MATH 123 Midterm

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Description and Tags

General vocabulary and definitions to know

43 Terms

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simple majority method

The voting method where the candidate who gets the majority of the votes wins (x/2)+1

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A voting method satisfies the majority rule if…

the candidate who wins more than half the votes wins.

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The simple majority method is near-decisive. Near-decisiveness is…

the candidates

If there are two candidates, the majority rule can only produce a tie if the candidates win the same number of votes (which can happen if there is an even number of voters)

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A quota is…

The minimum number of votes necessary to win

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A voting system is a quota method if…

There is some number q, called the quota, such that a candidate is declared a winner if they receive at least q votes.

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What is the quota in the supermajority method?

q = pt, where p is is the parameter (1/2 < p ≤ 1) and t is the number of votes

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Does supermajority satisfy the majority rule?

No, since winning more than half the votes does not guarantee a win, as p might be set to a higher fraction of votes.

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Parity Method

If one candidate gets an even number of votes, that’s the winner. If both get odd or even number of votes, it’s a tie.

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Monarchy Method

One of the candidates is a monarch and this candidate wins no matter what the election outcome is.

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Dictatorship Method

One of the voters is a dictator and whoever this person votes for is the winner.

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Anonymity

If two voters were to switch ballots, the election result would not change.

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Neutrality

If all voters were to switch their votes, the election result would change.

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Monotonicity

It is impossible for the winning candidate to become the losing candidate by gaining votes.

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Dictatorship is not anonymous because…

if the dictator switches ballots with someone, and their ballot has a different candidate than the dictator, that other candidate now becomes the winner.

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Monarchy is not neutral because…

if all voters change their votes, the monarch would still be the winner.

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Parity is not monotone because…

switching a vote changes the parity of the votes cast for both candidates, so even-odd becomes odd-even, and the other candidate wins.

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If a voting method for an election with two candidates is anonymous, neutral, and

monotone, then it is....

a quota method

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May’s Theorem

The only voting method for an election with two candidates that is anonymous, neutral, monotone, and nearly decisive is the simple majority method.

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May’s Theorem says that simple majority method is the best voting method when…

there are two candidates

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Plurality method

The voting method where the candidate who gets the most votes wins

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Vote splitting

brings extreme or unpopular candidates to the top

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Spoiler effect

When the vote is split between a minor candidate and a major candidate and this causes the major candidate to lose,

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Social choice theory

studies the ways in which individual preferences, opinions, or interests combine to reach a collective decision.

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Social choice/welfare functions

plurality, dictatorship, instant runoff, Borda, Black, Copeland, sequential pairwise

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NOT social choice/welfare function

Condorcet

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What makes a voting method a social choice/welfare function?

Given a collection of ranked ballots, these methods produce a weak ordering of candidates.

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Why is Condorcet not a social choice/welfare function?

It does not always produce a weak ordering (Condorcet cycles)

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Majority criterion

If the majority of agents rank an outcome first, this outcome should be chosen.

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Condorcet criterion

If the social welfare function places A above everyone else in one-on-one contests (A is the Condorcet winner), then A is the outcome.

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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)


Suppose there are two ranked profiles from the same set of agents and the same set of outcomes. Suppose the relative positions of outcomes A and B are the same for every agent in those two profiles and suppose the method chooses A but not B as the winner in one of the profiles. Then the method does not choose B as a winner in the other profile. (Heuristically, rearranging the rankings of outcomes other than A and B should not affect the relationship between A and B.)

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Instant Runoff satisfies…but fails…

anonymity, neutrality, majority…monotonicity

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Borda Count satisfies…but fails…

anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity…majority, IIA

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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

The only social choice (or welfare) function (for three or more outcomes) that satisfies both the monotonicity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a dictatorship.

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Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Dictatorship is the only ranked order voting system that is not manipulable, i.e. not susceptible to strategic voting.

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Candidates are rated independently of each other in…

Cardinal voting methods

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Dummy voter

Even though a voter has a vote, they have no power

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Quota Rule

A state’s apportionment should be either the floor or the ceiling of its quota Pop/s

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Alabama Paradox

Increasing the number of seats decreases a state’s share of seats

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New States Paradox

Adding a state and a proportional number of new seats causes an existing state to lose a seat

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Population Paradox

Small state with fast growth loses a seat to bigger state with smaller growth.

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Neutrality (for apportionment)

Switching the populations of two states results in the switch of their apportionments.

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Balinski-Young Theorem

It is impossible for a neutral apportionment system to satisfy the quota rule and be free of the population paradox.