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What is the central question of Fiscal Policy in Practice and Political Economy?
⢠The previous models describe what fiscal policy could do under ideal conditions.
⢠This chapter compares stabilisation and redistribution objectives with observed outcomes.
⢠It explains the gap through uncertain information, policy lags and political incentives.
How do the introductory examples illustrate fiscal dominance and its consequences?
⢠High debt and borrowing costs can pressure central banks to support public finances rather than price stability.
⢠Political interference with central-bank independence creates a second route to fiscal dominance.
⢠Larch contrasts Brazil's historically higher inflation with the euro area, noting higher growth as well as significant fiscal expansion & lessser independence of the CB
What should fiscal stabilisation achieve, and what do output-gap data reveal?
⢠Output fluctuates around potential output, which represents the sustainable level of activity.
⢠A negative output gap indicates slack, while a positive gap indicates overheating. Okun's law links a 1-point gap to roughly 0.3ā0.5 points of unemployment.
⢠Large gaps persist even after policy intervention, raising questions about stabilisation in practice.
What is potential output, and how does Larch derive it from the Phillips curve?
⢠Potential output is the level of output consistent with stable inflation.
⢠With ĻāāĻāāā=(m+z)āαu and Y=L(1āu), setting inflation changes to zero gives Yā=L(αāmāz)/α.
⢠It rises with the labour force and falls with higher mark-ups or wage-pressure factors z in this simplified model.
Why is estimating potential output difficult, and what are the three principal methods?
⢠Potential output is unobserved and must be estimated rather than measured directly.
⢠Peak-to-peak links business-cycle peaks but confuses maximum output with stable-inflation output and requires future peaks.
⢠Statistical filters extract a smooth trend,
⢠Structural models, e.g. production-function methods estimate trend labour, capital and productivity.
How do the HP filter and the production-function method estimate potential output?
⢠HP filtering smooths observed GDP. A higher smoothing parameter Ī» implies a smoother trend and larger measured gaps. ⢠The production-function approach uses Y=AKαL(1āα), with A estimated as the Solow residual.
⢠Institutions trend-adjust productivity and labour, while the Commission treats capital as fully utilised, then reconstruct potential output.
What is counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and how do we read Larch's four-quadrant graph?
⢠Counter-cyclical policy expands when the output gap worsens and tightens when it improves.
⢠With the change in the output gap on the horizontal axis and tightening upward, south-west and north-east are counter-cyclical.
⢠North-west (tightening in a downturn) and south-east (expansion in an upturn) are pro-cyclical.
How do automatic stabilisers differ from discretionary fiscal policy?
⢠Automatic stabilisers adjust budget outcomes with economic activity without new legislation (unemployment benefits, progressive taxes, borrowing during downturns to finance discretionary expenditure)
⢠Discretionary policy consists of deliberate changes in taxes, transfers or spending.
⢠To assess discretionary stance, changes caused purely by the cycle must be removed from the observed budget balance.
What is the structural budget balance and how is it calculated and interpreted?
⢠Headline balance (Bt) = structural balance + cyclical component.
⢠Structural balance = Bt ā ε Ć (Yt - YPt)/YPt , where output gap in percent of potential; ε the budgetary sensitivity.
⢠An improving structural balance indicates discretionary tightening, while a deterioration indicates expansion, subject to measurement limitations.
What do the EU budget-balance charts show about the cycle and the structural balance?
⢠In booms, higher revenue automatically makes the headline balance look better than the structural balance.
⢠In recessions such as 2009 and 2020, cyclical weakness makes headline deficits deeper.
⢠The gap between the two measures illustrates why headline balances alone cannot identify deliberate fiscal decisions.
What do Larch's country graphs reveal about actual fiscal stabilisation?
⢠France, Italy, Germany and the euro area have observations in both counter- and pro-cyclical quadrants.
⢠The major crises of 2009 and 2020 often prompted counter-cyclical expansion, though Italy lacked room in 2009.
⢠Ordinary years cluster around the origin, with no consistently stabilising pattern.
What does Larch's cross-country evidence say about pro-cyclicality and EU fiscal rules?
⢠Larch, Orseau and van der Wielen: slightly more than half of fiscal episodes were pro-cyclical.
⢠EU and non-EU countries show similar shares, with no statistically significant difference.
⢠The evidence does not support attributing pro-cyclicality primarily to the Stability and Growth Pact.
How has redistribution affected inequality in Europe compared with the US?
⢠Market-income inequality increased markedly from the 1970s to the 2000s in both regions.
⢠In the EU15, the market Gini rose by about 6.7 points but the disposable-income Gini by only 1.0.
⢠In the US, market inequality rose by about 8.7 points and disposable inequality by 6.2, implying weaker offsetting redistribution.
What are drivers of cross-country differences in redistribution?
