midterm cases

Commonwealth v. Mochan

Michael Mochan made a series of harassing phone calls with obscenities to a married woman for a period of over a month. He would call day and night, using vulgar and explicit language. The thing is, none of these actions necessarily fell under a specific statute. Common law, despite being uncommonly used within our society for crime definition, is still valid and applicable as a source of law.

Mochan holding

common law is enforceable criminal law

Morissette v. United States

Morissette entered an Air Force bombing range and stumbled onto shell casings. He took three tons of the scrap metal, then sold it for a profit. When he was arrested, he openly admitted it, believing the shell casings were abandoned property. He had no intent to steal anything, he just believed he was collecting garbage. At trial, the judge instructed the jury to interpret the word “knowingly” as Morissette intended to take the shell casings rather than his intent to steal them. He was convicted. SCOTUS reversed his conviction, stating that criminal intent was an essential element of the crime, and there was no determination below as to his intent.

Morissette holding

criminal intent is necessary

State v. Alvarado

Ivan Alvarado was arrested after he was caught with a marijuana pipe and a marijuana during a pat-down search. When he arrived at jail, he was asked multiple times if he had any drugs or weapons with him. Alvarado denied it, but was then discovered to have more marijuana on his person. The criminal statute he was charged with said “knowingly taking contraband into a correctional facility,” and Alvarado argued that he was brought there against his will, therefore, he should not be found guilty. An actus reus is a "determined conscious bodily movement, in contrast to a knee jerk reflex driven by the autonomic nervous system.” He may not have entered the jail involuntarily, but he still brought the weed with him voluntarily and did not turn it over to the authorities when asked.

Alvarado holding

actus reus is a determined, conscious bodily movement (not involuntary)

Lambert v. California

Virginia Lambert was convicted of forgery under California law. The Los Angeles municipal code required felons to register with the Chief of Police if they remained in LA for longer than five days. Lambert was unaware of this law and failed to register, thus violating the statute. Because the actus reus was a “passive act” and not an omission, and she was unaware with no opportunity to comply before being penalized, her conviction was overturned. The statute imposed a punishment for a passive state of being. You cannot criminalize someone for a state of being.

Lambert holding

cannot punish one for a passive state of being

People v. Kellogg

Thomas Kellogg was a homeless man suffering from alcoholism. He was arrested and charged with violating California Penal Code § 647(f), which criminalized public intoxication. Kellogg argued that as a homeless person, there was nowhere he could be intoxicated in private, so the statute criminalized his state of “being” and violated his Constitutional Rights. A person may not be convicted for their state of being, however, they can still be convicted if their actions pose a risk to public safety. His conviction stands.

Kellogg statute

cannot be convicted for a status, only conduct

Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility et al. v. Nelson A. Rockefeller et al

Current and former inmates, plus the family of one inmate who died, sued the prison where they were incarcerated, Attica Correctional Facility. They alleged that state police officers and corrections officers subjected them to brutality and killed 32 inmates. They sought an injunction compelling state and federal officials to investigate and prosecute those involved. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case, holding that both state and federal prosecutorial discretion precluded judicial intervention to force prosecutors to bring criminal charges.

Inmates of Attica holding

courts will not intervene in federal prosecutorial discretion to bring criminal charges

United States v. Armstrong

Defendants were charged with conspiring to possess and sell over 50 grams of crack cocaine, and for federal firearm offenses. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, saying every person arrested under the statute was black. Prosecutors refused to comply with a discovery order asking for demographical information about those arrested, so the case was dismissed. The dismissal was reversed, holding the defendants did not provide evidence that people of other races were arrested but not prosecuted for the crime. The Court held that overcoming the presumption of regularity and providing selective prosecution requires clear evidence of both discriminatory effect (where one group is affected more than others similarly situated), and a discriminatory purpose (that the prosecutor is intending to discriminate against that specific group). To get discovery, defense must show some evidence of that happening.

Armstrong holding

selective prosecution requires (1) discriminatory effect and (2) discriminatory purpose. (1) that similarly situation individuals of a different status or affiliation were not prosecuted. (2) that the prosecution did so with intent to discriminate. this is a very high bar to overcome the presumption of regularity

Armstrong holding

selective prosecution (discriminatory effect and purpose) must have clear evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity

People v. Williams

Defendant bought Walmart gift cards using a re-coded credit card to use someone else’s credit card information. When confronted by security, Defendant couldn’t produce the credit card that matched the receipt. Defendant then shoved a security guard and tried to escape. Defendant was charged with theft and robbery. Defendant’s robbery conviction was reversed. Larceny (and therefore, robbery) requires asportation and does not require acquiring title, but theft by false pretenses ends as soon as title is acquired. The crime “ended” when D received title to the gift cards. SO, D’s use of force occurred after the crime had completed, not in furtherance of the crime. It was a theft by false pretenses AND then an assault.

