Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons

The puzzle of nuclear proliferation

• WWII - U.S. used 2 nuclear bombs on Japan

• ‘63 President Kennedy predicted by 1975 some 20-25 countries may possess nuclear weapons 

  • “The greatest possible danger and hazard” facing mankind

• Fourth countries - 1957 belief up to 10 countries could be capable to make nuclear weapons within the next decade 

• 9 countries have nuclear weapons today - way less than predicted in the 50s and 60s

• 1975 - 5 nuclear weapons - US, USSR, UK, France, China (same 5 when Kenndey made his prediction)

• Only 4 countries have joined the club 50 years later (India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea)

• Puzzle: Why so few nuclear weapons states? Why do some states seek nuclear weapons while others do not?

Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation

• Horizontal Proliferation: When a country that doesn’t already have nuclear weapons gets nuclear weapons (what we talk about in class)

• Vertical Proliferation: when states that already have nuclear weapons get more nuclear weapons or better nuclear weapons

What 3 models explain the causes of proliferation (Sagan)

• Security

• Domestic Politics

• Norms

Sagan Belief:

• Common solution to puzzle: States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means

• Argument: National security being the cause of proliferation is an inadequate and incomplete argument for why states build nuclear weapons

REVIEW SAGAN NOTES

Security model of proliferation

• Anarchy means states worry about their own survival

• Nuclear weapons (powerful deterrent) can protect states from external security threats in anarchic world 

• Nuclear-armed adversary creates particularly strong incentives to get a nuclear weapon

• Expect: Nuclear proliferation drive more nuclear proliferation (nuclear domino theory)

  • Ex: US → USSR → China → India → Pakistan got nuclear weapons

• However: Nuclear pursuit = expensive, so states might get security in other ways 

  • Ex: Why doesn’t SK get nuclear weapons if they are threatened by NK? What about Japan, having being threatened by China?

    • U.S. Nuclear Umbrella - extending a credible nuclear guarantee to alies to a powerful tool to limit nuclear proliferation 

• However: Nuclear pursuit = dangerous (Iraq, Syria, Iran)

  • Commitment problems - fear adversaries will strike against them before they are equipped to get a nuclear weapon 

  • Arises when the thing you are bargaining over is itself a source of bargaining power 

  • Strong incentive to bomb you now when you don’t have nukes 

  • Security calculations might lead some states to conclude security costs outweigh security benefits of nuclear weapons

    • Ex: Israel bombing countries around them developing nuclear weapons, → maybe it would be better not to develop them at all so you have better security 

Nuclear Domino Theory

When one state acquires nuclear weapons, other states inevitably follow

^ debunked

Domestic politics model of proliferation

Domestic Politics Model

• Military, nuclear scientists/labs, defense industries, politicians who can use nuclear nationalism, bureaucracies who receive expanded budgets → benefit from nuclear weapons

• Governments that do not benefit

  • Outward facing governments whose political survival depends on integration into the world economy face especially costs from proliferation

• Governments that do benefit

  • Inward looking nationalist governments can more easily use nuclear programs as instruments of political mobilization (cementing own power at home)

• Example: Iraq vs. Egypt 70s, 80s

  • Iraq - Nuclear power/modernization → political mobilization for Saddem Hussein 

    • Pursues expensive nuclear weapons program 

  • Egypt - open economy to the world, strengthening trade ties, → nuclear weapons become less appealing 

    • Diplomacy with Israel, shifted toward U.S., embraced nuclear restraint

Norms model of proliferation

• Sagan uses the “international norms” he means states treat nuclear weapons as a symbol

• What normative power does a state having nuclear weapons have?

  • Power, great power status, technological progress, modernity, independence, sovereignty, 

• Nuclear restraint carries normative power too

  • Peacefulness, responsible international citizenship, membership in the international community, moral leadership

• Ex: Why did France get nuclear weapons and not Japan?

  • France “no great power can voluntarily accept status which would leave it in permanently inferior position” - nuclear weapons gives it a global, great power status

  • “Japan believes it is her moral responsibility to take non-nuclear path as the only country to have suffered from atomic bombings” - moral authority

    • Both are normative explanations 

Nuclear Assistance/Comparative Cases

• Israel and Egypt 

• Egypt would have no choice than protective/preventive war if Israel developed a nuclear weapon 

• Why does Israel develop a serious nuclear option while Egypt does not?

