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Corrective Justice
A reflective, appropriate remedy must be brought about to correct the injustice. This arises from the relationship between A and B- moral obligation. B responsible under normative law to correct injustice. Gardner's main theory.
Responsibility theory
What persons should do by virtue of their position and status. Kant: rational agents have a responsibility to act in ways which could become universal law.
Persons have capacity and freedom to act or not to act. Responsibility flows from this capacity and to have done more. Kant: free will.
What are the trespasses to persons?
Battery
Assault
False imprisonment
The rule in Wilkinson v Downton [1897]- infliction of physical or mental harm. This is a very specific rule that applies in certain/rare instances.
Elements of Battery
Home Office v Wainwright and another
Direct Contact
Intentional Contact
Unlawful Contact which is hostile and has no consent
Elements of Assault
Collins v Wilcock
The defendants intends that the claimant apprehends the immediate and direct application of unlawful force.
Claimant immediately apprehends the immediate and direct application of the unlawful force.
The defendant has no lawful excuse.
Elements of False Imprisonment
Collins v Wilcock
Complete restraint on C trying to leave a place
Intentional complete restraint- not negligently
Without lawful justification- hostile, no consent, and unlawful
The Tort in Wilkinson v Downton- updated in OPO v Rhodes
Joke that Wilkinson’s husband was dead- psychiatric harm
OPO v Rhodes- conduct element (not limited to words, directed towards C), mental element (does not need to intend cause harm that resulted), consequence element
Definition of negligence
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks- negligence is the omission to do something.
Elements of the tort of negligence- Blyth v Birmingham
A duty is owe by the tortfeasor to the claimant
The duty is breached- conduct falls below the required standard of care
There is a factual causational link between the breach and the damage/harm suffered by the claimant.
The damage is not too remote from the breach (legal/causation/remoteness)
Duty of care
Does this relationship give rise to a duty of care
Does the damage give rise to a duty of care
Donaghue v Stevenson- first test for duty of care
You must not injure your neighbour
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who in law is my neighbour? 'persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected'
Omissions
Lord Goff in Smith v Littlewoods [1987]- the common law does not impose liability for what are called pure omissions
Anns v Merton LBC test
Stage 1- proximity test (is there a duty of care)
Defined as- harm to C was foreseeable. Proximity was established merely by contemplation of likely harm.
Test evolved from Donoghue (neighbour proximity) to Anns (foreseeability is a requirement of proximity)
Duty is established in principle.
Stage 2- public policy test (should there be a duty of care?)
Defined as- should a duty of care be excluded for public policy reasons?
Caparo test
Foreseeability- explore whether the damage is reasonably foreseeable
Proximity- explore whether there is a relationship of proximity between the claimant and the defendant
Fair, just, reasonable- explore whether the imposition of a duty of care upon the defendant is fair, just, and reasonable
Robinson
Held that Caparo should only be used when a relationship between A and B is novel
Kent v Griffiths
The ambulance service is an extension of the NHS and as such, owe a duty of care to patients once a patient has rung and the call has been accepted by the service.
Omission would constitute a breach of duty.
Capital and Counties Plc v Hampshire CC [1997] - fire brigade
(1) There is not a common law duty of care (i.e. duty in tort law) for the fire service to answer a call for assistance. Applied: Stovin v Wise [1996] 1 AC 923
(2) If fire service does answer a call for assistance, then a positive duty arises to not make a situation worse but there remains no duty for omissions.
(3) Section 13 Fire Service Act 1947 DOES NOT create a duty of care under common law for the fire service only a statutory duty.
(4) There is no duty to INTERVENE BUT IF THEY DO there is a common law duty of care
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1987]- negligence principle
No police duty for omissions. The two staged Anns v Merton test was applied and held that due to proximity and public policy concerns, the police do not owe a duty of care to members of the public who fit the victim profile.
Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1997]
Police had assumed responsibility towards specific individuals (the informants) and this had created a relationship giving rise to a duty of care. A clear message that police should not be seen as having a ‘blanket immunity’ regarding omissions.
Note that the decision in Swinney held there to be no duty of care arising because the injury suffered did not fall within the scope of liability.
