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What is a concept, and how do category and exemplar differ from it?
A concept is a mental representation that groups different things as instances of the same kind; a category is the set grouped together, and an exemplar is one individual member.
What three kinds of things can concepts cover?
Natural objects (dogs, lions, fruit), man-made objects (tools, chairs, vehicles), and abstract ideas/knowledge domains (freedom, economy, happiness).
Why are categories important — what would happen without them, and what do they allow us to do?
Without categories every object would be unique, so we couldn't interact with it, predict its properties, or communicate about it — categories let us parse the world into meaningful chunks, organize knowledge, and generalize from shared properties.
![<p>In the musical-instruments diagram, what is shared knowledge vs. object-specific knowledge? [Figure: musical-instruments-shared-vs-specific.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/448f19c6-74dc-4bee-911b-b3bf11420b82.png)
In the musical-instruments diagram, what is shared knowledge vs. object-specific knowledge? [Figure: musical-instruments-shared-vs-specific.png]
Shared knowledge applies to all members of the category: "is played" and "makes music." Object-specific knowledge differs per exemplar: the guitar "has six strings," the violin "has four strings," the trumpet "is blown into."
What does a category label let you infer about a brand-new object, and what is the catch?
A label like 'musical instrument' suggests features (strings, resonating body, tuning pegs, how to play it) — but it gives expectations, not certainties, so those inferences may be wrong.
![<p>Name the three levels of conceptualization and give the furniture example for each. [Figure: levels-of-conceptualization.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/b26cb0b8-5260-445e-ba32-9225ad4269aa.png)
Name the three levels of conceptualization and give the furniture example for each. [Figure: levels-of-conceptualization.png]
Superordinate (most general): furniture. Basic level: chair. Subordinate (most specific): Windsor chair.
What does the superordinate level maximize, and at what cost?
It maximizes accuracy of identification — you are rarely wrong that something is furniture — but it has the least predictive power: "furniture" tells you little about what to do with the specific item.
What does the subordinate level maximize, and at what cost?
It maximizes predictive power — "rocking chair" tells you exactly how to use it (sit in it, rock back and forth) — but it is the most specific level, defined by just one or a few items in the category.
Why is the basic level the "sweet spot"?
It balances information and efficiency: specific enough to support predictions, but not so specific that it is defined by only one or two items. It is the most abstract level at which objects have similar shapes.
What is the developmental and language evidence for the basic level?
Children's first words are at the basic level (cat, ball); it is the natural level at which objects are named, and languages first acquire basic-level terms.
How does expertise change the level at which people name objects?
As you acquire expertise in a category, you are more likely to name things at the subordinate level rather than the basic level.
Is the basic level fixed, or can it vary? Use the furniture example.
It is partly arbitrary and depends on experience: "furniture" and "household items" are both valid superordinate categories for a chair, and an object can belong to multiple superordinate categories.
![<p>What did O'Craven & Kanwisher (2000) show about faces vs. places? [Figure: faces-vs-places-ocraven-kanwisher.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/2702b109-badf-4fa5-8e2a-c0f33b919415.png)
What did O'Craven & Kanwisher (2000) show about faces vs. places? [Figure: faces-vs-places-ocraven-kanwisher.png]
Different categories activate different neural areas: faces activate the fusiform face area (FFA) more than places, while places activate the parahippocampal place area (PPA) more than faces.
![<p>In Martin & Chao (2001), what differed when people silently named animals vs. tools? [Figure: martin-chao-naming.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/1a5c5656-b7ec-4dd4-b810-d6d85d4c3610.png)
In Martin & Chao (2001), what differed when people silently named animals vs. tools? [Figure: martin-chao-naming.png]
Animals activated perceptual areas more — lateral fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus. Tools activated ventral premotor cortex (e.g., when silently naming a hammer) — action-related cortex, showing that the actions associated with a tool contribute to its representation.
What does the Martin & Chao result imply about conceptual knowledge?
Conceptual knowledge is intertwined not only with sensory/perceptual properties but also with functional properties — how we interact with objects.
![<p>What is anomia, and what did the lesion data show? [Figure: lesion-naming-gradient.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/784b9819-d17a-472c-aa9f-c491d394df16.png)
What is anomia, and what did the lesion data show? [Figure: lesion-naming-gradient.png]
Anomia is difficulty retrieving an object's name, and temporal-lobe damage disrupts naming selectively by category — temporal-pole damage hit people hardest (59.8% accuracy), while lateral-occipital damage hit tools hardest (78.5%).
Does a naming deficit prove the concept itself is lost? How would you test that?
No — the word may be inaccessible while the concept is intact, so test without naming: have the patient categorize items, pick the odd one out, or demonstrate how to use the object.
