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The principal-agent problem
Principal (us) have less information than the agent (president)
President has different incentives and can manipulate that to their benefit, hard to know what agent is doing
Leads to rally effect and diversionary war
We only see result of war, not what goes behind it
Diversionary war
involvement in war/international conflict distracts the populationÂ
Not super common → losing wars have bad consequences for leaders
Bargaining model → take in costs of war and benefitsÂ
Rally effect must take over entire bargaining range for when war is costly which is unlikely
The benefit from the rally effect must be beneficial on both sides
Rally Effect
leader approval goes up during warÂ
A conflict to generate a rally effect is called a diversionary warÂ
Ex: Falklands war with Argentina and Britain - both started wars which generated a rally effect
Ex: war in Iran
Democratic peace
Democracies are less likely to fight each other
Democracies are no less likely to fight than other states
Theories to explain democratic peace
1. Norms of non-violent conflict resolution
Democracies usually don’t settle conflicts with violence
2. Selectorate theory
Select leaders, leaders must take selectorate’s interests into account and keep them there to get re-elected/stay in power
3. Democratic transparencyÂ
Open, observableÂ
^ explains why democracies are less likely to go to war in general not exactly a good explanation for why democracies don’t go to war with each other
Correlation vs. Causation (democracy)
Democracy (x) and peace (y) are correlated but doesn’t mean democracy causes peace
It could be that x causes y
Democracy causes peace
It could be that y causes x
Peace causes democracy
It could that z causes both x and y
Something else causes democracy and peace
Gambling for Resurrection
Reckless, near failure decision to go to war because you’re trying to save yourself and there’s seemingly little to lose
Ex: you get into a war (risky, near failure decision) but the war goes poorly, you worry about your job, you know you should negotiate peace for the good of the country but maybe it could save your jobÂ
if you negotiate:Â
You’ll lose your job
If you keep fighting
You’ll be very likely to lose your job
But there's a small chance you win and are seen as a heroÂ
Ex: Putin doesn’t want to settle now even though it is in the best interests of the country because he needs to win (or else he’d be punished)
People are risk-acceptant in the loss domain
Face to face diplomacy
Scholars are skeptical - talk is cheap
Does not constrain future behavior
State interests are from security/power/ideology, can have personal rapport between leaders
Even if it clarifies intentions, it doesn’t necessarily lead to peaceful outcomesÂ
Better understanding of the adversary may lead to conflict (you could find out they have bad intentions)
Opposing interests don’t magically disappear
But diplomats will still have face to face meetingsÂ
Signals vs. indices
Signals -Â easy to fake, explicitly chosen, strategic
speeches, press statements
Indices - hard to control, outside the speaker’s control
Expressions, tones, hesitations, eye movement, body language
Security dilemma sensibility (Booth, Wheeler)
Ability to see how one’s own actions might be seen as threatening
LACK of SDS Example: Weinberger “[the Soviets] know perfectly well that we will never launch a first strike on the Soviet Union”
Failed b/c he had the perspective the U.S. is peaceful
False conviction about the motivations of othersÂ
Selection problems
Face to face meetings between leaders don’t happen randomly
things have to be bad but not to bad in order to meet
The best emissary isn’t always the leader
You don’t want to go if the meeting is bound to fail/no deal happens
“Evidence” in successful negotiations due to face-to-face interaction are a tiny fraction of evidence