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018]
Public authorities, like private individuals and bodies, are generally under no duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm exceptions include where there is an assumption of responsibility.
Negligence in the ECHR
Osman v Ferguson [1993]- Applying hill, there is immunity to the police here, since it was a failure to act. However, under the HRA there was a basis for a claim.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD and another [2018]- ECHR/HR: The UKSC found the police liable for breach of Art 3 ECHR (Prohibition of Torture) and held that the Hill immunity is irrelevant when it comes to ECHR (see Lord Kerr’s speech).
Recognised psychiatric illness
Page v Smith
Primary victim- psychiatric harm
physical injury due to defendant’s breach of care or fell within zone of danger
psychiatric harm is covered by defendant’s duty of care
some psychiatric harm must be foreseeable
When does the duty of care extend to secondary victims?
Bourhill v Young [1943]
Ratio 1: A duty of care arises if it is foreseeable that some harm would occur to a secondary victim. In other words, if the ‘ordinary person’ would not foresee an incident leading to psychiatric harm, then no claim can be made.
Ratio 2: Once it is foreseeable that some psychiatric harm may occur, you take your victim as you find them (i.e. the exact harm does not need to be foreseeable).
Alcock criteria
category of relationship (close and loving relationship)
physical proximity
immediate perception and shock- Paul v Wolverhampton (recognised psychiatric illness)
injury must have been foreseeable
must be an event, not just a negligent incident
Rule of bystanders
General rule- they cannot recover. There are exceptional circumstances where they may be able to recover- there must have been a sufficient degree of proximity (McFarlane v EE Caledonia [1994])
Spartan Steel
Pure economic loss does not fall within the scope of liability
Islington LBC v University College London Hospital NHS Trust [2005]
Economic loss that is consequential upon bodily/physical injury to the claimant is recoverable
Anns v Merton [1978]
Overruled by Murphy v Brentwood.
Test from such was applied in Hill.
Cracks in wall constituted physical damage because it was a risk to health and safety.
Hedley Byrne- where pure economic loss can be recoverable
There exists a fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence between the parties;
The advice giver has voluntarily assumed the risk;
The C has reliance on the advice;
Such reliance was reasonable in the circumstances; and
The C suffers financial loss as a result
Standard of care
Nettleship v Weston- standard is objective. The ‘reasonable’…
Standard of care for drivers
Nettleship v Weston- same standard for all drivers, regardless of experience.
Bolam test
No negligence if ‘he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’.
Bolitio addition to Bolam test
Logical basis to the school of thought
Standard of care for medical professionals sharing information
Montgomery- Doctors are “duty bound” to “take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatment”.
McCulloch v Forth Valley Health Board [2023]
This case has clarified the meaning “and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatment”
The Court unanimously held that whether a treatment is a reasonable alternative is to be determined by application of the professional practice test (i.e. Bolam, as qualified by Bolitho)
Duty of care between employers and employees
Latimer v AEC [1953]
Different standards of care for children.
Mullin v Richards [1998]
‘A reasonable 15-year-old would not have foreseen any injury arising from the pair’s game, and so would not have taken any additional steps to safeguard the claimant from harm. Accordingly, the defendant acted as a reasonable child would, and was not in breach.’
Sports- bystanders
Bolton v Stone [1951]
Mere remote possibilities of injury are insufficient; there must be a reasonable probability that a reasonable person would anticipate. A defendant owes a duty of care to avoid causing harm to others if it is reasonably foreseeable that their actions could result in injury. Whether they acted reasonably depended on the foreseeability of harm. In this case, they had acted reasonably.
Sport- professional v amateurs
Condon v Basi [1985]- The standard of care varies according to the level of expertise the player has.
Sport- expertise of the referee
Vowles v Evans [2003]- reasonably competent referee
Factual causation
did the tortfeasors' breach of duty cause the damage?
Legal causation- remoteness
is the damage attributable to the tortfeasors breach of duty?
Factual causation- but for test
Had the tortfeasor not breached their duty, the harm would not have occurred.
This is asked on balance of probabilities- did the D's breach cause the harm- it is more likely than not.
