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Natural Law Issues
Natural Law and the Right to Resist Shklar pointed out that natural law thinkers oddly treated morality as a kind of higher law, even when using it to justify disobeying unjust laws. She argued that what matters is citizens having a critical, independent attitude, not whether they call a bad law "non-law" or simply "bad law." She mocked natural law thinkers because their endless disagreements with each other showed that the fixed, universal rules they claimed did not exist.
The Fuller–Hart Debate In the famous debate between Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart, Shklar leaned toward Fuller but rejected his claim that moral values are built into law itself. For her, liberal values come first and are what justify legalism, not the other way around.
Skepticism About Rights Theories Shklar distrusted theories of rights based on nature, and she grouped Ronald Dworkin with Fuller as a natural law thinker in disguise. She noted that natural law had usually supported conservative politics, though she admitted liberals sometimes long for natural rights to limit powerful states.
Positivism Issues
Positivism's Hidden Ideology Shklar gave natural law credit for at least admitting that law is tied to a broader political theory. Positivism bothered her more because it denied having any ideology at all, which kept it from openly admitting it supported liberalism.
Kelsen and the Origins of Positivism Focusing on Hans Kelsen, Shklar argued that treating law as a neutral, separate system is itself a political preference. Positivism grew up alongside the modern state as a liberal strategy to stay out of fierce moral conflicts by presenting the state as separate from morality.
Separating Law from Morals Is a Political Ideal Shklar said positivists presented as fact what was really a political ideal: keeping public law apart from private morality. She thought Fuller missed the best reply, which is that the reason to adopt law comes from an outside moral and political view, namely liberalism.
Legalism actually serves Liberalism
Shklar's Background and Central Goal As a Jewish refugee who passed through Riga, Tokyo, and Montreal before reaching Harvard, Shklar had a strong sense of how fragile liberalism is. Her main goal in Legalism was to save rule-following for liberal politics by showing that ideas like the rule of law are useful ideologies.
Defining Legalism and Critiquing Natural Law Shklar defined legalism as the attitude that being moral means following rules, a view shared by both natural law thinkers and positivists, who disagreed only about where the rules come from.
Legalism Serves Liberalism, Not the Reverse Moyn notes that legalism can serve causes other than liberalism, since legalists value regularity while liberals value freedom and diversity. Shklar's overall position was that legalism should be valued because it usually serves liberalism well, which makes her book a defense of legalism through a critique of its usual justifications.
Legalism as a "Noble Lie" Moyn argues that Shklar, without realizing it, made legalism into a "noble lie," because it works only if lawyers believe in it sincerely rather than as a political preference. Being openly self-aware about legalism's ideological role could undermine the very practice she wanted to defend.
Unger and "Half-Belief" Roberto Unger later claimed that many lawyers now perform their duties while privately knowing law is political, a state he called "half-belief." Moyn doubts that a whole society could live this double life, and he thinks Shklar believed legalism's benefits would erode if everyone knew its real rationale.
The Noble Lie in International Law Instead of exploring this problem, Shklar turned to Nuremberg, where defending legalism on political grounds seemed unavoidable. Moyn argues the need to hide legalism's political purpose is even greater internationally, which may explain why people in the field rarely admit their work is political.
Legalism at Nuremberg
Shklar's Qualified Defense of Nuremberg Shklar thought political trials expose legalism's rigid and unrealistic thinking more clearly than anything else, and she was hard on international criminal law. She rejected Nuremberg's main charges of crimes against peace and war crimes, but she defended the trial on political grounds because of its charge of crimes against humanity.
Home and Abroad Are Different The benefits legalism provides at home depend on a long history of stable liberal states, while international criminal law is sporadic and still in its early stages. So Shklar had to defend international trials on completely different grounds than she used for domestic legalism.
The Tokyo Trial and Imposed Natural Law Shklar strongly criticized the Tokyo trial for forcing a foreign natural law framework on Japanese culture. She attacked chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan for focusing on abstract theory and the future of international law instead of practical goals.
Positivism's Faith in International Law Shklar wondered why positivists, whose ideas grew out of the liberal state, so often championed international law. She argued that because international law had so little real enforcement, positivist international law was "a program and little else."
