A class of interactions in which actors attempt to resolve disagreements over the allocation of a good.
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What are the basic elements of a bargaining situation?
Actors with preferences over outcomes; one actor proposes a division of a good and another accepts or rejects; it all takes place under a given bargaining protocol.
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What does it mean to assume actors are rational?
They know their own preferences and know which actions will best meet those preferences.
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Payoff
The value associated with a particular outcome; used to define actors' preferences.
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Does rationality imply a specific value system?
No. Scholars assume value systems for actors, which lets them define payoffs. (Other approaches: bounded rationality, prospect theory, heuristics, etc.)
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Bargaining protocol
The rules of how the bargaining game is played (who proposes, who responds, whether counteroffers are allowed). Protocol is one source of bargaining power.
One person makes a proposal; the other accepts (proposal is the outcome) or rejects (reversion point is the outcome). No counterproposals.
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Reversion point
What happens if there is no deal. Same idea as 'reservation utility.'
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In the $100 ultimatum game, what is the reversion point?
(0,0) -- the money disappears if there is no agreement.
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In the $100 ultimatum game, what does a rational proposer offer?
(100,0). The responder is willing to accept anything slightly more than 0 (or even 0 if indifferent) because rejecting yields (0,0).
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What does the ultimatum example tell us about proposers?
Proposers have significant advantages when issuing ultimatums, even more so when they can threaten the other side with a 'bad' reversion point.
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Why might the extreme (100,0) outcome not occur in real life?
Cultural norms, dislike of inequality, altruistic motives, uncertainty about the other person's preferences (e.g., spite). These can be built into the model as changes to actors' preferences.
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Alternating offers with costly delay
One person proposes; the other accepts or rejects. If rejected, the other makes a counterproposal. The process continues until agreement, but each round of bargaining entails costs.
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Cost of delay in the in-class $100 example
Every time a proposal is rejected, $10 is removed from the budget (round 1 = $100, round 2 = $90, etc.).
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How do you solve an alternating offers game?
Start at the end (backward induction): the last round is an ultimatum; each earlier offer depends on what each side anticipates will happen after a rejection.
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$100 game, Round 10 (pot = $10, B proposes): what is the offer and result?
B offers (0,10): 0 to A, 10 to B. A accepts (assuming A is indifferent at 0). This is just an ultimatum.
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$100 game, Round 9 (pot = $20, A proposes): what is the offer and result?
A offers (10,10): 10 to A, 10 to B. B accepts, because rejecting leads to Round 10 where B gets 10.
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Final outcome of the $100 game (lose $10 per rejection, A proposes first)?
An even split: A proposes (50,50) in Round 1 and B accepts.
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In the $100 game, why does B come out slightly ahead every time B makes an offer?
Because B is set to make the ultimatum offer in the last round.
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How can A prevent B from using the last-round ultimatum advantage?
Only by offering an even split when she has the chance.
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Ultimatum vs. alternating offers: who has the advantage?
Actors who can make an ultimatum offer have an advantage, but with alternating offers this advantage can be reduced.
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Outcomes of bargaining are critically influenced by...
1) The bargaining protocol 2) What actors anticipate is the result of a rejection.
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$45 to split, lose $15 per round, A offers first: what is the outcome?
Round 3 (pot $15): A proposes (15,0), B accepts. Round 2 (pot $30): B proposes (15,15), A accepts. Round 1 (pot $45): A proposes (30,15), B accepts.
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Why does the $45 game end differently from the $100 game?
A different set-up (different pot and cost of delay) and a different actor (A) makes the final offer.
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Logrolling
The exchange of specific favors or benefits to pass legislation (e.g., offering benefits to Senators Manchin and Sinema to get 50 Senate votes for a spending bill).
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Why does bargaining over multiple issues often make a deal easier?
If players value different things (e.g., lump sum vs. monthly payments), they can trade on issues they care about less, making agreement a lot easier.
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Two general sources of power in bargaining
1) Structure/protocol 2) Characteristics (attributes) of the actors.
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In the $100 example, why did differences in outcomes arise mostly from protocol?
Because we assumed the actors had equal power. In reality actors have different degrees of power, and power is relative to the opponent.
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Who has an advantage in alternating offers besides the first mover?
The actor who can better withstand the cost of delay. (First mover's advantage is not as great as with an ultimatum.)