People v. Williams holding

theft by false pretenses is when you acquire legal title and ownership of the property

People v. Donaldson

Defendant was seen trying to steal a van, then fled. Officers observed that the steering column was dismantled and that all of the electrical systems were turned on. After being caught, he was charged with second-degree theft. Defendant filed a motion for acquittal saying he never asported with the vehicle, but the motion was denied. D’s conviction was affirmed because the state statute did not require asportation. Instead, it only required dominion or control be asserted. That’s satisfied when someone has possession of property to the exclusion of others’ possession. Physical movement or operation isn't required. Because D dismantled the steering column, he asserted control over the vehicle. This is an example of state statutes superseding common law.

Donaldson holding

control or dominion of the property is satisfied when someone has possession of property to the exclusion of others’ possession, asportation is not always required

State v. Siegel

Defendant was expelled from college. He then refused to return the laptop he was given by the school, so he was charged with grand theft. The trial court dismissed the case, saying he lacked the requisite intent for theft when he was given the laptop. The majority opinion held that struggle, injury, or resistance was required to constitute robbery. There must be more force than minimally necessary. The court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding Defendant not criminally liable for robbery.

Siegel holding

robbery requires intent to steal at the onsent. embezzlement comes after the fact.

State v. Sein

Defendant ran up behind a woman, slid her purse from underneath her arm, and ran away, using only the force necessary to remove her purse. Defendant argued he was only liable for larceny because of the minimal use of force, but he was charged and convicted of second-degree robbery. The appellate court reversed the conviction, so the state appealed. A “claim of right” defense (the defense that the actor was attempting to recover their own property, not appropriating someone else's) does not apply toward robbery. Robbery involves force, and the state does not encourage self-help through force.

Sein holding

more force than a “snatching” is necessary for the act to constitute robbery

People v. Reid & Riddles

Reid and his stepbrother robbed three people at gunpoint. After the robberies, Reid took his stepbrother’s gun and demanded the money he was holding. After a struggle, Reid shot his stepbrother. In Riddles’ case, he claimed he only took $25 from the victim, who claimed Riddles struck her and took $50. In both cases, they argued that their victims had owed them the money they took, so they asserted a “claim of right” defense. The state’s theft statute also included embezzlement, which did not require criminal intent at the time of taking. The court reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case, as refusing to turn over the laptop amounted to fraudulent conversion. This satisfied the elements of embezzlement allowing D to be charged with theft. Thus he could be tried on the question of whether he committed theft on an embezzlement theory.

Riddles holding

claim of right cannot be used with money (non-traceable) or robbery (force)

State v. Begaye

Defendant was charged with burglary, breaking and entering, and possession of burglary tools after he was arrested after breaking into a business. After his conviction, Defendant appealed, saying that the similarities between the burglary and breaking and entering statutes violated double jeopardy. Because the statutes both had their own specific means of completing their respective crimes, double jeopardy (can’t be charged for the same crime twice unless you committed the crime twice) was not violated. Burglary required the specific intent of felony or theft, whereas breaking and entering required specific means for gaining entry. Each crime required proof of an element the other did not. His conviction was affirmed.

Begaye holding

burglary is specific intent while breaking and entering is general intent

United States v. Eichman

Defendant and an accomplice climbed onto the US Army Recruiting Station at Times Square, then set the roof of the building and an American flag on fire as a protest. Defendants were charged with burglary, among other things. They moved to dismiss their burglary charge. Burglary required entry into the premises within the four walls or beneath the roof into an enclosed space. The court rejected the government’s contention that being on the roof constituted entry, and it held it would dismiss their burglary charge if the prosecution could not offer any evidence testifying to those requirements.

Eichman holding

burglary requires entry into the four walls or ceiling of a dwelling, being on top of a roof by itself does not count

State v. Dorn

Victim made rude comments about Defendant, so she pushed him down. He fell into a bonfire and sustained significant burns. Dorn claimed she pushed the victim to get him away from her, and she did not intend for him to get burned. The court affirmed Dorn’s conviction because she acted with intent to push the victim. It was not deciding the question of whether proof of direct cause (rather than mere proximate cause) is required in all cases because her actions were sufficient to meet the more stringent standard of direct cause. Despite not intending to cause such severe injuries, Dorn’s act of pushing the victim was the direct cause of his burns. She met the higher standard of causation with direct cause, not proximate cause.

