Ch4: FP in practice and political economy

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27 Terms

1
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What is the central question of Fiscal Policy in Practice and Political Economy?

• The previous models describe what fiscal policy could do under ideal conditions.

• This chapter compares stabilisation and redistribution objectives with observed outcomes.

• It explains the gap through uncertain information, policy lags and political incentives.

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How do the introductory examples illustrate fiscal dominance and its consequences?

• High debt and borrowing costs can pressure central banks to support public finances rather than price stability.

• Political interference with central-bank independence creates a second route to fiscal dominance.

• Larch contrasts Brazil's historically higher inflation with the euro area, noting higher growth as well as significant fiscal expansion & lessser independence of the CB

3
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What should fiscal stabilisation achieve, and what do output-gap data reveal?

• Output fluctuates around potential output, which represents the sustainable level of activity.

• A negative output gap indicates slack, while a positive gap indicates overheating. Okun's law links a 1-point gap to roughly 0.3–0.5 points of unemployment.

• Large gaps persist even after policy intervention, raising questions about stabilisation in practice.

4
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What is potential output, and how does Larch derive it from the Phillips curve?

• Potential output is the level of output consistent with stable inflation.

• With Ļ€ā‚œāˆ’Ļ€ā‚œā‚‹ā‚=(m+z)āˆ’Ī±u and Y=L(1āˆ’u), setting inflation changes to zero gives Yā‚™=L(Ī±āˆ’māˆ’z)/α.

• It rises with the labour force and falls with higher mark-ups or wage-pressure factors z in this simplified model.

5
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Why is estimating potential output difficult, and what are the three principal methods?

• Potential output is unobserved and must be estimated rather than measured directly.

• Peak-to-peak links business-cycle peaks but confuses maximum output with stable-inflation output and requires future peaks.

• Statistical filters extract a smooth trend,

• Structural models, e.g. production-function methods estimate trend labour, capital and productivity.

6
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How do the HP filter and the production-function method estimate potential output?

• HP filtering smooths observed GDP. A higher smoothing parameter Ī» implies a smoother trend and larger measured gaps. • The production-function approach uses Y=AKαL(1āˆ’Ī±), with A estimated as the Solow residual.

• Institutions trend-adjust productivity and labour, while the Commission treats capital as fully utilised, then reconstruct potential output.

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What is counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and how do we read Larch's four-quadrant graph?

• Counter-cyclical policy expands when the output gap worsens and tightens when it improves.

• With the change in the output gap on the horizontal axis and tightening upward, south-west and north-east are counter-cyclical.

• North-west (tightening in a downturn) and south-east (expansion in an upturn) are pro-cyclical.

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How do automatic stabilisers differ from discretionary fiscal policy?

• Automatic stabilisers adjust budget outcomes with economic activity without new legislation (unemployment benefits, progressive taxes, borrowing during downturns to finance discretionary expenditure)

• Discretionary policy consists of deliberate changes in taxes, transfers or spending.

• To assess discretionary stance, changes caused purely by the cycle must be removed from the observed budget balance.

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What is the structural budget balance and how is it calculated and interpreted?

• Headline balance (Bt) = structural balance + cyclical component.

• Structural balance = Bt āˆ’ ε Ɨ (Yt - YPt)/YPt , where output gap in percent of potential; ε the budgetary sensitivity.

• An improving structural balance indicates discretionary tightening, while a deterioration indicates expansion, subject to measurement limitations.

10
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What do the EU budget-balance charts show about the cycle and the structural balance?

• In booms, higher revenue automatically makes the headline balance look better than the structural balance.

• In recessions such as 2009 and 2020, cyclical weakness makes headline deficits deeper.

• The gap between the two measures illustrates why headline balances alone cannot identify deliberate fiscal decisions.

11
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What do Larch's country graphs reveal about actual fiscal stabilisation?

• France, Italy, Germany and the euro area have observations in both counter- and pro-cyclical quadrants.

• The major crises of 2009 and 2020 often prompted counter-cyclical expansion, though Italy lacked room in 2009.

• Ordinary years cluster around the origin, with no consistently stabilising pattern.

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What does Larch's cross-country evidence say about pro-cyclicality and EU fiscal rules?

• Larch, Orseau and van der Wielen: slightly more than half of fiscal episodes were pro-cyclical.

• EU and non-EU countries show similar shares, with no statistically significant difference.

• The evidence does not support attributing pro-cyclicality primarily to the Stability and Growth Pact.

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How has redistribution affected inequality in Europe compared with the US?

• Market-income inequality increased markedly from the 1970s to the 2000s in both regions.

• In the EU15, the market Gini rose by about 6.7 points but the disposable-income Gini by only 1.0.

