitions
• Decolonization had begun before World War II but became much faster afterward
Post-colonial world
• Industrialisation in the periphery
• Colonial and post-colonial wars → repatriation of European elites → Decline of traditional European great powers
New balance of power
• The age of the superpowers: United States and the Soviet Union
• Cold War between two military and ideological blocs
Survival of productive capacity
Surprisingly, Western Europe’s productive capacity largely survived.
Industrial capacity was as large as or larger than before the war.
Post-war resettlements partly offset population losses.
Europe’s productive capital stock in 1947 was approximately equal to its 1937 level.
Germany’s capital stock may have been larger because of wartime investment.
However, without the war and assuming 2% annual growth, Europe’s capital stock might have been approximately 20% higher by 1947.
The war created a serious setback, but not a complete destruction of Europe’s productive foundations. Roads, bridges, power facilities and factories could often be repaired quickly.
A lesson from Allied strategic bombing: its impact on enemy war
production was smaller than expected
Damage to the economic and social system
-Wartime economic controls maintained to avoid inflation and unrest
• The price mechanism was largely suspended under rationing and price controls
-Economic elites who had collaborated with the Nazi regime were attacked by
populists
• Collaborators' assets were seized and their firms nationalised (e.g. Louis Renault in France)
-Domestic and international payments systems ground to a halt
• Trade at a standstill; capital markets inert
• Dollar and gold reserves depleted, so no means to pay for US imports
• Banks forced to hold government bonds had little left for peacetime lending
-"The two wars smashed the delicate balance of the nineteenth-century world economy and undermined the fundamental basis of Western European existence." (Thomas Balogh, 1949)
• Eichengreen: too sweeping. The balance was "smashed, but not beyond repair".
Uneven physical destruction
Transport infrastructure
• Railways and railway equipment
• Loss of merchant shipping; waterways blocked by wreckage
Civilian infrastructure
• Residential housing and urban infrastructure
• Cities often cut off from their hinterland by transport bottlenecks
Production capacity
• The stock of industrial equipment grew during the war, despite
destruction: by 20% in Germany, 30% in northern Italy
• Power-generating capacity larger than pre-war; needed little repair
National evidence on destruction
France (all country Figures from Eichengreen pp. 54-55)
• 115 railway stations severely damaged/destroyed, 70% of locomotives damaged/ removed
• All major canals, rivers and ports unnavigable; farmland turned into minefields
• 9 in 10 motor vehicles out of commission
• 1.8 million buildings damaged, nearly a quarter beyond repair
Italy
• 85% of merchant marine, 1/3 of railway capacity, 1/5 of plant and equipment destroyed
• But the industrial north largely intact: hydroelectric capacity +16%, engineering capacity +30% (1946 vs 1938)
Germany
• 90% of rail network blocked or impassable
• 20% of residential buildings severely damaged; 50% in major cities
The damage was concentrated in transport and housing, not in productive capacity.
Figures look dramatic, but mostly describe repairable infrastructure → fast recovery
Rapid reconstruction
Collapse of industrial production in 1945
• c. 40% of pre-war level in Belgium, France and the Netherlands
• Under 20% in defeated Germany and Italy
Reconstruction priorities
• Waterways reopened and railway tracks repaired within a year
• Damaged industrial capacity repaired with imported American machinery and
technical assistance
Even dismantled plant could be replaced
• Genoa's steelworks, stripped by German troops, were re-equipped with US help
• Railway equipment recovered and restocked by 1947
Reconstruction bottlenecks
• Germany and Italy had lost most of their merchant marine
• Urban housing remained insufficient, which held back the return of displaced
workers to the urban economy
The “battle for production”
Reconstruction and economic revival were seen as a national effort
• Consensus across political parties; trade unions overwhelmingly supportive
until 1948
Strikes almost absent in 1945–46 (in the US, strikes increased in 1946)
Swing to the left
• Britain: the Labour Party came to power in 1945 and introduced the welfare
state, but maintained war-like mobilisation (e.g. state control over industry)
• France: socialists and communists put reconstruction before concessions to
the working class; "Produce, produce"; "Work hard first, then ask for
concessions”
• Italy: squads of elite workers (PCI & CGIL driven) to encourage greater work
effort in firms
Why the left held back
• Fear that disruptive strikes would drive the middle class to the right
• In coalition governments they could be reliable partners
Production was necessary before wages and living standards could improve.
