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Union Pump Co.
Facts: A pump fire was extinguished; afterward, an employee slipped while crossing a wet pipe rack after taking a familiar shortcut. Holding: The pump fire was not the proximate cause of the later fall. Rule: Negligence that merely furnishes the occasion or condition for a different injury, after the original risk has ended, is too remote.
New York Central Railroad
Facts: Sparks from a railroad engine ignited a shed; flames then spread roughly 125–150 feet and destroyed another house. Holding: No recovery for the remote property fire under the historical one-leap approach. Rule: An old restrictive fire-spread remoteness rule, not the modern general scope-of-risk standard.
Polemis
Facts: Workers negligently dropped a plank aboard a ship carrying flammable benzene; an unforeseeable spark ignited vapors and destroyed the ship. Holding: The negligent act directly caused the loss despite unforeseeability of fire. Rule: Historical direct-consequences approach, subsequently displaced by the Wagon Mound foreseeability-of-kind rule.
Jolley
Facts: Children meddled with a rotting, abandoned boat, tried to repair or prop it up, and one was injured when it collapsed. Holding: The general risk of physical injury from children meddling with the boat sufficed; exact mechanics need not be predicted. Rule: Foresee the GENUS of harm, not the precise sequence.
Ventricelli
Facts: A rental car had a defective trunk; while the renter was stopped and dealing with the defect, another car independently hit him. Holding: The defective trunk was not a proximate cause of the collision injuries. Rule: A defect that merely puts P at the scene of an unrelated risk does not place that injury within the scope of liability.
Pollard
Facts: Railway-related blasting powder was left accessible; a teenager took it, held it with adults’ knowledge, and later ignited it, injuring someone. Holding: Independent handling and ignition broke the causal chain. Rule: Deliberate, sustained intervening choices may be a SUPERSEDING cause when the original risk no longer controls.
Du Pont
Facts: Explosives were left on a farm; a teenager moved and buried them, and younger boys later found them and were injured. Holding: Moving and burying the explosives did not supersede Du Pont’s negligence. Rule: The original explosive danger persisted; foreseeable careless handling does not necessarily break the chain. Contrast Pollard.
Roberts
Facts: A sheriff’s-office cook deputized for extra pay was required to carry a gun; while drunk and fooling with it, he shot P. Holding: His extraordinarily reckless gunplay was a superseding cause even assuming negligent training. Rule: An independent, highly extraordinary intervening act can cut off the original actor’s liability.
Martinez
Facts: A landlord failed to provide hot water; a tenant heated water in a pot for bathing and accidentally burned a child. Holding: The tenant’s intervening carelessness was treated as superseding the landlord’s failure. Rule: Analyze whether subsequent conduct is a sufficiently independent source of a different injury.
Britton
Facts: A commercial tenant’s premises were implicated in arson damage to the landlord’s building. Holding: The court was willing to consider tenant responsibility despite intentional third-party arson. Rule: Criminal conduct does not automatically supersede when protection against that harm falls within D’s responsibility.
Graves
Facts: TV producers arranged an on-air surprise revealing a male guest’s secret admirer was another man; two weeks later the guest murdered the admirer off-site. Holding: The show’s protective duty did not extend indefinitely outside the studio. Rule: Formally a limited-DUTY holding, but the outline places it here as an example arguably better analyzed as superseding cause/remoteness.