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Power from protocol: first-mover / proposal power
The ability to set the agenda is advantageous, especially when the responder can't counter (ultimatum), but often less powerful in the alternating counteroffer case.
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Power from protocol: veto
You can move last and still have a lot of power (depends on the reversion point).
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Power from protocol: hold-up
Being the last to decide and able to hold out from signing to extract more from the deal. Degree of power depends on costs of delay.
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The US President rarely vetoes bills. Is veto power meaningless?
No. Anticipation of a veto shapes proposals and offers. Vetoing is costly (reversion point, reputational costs, costs of delay/putting legislation together).
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Three sources of power from actor attributes
1) Size/strength 2) Resolve (willingness to suffer) 3) Credibility.
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Resolve
Each side's willingness/ability to suffer, and the length of time they can hold out.
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Guerrilla/insurgent superiority (quote)
Not their ability to harm, but their greater willingness to be harmed. (Ho Chi Minh: the Americans will kill ten of us for each American soldier, 'but it is they who will tire first.')
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Credibility
How believable a threat is (and whether a bargain itself is believable).
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How does reputation affect credibility?
Example: by being brutal in Ukraine, Russia makes it more believable that they will be strong adversaries in the future, giving them more bargaining power.
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When are bargains hard to make credible?
Bargains over issues that affect your future power (like weapons), e.g., civil war termination, where one side has to give up weapons.
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Audience costs
A leader promises voters a specific action, raising the costs of backing down. This should strengthen resolve and increase credibility.
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What happens if a leader fails to follow through on a promised action?
Credibility is undermined (example: Obama's 'red line' on Syria).
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Review: What are bargaining protocols, and how can they create advantages or disadvantages?
Protocols are the rules of how bargaining is played (who proposes, who responds, whether counteroffers are allowed, how many rounds). They create power through sequence of moves: e.g., the proposer in an ultimatum has a big advantage, and whoever makes the last offer in alternating offers holds an ultimatum advantage.
Review (bonus): Does bargaining get easier or harder with multiple issues?
Often easier: if players value issues differently, they can trade (logrolling) on what they care about less to get what they care about more.
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What two questions distinguish presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems?
1) Does the legislature have responsibility over the executive? 2) Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term? The difference is in how executives come to power and how they stay in power.
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Presidential system (per the decision tree)
The legislature does NOT have responsibility over the executive (the executive does not depend on legislative confidence).
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Semi-presidential system (per the decision tree)
The legislature has responsibility over the executive AND the head of state is popularly elected for a fixed term.
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Parliamentary system (per the decision tree)
The legislature has responsibility over the executive AND the head of state is NOT popularly elected for a fixed term.
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How do governments form in parliamentary democracies?
A legislative election determines each party's seats; a party or group of parties must then form a government approved by a majority of the legislature (often via an investiture vote).
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Investiture vote
A legislative vote (needs a majority, >50% of seats) approving the proposed government. In the German example, 368 of 735 votes were needed.
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What happens if one party wins a majority of seats?
Things are easy: that party can form the government on its own (e.g., Labour after the UK's July 2024 election landslide; Keir Starmer became PM).
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What happens if no party has a majority?
A coalition government must be formed.
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Coalition government
A government formed by a group of parties that agree on how to divide cabinet ministries.
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Formateur
The person (usually the leader of the largest party) given the first opportunity to try to form a government. The largest party usually gets this first chance, but the formateur is an individual, not a party.
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Belgium government formation example
Belgium agreed on a government 16 months after the vote (May 2019 elections; deal announced Sept 30, 2020). It was led by a caretaker government and a minority coalition in the meantime; Flemish Liberal Alexander De Croo was set to become PM.
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Cartoon on slide 5 (Belgium joke)
A jigsaw puzzle shop sells puzzles in categories: 'easy,' 'hard,' 'nearly impossible,' and 'Belgian government formation' -- a joke about how hard government formation can be.
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Caretaker government
A government that stays in office on an interim basis (e.g., Belgium 2019-2020) while a new government has not yet been formed.
German example: Votes needed to win the investiture vote
At least 368 (>50% of 735 seats).
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German example: Who is the formateur and why?
Olaf Scholz, the head of the SPD. The SPD was the largest party (206 seats, 28.03%), so its leader had the first opportunity to form a government.
