Philosophy

What was the goal of the Vienna Circle?

The Vienna Circle was committed to the ideals of the Enlightenment. They aimed at making philosophy scientific with the help of modern logic. To that end, they sought to eliminate metaphysical entities from discourse by requiring that all claims be scientifically verifiable.

State the Verificationist Theory of Meaning (VTM).

For every true statement about the world, you must be able to state the condition in the world that would attest to it being true or false. Statements that cannot be verified are meaningless. There is a strong and a weak version. The strong version holds that 'to be verified is to be tested. The weak version holds that verification merely be in principle, not actual.

Explain how VTM is shapes scientific studies of such phenomena as mind?

Applied to theories of mind, the VTM reduces talk about mental states to that which is verifiable. For example, Behaviorism reduces mental states to behaviors: that is, it reduces pain to the dispositions to respond to certain stimuli with certain responses.

How is VTM applied to mind under a Behaviorist paradigm?

There are many types of Behaviorism. Each type of Behaviorism reduces mental states to behaviors: that is, it reduces, for example, pain to a disposition to respond to painful stimuli with certain a pain response. As such, it seeks to understand an organisms behaviors with reference to that organism's environment and its physical structure (genetics).

How is VTM applied by identity theorists to the question of mind?

Identity Theorists reduce mind to the activity of neurons within the brain. IT is typically, phrased as follows: mental states are identical with brain states. Thus, mind is only possible in things that are made of the same material: certain neurons.

Identity theorists further support the reduction of mind to the firing of neurons with reference to other successful reductions from Science. Identify one of them and explain it.

A successful reduction mentioned by Identity Theorists is the reduction of temperature to mean kinetic energy. Temperature is not anything over and above mean kinetic energy. In this way temperature is reduced to an average of energy.

How is VTM applied by computational theorists when explaining mind.

Computational theories of mind reduce mind to functional activity. That is, mind is nothing over and above the processing of information, or the implementation of an algorithm in a physical system. To have a mind is to run the mind program. Any physical system capable of running the mind program has a mind.

What is the thesis of multiple realizability?

Computations can be implemented on devices made of vastly different substances. For example, computer made of tinker toys, or a silicon chip can both implement an algorithm to plays tic-tac-toe. According to multiple realizability, to have a mind is to run the mind program. Any physical system capable of running the mind program has a mind.

There are three possible approaches to issue of mind and brain. What are they?

1) Eliminate one of the two. (e.g. What we call heat does not exist).

2) Reduce one to the other. (e.g. Heat exists, but it is nothing or and above mean kinetic energy.) (1 is a stronger than 2).

3) Hold that the two are irreducible. Thus, they both exist, and neither can be reduced to the other.

State Strong AI.

a) Cognition is just computation.

b) Mental states are merely computational states.

c) Every computer that runs the mind’s program has a mind. After all, computation is hardware independent.

State Seale's Chinese Room Argument.

1 If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that if any computing system runs that program, that system thereby comes to understand Chinese.

2 I could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to understand Chinese.

3 Therefore Strong AI is false.

What is the System Reply to Searle, and what is Searle's response?

The System Reply rejects 2 by holding that Searle may not understand the Chinese, but he is only part of the system. The entire system, including the rules on the walls, understands Chinese.

In his response, which of the three strategies is Searle using?

It is hard to understand what the walls with rules written on them contribute to understanding. He imagine that the person in the room memorized the rules, thus the entire system is in him. How does this contribute to his understanding? He claims that this memorization does not now confer understanding. At most, he knows rules for symbol manipulation

Which strategy is being employed by the Systems Reply?

Searle holds that mind and a physical system are irreducibly different. In the System Reply, his appeal is not directly to qualia, but to understanding. As such, the debate can occur without reference to first-person experiences. If knowing how to use the language is knowing how to correctly respond, then the system knows the language. It may be that knowing and understanding differ, or that some kinds of understanding differs. It requires a first-person experience.

What is qualia? When you explain it, make reference to the Country of the Blind.

Qualia is a first-person 'felt' experience we have when we see, taste, smell or feel an emotion. It is something over and above a third-person description. The protagonist's ability to see exemplifies a first-person experience, one that is something more than the attempts to reduce it to a third-person description. Sight is not just the ability to accurately predict who is located where.

There are two types of objections to functionalism concerning qualia, one concerns felt qualities, one concerns how we understand. What is the danger with the second?

As such, the debate can occur without reference to first-person experiences. If knowing how to use the language is knowing how to correctly respond, then the system knows the language. It may be that knowing and understanding differ, or that some kinds of understanding differs. It requires a first-person experience. This is illustrated with the case of Sue Berry. She was stereoblind. After training her eyes to track one another, the world popped for her. She had new experience of seeing in 3D, an experience that she had not had. While she knew the descriptions of what it was to experience the world in 3 dimensions, her knowledge of what 3-D was did not allow her to understand what it was to experience the world in three dimensions

How does Searle defend qualia?

Introspection

Summarize Nagel's argument. Draw a parallel with the Country of the Blind

Bats experience the world through echolocation. We cannot experience the world through echolocation. Each of our five senses have a different first-person experience. Echolocation is no different. Thus, we cannot experience the world in the same way as a bat. A parallel to this is found in HG Wells's Country of the Blind. Centuries ago, an isolated community lost the ability to see. They have had no contact with the outside world. They do not believe the sight exists. It has become a fiction of the past. When a sighted-traveler arrives, they reject his claims to see. For them, there is no fifth sense by which to experience the world. We are like the inhabitants. The sighted-traveler is a bat.

Apply Nagel to the Strong AI debate. Which thesis is it rejecting?

Nagel's thesis maintains that mental states and physical states are irreducibly different. As such, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states, including computational states. That is, first-person experiences are irreducible to thirdperson descriptions.

What is the qualia defense for Searle's position?

We can introspect. We experience qualia in the first-person. We can give both a first-person and a third-person descriptions of ourselves

Explain 19 with reference to the strategy you noted in 13.

Searle's strategy is to deny the reducibility of mental states to functional activity. That is, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states, including computational states. That is, first-person experiences are irreducible to thirdperson descriptions.

What is Ned Block's main thesis in the paper "Troubles with Functionalism"?

Functionalism as a middle position between identity theory and behaviorism is unsustainable. He develops a case which purports to show that functionalism is either too liberal or it is chauvinistic. It is too liberal in that it includes things as having mental states that cannot and do not, or it is too chauvinistic in that it excludes thing that could have mind from having mind.