CH8: EU internal market for energy

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17 Terms

1
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What are the objectives, legal foundations and limits of the EU internal energy market?

• Article 194 TFEU: functioning markets, security of supply, energy efficiency/renewables, network interconnections. Energy is a shared competence (Art. 4 TFEU).

• The EU aims for competition, consumer choice, sustainability and reliable cross-border supply, wholesale markets are increasingly integrated.

• Article 194(2) preserves Member States' choices of energy sources and overall supply structure (e.g. French nuclear, German renewables, Polish coal history).

• National energy mixes, price interventions, fiscal differences and inadequate interconnections mean a common legal market does not yet guarantee equal prices.

2
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Why does the physical nature of electricity make market integration different from ordinary goods?

• Distinguish primary energy sources, fuels ('molecules') and electricity ('electrons'), electricity is only part of energy consumption.

• Electricity is hard to store economically at scale, so generation and demand must balance continuously, base load, daily peaks and seasons require flexible capacity.

• Wind, solar and hydro output vary, plants differ in ramping and restart costs. Forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets coordinate supply.

• AC electricity follows network physics and impedance, not the contracted trade route, storage, demand response and interconnectors ease but do not remove constraints.

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Why can wholesale electricity prices become negative, and what can reduce these episodes?

• Strong wind/solar output, weak demand and insufficient storage/export capacity can produce excess generation that must be absorbed or curtailed.

• Thermal generators may prefer briefly paying to keep operating rather than incur shutdown/restart costs, some renewables have support-related incentives to bid below zero.

• With marginal pricing, accepted negative offers can make the market-clearing price negative, this signals lack of flexibility, not necessarily market failure.

• Batteries, pumped storage, flexible demand, interconnectors and support reform help, consumers with fixed retail tariffs typically do not receive negative prices.

4
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Why are electricity grids natural monopolies, and why is this not a case for monopolising generation?

• Transmission and distribution require high sunk fixed costs, duplicating wires or pipes to reach the same customers is wasteful.

• LRAC declines over relevant demand because fixed infrastructure is spread across throughput, marginal transmission cost is comparatively low until congestion.

• Unregulated grid operators may charge excessive access prices or exclude rivals, while marginal-cost tariffs alone may not recover fixed costs.

• The EU retains regulated grid monopolies but opens generation, wholesale trading and retail supply to competition, independent regulation and non-discriminatory third-party access are essential.

5
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How should Pelkmans' natural-monopoly graph (Figure 8.1) be interpreted?

• Many small suppliers: each at low scale/high cost, supply S at P3 intersects demand at A, giving output q2.

• One X-efficient monopolist: chooses MR=LRMC at q3 and demand price P2 (point C), P2 < P3, showing potential scale advantage.

• One producer supplying q2 would have average cost P1 (point B), P3ABP1 measures resources wasted by fragmented supply at that output.

• Regulated P=LRAC yields q4 and break-even, P=LRMC yields q5 (allocatively efficient) but needs financing because LRMC < LRAC.

• A complacent monopoly can develop X-inefficiency, raise costs and innovate less, scale savings are not a reason to leave it unregulated.

6
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How did EU electricity-market liberalisation change vertically integrated national monopolies?

• Previously an incumbent controlled generation, transmission, distribution and supply, leaving consumers little choice and entrants dependent on a rival's network.

• After liberalisation, generators and traders compete in wholesale markets, retailers compete for customers, who can switch without changing physical connections.

• Unbundling separates networks from competitive activities: accounting/legal/functional or ownership separation, ISO/ITO models are possible under conditions.

• TSOs operate high-voltage networks, balancing and congestion, DSOs manage local networks and distributed resources. Independent regulators police access and tariffs.

• Competition in commercial services depends on fair network access and is distinct from ownership of the physical grid.

7
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What are Pelkmans' six steps for integrating network industries, and how do they apply to energy?

• 1. Choose competition in the market or competition for the market (e.g. franchising). 2. Separate reserved/network and competitive services, with independent regulation.

• 3. Preserve universal-service quality and affordability. 4. Finance public/universal obligations transparently, preferably with targeted subsidies or sector funds.

• 5. Guarantee non-distortive network access, including terms and tariffs. 6. Remove discriminatory cross-border charges and secure genuine cross-border trade.

• The 1996/1998 and 2003 electricity/gas packages progressively opened supply and established access/regulators, later packages strengthened unbundling and EU coordination.

• EU market integration can range from isolated national systems to linked spot/forward markets and common short- and long-term market institutions.

8
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What are loop flows, and why do they reveal a limit of commercial market integration?

• Electricity traded within one bidding zone can physically cross neighbouring grids: e.g. northern-to-southern German flows may pass through Poland or Czechia.

• Alternating-current flows follow impedance and network conditions, not bilateral contracts or national borders, such flows are not automatically illegal.

• They can occupy cross-border capacity, cause congestion or redispatch costs, and impose spillovers on neighbouring networks.

• Remedies include better domestic grids, coordinated flow-based capacity allocation, joint remedial measures and revised bidding zones if congestion persists.

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Why does the EU internal energy market remain fragmented despite legal liberalisation?

• Insufficient interconnectors and national bottlenecks, slow permitting and underinvestment physically restrict competition and price convergence.

