qasd

How do the goals, methods, and rewards of the life of the philosopher as Socrates presents it in Plato's Apology compare with those of the life of a Pyrrhonean Skeptic as Sextus Empiricus describes it? Be sure to discuss Sextus Empiricus's remark, in the last paragraph of the selections we studied, that the Skeptic makes choices "in accordance with unphilosophical observations."

Socrates, as depicted in Plato's Apology, believes that philosophy is the pursuit of true beliefs through questioning, which leads to a good and examined life.

He values philosophical imperturbability, where seeking truth is worthwhile despite uncertainty.

In contrast, Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonean Skeptic, aims to avoid false beliefs rather than seek truth, as discovering one's falsehoods can be distressing.

His goal is to minimize discomfort through skeptical imperturbability, relying on unphilosophical judgments (habit and instinct) rather than rational inquiry.

While both engage in skepticism, Socrates embraces philosophy as a means to attain wisdom, whereas Sextus avoids commitment to any belief in order to achieve peace of mind.

What is the sense-datum theory? Explain how Ayer thinks the Argument from Illusion is supposedto support this theory

Ayer supports the sense-datum theory, which claims that we do not perceive objects directly but rather sense-data—mental representations of objects.

The Argument from Illusion justifies this view by noting that illusions and normal perceptions are qualitatively similar, meaning that even veridical perceptions could be deceptive.

Since perception is affected by external factors, this suggests that we only ever access sense data, not the objects themselves.

Ayer argues that this explains why perception is fallible, as sense-data mediate our experience of the world rather than providing direct access to reality.

What alternative to the sense-datum theory does Sellars propose for how to account for sentencesof the form "x looks F to S"? Is his theory convincing? In answering this question be sure to discuss his remarks about existential and generic looks-statements in the second paragraph of section 17

Sellars challenges the sense-datum theory by arguing that perception is shaped by conceptual understanding rather than by mental intermediaries.

He claims that "is" precedes "looks," meaning that our knowledge of what something is informs how it appears to us.

Unlike sense-datum theorists, who believe perception only gives us representations of reality, Sellars contends that perception involves recognizing actual objects based on prior knowledge.

His approach allows for direct access to reality through conceptual awareness, rejecting the idea that we are forever trapped behind sense data.

Is his theory convincing? Yes, I find it convincing.

By showing that perception is tied to conceptual understanding, Sellars avoids the problem of sense-data skepticism, which claims we never directly perceive reality.

His distinction between existential and generic statements reinforces that perception is more than just isolated sensory experiences—it is shaped by prior knowledge and linguistic context.

While critics may argue that this still relies on subjective interpretation, Sellars' approach provides a stronger framework for explaining how we meaningfully perceive and describe the world.

Explain Socrates's argument in the Theaetetus against the theory that knowledge is perception. Inwhat ways do Descartes's reflections in Meditation II about the ball of wax expand on this argument?

In Theaetetus, Socrates argues against the idea that knowledge is perception.

He points out that perception is subjective and varies between individuals, meaning it cannot serve as a stable foundation for knowledge.

For example, the same wind can feel warm to one person and cold to another, which implies that perception alone cannot establish objective truth

.Descartes, in Meditation II, expands on this idea with his discussion of the ball of wax.

He argues that our knowledge of the wax's nature comes not from the senses, which show it changing form, but from intellectual understanding.

This supports the idea that knowledge must be based on reason rather than mere perception.

How does Anthony use the existence of suffering to prove that God probably does not exist? Is her argument convincing? Why or why not?

Anthony argues that the existence of unnecessary suffering proves God probably doesn't exist, since an all-powerful, all-good God wouldn't allow such suffering.

However, her argument isn't convincing because it overlooks possible justifications for suffering.

The free will defense posits that suffering stems from human choices, necessary for meaningful moral agency.

Others argue suffering fosters growth, like resilience or compassion, which a benevolent God might permit for greater goods.

Additionally, Anthony assumes humans can discern whether suffering is truly pointless—an epistemic limitation.

Without disproving these theistic responses, her conclusion remains weak.