Dorn holding

direct cause because she caused the stumbling and not proximate cause

Commonwealth v. Mitchell

Mitchell was the primary caretaker for her friend’s disabled child, James. After her friend moved out, Mitchell severely neglected James. Mitchell was convicted of causing James’ injuries. The court held that the prosecutor’s failure to identify the legal duty that Mitchell violated by neglecting James denied her a fair trial. Therefore, her conviction on one charge should be reversed, but the appellate court’s dismissal of the other charge should also be reversed.

Mitchell holding

there was a legal duty from one of four theories from KY: (1) where a statute imposes a duty to care for another, (2) where one stands in a certain status relationship to another, (3) where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another, (4) where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.

State v. Morton

Defendant was fired from his job at a grocery store, so he decided to rob it. He stole an unloaded gun from his mom, loaded it, and returned to the store saying he was there to return his uniform. When he arrived, he pulled out the gun and threatened the manager, who complied. During the robbery, he shot his former manager from three feet away, stole and destroyed the security equipment. Premeditation can be determined by considering: 1) the nature of the weapon used, 2) lack of provocation, 3) defendant’s conduct before and after the killing, 4) defendant’s conduct before and after the killing, and 5) if lethal blows were dealt after the deceased was rendered helpless. [should know these for exams, but do not need to list the specific case names] There is no specific time requirement for premeditation, but it requires something more than an instantaneous decision. Both premeditation and felony-murders are viable avenues to pursuing a charge of first-degree murder in this jurisdiction*.

Morton holding

premeditation: (1) the nature of the weapon used, (2) lack of provocation, (3) defendant’s conduct before and after the killing, (4) defendant’s conduct before and after the killing, and (5) if lethal blows were dealt after the deceased was rendered helpless

People v. Stamp

Defendants robbed the General Amusement Company. They frightened the owner, who had a heart condition. The fear induced a heart attack, and he died. The fear the owner experienced was determined to be the cause of the heart attack, and defendants were charged with first-degree murder. Defendants argued that the death was not foreseeable, so there was no “direct causation.” Despite the victim having a heart condition before the felony, it was exacerbated by the defendants’ actions. Victims are “taken as they are,” meaning his preexisting health conditions do not reduce D’s liability. This is known as the “eggshell skull” rule. Therefore, the defendants could be held liable for causing the death of the owner, despite not physically killing him. This is an example of “but-for” causation, a type of direct causation. But for the defendant’s actions, the victim would not have died.

Stamp holding

eggshell skull, but-for causation, and foreseeability

Patterson v. New York

Defendant was estranged from his wife. When he saw her semi-undressed with a neighbor, he shot the man in the head twice. At trial, he raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Affirmative defenses are mitigating factors that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in this jurisdiction. That burden is on the defendant. Proving the elements of the crime is still the prosecution’s burden.

Patterson holding

EED affirmative defense burden of proof on defendant

Robertson v. Commonwealth

Police officer attempted to arrest defendant, and defendant jumped over a gap in a bridge while fleeing. The officer attempted the jump and fell to his death. Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. On appeal, defendant argued the officer’s actions caused his death. The Court affirmed the conviction because Robertson’s actions were a direct cause of the officer’s death [if D did not run, the police officer would not have chased him]. The court decided it was reasonably foreseeable that the officer would chase the defendant. It held the defendant knew, or should have known, that the officer would chase him, and defendant consciously disregarded the risk that someone may get hurt.

Robertson holding

reasonably foreseeable required for disregard of the risk

State v. Williams

Defendants failed to seek medical attention for their child because they were afraid their child would be taken away from them. The child then died. The parents were charged with manslaughter. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the parents did not behave as a reasonable person [negligence, objective] would. Their deviation from the norm amounted to ordinary negligence [not gross negligence], which was sufficient to support a charge of manslaughter under the Washington statute.

State v. Williams holding

ordinary negligence because they did not behave as a reasonable parent would

In Re MTS

M.T.S. was charged with sexual assault after he engaged in penetration with a 15-year-old girl without her consent. The trial court found him liable, but the appellate court reversed this decision due to lack of force. The Supreme Court chose to focus on defendant’s conduct more than the victim’s state of mind. It rejected the appellate court’s contention that physical force be required. It also held that permission must be affirmative and freely given, and it may be inferred from words or actions. It doesn’t matter if force was required, it was the consent part. No permission, any touching is enough.