• Member States differ in generation mixes, taxes/subsidies, capacity mechanisms and retail price regulation, incumbents remain strong and customers may not switch.

• Cross-border projects create uneven benefits and costs, and national governments retain legitimate energy-security responsibilities.

• Integration can transmit foreign price shocks, resolving fragmentation requires infrastructure, coordination and regulatory enforcement, not only formal market opening.

10
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How does marginal pricing transmit gas-price shocks into electricity prices, as in 2021–2022?

• Electricity's short-run demand is inelastic and replacement supply is slow, a supply shock can sharply increase the market price.

• Under merit-order/marginal pricing, the last generator required to meet demand sets the wholesale clearing price.

• If gas-fired plants are marginal, higher gas prices raise the electricity clearing price even for nuclear, wind or other units whose own costs barely changed.

• The 2021–2022 gas crisis, intensified by disrupted Russian supplies, generated very high electricity prices, this underlies debates on intervention and windfall gains.

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What are windfall revenues/profits and how did the EU respond during the energy crisis?

• In the simple diagram a price rise from pm to pwp creates extra gross revenues of (pwp - pm) × qm on the original output, shown as a rectangle.

• Extra revenue is not automatically profit: higher fuel costs, hedges, forward contracts, taxes and other obligations matter.

• Low-marginal-cost infra-marginal generators can receive high prices set by expensive gas plants without comparable cost increases.

• EU emergency Regulation 2022/1854 introduced a temporary €180/MWh revenue ceiling for certain infra-marginal producers and solidarity measures for some fossil-fuel profits.

• Redistribution can protect consumers but must consider investment incentives, the slide's demand-shift diagram differs from the mainly supply-driven 2022 episode.

12
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How did the Iberian (Spanish–Portuguese) mechanism lower electricity prices, and what were its trade-offs?

• Introduced in June 2022: eligible gas-fired generators bid as if gas cost a lower reference price (initially €40/MWh), receiving compensation for the eligible fuel-cost difference.

• The effective gas-generation supply bids shift downward, potentially lowering the marginal clearing electricity price, unlike a simple retail price cap, plants are compensated.

• To isolate the mechanism correctly, hold demand constant while comparing high-cost gas bids with subsidised lower bids (the original slide also shifts demand).

• Consumers may face lower wholesale prices, but subsidies require financing and can increase electricity/gas use and exports to neighbours.

• Iberia's limited interconnections made the scheme politically and technically distinctive, benefits differ across contracts and users.

13
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What are the economic benefits and potential problems of national energy-price controls and generation restrictions?

• Retail/wholesale caps or subsidies may shield consumers from shocks, but if set below the market-clearing price they risk excess demand, shortages or fiscal costs.

• Controls can weaken energy-saving incentives, distort imports/exports and shift costs among taxpayers, producers and consumers, design and compensation matter.

• Restrictions on cheap generation technologies shift electricity supply left, raising prices and reducing output in the simple diagram.

• However, private production cost may differ from social cost: emissions, safety, security and other externalities may justify some restrictions.

14
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Why can energy-only markets face a 'missing-money' problem, and what do capacity mechanisms do?

• Back-up generators incur large fixed costs but may operate few hours, volatile demand, price caps and low-marginal-cost renewable production can limit energy-market revenues.

• Under a missing-money problem, expected energy revenues may be insufficient to finance reliability capacity even if it is socially valuable.

• Capacity mechanisms pay for being available, not only for electricity generated, examples include capacity auctions, strategic reserves and reliability options.

• They can preserve security of supply, but poorly coordinated national designs subsidise domestic generators and distort cross-border investment and trade.

15
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How has the EU legal framework for energy-market integration evolved?

• Article 194 TFEU provides energy objectives, alongside internal-market, competition, environment and state-aid provisions.

• 1990s and 2003 electricity/gas directives began market opening, the 2009 Third Energy Package strengthened unbundling, national regulation and established ACER.

• The 2019 Clean Energy electricity framework addresses trading, consumers and capacity mechanisms, the 2024 electricity reform supports longer-term contracts and protection.

• 2024 gas/hydrogen legislation, TEN-E, security-of-supply, REMIT and network codes complement market rules, distinguish temporary 2022 emergency interventions.

16
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How do EU case law and cross-border infrastructure support a genuine internal energy market?

• CJEU case law limits preferential transmission access, discriminatory exclusive rights and disproportionate restrictions, while recognising justified public-service obligations.

• Interconnectors, transmission upgrades, pipelines, LNG, storage and coordinated capacity allocation let countries share cheaper supply, flexibility and reserves.

• TEN-E and Connecting Europe Facility support cross-border projects, market coupling helps allocate existing capacity efficiently.

• But physical networks involve environmental costs, permitting delays, internal congestion and disagreements over who pays, infrastructure must pass cost-benefit scrutiny.

17
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What is the central unresolved challenge of European energy-market integration?

• Formal liberalisation is advanced, but natural-monopoly grids and electricity physics still require strong, coordinated public regulation.

• Market rules must be paired with adequate interconnectors, grid investment, flexible demand/storage and effective cross-border capacity management.

• Policy must balance competition and affordable prices with security of supply, climate goals, universal service and financing of future capacity.

• Pelkmans' lesson: exploit network scale economies without tolerating X-inefficiency, exclusionary conduct or poor innovation, separate the grid monopoly from contestable activities