CH3: Custom Union Theory

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17 Terms

1
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How does economic integration differ between market integration and policy integration?

• Market integration removes economic frontiers and changes market structure, conduct and performance (SCP).

• It increases actual/potential competition and, absent distortions, tends to improve welfare.

• Policy integration involves cooperation, coordination, harmonisation or common binding rules.

• Its degree varies and more policy integration is not automatically welfare-enhancing.

2
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How do Tinbergen's negative and positive integration differ, and why is the distinction imperfect?

• Negative integration: reciprocal removal of trade barriers and discrimination to increase trade and competition.

• Positive integration: common policies/institutions to internalise externalities and realise scale economies (Tinbergen, 1954).

• They coexist in practice: even a customs union needs common tariff classifications, external trade rules and implementation.

• 'Positive' and 'negative' are descriptive, not welfare judgements.

3
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What are the three principal economic benefits of integration?

• Allocative gains: better use of resources, specialisation according to comparative advantage and stronger competition.

• Dynamic growth gains: market enlargement, investment, productivity and innovation.

• Strategic gains: greater collective bargaining power in external trade negotiations.

• Overall gains depend on the form and implementation of integration.

4
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What are the main stages of European economic integration, from the FTA to complete economic union?

• FTA: internal tariff elimination; each member retains its own external tariffs.

• CU: FTA + common external tariff (CET) and common external trade policy.

• Common Market: CU + free movement of factors of production.

• EMU: common market + single currency.

• Complete Economic Union: shared fiscal/budgetary decisions; political union is a possible further step.

• Slides also place preferential tariff reductions and sectoral cooperation before an FTA.

5
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Why is Balassa's sequential model of integration an imperfect description of reality?

• Integration does not necessarily progress linearly from one stage to the next.

• Even CUs and common markets require positive integration, contrary to the schematic model.

• Boundaries between common market and economic union overlap.

• Full integration need not culminate in a unitary political state.

• Actual European arrangements overlap (EU, euro area, Schengen, EEA).

6
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What distinguishes an FTA from a customs union, and why do rules of origin matter?

• In an FTA, national external tariffs differ, permitting trade deflection through the lowest-tariff member.

• Rules of origin restrict duty-free treatment to goods sufficiently produced within the FTA, but raise administrative costs.

• A CU sets a CET, removing the external-tariff difference and requiring common trade policy.

• The Treaty of Rome, Art. 9(1), made a CU foundational: no internal customs duties and a common tariff vis-à-vis third countries.

7
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What are the main assumptions and limits of Viner's static customs-union analysis?

• Partial equilibrium: home A, partner B, rest-of-world C; one homogeneous product; a common external tariff.

• Perfect competition, constant returns, fixed technology, no transport costs; A is initially high-cost and C low-cost.

• Viner (1950) introduced trade creation/diversion as production effects; later work added consumption effects.

• Static analysis holds technology and scale constant and therefore misses dynamic responses.

8
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What is trade creation, and through which channels does it raise welfare?

• Removing internal tariffs shifts supply from high-cost domestic producers to lower-cost partner producers.

• The resulting domestic price falls, domestic production contracts and consumption rises.

• Production efficiency gain: formerly inefficient domestic output is replaced.

• Consumption efficiency gain: extra purchases become worthwhile at the lower price.

• In the lecture's diagram, net welfare gain = areas 2 + 4; areas 1 and 3 are transfers.

9
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How does the UK–Denmark–New Zealand butter example illustrate trade creation?

• Illustrative pre-integration unit costs: UK 130p, Denmark 120p, New Zealand 100p.

• UK import tariffs raise Danish butter to 132p and New Zealand butter to 132p, protecting UK output.

• Removing the UK–Denmark tariff brings Danish butter to 120p.

• Cheaper partner imports replace inefficient UK production and stimulate UK consumption.

• The lower world cost of NZ butter foreshadows why diversion must also be considered.

10
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What is trade diversion, and why might a customs union reduce welfare?

• Preferences shift imports from the lowest-cost non-member supplier to a more expensive member supplier.

• The CET maintains a tariff disadvantage for the outsider even though its production cost is lower.

• Consumers may gain from a lower domestic price, but the government loses tariff receipts.

• In the diagram, the extra resource cost of switching suppliers is area 5.

• Net welfare = trade-creation gains (2 + 4) − diversion loss (5), so the sign is ambiguous.

11
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How do the five static effects of a customs union fit together?

• Price effect: domestic price changes after tariff removal.

• Production effect: domestic production falls as partner imports replace it; diversion can replace lower-cost outsider supply.

• Consumption effect: lower prices increase consumption (omitted in Viner's original production-only analysis).

• Revenue effect: lost customs tariff revenue.

• Welfare effect: net of efficiency triangles and diversion cost—2 + 4 under pure creation; 2 + 4 − 5 with diversion.

12
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Why is a customs union not automatically welfare-improving, and what affects the balance?

• Trade creation and diversion can occur simultaneously; preferential integration is not equivalent to global free trade.

• More trade inside a CU is not sufficient evidence of net gains: the no-integration counterfactual matters.

• Gains are more likely with high initial tariffs, limited initial imports from outside and post-CU prices near world prices.

• The structure of trade, union size, production structure, transport costs, CET and accompanying measures all affect outcomes.

13
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How do economies of scale generate dynamic gains from market enlargement?

• Bigger integrated demand permits higher output and a move down the falling part of long-run average cost (LRAC).

• Lower unit costs can translate into lower prices and more production/consumption.

• This was a major post-war rationale for building an EEC market large enough for competitive European firms.

• Beyond minimum efficient scale, diseconomies can appear; scale benefits must be weighed against market power.

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How can stronger competition create dynamic efficiency gains from integration?

• Foreign entrants increase the elasticity of demand facing domestic firms and constrain market power.

• Firms reduce mark-ups and prices, improving allocative efficiency (price nearer marginal cost).

• Competitive pressure encourages cost reductions, efficiency and innovation over time.

• Integration also lowers barriers and supports specialisation by comparative advantage.

• Yet the benefits of large firms and fierce competition must be balanced.

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How can customs-union integration encourage cooperation and knowledge spillovers?

• Cross-border market enlargement creates incentives for joint R&D and technical cooperation.

• Firms can share research costs, knowledge and specialised inputs across borders.

• External economies and geographic polarisation are also named among dynamic effects in the slides.

• The overall dynamic effects go beyond the resource reallocation measured in static tariff diagrams.

16
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What does empirical evidence say about trade creation and diversion in European integration?

• Founding EC6: intra-EC imports rose from 30% (1962) to 45.9% (1984); intra-EC export share from 18.5% to 31.6%.

• Industrial trade among original members rose around 15–30%, with trade creation generally exceeding diversion.

• Agriculture is an important counterexample because CAP support can favour higher-cost internal supply.

• Early static welfare estimates are modest (around 0.15% of GNP).

• Attribution requires a counterfactual: other changes also affect trade.

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What overall judgement can we draw on customs-union welfare and the role of institutions?

• Gains: trade creation, scale economies, fewer regulatory discrepancies and possible convergence.

• Costs: trade diversion, transfers, compliance, excessive regulation and common decision-making.

• Institutions enforce commitments and constrain market distortions, but regulatory capture and rent-seeking are risks.

• Overall EU experience is generally viewed as trade-creating, yet measured welfare gains can be modest.

• Slides cite an 8–9% of EU GDP estimate for the broader customs-union benefit, not directly comparable with early static estimates.