![<p>Does giving a richer presentation of the object eliminate the category-specific naming deficit? [Figure: naming-across-formats.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/28ad807d-00cd-46b7-bfdc-3e81c99ee2a6.png)
Does giving a richer presentation of the object eliminate the category-specific naming deficit? [Figure: naming-across-formats.png]
No — from line drawings to real objects, fruit/vegetable naming stays impaired (0.45–0.77 correct) while artifact naming stays near ceiling (~1.0), so richer detail doesn't erase the category difference.
How does herpes simplex encephalitis produce category-specific deficits?
The viral infection causes inflammation and tissue degeneration with bleeding (hemorrhagic necrosis) of the temporal lobe; some affected individuals show disproportionate difficulty with particular categories, and the pattern of impairment gives clues about how knowledge is organized.
![<p>What did the patient asked to draw items from memory show, and why does it matter? [Figure: drawn-from-memory.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/d14b4673-11bc-436a-9b0f-3dde493bae6b.png)
What did the patient asked to draw items from memory show, and why does it matter? [Figure: drawn-from-memory.png]
From memory, living things were drawn vaguely and alike (the camel had no hump) while nonliving things were drawn in detail — proving a true category-specific conceptual deficit, not just a naming failure.
![<p>What is Damasio's sensory-and-action explanation for why living things are more vulnerable? [Figure: sensory-action-scissors-bird.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/1ba7d68e-b1fe-409b-a4ac-618571233bad.png)
What is Damasio's sensory-and-action explanation for why living things are more vulnerable? [Figure: sensory-action-scissors-bird.png]
Artifacts get kinesthetic/sensorimotor codes from interacting with them (scissors: vision plus the cutting action), while animals are known mainly through perception — so living things have fewer routes to their representation and are more vulnerable when perceptual knowledge is damaged.
What is the visual-similarity explanation for the living-things vulnerability?
Many living things share visual features, so telling them apart requires fine visual detail; artifacts tend to have more distinctive features. Living things are also often processed more holistically, while artifacts have distinctive parts.
Does a category-specific deficit imply separate category-specific stores in the brain?
No — a category-specific deficit does not necessarily imply separate stores for different categories; it may reflect differences in the features the categories depend on.
![<p>Contrast category-based and property-based organization of conceptual knowledge. [Figure: category-vs-property-based.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/ca1e4ca8-f7a1-4836-b6fc-784fedabffcb.png)
Contrast category-based and property-based organization of conceptual knowledge. [Figure: category-vs-property-based.png]
Category-based: knowledge grouped by kinds of things (animals, fruits, vehicles, tools; living vs. nonliving). Property-based: knowledge distributed across systems representing different features (visual, texture, color, shape, uses, places found; functional vs. perceptual).
![<p>How is a concept like "hammer" represented in a distributed feature system? [Figure: distributed-features-hammer.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/b8cebedb-0710-4a79-85fd-30601eee7d81.png)
How is a concept like "hammer" represented in a distributed feature system? [Figure: distributed-features-hammer.png]
Across multiple feature systems: shape, sound, typical motion, grasp/action, and function — each represented in different brain areas, with the pattern of activation across them defining the concept.
![<p>In the hub-and-spoke account, what are the spokes and what is the hub? [Figure: hub-and-spoke.png]</p>](https://assets.knowt.com/user-attachments/3eb7c989-62f5-473f-8e59-aa539efeaac2.png)
In the hub-and-spoke account, what are the spokes and what is the hub? [Figure: hub-and-spoke.png]
Spokes represent different types of information (the distributed sensory/motor feature systems). The hub is a multimodal (amodal) convergence zone that integrates information across features and modalities into a coherent concept.
What problem does the hub solve?
It explains how a distributed pattern of features becomes one coherent concept — letting the system recognize different-looking instances as the same kind of thing, and similar-looking things as belonging to different categories.
What is the core question about category membership, and what is the classical account's answer?
The core question is what stays constant across members that vary widely — and the classical account answers with defining features: necessary features (must be present) and sufficient features (guarantee membership), with membership determined by whether the definition is satisfied.
What is the classical account's feature checklist for "dog," and what are the counterexamples?
Dog = mammal, four legs, barks, tail, wags tail, pet — counterexamples: a dog that lost a limb/tail (2, 4, 5), the barkless Basenji (3), a stuffed toy dog (1), and a farm sheepdog that's no pet (6).
What is the feature checklist for "game," and what are its counterexamples? What is Wittgenstein's conclusion?
Game = children, fun, rules, multiple people, competitive, leisure — but the Olympics break (1, 2), solitaire breaks (4, 5), and pro athletes break (6), so Wittgenstein concluded defining features can't explain everyday categories: any attribute has exceptions, and repeating the list for every member is inefficient.