Industrial recovery by 1947
Industrial production in most Western European countries had returned to or exceeded pre-war levels by 1947.
Marshall Plan countries together produced 87% of their 1938 level.
Excluding West Germany, they produced approximately 105%.
Agricultural production recovered more slowly, reaching only around 80% of pre-war levels in 1947–48.
The difference reflected reconstruction priorities and agricultural production cycles. Industrial facilities could be repaired quickly, while fields required planting seasons and agricultural inputs.
Germany’s destruction and punitive occupation
Scale of destruction
• Allied bombing devastated German cities and railways
• 20% of residential buildings (50% in cities), 90% of the rail network, severely damaged
• Public utilities and communication lines became dysfunctional
Post-war settlement
• Post-war Germany divided into four occupation zones
• Trade and transfers of resources between zones kept to a minimum
• The Potsdam Agreement required German reparations to be met by dismantling industrial plant and equipment
• The Soviets, who held much of the industrial heartland, made dismantling and shipping plants east their priority (but sent back part of it)
Allied occupation: punitive, deindustrialised "hard peace" strategy
• Level of Industry Plan (1946) limited manufacturing to 1/2, machine-tool output to 1/10 of pre-war capacity
• The dilemma: Germany (again) economic centre of Europe + Communist threat of USSR
• Supply crisis in winter 1946/7 (risk of mass starvation) triggered new occupation policy
Germanys territorial division
Germany was divided into four occupation zones.
Territories east of the Oder-Neisse line passed to Poland and the Soviet Union.
The Saar became a French protectorate between 1947 and 1956.
The British zone was heavily industrial.
The American zone was more agricultural.
Barriers between the complementary zones obstructed trade and recovery.
Eventually:
The three Western zones became West Germany.
The Soviet zone became East Germany.
Germany’s division represented the broader division of Europe.
Three obstacles to recovery
Dollar shortage: Europe lacked foreign currency to purchase American machinery, food and raw materials.
Command economy: Price controls, rationing and regulated production prevented markets from allocating resources effectively.
Political uncertainty: Investors did not know whether private property and market capitalism would survive.
All three obstructed Europe’s preferred strategy of investment-led industrial growth.
Investment-led growth
Economic strategy
• An investment-led growth model required more production of capital
goods and/or imports of machinery
• The lesson of the war: industrial capacity decides the outcome
Psychology of 1945: growth, esp. industrial growth, became "obsession”
• A shared goal around which governments could rally supporters
• The US insisted on an open trading system, so Europe had to raise
productivity to compete
The French Monnet Plan of 1946, for example, prioritized transport, energy, iron and steel.
The dollar shortage
External constraints
• German steel and machinery production was insufficient to meet post-
war demand for capital goods
• Europe had depleted its hard-currency reserves during the war, so it
could not import capital goods from Britain and the US
• Foreign assets had been sold to pay for the war, so income from
overseas investments was lower
• By 1947 dollar and gold reserves were exhausted, and what
remained went on food imports
• Borrowing abroad was not possible: political uncertainty and
memories of failed interwar loans
• Problem: Imports had to be paid for by exports, but to export
industrial production had to increase first.
→ The European economy could not revive without Germany
The post-war command economy
Wartime controls
• Fixed prices and rationing to avoid inflation and shortages
• Wage controls to stop firms competing for workers and to steer labour to high-priority industries
• Regulated bank lending to support industrial and public investment
Disabled markets
• Under fixed prices and rationing, firms had no incentive to raise production or productivity
• Farmers stored grain, or fed it to animals, instead of selling it
• Market transactions were replaced by "compensation" deals (barter between firms)
• Wages had to be supplemented with provisions in kind
• High absenteeism: city dwellers bartered household goods for food in countryside
Reluctance to liberalise was driven by deep distrust of markets
• Market had been suspended for a decade, in 1930s it had produced Great Depression
• Communists/socialists did not accept legitimacy of markets
• Decontrol meant inflation while budget deficits were financed by printing money
• Balancing budgets required tax rises + spending cuts, no consensus on how to share them
Political uncertainty and the left
New politics
• Communists on the rise in France and Italy, held important positions in governments → Left wing parties were powerful
• French Communists + Socialists held 40% in 1946 Constituent Assembly election
• The Labour government in Britain proposed a nationalisation programme
German politics
• Until 1947 the Social Democrats (SPD) were the largest party, controlled the Economic Administration and supported nationalisation and price controls.