⢠Higher income per person can support greater redistribution
⢠political ideology shapes preferences for government intervention
⢠Labour-force composition, including the share of lower-skilled workers more demand for redistribution.
⢠In the MeltzerāRichard median-voter model: average income above median income creates majority support for redistribution.
Why can real-time output-gap estimates lead to misguided fiscal policy?
⢠Policy makers must decide before knowing whether a change in GDP is temporary/permanent or cyclical/trend.
⢠The real-time output gap estimates are forecasts and are revised as future and historical data become available.
⢠Mistaking overheating for slack may induce fiscal expansion when contraction would have been appropriate.
What did the pre-2008 output-gap evidence show, and why were finance-neutral estimates different?
⢠Ex-post estimates showed stronger overheating, revealing substantial real-time measurement errors.
⢠Borio and co-authors' finance-neutral estimates included financial indicators and were more stable across revisions.
What do the EU real-time output-gap errors and Larch's diagram imply for the fiscal stance?
⢠For EU28 in 2003ā17, real-time output gaps were roughly one point more negative on average than revised estimates.
⢠Initial estimates also showed less variation, making the economy appear closer to normal yet systematically weaker.
⢠If estimated potential exceeds true potential, policy makers overstate slack and risk excessive expansion.
How do inside and outside lags limit discretionary fiscal stabilisation?
⢠Inside lags: cover diagnosis, political negotiation, legislation and implementation, often lengthy for fiscal policy.
⢠Outside lags: once aadopted and implemented fiscal measures produce a fairly quick impact on AD e.g. increase in taxes, new transfers to hh
⢠Measures can take effect after the cycle has changed, turning intended counter-cyclical action into pro-cyclical policy.
Why does Larch discourage fiscal fine-tuning, and when is discretionary intervention justified?
⢠Small output-gap estimates are uncertain, while legislative and implementation lags make precise timing difficult.
⢠In normal times, automatic stabilisers are preferable to repeated discretionary adjustments.
⢠Discretionary measures are more defensible after large demand shocks
What does Larch consider the main automatic stabiliser, and why does borrowing access matter?
⢠Taxes and unemployment benefits react automatically, but account for only part of observed stabilisation.
⢠Crucially, governments can keep existing expenditure stable in recessions by allowing deficits and borrowing.
⢠Emerging economies with costly or restricted market access may be forced to cut spending in downturns.
How does political economy explain the gap between normative fiscal policy and observed outcomes?
⢠Normative models often assume a benevolent decision maker maximising overall social welfare
⢠Political economy: In democracies, voters and parties pursue heterogeneous interests, conflict of interest leads (ideology, reelection) to deviations from optimal policies
⢠Fiscal policy is therefore shaped by political institutions and bargaining, not only by the objective of stabilising output.
What is deficit bias, and what do country debt paths illustrate?
⢠Deficit bias is the persistent tendency to run deficits that are not sufficiently offset by surpluses in good times.
⢠Italy, France, Spain and the US show long-run upward debt trends, unlike more cyclical debt paths in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands.
⢠Political incentives can sustain deficits even when stabilisation alone would not require rising debt.
How do deficit illusion and asymmetric information create deficit bias?
⢠Under deficit illusion, voters value current spending or tax reductions without fully recognising their future financing costs.
⢠With asymmetric information, politicians know more about the budget than otherwise rational voters and can hide relevant costs.
⢠For both: Ill-informed voters embrace benefits of fiscal expansions without considering that deficits will eventually have to be financed by future tax increases/spending cut
How does debt become a strategic variable for incumbent governments?
⢠PerssonāSvensson and AlesinaāTabellini: explain how electoral competition can generate deficit bias
⢠An incumbent facing possible electoral defeat may borrow to finance priorities favoured by its supporters.
⢠The debt limits the successor's fiscal space and ability to implement different policies.
How does the common-pool problem generate government deficits?
⢠Different ministers, parliamentarians or regions seek spending from a common tax base.
ā¢Politicians tend to spend excessively on targeted distributive purposes, ignoring the effect on the overall tax burden.
⢠The aggregate result can be overspending and deficits, especially when governments are fragmented.
How does intergenerational redistribution lead to deficit bias?
⢠Without full Ricardian equivalence, households face borrowing constraints:
⢠Current voters receive benefits from debt-financed expenditure while future generations face repayment costs.
⢠Future taxpayers cannot vote today, weakening resistance to shifting the burden forward.
What is the war-of-attrition explanation of delayed fiscal consolidation?
⢠A persistent adverse shock makes existing spending or revenue plans unsustainable.
⢠Political groups agree adjustment is needed but disagree about who should bear spending cuts or tax increases.
⢠Each waits for others to concede, prolonging deficits until the cost of delay becomes too high.