  • Israel assisted by France

• Access to nuclear assistance changes states calculations when it comes to pursuing nuclear weapons (Something Sagan does not address)

  • Israel had a nuclear-sharing agreement with France, France gave nuclear supply

  • Both Israel and Egypt wanted nukes but only Israel was confident it could get them

Demand-side drivers of proliferation

• (motive, willingness)

  • Security, alliances, interests/domestic politics, status/prestige may drive you towards getting a nuclear weapon

Supply-side drivers of proliferation

• (means, opportunities)

  • resources, ability to get opportunities, assistance (civilian and sensitive), procurement networks may drive you to get/not to get a nuclear weapon (proliferation v. restraint)

  • Institutions

  • Others: Regime type, psychology, bureaucracy 

Institutional drivers of proliferation

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - prevents countries from seeking weapons??

Nuclear Umbrella

extending a credible nuclear guarantee to allies to a powerful tool to limit nuclear proliferation

Ex: South Korea doesn’t have a nuclear weapon even though it’s adversary right next to them does…SK can hide under the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella

Nuclear Latency

have a latent capability to turn a civilian nuclear technology to a nuclear weapon (can have high or low latency)

Nuclear Hedging

Build up civilian facilities that bring them close to having a weapon and wait. Building nuclear latency

Nuclear Breakout

if they feel threatened they can get weapons

the time it takes a state to accumulate a "significant quantity" (roughly 25 kg) of weapons-grade uranium (90% U-235) needed to build a nuclear device

??

Nuclear nonproliferation regime

(NPT) an international framework designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, promote peaceful nuclear energy, and work toward global disarmament

• read this in the Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons article

Mutual assured destruction (MAD)

full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would cause complete annihilation of both

• Some say there’s been no WWIII because of nuclear weapons 

• War between nuclear states → would become so costly we wouldn’t do it

First-strike advantage

• Ex: Imagine Kaplow reduce/eliminates nuclear arsenal by launching before I do but if I know this, I might want to strike first, and if you know I know you might strike sooner

  • Thomas Schelling - “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack”

Secure Second Strike

(solution to first strike advantage)

• We want “survivable” nuclear forces

  • Missile silos, subs, launch on warning, airborne alert, launch on warning (can’t destroy all of them)

• If we can absorb a nuclear first strike and still be able to retaliate with nuclear weapons

• We want the other side’s forces to be survivable too

• Suggests we do not want to protect our population from a nuclear strike 

  • No ballistic missile defense, maybe no fall out shelters

• Conventional weapons make you safer but nuclear weapons better defense can make both sides less safe because deterrence is built on mutual vulnerability 

Limited War/Stability-Instability Paradox

• A nuclear would be costly but what if we agreed to have a conventional war with no nukes 

• BUT - always the risk of escalation 

• Difficult to know the other side’s red lines (what would cause them to use nuclear weapons)

  • Each side thinks their red line is abundantly clear to their adversary but its not

• Possibly can make all out war less likely, limited war more likely

  • Would be willing to fight a conventional war elsewhere and take a loss as long as their nuclear arsenal is safe

  • Stability-instability paradox

Brinksmanship

Incredible Threats

• For MAD to work, one side needs to be able to credibly threaten to engage in a retaliatory nuclear strike 

  • But so many innocent people would die…it’s really hard to make that threat credible 

• If you can’t make that threat credible, there’s a high chance of nuclear war

  • First strike advantage etc.

• Solution - Brinkmanship “threats that leave something to chance”

  • Edge of cliff, tied together on a rope, asking for sandwich, say no, kaplow gets closer to the cliff

  • Run a risk of falling off a cliff

    • Like a game of chicken, whose willing to run the biggest risk closest to the edge

  • Competition in risk-taking and the winner is the party with the most resolve (willingness) not necessarily the most power 

    • All you need is to bring a risk to the brink of disaster - you don’t need any more than that to be credible