Philosophy

Paradox of identity

hwo mcuh change makes something different

arguement

reasoning for or against something

begging the question

is a logical fallacy where the conclusion is assumed in the premises, rather than being proven.

Circular argument

A type of reasoning in which the conclusion is included in the premises, creating a logical circle that doesn't provide valid support for the argument.

consistency

In philosophy, consistency refers to the property of a set of statements or beliefs where they do not contradict each other, allowing for logical coherence and reliability in reasoning.

entailment

is a logical relationship where one statement necessarily follows from another, indicating that if the first statement is true, the second must also be true.

induction

A method of reasoning in which generalizations are made based on specific observations or cases, often used to formulate hypotheses or theories.

abduction aka: infrance to the best explanation

A form of logical inference that seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanation for given observations, often referred to as inference to the best explanation.

Modus poncas

is a valid form of argument in propositional logic that states if a conditional statement is accepted and the antecedent holds true, then the consequent must also be true.

modus tolhems

is a valid form of argument in propositional logic that states if a conditional statement is accepted and the consequent is false, then the antecedent must also be false.

soundness

a sound arguement is a valid arguement with true premisises

validity

the premises are impossible to be true while the conclusion is false

fallacy

a logical hole in an arguement

tautology

a statement that is unconditionally true by virtue of its logical form alone, making it impossible to deny without contradiction

biconditional

p happens if and only if q

conditional

if p then q

Iff

if and only if

negation

A sentence of the form “It is not the case that P” or some related form

preposition

the underlying meaning or content of a declarative sentence that is capable of being either true or false

analysis

explain in more basic terms

closure principal

the underlying meaning or content of a declarative sentence that is capable of being either true or false

counter example

refutes a general claim

epistemology

branch of philosphy that studies nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge

externalism and internalism about justification

interalism: justification is based on mental state and personal beliefs

Externalism: Justifcation is based on otuside factors that are seen for example: cause and effect

Justified belief

S believes p on the basis of sufficient reasons or evidence for p, or adequate grounds

nessecary and sufficent conditions

for P to be nessecary a thing cannot be G

Being G is a sufficient condition for being F iff it is impossible for a thing to be G without being F. For example, being a poodle is sufficient for being a dog, and being a dog is necessary for being a poodle without being P

proof

sufficient arguemnt that demonstates truth

JTB theory of knowledge

To know something it must be a justified true belief

Gettier on JTB

Gettier argues that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient

for knowledge, by giving two examples in which someone has a justified true belief that p but does not

know that p. If Gettier’s examples work, they are counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge.

Note that Gettier assumes that justified belief is closed under known entailment

Zagzebetski on knowledge and belief

Zagzebski analyzes knowledge as belief arising from acts of

intellectual virtue. Any such belief has to be true, because each intellectual virtue includes a success

component (reaching the truth) as well as a motivational component (a disposition to have an emotion

that directs your actions towards the truth).

williamson on Knowledge and belief

Williamson agrees with the traditional view that knowledge entails

true belief, but he does not think that knowledge can be analyzed in terms of true belief plus more

ingredients. He says that knowledge is a more basic concept than belief

A posteriori

knowledge based on experience

a priori

a fact that would be derived naturally ex: math

Anaylitic

analytic iff it is “true solely in virtue of its meaning,” or “true by definition,” or “true by virtue of linguistic convention.”

synthetic

, a sentence is analytic iff any competent speaker of the language is in a position to recognize its truth simply by virtue of being acompetent speaker. if this cannot happen it is

necessity and possiblilty

A proposition p is necessary (or necessarily true, or a necessary truth) iff p could not possibly have been false; p is possible (or possibly true) iff p could have been true;

negation

A sentence of the form “It is not the case that P” or some related form,

problem of induction

inductive reasoning assumes that the objects we have examined constitute a representative sample of the domain under investigation,

matter of fact

claim is a statement whose denial is not self-contradictory

relation of ideas

a statement whose denial is self-contradictory or impossible

Hume on the problem of induction

Past events cannot determine the future/explicitly guarentee that it will occur a mildly circular explination

Strawson on induction

dissolved the traditional problem of induction by arguing that asking for a general justification of inductive reasoning is logically absurd and stems from a misunderstanding of how language and standards of rationality work

Axion

an assumption that neither needs to or admits proof

basic knowledge and belief

A belief in p is basic for a person S iff S believes p but has no reasons or evidence (distinct from p itself) that supports p. A belief in p is basic knowledge for S iff it is basic for S and S knows p

foundationalism

the view that whenever a person S knows some proposition p, S’s knowledge of p is either basic—independent of his knowledge of other facts—or grounded in his basic knowledge.

skeptical hypothesis

skeptical hypothesis—that is alleged to be consistent with our evidence, but in which our beliefs would be radically and systematically mistaken.

sketpicism

The view that nothing is known about a certain subject matter or that we do not have justified beliefs about it.