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969]
Facts: Three watchmen became seriously ill after drinking poisoned tea and attended A&E. A doctor refused to examine them and told them to go home. One man, Barnett, died five hours later from arsenic poisoning.
Issue: Did the doctor's negligence cause Barnett's death?
Held: No. Although the doctor breached his duty by failing to examine Barnett, the "but for" test was not satisfied because Barnett would have died even if he had received proper treatment.
Principle: A defendant is not liable where the harm would have occurred regardless of their negligence. The case is the leading authority on factual causation and the but-for test.
McWilliams v Sir William Arroll Co Ltd [1962]
Facts: C’s husband was a steel erecter and had died after falling 70 feet off a steel platform. He had not been provided with safety equipment and his widow was now seeking damages arguing that the construction company had breached their duty of care by failing to provide a harness. The relationship and damage gave rise to a duty of care.
Held: He wouldn’t have worn the belt anyway, so there was no factual causation.
Alternative to ‘but for’ test- cumulative causes
Multiple events
That blend together
So that both materially contribute to the injury.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956]
Facts:
The claimant worked in a factory and inhaled silica dust from two sources:
Innocent dust: dust that was an unavoidable part of the manufacturing process.
Guilty dust: excess dust produced because the employer failed to maintain extraction equipment as required by regulations.
The claimant developed pneumoconiosis, a lung disease caused by inhaling silica dust.
Ratio:
Where a claimant's injury results from multiple causes, factual causation is established if the defendant's breach of duty materially contributed to the injury. The claimant does not need to prove that the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's negligence.
Key Principle:
A defendant is liable where their negligence makes a more than negligible contribution to the claimant's injury, even if other non-negligent factors also contributed.
Unrelated sufficient causes
Multiple torts which happen at different times, unrelated to another, but all sufficiently contribute to the injury.
Fitzgerald v Lane [1989]
Facts: C walked across a pelican crossing when light was showing red. Struck by car L1, bounced off their bonnet and was hit by car L2. C had tetraplegia.
Issue: But for test does not apply as neither was on balance of probabilities the cause. Not able to identify which Tortfeasor caused the ultimate harm.
Decision: Multiple torts, happen at different times, one after the other, and unrelated to one another, but all sufficiently contribute to the injury.
Held: Both L1 and L2 were equally liable. (50% each/shared liability) Note: C contributory negligent (50% reduction in damages)
Baker v Willoughby [1970]
Facts: C in car accident due to T1’s negligent driving. Cause left leg injury. He had to find alternative employment. Three years later, before the trial, claimant shot by robbers in his left leg resulting in his already injured left leg being amputated. Issue: Is T1 liable for all harm or did their liability end when C was shot? T1 argued that the shooting obliterated the effect of the injury.
Decision: Where T1 has sufficiently caused the harm T1 has an ongoing liability and thus, is 100% liable for all the costs. T2 if found they will be liable for additional costs, but T1 remains ongoingly liable and 100% of damages are recoverable from T1. T1 sufficient cause of harm significantly weakened C so that when shot the harm was much more severe.
Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982]
Facts: Butcher had slipped on the floor and injured back due to the defendant’s breach of duty; before the trial and 3 years after the incident, claimant’s unrelated spinal disease (myelopathy) renders him unfit to work.
Decision: where the later sufficient cause overtakes and obliterates the first tort cause, T1 is only liable up to the point of the later non-tort naturally occurring event.
Distinguished from Baker on the supervening event which obliterates the original tort.
Murrell v Healy [2001]
Facts: C was involved in two car accidents within the same year. After accident 1 C received £58,500 in compensation. C then developed a spinal condition that impacted him going forward.
Held: Neither T1 or T2 were liable as the spinal condition was unattributable to either T (Applied Jobling)
Gray v Thames Trains [2009]
Facts: The C was on the train during the Ladbroke Grove rail crash. As a result of the crash C suffered minor physical injuries but very significant psychological injuries. The train company admitted to negligence causing these injuries. Whilst under the influence of his psychiatric condition, the claimant eventually armed himself with a knife and killed a man with whom he had had an altercation. He was convicted of manslaughter. As a consequence, he suffered loss of potential earnings due to being in prison.