Thus, her argument fails to definitively negate God's existence.

Present Anselm's "Ontological Argument" for the existence of God and a serious objection to it. Does the objection defeat Anselm's argument? Can Anselm clarify the argument or modify it in a relatively minor way to make it immune to this objection? Why or why not?

Anselm's Ontological Argument claims that God, defined as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," must exist in reality—not just in the mind—because existence in reality is greater than mere existence in thought.

A key objection (from Kant) is that existence isn't a predicate

defining something as "greatest" doesn't guarantee its existence (e.g., a "greatest island" wouldn't thereby exist).

However, Anselm could modify his argument to address this by clarifying that God's existence is necessary (not contingent), distinguishing God from finite things like islands.

By framing existence as part of God's essence—how a triangle's angles necessarily sum to 180°—the argument avoids treating existence as a mere predicate.

This refinement preserves its core while defusing the objection.

Explain why Aristotle thinks that the life of pleasure, the life of honor, and the life money making do not embody a correct view about the Good.

Aristotle rejects the life of pleasure, honor, and moneymaking as incomplete conceptions of the Good.

First Pleasure is Animalistic and shared with beasts and it fails to engage our unique human capacity for reason.

Second Honor is Dependent on others' opinions, not intrinsic to the actor—too unstable to be the ultimate Good.

Third, Moneymaking is Merely instrumental (wealth is a means, not an end) and it misidentifies the true goal of life.

Thus, True eudaimonia, for Aristotle, must be self-sufficient, intrinsically valuable, and distinctively human—criteria only met by rational activity in accordance with virtue.

What is a virtue, according to Aristotle? Use an example other than courage or honesty to explain how a virtue differs from its related vices.

For Aristotle, a virtue is a cultivated excellence of character that hits the "golden mean" between two vices—one of excess and one of deficiency.
Examples of Patience.

Virtue (Mean): Patience balances calm endurance with appropriate action (e.g., waiting thoughtfully for a delayed friend without resentment).

Vice of Excess: Passivity (enduring harm indefinitely, like tolerating abuse without protest).

Vice of Deficiency: Impulsiveness (acting rashly, like storming out after a 2-minute wait).

The virtuous person discerns the contextually appropriate response, while the vices distort behavior in opposite ways.

Unlike innate traits, virtues require reason and habituation—e.g., patience isn't mere silence but deliberate, reasoned restraint.

Present Kant's so-called "function argument" (Ak. 394-396) against the claim that happiness is the purpose for thesake of which reason directs the will. Does Kant's conclusion here challenge Aristotle's view about the Good? Whyor why not?

Kant's function argument claims that if reason's purpose were merely to secure happiness, nature would have equipped us with instinct instead, since instinct serves that end more reliably.

But reason, in fact, often complicates happiness by generating desires and anxieties.

Instead, reason's true function is autonomous self-legislation—producing a will that acts from universal moral law, not contingent desires.

This directly challenges Aristotle, who sees the Good (eudaimonia) as happiness achieved through rational virtue.

For Kant, the highest good is the good will (moral self-governance), not happiness.

Thus, Kant's argument rejects happiness as reason's end, opposing Aristotle's teleology.

Their disagreement hinges on whether reason's purpose is self-legislation (Kant) or fulfillment of human nature (Aristotle).

Explain why Aristotle and Kant, each in his own way, holds that ethics requires more of us than that we act in accord with its requirements. For Aristotle you will need to look at Book II Chapter 4 of Nicomachean Ethics, and for Kant you will need to look at the shopkeeper example

Aristotle's View (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II.4):Aristotle argues that merely performing virtuous actions isn't enough—true virtue requires acting from a stable moral character (hexis).

For example, giving to charity grudgingly or for reputation doesn't count as virtuous

one must do it with pleasure and because it's right.

Ethics demands habituation until virtuous acts flow naturally from one's disposition, not just external compliance.

Kant's View (Shopkeeper Example):Kant claims an action has moral worth only if done from duty, not mere conformity to duty.

