CH3: FP in mainstream macro models

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1/23

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24 Terms

1
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What is the central question of fiscal policy in practice, and how does it differ from the models?

• The models show how fiscal policy can stabilise output when governments pursue macroeconomic objectives.

• In practice, output still fluctuates substantially around potential, and fiscal policy is often pro-cyclical.

• Larch examines three explanations: uncertain information, implementation lags and political-economy incentives.

2
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What do Larch's fiscal-dominance examples illustrate?

• Unsustainable fiscal policy can force a central bank to choose between price stability and financial stability.

• Political pressure on central-bank independence can also undermine monetary dominance.

• The Brazil–euro-area inflation comparison illustrates different outcomes, although fiscal institutions are not the only explanation.

3
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What is potential output, and why does it matter for stabilisation?

• Potential output is the level of production consistent with stable inflation, not the economy's absolute maximum output.

• Actual GDP can be separated conceptually into a potential trend and cyclical deviations from it.

• The output gap indicates slack or overheating, but potential output is unobserved and must be estimated.

4
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How is potential output derived in Larch's simple Phillips-curve model?

• The Phillips curve links inflation changes to unemployment: πₜ − πₜ₋₁ = (m + z) − αu.

• Inflation is stable when uₙ = (m + z)/α, giving Yₙ = L(α − m − z)/α.

• Potential output rises with the labour force and falls with higher mark-ups or wage-pressure factors z in this model.

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How do peak-to-peak and statistical methods estimate potential output, and what are their weaknesses?

• Peak-to-peak joins business-cycle peaks, but approximates maximum rather than non-inflationary output and needs an unknown future peak.

• Statistical methods (e.g. HP filter) extract a smooth trend from observed GDP, using past and future observations.

• A high smoothing parameter λ gives a smoother trend and larger estimated gaps, so results depend on methodological choices.

6
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How does the production-function method estimate potential output?

• Start from a production function such as Y = AK^αL^(1−α), using capital, labour and total factor productivity (TFP).

• Estimate TFP as a residual, then separate its trend from cyclical movements and estimate trend labour input.

• Combine trend TFP and labour with the capital stock to estimate potential output, as done by the Commission and other institutions.

7
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What is counter-cyclical versus pro-cyclical fiscal policy, and how are the quadrants read?

• Counter-cyclical policy expands when the output gap worsens and tightens when it improves, stabilising activity.

• Pro-cyclical policy tightens during a worsening gap or expands during an improving gap, amplifying fluctuations.

• In Larch's diagram, counter-cyclical episodes are south-west and north-east, pro-cyclical episodes north-west and south-east.

8
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How do automatic stabilisers differ from discretionary fiscal measures?

• Automatic stabilisers change the budget with economic activity without a new government decision.

• Examples include unemployment benefits, tax revenue responses and maintaining expenditure when revenue falls.

• Discretionary measures are deliberate changes in taxes or spending to influence demand.

9
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Why is the structural balance needed to measure the discretionary fiscal stance?

• The headline budget balance changes both because of policy decisions and because the business cycle affects revenue and spending.

• Structural balance = headline balance − ε × output gap, where ε measures the budget's cyclical sensitivity.

• An improvement in the structural balance indicates discretionary tightening, while a deterioration indicates easing.

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What do Larch's country graphs show about actual fiscal stabilisation?

• France, Italy, Germany and the euro area show many observations in pro-cyclical as well as counter-cyclical quadrants.

• Major shocks such as 2009 and 2020 more clearly prompted counter-cyclical responses, although fiscal space mattered, especially for Italy in 2009.

• Larch, Orseau and van der Wielen (2021) find a little over half of episodes pro-cyclical, with no statistically significant EU–non-EU difference.

11
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What do the redistribution graphs show about Europe and the United States?

• Market-income inequality increased between the 1970s and the 2008–14 period across the groups shown.

• In the EU15, taxes and transfers absorbed most of the rise, leaving disposable-income inequality nearly unchanged.

• US disposable-income inequality rose much more, alongside a smaller expansion in government expenditure.

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Which factors help explain cross-country differences in redistribution?

• Higher per-capita income can support greater redistribution, while political ideology shapes its desired scale.

• The composition of employment also matters, with more low-tech employment associated with greater redistribution in Larch's slides.