Decision: Jobling was applied and D was not liable for the full extent of injuries/
Reaney v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2015]
Facts: C at aged 61 developed Transverse Myelitis resulting in paralysis. 31.5 hours of care were implemented and it was expected that C should have led an independent life. During the same hospitalisation, before being able to utilise the care, the hospital staff breached their duty of care causing further harm. With long lasting damage she was now unable to use the standard wheelchair, required significantly more care and would not be able to work.
Decision: We are aware of the C’s condition before the negligent action. Thus, this is not a case of multiple causes. The but for test applies, and the D’s are liable in full for the additional care costs. In relation to multiple causes, if there are two or more events, T2 would only be liable for the additional costs relating to divisible causes.
Material increase in the risk of injury
Multiple events or exposures that increase the risk of injury arising
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973]
Facts: McGhee works in a coal mine, in hot and dusty conditions. The C is exposed to brick dust and has no opportunity after finishing his work to shower at work. He must cycle home in dust and sweat. McGhee developed dermatitis.
2 causes:
increased dust exposure
lack of showering increased dust exposure
This was not a multiple causes case since the two sources did not each sufficiently or materially contribute to the injury suffered.
Held: liability for the dermatitis because the negligent exposure increased the likelihood of dermatitis.
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]
Facts: A premature baby developed Retrolental Fibroplasia (RLF). Possible causes included complications of prematurity, intraventricular haemorrhage, apnoea, patent ductus arteriosus, and the hospital’s negligent administration of excess oxygen.
Decision: No liability. The House of Lords rejected the application of McGhee, finding insufficient evidence that the negligence materially increased the risk of RLF.
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002]
Facts: The claimant was exposed to asbestos by multiple employers and later developed mesothelioma. As the disease may be caused by a single fibre or many fibres, it is impossible to prove which exposure caused the cancer. There is no safe level of exposure, although greater exposure increases the risk. This is therefore an increased-risk case rather than one involving multiple proven causes.
Key elements of the risk-based causation test:
Multiple factors increased the risk of injury.
All factors were tortious.
Each defendant was liable for the entire damage (joint and several liability)
Barker- extension of Fairchild
Facts: The claimant was exposed to asbestos due to breaches of duty by multiple employers, as in Fairchild. However, some employers were insolvent, and the claimant had also been self-employed and exposed to asbestos during that period.
Held: No. Each defendant was liable only in proportion to the risk they created, usually measured by the length of exposure attributable to them.
Why did Barker depart from Fairchild
Pragmatism: The claimant's self-employment and the insolvency of some employers made full liability for solvent defendants seem unfair.
Corrective Justice: Defendants should be liable only to the extent that their breach increased the risk of injury.
Bipolar Litigation: Each claimant-defendant relationship is separate, supporting proportionate liability.
Institutional Role: Courts should focus on corrective justice, while broader policy questions are for Parliament.
Reconciling Wilsher with Fairchild and McGhee
Uncertainty test- due to the state of scientific knowledge, it must be that it is impossible to prove that each of the possible causes did increase likelihood or materially contribute to the injury
Single agents- there must be a single agent responsible for the injury. In Fairchild, asbestos was the single agent. In McGhee dust was the single agent. In Wilsher there were multiple agents.
A non-negligent source- it is suggested that if one of the employers had not been negligent, had taken precautions but C still exposed, they would not be liable.
Loss of chance (to prevent damage)
Whether the defendant's breach of duty of care deprived the claimant of an opportunity to obtain a benefit or avoid a loss.
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987]
Facts: Claimant was a young boy who had fallen from a tree and sustained multiple injuries. He was taken to hospital, but his fractured hip injury was not diagnosed due to a breach of duty of care by the doctors. 5 days later the claimant returned to hospital. Rather than having a 75% chance of permanent disability, he now has 100%. He has lost the opportunity to recover.
Decision: causation was not established since the claimant failed to establish that on the balance of probability the disability would not have occurred but for the defendant’s breach of duty.
It wasn’t more likely than not that they would recover.