• In the US, market inequality rose by about 8.7 points and disposable inequality by 6.2, implying weaker offsetting redistribution.

14
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What are drivers of cross-country differences in redistribution?

• Higher income per person can support greater redistribution

• political ideology shapes preferences for government intervention

• Labour-force composition, including the share of lower-skilled workers more demand for redistribution.

• In the Meltzer–Richard median-voter model: average income above median income creates majority support for redistribution.

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Why can real-time output-gap estimates lead to misguided fiscal policy?

• Policy makers must decide before knowing whether a change in GDP is temporary/permanent or cyclical/trend.

• The real-time output gap estimates are forecasts and are revised as future and historical data become available.

• Mistaking overheating for slack may induce fiscal expansion when contraction would have been appropriate.

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What did the pre-2008 output-gap evidence show, and why were finance-neutral estimates different?

• Ex-post estimates showed stronger overheating, revealing substantial real-time measurement errors.

• Borio and co-authors' finance-neutral estimates included financial indicators and were more stable across revisions.

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What do the EU real-time output-gap errors and Larch's diagram imply for the fiscal stance?

• For EU28 in 2003–17, real-time output gaps were roughly one point more negative on average than revised estimates.

• Initial estimates also showed less variation, making the economy appear closer to normal yet systematically weaker.

• If estimated potential exceeds true potential, policy makers overstate slack and risk excessive expansion.

18
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How do inside and outside lags limit discretionary fiscal stabilisation?

• Inside lags: cover diagnosis, political negotiation, legislation and implementation, often lengthy for fiscal policy.

• Outside lags: once aadopted and implemented fiscal measures produce a fairly quick impact on AD e.g. increase in taxes, new transfers to hh

• Measures can take effect after the cycle has changed, turning intended counter-cyclical action into pro-cyclical policy.

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Why does Larch discourage fiscal fine-tuning, and when is discretionary intervention justified?

• Small output-gap estimates are uncertain, while legislative and implementation lags make precise timing difficult.

• In normal times, automatic stabilisers are preferable to repeated discretionary adjustments.

• Discretionary measures are more defensible after large demand shocks

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What does Larch consider the main automatic stabiliser, and why does borrowing access matter?

• Taxes and unemployment benefits react automatically, but account for only part of observed stabilisation.

• Crucially, governments can keep existing expenditure stable in recessions by allowing deficits and borrowing.

• Emerging economies with costly or restricted market access may be forced to cut spending in downturns.

21
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How does political economy explain the gap between normative fiscal policy and observed outcomes?

• Normative models often assume a benevolent decision maker maximising overall social welfare

• Political economy: In democracies, voters and parties pursue heterogeneous interests, conflict of interest leads (ideology, reelection) to deviations from optimal policies

• Fiscal policy is therefore shaped by political institutions and bargaining, not only by the objective of stabilising output.

22
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What is deficit bias, and what do country debt paths illustrate?

• Deficit bias is the persistent tendency to run deficits that are not sufficiently offset by surpluses in good times.

• Italy, France, Spain and the US show long-run upward debt trends, unlike more cyclical debt paths in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands.

• Political incentives can sustain deficits even when stabilisation alone would not require rising debt.

23
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How do deficit illusion and asymmetric information create deficit bias?

• Under deficit illusion, voters value current spending or tax reductions without fully recognising their future financing costs.

• With asymmetric information, politicians know more about the budget than otherwise rational voters and can hide relevant costs.

• For both: Ill-informed voters embrace benefits of fiscal expansions without considering that deficits will eventually have to be financed by future tax increases/spending cut

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How does debt become a strategic variable for incumbent governments?

• Persson–Svensson and Alesina–Tabellini: explain how electoral competition can generate deficit bias

• An incumbent facing possible electoral defeat may borrow to finance priorities favoured by its supporters.

• The debt limits the successor's fiscal space and ability to implement different policies.

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How does the common-pool problem generate government deficits?

• Different ministers, parliamentarians or regions seek spending from a common tax base.

•Politicians tend to spend excessively on targeted distributive purposes, ignoring the effect on the overall tax burden.

• The aggregate result can be overspending and deficits, especially when governments are fragmented.

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How does intergenerational redistribution lead to deficit bias?

• Without full Ricardian equivalence, households face borrowing constraints:

• Current voters receive benefits from debt-financed expenditure while future generations face repayment costs.

• Future taxpayers cannot vote today, weakening resistance to shifting the burden forward.

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What is the war-of-attrition explanation of delayed fiscal consolidation?

• A persistent adverse shock makes existing spending or revenue plans unsustainable.

• Political groups agree adjustment is needed but disagree about who should bear spending cuts or tax increases.

• Each waits for others to concede, prolonging deficits until the cost of delay becomes too high.