M.T.S. holding

sexual assault is any act of sexual penetration by a defendant without affirmative and freely given consent

McQuirter v. State

Defendant was charged with attempted assault with intent to rape after following a woman home and stopping near her residence and waiting there for 30 minutes. Police officers testified that defendant confessed to wanting to abduct the woman and that he would have killed her if she resisted. Defendant claimed he was meeting with someone. Defendant was convicted, then argued that the verdict was not supported by the evidence on appeal. The court affirmed the trial court’s verdict, saying the prosecution met their burden. The prosecution needed to prove 1) an attempt (rape that has not yet amounted to a completed assault) , 2) intent to have sex with the complainant, 3) against the victim’s will, and 4) that the defendant planned to do so by force or putting her in fear. The court held that the prosecution met this burden.

McQuirter holding

the definition of sexual assault, which is any degree of unwanted physical contact, not needing to be more than what is reusexual penetration

State v. Booth

Police officers found heroin inside of a heater and cabinet inside of defendant’s apartment. The defendant claimed he was not in possession of the substance and that he had no knowledge of it in the apartment. He was convicted of drug possession. To establish constructive possession, the court considers 1) whether the defendant knew that illegal drugs were present in the area, 2) the defendant’s relationship to the person in actual possession of the drugs, 3) whether there is evidence of recent drug use, 4) the defendant’s proximity to the drugs, 5) and any evidence that the area is frequented by drug users. After considering these factors, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction.

Booth holding

factors to determine constructive possession: 1) whether the defendant knew that illegal drugs were present in the area, 2) the defendant’s relationship to the person in actual possession of the drugs, 3) whether there is evidence of recent drug use, 4) the defendant’s proximity to the drugs, 5) and any evidence that the area is frequented by drug users

US v. Jewell

Defendant drove across the US border with 110lbs of marijuana in his car. He claimed he didn’t definitively know the drugs were there, but he was offered money to drive the car across the border, and he told a border patrol agent that he suspected there might have been something illegal in the car. A defendant may not circumvent the required mens rea through willful blindness in this jurisdiction. A person is willfully blind when they 1) believe there is a high probability that a fact exists, and 2) they take action to avoid learning of the fact. [NEED BOTH FOR THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS TEST] The Court found that the defendant was willfully blind, so he satisfied the mens rea element of the statute.

Jewell holding

the willful blindness test which is when (1) defendant believes with a high probability that a fact exists AND (2) they take action to avoid learning the fact.

Staples v. United States

Defendant possessed an AR-15 that had been modified to allow for fully automatic firing. Defendant failed to register the weapon under the National Firearms Act. He was convicted for unlawful possession of an unregistered machine gun. The court held that when criminal statutes do not contain a mens rea element, there should not be a presumption that the statute should be treated like a public welfare/strict liability [liable without a mental state requirement] offense. Here, the defendant’s conviction was overturned because the prosecution could not prove that the defendant knew the particular type of gun (here, a machine gun) was subject to the registration requirement.

Staples holding

when criminal statutes do not contain a mens rea element, there should NOT be a presumption that the statute should be treated like a public welfare/strict liability

State v. Freeman

Defendant agreed to sell cocaine to a man who was working with the government. Defendant sold the man Tylenol, but he believed it was actually cocaine. Defendant was convicted of delivering a simulated controlled substance. The court held that defendant’s mistake was not sufficient to warrant an acquittal. A mistake of fact defense is not a valid defense if the actor would have actually committed a crime. Mistake of fact defense only works if it negates the mens rea of the crime. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed.

Freeman holding

A mistake of fact defense is not a valid defense if the actor would have actually committed a crime.

People v. Marrero

Defendant was a corrections officer in Connecticut. He was arrested in Manhattan for possession of a loaded firearm. Defendant argued that he was allowed to carry a firearm because he was a peace officer. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. Defendant’s ignorance of the law was not a valid defense. Generally, a mistake of law defense is not valid unless there is a fundamental mistake in the statute or another regulation, or an interpretation by the governmental authority charged with enforcing the law makes an error. Here, the defendant was ignorant of the law and did not properly inform himself.

Marrero holding

a mistake of law defense is not valid unless there is a fundamental mistake in the statute or another regulation, or an interpretation by the governmental authority charged with enforcing the law makes an error