Gregg v Scott [2005]
Facts: The C had noticed a lump under his arm and saw his doctor who incorrectly diagnosed the lump as benign. Unfortunately, the lump was a malignant cancer and was not discovered for 9 months. In these 9 months the C’s cancer had significantly grown. Medical evidence suggested that had the C been diagnoses at the initial consultation he would have had 42% chance of survival. Now he only has a 25% chance of survival.
Decision: No. Causation not established. 17% loss. Stuck to 50% rule. 42% chance of survival: more likely than not that he would not survive. 25% chance of survival: more likely than not that he would not survive.
Legal causation- remoteness
“…the normative question of whether a particular consequence of breach should be judged to be within the scope of liability for the breach.” Stapleton, 2006 (i.e. Should there be legal liability?)
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964]- remoteness
Facts: Asbestos lid fell into pot of molten liquid, reacting with the liquid caused an explosion. C who was standing close by suffered burns.
Causation? Yes, the asbestos and molten liquid reacted causing an explosion and explosion harmed C.
Remoteness? No, At the time, it was not known that asbestos could cause an explosion if mixed with molten liquid. Therefore, not foreseeable and too remote. If the damage is not foreseeable, it falls outside the scope of liability.
Is the damage attributable to the Tortfeasors breach of duty?- remoteness
The three criteria:
Foreseeability (Wagon Mound No 1)
Intervening acts
Of a third party- Webb v Barclays Bank Plc
Of the claimant- McKew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts
Scope of duty- SAAMCO v York Montague
Re Polemis and Furness Withy & Co [1921]
Facts: Employers of a ship were loading cargo onto the ship. During this process, they negligently dropped a large plank of wood. On falling it knocked against a component of the ship which then created a spark igniting all the petrol resulting in destruction of the ship.
Decision: D’s were liable, even though those consequences could not have reasonably been anticipated
Legal rule: was there a direct link between breach and harm?
The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961]
Facts: The D’s ship, The Wagon Mound, breached their duty of care by negligently releasing fuel oil into the sea near a wharf close to Sydney Harbour. The oil became mixed with cotton debris and after a few hours the oil spreads to the claimant’s wharf. About two days later, the oil catches fire causing damage to the wharf which spread quickly and severely damaged several nearby boats and the dock.
Decision: Though the damage (damaged wharf) was directly (see Re: Polemis [1921]), caused by the breach of duty (negligently split oil), the damage was unforeseeable (it was unforeseeable that oil split on to the water would catch fire and damage the wharf). Thus, the defendant is not liable.
Smith v Leech Brain and Co Ltd [1962]
Facts: C is a widow. Her husband had worked with glass and as part of his job had to lower articles using a crane into molten metal. He was given inadequate protection against splashing and one day burnt his lip. This burn developed into cancer, and he died three years later.
Decision: It was held that Wagon Mound does not require the extent of the injury to be foreseen. Thus, ‘The initial injury (the burn) was of a readily foreseeable type, and the subsequent cancer was treated as merely extending the amount of harm suffered.’
Thus, in situations where a victim might be more vulnerable, the D must take their victim as they find them.They are liable for harm if harm is foreseen even if the eventual harm is more extensive damage than they may have foreseen. Exception: A D is not liable if without the vulnerability no harm is foreseeable at all.
Intervening acts
A human act occurring after the defendant's breach of duty and before the occurrence of ultimate damage.
It breaks the chain of causation: an intervening act that interrupts the sequence of events between the defendant;s breach of duty of care and the occurrence of damage- Novus Actus Interveniens.
Baker v Willoughby [1970]
Factual causation- the original negligent action sufficiently contributed to the ultimate injury
Remoteness- the human act intervened, interrupting the series of events between breach and ultimate harm, thus, too remote to be liable.
Webb v Barclays Bank Plc and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2001]
Facts:
The claimant, who had childhood polio, injured her weakened leg after slipping on the defendant bank’s negligent flooring. A consultant recommended amputation, but this advice was later found to be negligent because alternative treatments had not been explored.
Held: No. Negligent medical treatment will only break the chain of causation if it amounts to gross negligence. The original tortfeasor remained liable because the consultant's negligence did not reach that threshold
Gross negligence
Gross negligence means negligent actions:
1. That amount to a criminal act or omission: Does not require intention but extreme carelessness or disregard towards a claimant.