His honest shopkeeper who charges fairly only to maintain profits acts "in accord" with morality but lacks moral worth.

True ethical action requires acting because it's right—motivation matters, not just outcomes.

Shared Insight: Both philosophers reject transactional morality. Aristotle ties virtue to character development

Kant ties it to rational duty. For both, ethics judges why we act, not just what we do.

What is the "Swine Objection" and how does Mill respond to it? Is Mill's response acceptable? Why or why not?

The Swine Objection claims utilitarianism degrades human dignity by reducing morality to base pleasures (like animals), ignoring higher faculties (e.g., reason, art).

Mill's Response is that He distinguishes qualities of pleasure (higher intellectual/artistic joys outweigh lower bodily ones).

A "competent judge" who experiences both would prefer higher pleasures.

However, here are reasons why it fails.

First it is subjective, the "judge" test is circular—it assumes what it proves (that higher pleasures are superior because "better" people prefer them).

Second, Elitism: it Implies cultural/educational bias (e.g., valuing opera over folk music as "higher").

And Third, Moral Arbitrariness: it Doesn't explain why preferring higher pleasures is obligatory—just because some prefer them doesn't mean everyone must.

Mill's appeal to quality doesn't resolve the objection

it just restates utilitarianism's inability to ground human dignity objectively.

Explain what Hursthouse calls (p. 229) "the major criticism" of the virtue theory, and describe how she answers this criticism.

Hursthouse's "Major Criticism" of Virtue Ethics:The theory is too vague to guide action—unlike utilitarianism (maximize happiness) or deontology (follow rules), virtue ethics lacks clear principles to resolve moral dilemmas (e.g., "Be brave" doesn't specify how to act in a crisis).

She Response with three things:

Role Models: Virtue ethics provides concrete exemplars (e.g., "What would a virtuous person do?"), offering contextual guidance beyond abstract rules.

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): Moral judgment isn't about applying rigid rules but cultivating discernment through experience—like a skilled doctor diagnosing unique cases.

Framing Questions: Instead of "What's the rule?", ask "What kind of person should I be?"—shifting focus from acts to character.

While not algorithmic, this mirrors real-life reasoning (e.g., parenting, leadership), where rigid rules often fail. Virtue ethics embraces complexity rather than oversimplifying it.

Six strangers are sick and will die if they do not get a drug that belongs to you. One of them needsall of the drug to recover

each of the others needs only one fifth of the available drug to recover.State Taurek's argument that you are not morally obliged to give the drug to the five sick people.

Taurek's argument is that you are not morally required to favor the five over the one because each individual's life has equal intrinsic worth, and simply counting lives does not justify sacrificing one for many.

He denies that we should aggregate harms, as this reduces people to interchangeable numbers rather than valuing them as distinct persons.

Instead, he proposes giving each individual an equal chance—such as by flipping a coin—to decide who gets the drug. This approach treats all lives with equal respect rather than privileging the majority.

Taurek also questions whether the loss of five lives is truly worse than the loss of one, since suffering is experienced individually, not collectively.

His position challenges utilitarian reasoning by prioritizing fairness and impartiality over maximizing total lives saved.

What is the doctrine of double effect? Why does Foot think that we should take it seriously as anaccount of an important subset of our moral judgments? Why does she say that people who endorse the doctrine of double effect have to work with a concept of "closeness?"

The doctrine of double effect (DDE) holds that it can be morally permissible to cause harm as a side effect of achieving a good outcome, provided the harm is not intended as a means or an end.

Foot takes DDE seriously because it explains why we intuitively judge actions like strategic bombing (where civilian deaths are foreseen but unintended) differently from direct attacks on civilians.

She argues that DDE captures a real distinction in moral reasoning—between what we deliberately bring about and what we merely allow.

However, Foot highlights that DDE relies on a concept of "closeness" to determine whether a bad effect is truly unintended or just disguised intention.

For example, if harm is too tightly connected to the act (e.g., crushing a fetus to save the mother), it may fail DDE's conditions.

Thus, defenders must carefully define "closeness" to prevent misuse of the doctrine while preserving its ethical insights.