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How does economic integration differ between market integration and policy integration?
• Market integration removes economic frontiers and changes market structure, conduct and performance (SCP).
• It increases actual/potential competition and, absent distortions, tends to improve welfare.
• Policy integration involves cooperation, coordination, harmonisation or common binding rules.
• Its degree varies and more policy integration is not automatically welfare-enhancing.
How do Tinbergen's negative and positive integration differ, and why is the distinction imperfect?
• Negative integration: reciprocal removal of trade barriers and discrimination to increase trade and competition.
• Positive integration: common policies/institutions to internalise externalities and realise scale economies (Tinbergen, 1954).
• They coexist in practice: even a customs union needs common tariff classifications, external trade rules and implementation.
• 'Positive' and 'negative' are descriptive, not welfare judgements.
What are the three principal economic benefits of integration?
• Allocative gains: better use of resources, specialisation according to comparative advantage and stronger competition.
• Dynamic growth gains: market enlargement, investment, productivity and innovation.
• Strategic gains: greater collective bargaining power in external trade negotiations.
• Overall gains depend on the form and implementation of integration.
What are the main stages of European economic integration, from the FTA to complete economic union?
• FTA: internal tariff elimination; each member retains its own external tariffs.
• CU: FTA + common external tariff (CET) and common external trade policy.
• Common Market: CU + free movement of factors of production.
• EMU: common market + single currency.
• Complete Economic Union: shared fiscal/budgetary decisions; political union is a possible further step.
• Slides also place preferential tariff reductions and sectoral cooperation before an FTA.
Why is Balassa's sequential model of integration an imperfect description of reality?
• Integration does not necessarily progress linearly from one stage to the next.
• Even CUs and common markets require positive integration, contrary to the schematic model.
• Boundaries between common market and economic union overlap.
• Full integration need not culminate in a unitary political state.
• Actual European arrangements overlap (EU, euro area, Schengen, EEA).
What distinguishes an FTA from a customs union, and why do rules of origin matter?
• In an FTA, national external tariffs differ, permitting trade deflection through the lowest-tariff member.
• Rules of origin restrict duty-free treatment to goods sufficiently produced within the FTA, but raise administrative costs.
• A CU sets a CET, removing the external-tariff difference and requiring common trade policy.
• The Treaty of Rome, Art. 9(1), made a CU foundational: no internal customs duties and a common tariff vis-à-vis third countries.
What are the main assumptions and limits of Viner's static customs-union analysis?
• Partial equilibrium: home A, partner B, rest-of-world C; one homogeneous product; a common external tariff.
• Perfect competition, constant returns, fixed technology, no transport costs; A is initially high-cost and C low-cost.
• Viner (1950) introduced trade creation/diversion as production effects; later work added consumption effects.
• Static analysis holds technology and scale constant and therefore misses dynamic responses.
What is trade creation, and through which channels does it raise welfare?
• Removing internal tariffs shifts supply from high-cost domestic producers to lower-cost partner producers.
• The resulting domestic price falls, domestic production contracts and consumption rises.
• Production efficiency gain: formerly inefficient domestic output is replaced.
• Consumption efficiency gain: extra purchases become worthwhile at the lower price.
• In the lecture's diagram, net welfare gain = areas 2 + 4; areas 1 and 3 are transfers.
How does the UK–Denmark–New Zealand butter example illustrate trade creation?
• Illustrative pre-integration unit costs: UK 130p, Denmark 120p, New Zealand 100p.
• UK import tariffs raise Danish butter to 132p and New Zealand butter to 132p, protecting UK output.
• Removing the UK–Denmark tariff brings Danish butter to 120p.
• Cheaper partner imports replace inefficient UK production and stimulate UK consumption.
• The lower world cost of NZ butter foreshadows why diversion must also be considered.
What is trade diversion, and why might a customs union reduce welfare?
• Preferences shift imports from the lowest-cost non-member supplier to a more expensive member supplier.
• The CET maintains a tariff disadvantage for the outsider even though its production cost is lower.
• Consumers may gain from a lower domestic price, but the government loses tariff receipts.
• In the diagram, the extra resource cost of switching suppliers is area 5.
• Net welfare = trade-creation gains (2 + 4) − diversion loss (5), so the sign is ambiguous.
How do the five static effects of a customs union fit together?
• Price effect: domestic price changes after tariff removal.
• Production effect: domestic production falls as partner imports replace it; diversion can replace lower-cost outsider supply.
• Consumption effect: lower prices increase consumption (omitted in Viner's original production-only analysis).
• Revenue effect: lost customs tariff revenue.
• Welfare effect: net of efficiency triangles and diversion cost—2 + 4 under pure creation; 2 + 4 − 5 with diversion.
Why is a customs union not automatically welfare-improving, and what affects the balance?
• Trade creation and diversion can occur simultaneously; preferential integration is not equivalent to global free trade.
• More trade inside a CU is not sufficient evidence of net gains: the no-integration counterfactual matters.
• Gains are more likely with high initial tariffs, limited initial imports from outside and post-CU prices near world prices.
• The structure of trade, union size, production structure, transport costs, CET and accompanying measures all affect outcomes.
How do economies of scale generate dynamic gains from market enlargement?
• Bigger integrated demand permits higher output and a move down the falling part of long-run average cost (LRAC).
• Lower unit costs can translate into lower prices and more production/consumption.
• This was a major post-war rationale for building an EEC market large enough for competitive European firms.
• Beyond minimum efficient scale, diseconomies can appear; scale benefits must be weighed against market power.
How can stronger competition create dynamic efficiency gains from integration?
• Foreign entrants increase the elasticity of demand facing domestic firms and constrain market power.
• Firms reduce mark-ups and prices, improving allocative efficiency (price nearer marginal cost).
• Competitive pressure encourages cost reductions, efficiency and innovation over time.
• Integration also lowers barriers and supports specialisation by comparative advantage.
• Yet the benefits of large firms and fierce competition must be balanced.
How can customs-union integration encourage cooperation and knowledge spillovers?
• Cross-border market enlargement creates incentives for joint R&D and technical cooperation.
• Firms can share research costs, knowledge and specialised inputs across borders.
• External economies and geographic polarisation are also named among dynamic effects in the slides.
• The overall dynamic effects go beyond the resource reallocation measured in static tariff diagrams.
What does empirical evidence say about trade creation and diversion in European integration?
• Founding EC6: intra-EC imports rose from 30% (1962) to 45.9% (1984); intra-EC export share from 18.5% to 31.6%.
• Industrial trade among original members rose around 15–30%, with trade creation generally exceeding diversion.
• Agriculture is an important counterexample because CAP support can favour higher-cost internal supply.
• Early static welfare estimates are modest (around 0.15% of GNP).
• Attribution requires a counterfactual: other changes also affect trade.
What overall judgement can we draw on customs-union welfare and the role of institutions?
• Gains: trade creation, scale economies, fewer regulatory discrepancies and possible convergence.
• Costs: trade diversion, transfers, compliance, excessive regulation and common decision-making.
• Institutions enforce commitments and constrain market distortions, but regulatory capture and rent-seeking are risks.
• Overall EU experience is generally viewed as trade-creating, yet measured welfare gains can be modest.
• Slides cite an 8–9% of EU GDP estimate for the broader customs-union benefit, not directly comparable with early static estimates.