SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY CHILDHOOD

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22 Terms

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Social cognition (definition & four processing stages)
The mental process of acquiring knowledge and understanding related to society and the intentions, dispositions, and behaviours of others across four stages: Selection, Encoding, Storage, and Retrieval.
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Theory of Mind (definition & key functions)
The ability to attribute mental states (knowledge, intentions, emotions) to oneself and others in order to explain, predict, and justify behaviour, guiding personal and social actions.
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Retrodiction & Pillai, Sheppard, & Mitchell (2012)
Retrodiction is deducing what happened in the past to cause someone's current mental state. Pillai et al. (2012) showed 35 participants short video clips (3.64–8.96 s) of spontaneous reactions to 4 scenarios (joke, waiting, compliment, story) and found participants successfully deduced which past scenario caused each reaction.
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Four criteria for investigating Theory of Mind in children
Tasks assessing children must be: 1) As simple as possible, 2) As familiar as possible, 3) As age-appropriate as possible, and 4) Yield answers as unambiguous as possible.
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Sally-Anne False Belief Test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985)
Sally puts a ball in her basket and leaves; Anne moves the ball to her box. When Sally returns, children are asked "Where will Sally look for her ball?" Passing requires recognizing Sally holds a false belief (basket) different from reality (box).
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Epistemic vs. Conceptual perspective-taking
Epistemic perspective-taking is reasoning about beliefs—recognising someone can hold justified false beliefs that diverge from reality. Conceptual perspective-taking is distinguishing between appearance and reality (recognising things can look different from what they really are).
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Attributing false belief to others: Age trend (Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
Children were tested on two Sally-Anne-style false-belief stories. Correct responses across both stories were: 0% for 3-year-olds, 57% for 4-year-olds, and 86% for 6–9-year-olds—showing explicit false-belief attribution develops after age 4.
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Attributing false belief to oneself: Smarties/Pencil tube task (Perner et al., 1987; Gopnik & Astington, 1988)
Children guess "sweets" are inside a sweet tube, see a pencil inside instead, and are asked what they originally thought was inside. 3-year-olds often answer "Pencil," whereas 4–5-year-olds succeed—showing self false-belief attribution develops after age 4.
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Appearance–Reality Distinction (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983)
Children are shown a fake object (e.g., a sponge rock) and asked what it really is (reality check) vs. what it looks like (appearance check). 3-year-olds often give the same answer to both, whereas 4–5-year-olds distinguish appearance from reality.
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Theory Theory vs. Simulation Theory
Theory Theory proposes we understand others using an acquired mental model/set of rules about how minds work (like naĂŻve physics) (Saxe, 2005). Simulation Theory proposes we internally replicate/simulate another person's situation in our own mind to predict what they would think or feel (Perner, 1998).
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Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner (2000): Referential communication grid task
Adults followed a confederate's instructions to move objects in a grid containing duplicates where one item (e.g., small candle) was visible only to the participant. Adults initially gazed at/reached for the hidden object, showing they did not automatically take the speaker's perspective on a first pass.
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Keysar, Lin, & Barr (2003): Hidden bag experiment & limits on adult ToM
Participants hid an object (e.g., roll of tape) in a paper bag in an occluded grid slot, while a visible cassette tape sat in the grid. When the director said "Move the tape," 71% of adults attempted to move the hidden bag at least once (46% twice or more; control: 0%), showing adults fail to consistently use ToM.
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Curse of Knowledge / Egocentric Bias (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley et al., 2004)
Egocentric bias (curse of knowledge) is the tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when trying to appreciate a naĂŻve or uninformed perspective (Birch & Bloom, 2004), and overcoming it is cognitively demanding (Epley et al., 2004).
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Is Theory of Mind automatic? (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009)
Adult belief reasoning is impaired by working-memory dual tasks (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007), language interference (Newton & de Villiers, 2007), and executive-function brain injury (Apperly et al., 2005). Apperly & Butterfill (2009) conclude ToM is highly flexible but NOT automatic—it is cognitively demanding and resource-limited (Performance ≠ Competence).
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Methodological problems with standard childhood ToM tests
Standard false-belief tasks may underestimate young children due to: 1) Binary scoring (pass/fail misses intermediate competence), 2) Question wording/temporal cues ("Where will Sally look first of all?" improves performance — Siegal & Beattie, 1991), and 3) High overall language demands.
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Onishi & Baillargeon (2005): Violation of expectation in 15-month-olds
15-month-olds watched an actor hide a toy in Box A, which was moved to Box B either while the actor watched (true belief) or didn't watch (false belief). Infants looked significantly longer when the actor searched in the box inconsistent with their belief, suggesting implicit false-belief understanding at 15 months.
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Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello (2009): Active helping false-belief task in 18-month-olds
An experimenter hid a toy in Box A; a second experimenter moved it to Box B while the first watched (True Belief) or didn't watch (False Belief), then locked both boxes. When the first experimenter failed to open Box A, 18-month-olds opened Box B in False Belief (to get the toy) but opened Box A in True Belief (assuming another goal)—showing active false-belief understanding at 18 months.
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Implicit vs. Explicit Theory of Mind
Infants pass non-verbal looking/helping false-belief tasks at 15–18 months (implicit Theory of Mind) before passing verbal tasks like Sally-Anne at age 4–4.5 (explicit Theory of Mind, which requires making explicit judgements).
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Cultural influences on Theory of Mind (Valanides, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2017)
Compared British (individualistic) and Mediterranean (collectivistic) adults predicting others' thoughts from brief behaviour clips. Mediterranean participants performed better, and this difference was entirely accounted for by higher levels of collectivism.
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Family size & sibling effects on Theory of Mind (Perner et al., 1994; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Lewis et al., 1996)
Having siblings improves false-belief performance (Perner et al., 1994), specifically having OLDER siblings rather than younger ones (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Lewis et al. (1996) found that extended families and the number of available adults interacting with the child was the strongest predictor of false-belief success.
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Parental mental-state talk & child temperament (Dunn et al., 1991; Ruffman et al., 2006)
Mothers who frequently explained behaviour using psychological motives/mental states at 33 months had children who passed false-belief tests 6 months later (Dunn et al., 1991; Ruffman et al., 2006). Child characteristics (e.g., fractious vs. calm temperament) also shape how easily parents provide such explanations.
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