Nuremberg as a "Liberal Show Trial" Shklar argued that Nuremberg could be justified only by its practical political effect of spreading legalism among defeated Germans. She admitted the trial was legally a "farce" and "simply unjust," but she said strict justice is not everything.
Trials Versus Revenge Shklar granted that trials were better than the bloodbath she thought would otherwise have followed, but she did not find this "lesser evil" argument very interesting. Moyn adds that widespread revenge was not a real threat after World War II and that the choice was never just between trials and vengeance.
Answering the Charge of Selective Justice Shklar argued that complaints about the Allies not being charged for similar acts did not apply to Nazi crimes the Allies never committed. For that reason, she saw crimes against humanity, rather than war crimes committed by all sides, as the strongest basis for defending Nuremberg.
Rejecting the Aggression Charge Shklar was especially harsh on the charge of aggressive war, even though it was the centerpiece of Robert Jackson's prosecution at Nuremberg. Moyn says this risked undermining any defense of the trial and that the aggression charge proved more useful later than she expected, as in debates over the Vietnam War.
Crimes Against Humanity as the Only Justification Shklar thought the horror of the war made Jackson's hope of outlawing war naïve. She concluded that the whole trial could be justified only by what it revealed about crimes against humanity, which could help Germany toward a decent future.
Issues with Shklar’s Argument
Shklar's Uncertain Evidence Shklar herself was unsure the crimes against humanity charge actually helped spread liberal values, saying only that it "probably" did. Moyn argues it now seems that Nuremberg failed in exactly the one way Shklar said it needed to succeed.
What Historians Now Say Recent historians find that Nuremberg had little positive effect on Germans, partly because the Holocaust was largely left out of the trial. The main German reactions were anger and boredom, and German lawyers actually sharpened their legalism by resisting the new crimes against humanity charge.
Shklar's Argument Turns Against Itself Germany was eventually transformed, but Nuremberg's role in that change now seems minor or even harmful. Because Shklar rested Nuremberg's whole defense on one weak support, her own reasoning leads to the opposite conclusion, leaving her critical insights as her lasting contribution.
The Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds
Shklar's Honesty About the Non-Western World As a skeptic, Shklar was honest about the world even when it did not help liberalism, and her views came from the hard experience of minorities. This made her sympathetic at times to people with different historical experiences, especially in the colonized world.
Praise for Justice Pal Shklar called Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal's dissent at the Tokyo trial the most serious discussion of the issues those trials raised. Moyn finds this praise remarkable, since Pal is usually ignored today, partly because Japan's right wing has made him a hero.
Pal's Critique of Western International Law Pal's dissent of nearly a thousand pages would have acquitted all the main Japanese defendants because it doubted any pre-existing rules applied. He went on to criticize Western international law as a tool of colonialism and argued the aggression charge protected a colonial world order.
Shklar Against the Myth of "the West" Shklar rejected the idea of a unified "Western" or "Judeo-Christian" tradition and asked why such values should bind the Japanese. She saw efforts to place law at the core of Western identity as a mythmaking reaction to the Cold War and to decolonization.
Agreeing with Pal on Aggression Shklar insisted there is no single Western tradition and that political freedom has been rare in Europe's history. She largely agreed with Pal that criminalizing aggressive war freezes an unjust colonial status quo that benefits the dominant powers.
Doubts About the Tokyo Trial Shklar doubted the Tokyo trial could teach the Japanese anything or restore any political traditions. She argued that the aggression charge failed even worse in Asia, where Western intervention and racism were part of the background to the war.
Nazism as a Unique Case Shklar did not excuse warmongers, but she doubted that her justification for Nuremberg would apply anywhere else. She boldly suggested that no future war might fit the clear good-versus-evil pattern that Nazism provided.
Relevance to Today's African Cases Today's focus on war crimes rather than aggression might seem to avoid political disputes, but Shklar's point still applies because modern wars almost always have arguable causes. Civil wars are never fought humanely, so charging war crimes against only one side, as in the ICC's Côte d'Ivoire case, can act as a hidden judgment about who started the war.
Who Does International Law Serve? Following Pal, Shklar asked whether international criminal law mainly confirms a questionable world order shaped by colonialism. Moyn concludes that international criminal law cannot assume postcolonial conflicts are morally simple and must defend its use politically case by case.