Descartes on foundationaism

builds all human knowledge upon an indubitable, absolute foundation using rational deduction i think therefore i am

reid on external world skepticism

Reid traced external world skepticism back to a fundamental error made by philosophers like John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. He called this error the Way of Ideas—the theory that the mind never perceives external physical objects directly, but only internal mental representations, ideas, or impressions

Vogel on skepticism

• Vogel argues that we can reject the skeptic's second premise by showing that the Real-World Hypothesis (RWH)—the common-sense view that real physical objects cause our experiences—is a vastly superior explanation than any skeptical alternative.

• Simplicity and Integration: RWH provides a rich, cohesive, and structured account of why objects behave, why physical laws hold, and how different perceptions relate to one another (e.g., why a tree and a bench occupy distinct, non-overlapping spatial locations)

Behaviorism

behavior can be used to determine mental states

Dualism

Substance dualism: The view that there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of substance: thinking things and material (or physical) things. This was famously defended by René Descartes (1596–1650) so is often called Cartesian dualism. Descartes also held that a thinking thing and its associated material body causally interact, and this is sometimes called Cartesian interactionism.

Property dualism: The view that there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of property: mental properties (e.g., the property of being in pain) and physical properties (e.g., the property of having a brain with such-and-such neural firing pattern).

Elimiativism

In the philosophy of mind, the view that no one has ever been in any mental state (or in a mental state of a certain kind). If that is right, then mentalistic vocabulary should ultimately be eliminated from scientific psychology.

Epiplenomenalism

n the philosophy of mind, the view that a person’s psychology or mental life never has any physical effects (although it may have physical causes)

functionalism

n the philosophy of mind, the view that mental states are defined by their causes and effects, including their causal relations to other mental states. Thus, a functionalist might define being in pain as a state that is typically caused by damage to the body, and which typically causes certain behavior

idealism

In metaphysics, the view that reality as a whole is in some sense mental or mind-dependent. See also panpsychism

identity

4 differnt ways to classify, body, soul, brain, and appearance

identity theory of mind

The view that every mental state is numerically identical (see identity) to a physical state; for example, the state of having a brain with such-and-such neural firing pattern.

materialism

a philosophical monist view stating that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and all things—including the mind, consciousness, and human history—are the result of material interactions and physical processes. It stands in direct opposition to idealism, which argues that reality is fundamentally spiritual, mental, or non-material.

mental state

the current state of your brain/feeling

Mind body problem

The problem of describing the relation between our mental lives and the physical aspects of our brains, bodies, and environments.

OCCams Razor

when presented with competing explanations for the same phenomenon, you should prefer the simplest one that makes the fewest assumptions

physicalism

world is entirely physicsl

property

feature or attribute

psyco-physical laws

Laws governing the relation between mental states and physical states

types and tokens

types is categories tokens is singular things

catergory mistake

a logical, semantic, or ontological error in which an idea or object is mistakenly presented as belonging to a different category, or is given a property it could never possibly have

cogito

i think therefore i am

indiscerinablity of identicals

if x and y are numerically identical (meaning they are literally the exact same thing), then they must share every single property in common

intentional fallacy

a fallacious application of the principle of the

indiscernibility of identicals, in which an apparent difference between X and Y, in terms of

someone’s different attitudes towards X and Y (such as beliefs, knowledge, desires, or intentions),

is taken to be a real difference between X and Y, leading to the fallacious conclusion that X is not

identical to Y. Examples: “I know who Don Diego is. I don’t know who the masked man is.

Therefore, Don Diego is not the masked man.

interactionalism

type of dualist view on which physical events can cause mental events and vice

versa; the mental and physical realms interact.

multiple realizability thesis

he view that a single mental state can be physically realized

(implemented) in multiple ways. For example, pain in human beings may have very little in

common physiologically with pain in squid (if squid can feel pain), or with pain in extraterrestrial

aliens. Usually taken to be a point in favor of functionalism and against the identity theory.

parallelism

type of dualist view on which mental events cause other mental events, and physical

events cause other physical events, but there is no causation from mental to physical or vice versa.