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German example: Do any coalition options require parties to be next to each other on the left-right dimension?
No. A coalition does not have to be 'connected' on the left-right dimension, but it may be easier if it is.
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Connected coalition
A coalition of parties that are adjacent to one another on the left-right ideological dimension (no ideologically intermediate party left out).
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Why strike a bargain with ideologically closest parties?
Parties with similar positions have less to disagree on, so bargaining over policy is easier and the coalition is more likely to hold together.
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German example: Linke + Greens + SPD
Not enough to win. Slide 15 shows 363 seats (<368); the table on slide 20 lists 355 seats (48.30%). Either way it falls short of a majority.
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German example: Greens + FDP + SPD
416 seats (56.60%): a majority. This is the coalition that actually formed.
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German example: SPD + CDU/CSU
402 seats (54.69%): a majority.
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German example: FDP + CDU/CSU + AfD
371 seats (50.48%): a majority, and a connected coalition. The SPD is not included in it.
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German example: Linke + FDP + CDU/CSU + AfD
A majority (402 seats / 54.69% in the table; 410 on slide 18). Not a connected coalition.
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German example: Linke + FDP + SPD
329 seats (44.76% in the table): not a majority.
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Minimum winning coalition (MWC)
The smallest number of parties necessary to form a government (per the slides). Standard version: a winning coalition that would lose its majority if any one member party left.
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Advantages of minimum winning coalitions (read clark, golder and golder ch12 reading)
Less power-sharing between parties; each party controls more offices; more stable; fewer differences of opinion to bargain over.
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Which coalition in the German table is the minimum winning coalition?
The slides' table lists FDP-CDU/CSU-AfD (371 seats, 50.48%) as the tightest majority, and note 'the SPD is not included here!' (Note: SPD-CDU/CSU needs only two parties, so check with your lecture which one your instructor highlighted.)
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Why didn't the minimum winning coalition win in Germany?
Because the SPD, as the largest party, had power through its leader (Scholz) as formateur: the person with the first chance to form a government can choose partners that include his own party (Greens + FDP + SPD, 416 seats).
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Surplus majority coalition
A coalition with more parties than are strictly necessary to control a majority of legislative seats.
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Why bargain with more parties than needed for an MWC?
The slide poses this as a question. Possible reasons (beyond the slides): a cushion against defections, ideological compatibility/connectedness, or access to a larger or supermajority for passing legislation.
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How is a coalition made? What are parties actually bargaining over?
How to divide cabinet ministries: the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor/Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Chancellery, Defense, Interior, Finance, Justice, Economics, Labour and Social Affairs, Agriculture, Transport, Construction, Health/Family, Research, Education, Economic Cooperation, Environment, Posts, Intra-German Relations, etc.
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Power and leverage in German government formation
The FDP and Greens were 'kingmakers': the SPD needed them to reach a majority (416 seats), so they had leverage to demand posts and policy.
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Kingmaker party
A party whose votes are pivotal to forming a majority coalition, giving it bargaining leverage (the FDP and Greens in the German example).
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What did the FDP receive in the German coalition?
Some major cabinet posts, influence over government decisions, and increased national presence.
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Gamson's Law
Cabinet portfolios are allocated to coalition parties in proportion to the share of the government's legislative seats that each party contributes.
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Gamson's Law scatterplot: what are the axes?
X-axis = share of the government's legislative seats; y-axis = share of cabinet portfolios. Points close to the diagonal line fit Gamson's Law.
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Gamson's Law: 'But wait...' what deviates from the line?
Small parties tend to get a larger share of portfolios than their seat share (points above the line), and the largest parties tend to get less than their seat share (points below the line).
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Why do small parties have bargaining power?
They are often pivotal to forming a majority (kingmakers), so they can extract more cabinet posts than their seat share would predict.
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Bargaining over types of ministries: why do parties, especially small ones, pick the portfolios they do?
The slide poses this as a question. Parties tend to bargain for ministries that matter to their core constituents and policy goals (see the Israeli ultra-Orthodox parties example).
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Putting frameworks together: what is a party?
A group of politicians who represent a group of citizens. These citizens have collectively delegated authority to the party to make decisions on their behalf.
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Delegation
Citizens give a party authority to decide on their behalf. Government formation requires interaction among parties (bargaining) that is influenced by the parties' relationships to their constituents.