• Median-voter logic predicts demand for redistribution when median income is below mean income and the majority gains from transfers.

13
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Why do uncertain real-time output-gap estimates cause inappropriate fiscal decisions?

• Potential output is unobserved, and estimates depend on forecasts and assumptions about permanent versus temporary shocks.

• Real-time estimates can differ sharply from ex-post estimates, so policy makers may misjudge whether the economy has slack.

• For the US before 2008, conventional methods suggested little overheating, whereas later estimates showed a positive gap.

14
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What do finance-neutral output-gap estimates and EU forecast errors reveal?

• Borio and co-authors find that including financial variables produced more stable real-time estimates before the global financial crisis.

• For EU countries, real-time output gaps were, on average, more negative and less dispersed than ex-post estimates.

• Thus conventional indicators can understate overheating and lead to misguided fiscal expansion.

15
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Why are policy lags a problem for discretionary fiscal stabilisation?

• Inside lags cover diagnosis, political agreement, legislation and administrative implementation, and are relatively long for fiscal policy.

• Outside lags cover the time between implementation and effects on demand, varying by instrument.

• By the time a measure works, the cycle may have changed, turning an intended stabilisation into a pro-cyclical action.

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Why does Larch reject fiscal fine tuning, and what does he recommend instead?

• Precisely offsetting small output gaps is unreliable because potential output estimates are uncertain and policy is slow.

• In normal times, governments should let automatic stabilisers work rather than repeatedly adjust discretionary policy.

• Discretionary action is more justified after large shocks, when the need for intervention is clearer.

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What is the most important automatic stabiliser according to Larch, and why does borrowing matter?

• More important than tax progressivity or unemployment benefits is the ability to maintain public spending when revenue falls.

• Borrowing allows governments to avoid cutting expenditure during recessions, thereby cushioning aggregate demand.

• Countries with limited market access, especially emerging economies, are more likely to cut spending and act pro-cyclically.

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How does political economy differ from the normative view of fiscal policy?

• Normative models often assume a benevolent decision maker seeking the socially optimal fiscal policy.

• In a democracy, decisions emerge from voters, parties and politicians with heterogeneous interests and incentives.

• Stabilisation may therefore be outweighed by electoral, ideological or distributional objectives.

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What is the deficit bias, and what do debt trends illustrate?

• Deficit bias is the tendency to run persistent deficits rather than offset recession deficits with stronger balances in good times.

• Italy, France, Spain and the US show sustained or rising debt, while Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have more often reversed crisis increases.

• Redistribution need not require deficits, and counter-cyclical policy alone does not explain persistent debt accumulation.

20
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How do deficit illusion and asymmetric information explain deficit bias?

• Deficit illusion (Buchanan and Wagner): voters enjoy current spending but underestimate its future tax or spending cost.

• Asymmetric information (Rogoff): voters may be rational, but politicians know more about policy costs and outcomes.

• In both cases, voters do not fully discipline deficit-financed promises.

21
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How does strategic debt create a deficit bias?

• An incumbent uncertain of re-election can borrow to finance spending preferred by its own constituency.

• If it loses, the successor inherits debt service and has less fiscal space for different priorities.

• Persson and Svensson, and Alesina and Tabellini, show how debt can strategically constrain future governments.

22
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What is the common-pool problem in fiscal policymaking?

• Each minister, party or regional representative seeks spending benefits for its constituency from a shared tax base.

• Each considers its own benefit but not the full fiscal cost imposed on other groups or future budgets.

• This produces aggregate overspending and deficit bias, particularly where budget decisions are fragmented.

23
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How does intergenerational redistribution explain persistent deficits?

• Current voters can benefit from debt-financed spending while shifting part of the future tax burden to later generations.

• Future taxpayers cannot vote today, so their interests carry less political weight.

• The incentive is stronger when Ricardian equivalence fails and households do not fully offset public borrowing with saving.

24
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How does the war-of-attrition model explain delayed fiscal consolidation?

• After a lasting adverse shock, spending must fall or revenue must rise to restore budget balance.

• Parties or groups disagree over who should bear the adjustment and delay agreement while hoping others concede.

• Deficits persist during the bargaining period: Alesina and Drazen's war-of-attrition mechanism.