Mental events and physical events merely happen in parallel

Descartes

argues that I must be distinct from my body, because I could be deceived about the existence

of my body, but not about my own existence — I think, therefore I exist (the cogito). I am an immaterial

(non-physical) mind, sometimes called a “Cartesian ego”. Descartes is an interactionist substance dualist.

Elizabeth of Bohemia

How can substance dualism explain causal interaction

between the physical world and a non-physical mind?

Arnuald

Descartes’ argument for dualism commits an intensional fallacy

Ryle

Descartes has made a category mistake [defined above]. The fact that the

mind is not a physical entity does not mean it is a non-physical entity. The operations of the mind are

parts of the physical world. [TYU, N&Q] (Ryle is a behaviorist, but the excerpt in the textbook contains

just objections to dualism, not an explanation or defense of behaviorism.)

Smart

His main argument for the identity theory is that dualism violates

Occam’s Razor by positing a realm of non-physical objects whose interaction with the physical world is

completely mysterious (see ELISABETH OF BOHEMIA, above). There could be psycho-physical laws

connecting the two realms, but they would have to be strange hybrid laws unlike any other laws (Smart

says they would be “nomological danglers”)

Putnam

argues for functionalism, on which a mental state is identified with a functional state. He says

functionalism has several advantages over the identity theory. The main one is that it allows for multiple

realizability [defined above]. Some identity theorists counter that identities between mental types and

physical types need only be species-specific, which leaves identity theory and functionalism relatively

close together. Almost all functionalists are in fact physicalists, but Putnam points out that functionalism

is theoretically compatible both with physicalism and (separately) with substance dualism.

Criteria of personal identity

Person A who exists at t1 = person B who exists at t2 iff A stands in relationR to B.

where R is specified without using the word “person” or any synonym thereof. For example,

Person A at t1 = person B at t2 iff A’s soul at t1 = B’s soul at t2.

or

Person A at t1 = person B at t2 iff at t1, B can remember some experience A had at t1.

Persistence

an object is said to persist through an interval of time iff it exists at every moment in the interval. A leaf that turns from green to red persists through the change iff there is a single item that exists at each moment of the process.

Reductionism

is the view that the facts about personal identity over time are fully determined by facts that can be stated without reference to personal identity; for example, facts about the physical and psychological relations that hold between persons existing at different times.

Locke

argues for the memory criterion of personal identity: a person P1 who exists at time t1 is identical

to a person P2 who exists at a later time t2 iff P2 remembers some of P1’s experiences. Locke considers

and rejects the soul criterion, on which a person P1 who exists at time t1 is identical to a person P2 at a

later time t2 iff P1 and P2 have the same immaterial soul. [TYU, N&Q]

Two famous objections to Locke’s theory of personal identity:

The transitivity objection (Thomas Reid — see p. 562, “Analyzing the Arguments”, #1): The old general

remembers the young officer’s experiences, and the young officer remembers the mischievous boy’s

experiences, but the old general cannot remember the mischievous boy’s experiences. According to

Locke’s theory of personal identity, general = officer, and officer = boy, but general ≠ boy. This

contradicts the transitivity of identity (the principle that whenever X=Y and Y=Z, you also have X=Z).

The circularity objection (Joseph Butler): Genuine remembering requires identity; you can only truly

remember experiences that you had. So it’s circular to define identity in terms of memory, since to

determine whether P2 genuinely remembers P1’s experiences, you’d already have to know whether

P1 = P2

Parfit

rgues, similarly to Locke, that psychological criteria, such as (apparent) memories of the past,

coherent personality traits, and expectations for the future, are the most important factors for personal

identity over time. However, these psychological criteria don’t always map onto numerical identity.

Consider cases where one person, X, divides into two people, Y and Z. Y ≠ Z, so you can’t say that X=Y

and X=Z. In such cases of “fission”, survival is more important than numerical identity. (Parfit says that

X survives as Y and also survives as Z, without being identical to either one.)

David Lewis

Lewis disagreed with parfit. Lewis maintained that identity itself still matters, and that we can preserve common-sense identity by overlapping aggregates and stage-sharing rather than abandoning the concept of identity