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General vocabulary and definitions to know
simple majority method
The voting method where the candidate who gets the majority of the votes wins (x/2)+1
A voting method satisfies the majority rule if…
the candidate who wins more than half the votes wins.
The simple majority method is near-decisive. Near-decisiveness is…
the candidates
If there are two candidates, the majority rule can only produce a tie if the candidates win the same number of votes (which can happen if there is an even number of voters)
A quota is…
The minimum number of votes necessary to win
A voting system is a quota method if…
There is some number q, called the quota, such that a candidate is declared a winner if they receive at least q votes.
What is the quota in the supermajority method?
q = pt, where p is is the parameter (1/2 < p ≤ 1) and t is the number of votes
Does supermajority satisfy the majority rule?
No, since winning more than half the votes does not guarantee a win, as p might be set to a higher fraction of votes.
Parity Method
If one candidate gets an even number of votes, that’s the winner. If both get odd or even number of votes, it’s a tie.
Monarchy Method
One of the candidates is a monarch and this candidate wins no matter what the election outcome is.
Dictatorship Method
One of the voters is a dictator and whoever this person votes for is the winner.
Anonymity
If two voters were to switch ballots, the election result would not change.
Neutrality
If all voters were to switch their votes, the election result would change.
Monotonicity
It is impossible for the winning candidate to become the losing candidate by gaining votes.
Dictatorship is not anonymous because…
if the dictator switches ballots with someone, and their ballot has a different candidate than the dictator, that other candidate now becomes the winner.
Monarchy is not neutral because…
if all voters change their votes, the monarch would still be the winner.
Parity is not monotone because…
switching a vote changes the parity of the votes cast for both candidates, so even-odd becomes odd-even, and the other candidate wins.
If a voting method for an election with two candidates is anonymous, neutral, and
monotone, then it is....
a quota method
May’s Theorem
The only voting method for an election with two candidates that is anonymous, neutral, monotone, and nearly decisive is the simple majority method.
May’s Theorem says that simple majority method is the best voting method when…
there are two candidates
Plurality method
The voting method where the candidate who gets the most votes wins
Vote splitting
brings extreme or unpopular candidates to the top
Spoiler effect
When the vote is split between a minor candidate and a major candidate and this causes the major candidate to lose,
Social choice theory
studies the ways in which individual preferences, opinions, or interests combine to reach a collective decision.
Social choice/welfare functions
plurality, dictatorship, instant runoff, Borda, Black, Copeland, sequential pairwise
NOT social choice/welfare function
Condorcet
What makes a voting method a social choice/welfare function?
Given a collection of ranked ballots, these methods produce a weak ordering of candidates.
Why is Condorcet not a social choice/welfare function?
It does not always produce a weak ordering (Condorcet cycles)
Majority criterion
If the majority of agents rank an outcome first, this outcome should be chosen.
Condorcet criterion
If the social welfare function places A above everyone else in one-on-one contests (A is the Condorcet winner), then A is the outcome.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
Suppose there are two ranked profiles from the same set of agents and the same set of outcomes. Suppose the relative positions of outcomes A and B are the same for every agent in those two profiles and suppose the method chooses A but not B as the winner in one of the profiles. Then the method does not choose B as a winner in the other profile. (Heuristically, rearranging the rankings of outcomes other than A and B should not affect the relationship between A and B.)
Instant Runoff satisfies…but fails…
anonymity, neutrality, majority…monotonicity
Borda Count satisfies…but fails…
anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity…majority, IIA
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
The only social choice (or welfare) function (for three or more outcomes) that satisfies both the monotonicity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a dictatorship.
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Dictatorship is the only ranked order voting system that is not manipulable, i.e. not susceptible to strategic voting.
Candidates are rated independently of each other in…
Cardinal voting methods
Dummy voter
Even though a voter has a vote, they have no power
Quota Rule
A state’s apportionment should be either the floor or the ceiling of its quota Pop/s
Alabama Paradox
Increasing the number of seats decreases a state’s share of seats
New States Paradox
Adding a state and a proportional number of new seats causes an existing state to lose a seat
Population Paradox
Small state with fast growth loses a seat to bigger state with smaller growth.
Neutrality (for apportionment)
Switching the populations of two states results in the switch of their apportionments.
Balinski-Young Theorem
It is impossible for a neutral apportionment system to satisfy the quota rule and be free of the population paradox.