• Its leader, Kurt Schumacher, expected a social revolution ending capitalism
• The centre-right dominated by Christian Socialism (Ahlen Programme)
Economic consequences
• Uncertainty about future property relations limited investment
• Investors held off buying securities until they knew how dividends would be taxed
• Banks hesitated to lend for fear that inflation would wipe out the principal
• Uncertainty about future of price/wage controls limited investment in skills and training
• Would governments respect private property, avoid confiscatory taxes and let markets work?
The Marshall Plan
European Recovery Programme (1948–52)
• 13 billion dollars of US government aid, in grants (!) over four years, in
exchange for trade liberalisation and economic cooperation
• Technical Assistance Programme to improve industrial productivity
Motives for US aid
• Remove the external constraints on European recovery
• Expand the market for US industry after demobilisation
• Contain Soviet expansion in Europe
Two pillars of the programme:
• 1. Money aid
-1. Step: Dollar grants to European governments to buy imports from the US
-2. Step: Counterpart funds (US goods sold to Europeans to finance domestic investment)
• 2. Intra-European cooperation: Recipients were expected to liberalize trade and coordinate through the OEEC.
Representation:
Aid shipments carried the European Recovery Programme emblem so recipients could identify American assistance.
The programme was connected to cooperation through the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
Participants included Western European countries, Greece, Turkey and eventually West Germany. No Soviet-bloc country participated.
The symbolism presented the United States as both:
The financial supporter of European recovery
A partner in a cooperative Western European project
Economic impact of Marshall Aid
External constraints
• Marshall Aid financed most of Europe's trade deficit with the US
• Between 1948 and 1950, Europe’s trade deficit was approximately $11.5 billion, while US grants totalled around $10 billion.
• It broke the vicious circle of having to export to pay for imports, but being unable to export without first importing materials and machinery
• Imported materials and machinery boosted industrial growth
Investment aid
• Counterpart funds provided extra resources to clear infrastructure and production bottlenecks
• Eased the tension between investment needs and welfare
Market incentives
• Marshall Aid was conditional on commitment to market economy:
• decontrol prices, stabilise exchange rates, balance budgets → reduced uncertainty about property rights and encouraged investment
• Imported food, fuel and raw materials eased shortages
The response to price liberalisation was immediate
• Hoarded goods filled empty shops; absenteeism fell; inputs from mines/farms reached industry
Political impact of Marshall Aid
Political power to the centre
• France: coalition government of Republicans and Socialists
• Germany: Christian Democrats took over the Economic Administration, beats SPD in 1949
• Italy: Christian Democrats won 1948 election decisively
How aid strengthened moderates
• US officials (e.g. Dean Acheson) were reluctant to give aid to Socialist governments
• Moderates could point to lost aid as a cost of opposing them, and to aid-financed investment as proof that moderation paid
Communists marginalised
• Accepting Marshall Aid implied a commitment to capitalism
• Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy: Communist ministers dismissed soon after Marshall Aid was announced
• Socialists accepted aid; Communists, on Moscow's instructions, rejected it, which split the left
Division of Europe and rehabilitation of Germany
The USSR and the Soviet bloc refused to take part
A choice between central planning and the private-ownership market economy
• "The Marshall Plan implied a private ownership economy, and thus in effect put an end to debates on other forms of economic organization." (Klaus Hinrich
Hennings, 1982)
Western Europe later developed welfare states and mixed economies, but these remained based on private ownership.
German rehabilitation
• Marshall Aid to France and Benelux substituted for reparations
• The revised Level of Industry Plan (1947) allowed industrial expansion
• → Division of Germany in East and West
US aid depended on the recipients agreeing a joint strategy for using it
• Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)
US planners: "United States of Europe”; that would make another European war impossible and provide a united front against the Soviet Union.