2. There is a serious and obvious risk of death: at the time of the breach of duty, would a reasonable person undertaking the role of the defendant have foreseen an obvious risk of death, not just a risk of injury or serious injury? The C does not need to prove that the D had foreseen the serious and obvious risk of death but that a reasonable person would foresee the serious and obvious risk of death.
McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd. [1969]
Facts: The C had suffered injuries to his leg as a result of his employers' negligence. Whilst recovering from their injuries at home, C decided to attempt the stairs which did not have a handrail. His leg gave way, and he sought to jump the remaining 10 steps. He suffered a severe ankle fracture leading to lifelong disability.
Decision: When the intervening act is an act of the claimant that is subsequent to the defendant’s breach of duty of care, there is a breach of the chain of causation, if it (the claimant’s subsequent act) is an unreasonable act that has not been a result of the defendant’s breach of duty of care (the claimant’s decision to descend a steep staircase with no handrail though his leg is weak due to injury at work).
Corr [2008]
Facts: Mr Corr was a mechanical engineer. A machine error led to Mr Corr being nearly decapitated. He was hit on the right side of his head by the metal and lost most of his right ear. Mr Corr had long and painful recovery requiring surgeries. He also suffered PTSD. He began drinking. He developed depression and was hospitalised 6 years later. He underwent treatment but ended his life.
Factual causation: suicide is not a novus actus where it results from a depressive illness caused by D’s negligence, since it is not voluntary or informed.
Remoteness: suicide didn’t break causation chain, so death was not too remote.
SAAMCO v York Montague [1996]
Facts: A professional valuer (defendant) was in breach of his duty of care towards his client (a lender; claimant) in that he overvalued a property (e.g. he found it £300,000); the lender would have not put money on a mortgage if he knew the true value of the property (e.g. £200,000); a fall in the property market also occurred (e.g. £100,000).
Decision:Though a fall in the property market may be foreseeable, the scope of a valuer’s liability only covers value lost due to him not doing his job properly (that is, due to overvaluing the property) (e.g. £100,000), not also due to failed speculation which is beyond his job duties (that, is not also due to the fall in the property market; e.g. £200,000).
Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021]
Facts: Auditor negligently advised the building society that its accounts could be prepared using hedge accounting and this would give a true and fair representation of the society’s accounts. The society entered into a contract, however, the hedge accounting hid volatility and a huge mismatch between what was paid and owed.
Decision: The auditors role included helping the society understand facts needed to evaluate risk. They failed to do this. Thus, the losses resulting were a result of the auditor's negligence.
Khan v Meadows[2021]
Facts: A went to doctor whilst pregnant. Doctor told her her baby wouldn’t have haemophillia. Baby had severe autism, too. Found that the original doctor in 2006 did not refer her for a genetic blood test just a normal blood test. Had she been referred for genetic blood test should would have been found to be a carrier. A held she would have terminated the pregnancy had she known
High Court: Found doctor liable for both costs.
Court of Appeal: Applied SAAMCO v York Montague held not liable as injury too remote, fell outside scope of liability.
Definition of private nuisance
‘An unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or some right over it, or in connection with it’ (Reed v Lyons [945] KB 215, 236 (Scott LJ)). This is NOT a definition.
Liability is established by reference to previous case law.
Private nuisance- standing to sue
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655:
Must have a proprietary or possessory interest- legal rights in the land.
Mere occupiers cannot sue in private nuisance
Mere occupiers include family, lodgers, employees etc.
Vindication theory- empowering rights, but specific of protected interests.
Dobson v Thames Water [2007]
Any damages to those with positive standing will be 'just satisfaction' for any occupiers also. Damages may be large to cover all harm suffered.
Khatun v UK (1998)
Residents of Poplar and Limehouse were experiencing a ‘great deal of dust’ due to construction in the area that was part of a scheme to rejuvenate London Dockyards.