Police Versus Armies
Victory Made Nuremberg Possible An international trial can begin only once the accused is captured, which depends on very different political conditions than domestic arrests. After World War II, the Allies' total victory made the trials possible, but that victory was planned independently of any trial plans.
The Difficulty of Arrests Today Today, capturing accused leaders such as Mladić, Gbagbo, Qaddafi, or Bashir depends on military force and the political will of powerful countries. History shows that few nations are willing to take great risks or sacrifice troops just to make trials possible.
No Police Force, No Army The ICC has no police force and certainly no army. This shows how far international criminal law is from matching domestic law, since who gets tried depends on power and who loses a war.
Powerful Countries Are Out of Reach Some leaders, like George W. Bush, are seen abroad as war criminals but will never face trial, since the United States is not an ICC member and has deals protecting its citizens. Even so, the United States sometimes helps the ICC by creating the military conditions for arrests, as in its support against the Lord's Resistance Army.
Limits of Shklar's Help Here Shklar offers less guidance on this issue because she wrote about a war that ended in a clear, widely accepted victory. She suspected that Jackson pushed the aggression charge to justify American intervention, but she did not question the intervention itself.
Positivism Hides the Need for Action Shklar argued that positivism wrongly treats international rules as already existing, waiting to take hold over time. This hides the fact that someone must take political, and sometimes military, action to make justice happen.
The Real Danger Is Total War A truly political theory would explain how people must first win a victory before law can step in, and Shklar hinted at this view. She argued that Nuremberg set no precedent, and that the real danger to future leaders comes from ideological total war, not from trials.
Reassuring and Warning Liberals Shklar was telling liberals that their own leaders would not be tried, since they would never wage total war. She also warned that if liberals ever lost a war to an ideological enemy, they would be lucky to get a trial as fair as Nuremberg.
Justice Depends on Who Wins Shklar's deeper point was that international justice depends on a prior military victory that the law does not provide. How that victory is won affects what difference criminal prosecution can actually make.
From Episodic to Permanent Court
Nuremberg's Long-Term Legacy Some, like Dutch judge B. V. A. Röling, argued that Nuremberg's value lies in its long-term effect, such as paving the way for the ICC. Shklar rejected this kind of reasoning, insisting that guesses about the future cannot justify actions now.
Rejecting "History Will Justify It" Shklar dismissed the idea that show trials can be justified by a better future as a comforting belief for troubled Marxists. By the same logic, the fact that Nuremberg led to today's institutions cannot justify it after the fact.
Could the ICC Be Different? The ICC is a permanent, treaty-based court covering much of the globe, which might allow it to be justified the way domestic criminal law is. Shklar thought it hopeless to fit Nuremberg into a regular legal system, but the ICC might fit.
When Legalism Works Best Shklar believed law works best in stable societies that accept open conflict and can settle disputes through rules. In some ways the world already resembles such a society, as treaties on trade and bodies like Interpol show.
The ICC Works Where Stability Has Failed In practice, the ICC deals only with places that are unstable and torn by war, such as Central Africa, Darfur, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d'Ivoire. Because the court steps in exactly where stability has broken down, legalism cannot play the role abroad that Shklar thought justified it at home.
Shklar’s Gaps
Why the Book Stayed Unknown Shklar's scorn for everyone else, the later rise of critical legal studies, and the field's rule-focused habits all kept the book from having influence. Today it is a "classic" mainly to a small cult following rather than a founding text of international criminal justice.
What Shklar Left Out Moyn clarifies that he is not saying the ICC cannot be justified, only that Shklar's book does not provide the tools to justify it. Shklar focused on keeping liberal societies stable and did not call for justice for victims for its own sake, which is what most supporters of international criminal law care about.
The Noble Lie Abroad Moyn returns to his point that legalism must work as a myth that its followers believe sincerely. Telling postwar Germans that the rule of law was only a useful myth could have destroyed the protection against evil it was meant to build.
Supporters Deny the Politics The ICC and international criminal law inspire many idealistic lawyers and students, but almost none of them treat it as a political project. Until supporters openly discuss its politics, realistic results, and alternatives, the project will lack credibility, especially among academics.
The Great Paradox of Legalism Legalist myths risk being exposed, and their makers risk becoming trapped in their own stories. Shklar's lasting value is showing that legalism is too rigid to see its own potential, and that being honest about what it can and cannot do would make a stronger case for it.