Issue: The claim was unsuccessful for individuals without a proprietary or possessory interest in the land, leading them to appeal to the ECtHR on the basis that restricting positive standing in private nuisance cases infringed their Article 8 rights
The distinction made in Hunter v Canary Wharf between those with proprietary interests and those without was not applicable for the purposes of Article 8(1).
Private Nuisance- there has been an interference
No damage is required, but there must be an interference with an interest.
There are, traditionally, three types of interferences as laid down by Lord Lloyd in Hunter v Canary wharf:
Encroachment on a neighbour's land
Actual damage to the land
Interference with amenity interests- the use and enjoyment of land.
Private nuisance- actual damage to the land itself
Includes:
Physical damage to the land itself- St Helens Smelting v Tipping [1865] 11 E.R. 1483: Fumes and noxious gases from D’s work caused damage to C’s trees.
Physical damage to chattels and economic loss consequential upon physical damage to land. Means that if there is damage to the land which subsequently damages the chattels, you can claim.
Private nuisance- interference with amenity interests
‘The personal inconvenience and interference with one’s enjoyment, one’s quiet, one’s personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the sense of the nerves’ St Helens Smelting v Tipping [1865] 11 E.R. 1483, 1486 (Lord Westbury).
Reasonable user test for private nuisance
Barr v Biffa Waste [2013]- C lived near a waste tipping site which had been operating lawfully for many years. D recently obtained a new permit which enabled the disposal of a new kind of pre- treated waste. C complained of the smell.
Give or take principle- private nuisance
Formulated by Bramwell B in Bamford v Turnley (1962) 3 B&S 62:‘… the principle of give and take as between neighbouring occupiers of land, under which “those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action.’ (at 83).
Factors for applying the reasonable user test
Always considered:
Intensity- duration, frequency, and timing of interference
Dependent on facts or type of claim:
Character of locality
Public benefit
Sensitivity of claimant
Defendant's malice
Intensity- private nuisance
Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4- Tate Modern viewing platform.
This was a case of ‘visual intrusion’. Cf. ‘mere overlooking’.
Intensity (frequency, duration, timing) can have an impact on whether it is considered unreasonable.
Character of locality- private nuisance
‘What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey.’ (Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch. D 852, 865).
Character of the locality means ‘the established pattern of uses’ of a particular area of the neighbourhood (Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 [183] (Lord Neuberger)).
The character of the locality can be determined through considering relevant criteria (dependent on facts):
a) Nature of D’s activities;
b) D’s planning permission;
c) Coming to the nuisance;
Nature of activities
Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13- D’s activities could be considered when determining the character of locality, except to the extent that they were actionable nuisances.
Planning permission- private nuisance
Should planning permission mean that there has been no unlawful interference- planning permission = license to commit nuisance?
Coventry v Lawrence [2014]- Planning permission can be considered, but it’s existence in and of itself cannot defeat a nuisance claim.
Can a defendant argue that they were there first?- private nuisance
No- being there first is not sufficient reason to allow D to create an unreasonable interference. To allow this argument would allow D to tie up the potential uses of neighbouring lands- Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852
Public benefit of D's activities- private nuisance
Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003]-
C claimed in nuisance for loss of amenity and enjoyment caused by significant noise from nearby military base. D argued that they were benefitting the public at large and should not be liable in private nuisance. Nuisance is found BUT ‘the public interest demanded that the flying of the aircraft should continue.’ Altered remedy awarded to give damages in lieu of an injunction (£950,000 awarded).
Sensitivity on C’s use of the land- private nuisance
Hypersensitivity = C’s characteristics or use of land make them particularly vulnerable to D’s actions becoming a ‘nuisance’ to them.
Robinson v Kilvert [1889]- paper box case.
Malice of the defendant- private nuisance
Malicious motive on the part of the defendant will sometimes tip the balance decisively in the claimant's favour- Christie v Davey [1893]
Establishing liability for property damage
Does C have standing to sue, has there been an interference, is the interference lawful?
Don’t consider the reasonable user test.
Damage to chattels that does not flow from property damage to affected land is not an interference.
Establishing liability for loss of amenity
Does C have standing to sue, has there been an interference, is the interference unlawful?
Loss of amenity and comfort- Sturges v Bridgeman
Apply reasonable user test.