Alliances

Alliance

• a continuing, legalized security commitment between states

  • Institutions, documents in their own right 

Coalition

usually temporary and organized around a particular crisis or conflict

Alignment

shared interested between parties in at least one area

Collective security

a security threat to one member is a threat to all, committing to a joint response against any aggressor

What do alliances accomplish?

• Deterrence - prevent attack against an ally by increasing the ally’s strength

  • Audience is adversary

• Defense: pool capabilities if deterrence fails

• Reassurance - reduce uncertainty about whether others will get involved

  • Audience is allies

• Coordination - joint planning, intelligence 

• Influence - affect the policies of allied states

The credibility problem in alliances

• Alliances only deter if adversaries believe alliance commitments are credible and will actually be honored

  • Fighting for an ally can be COSTLY

  • Once an attack occurs, the ally may not want to participate

• So how does a state make an alliance commitment believable?

How to make alliances credible

• Formalizing the commitment 

• Troop deployments/tripwire

  • Schelling quote, put 7000 U.S. troops in West Berlin - establishes credibility, U.S. will get involved further if they attack 

• Military integration and joint planning

• Reputation for honoring commitments 

• Most credible → share interests with ally 

Tripwire

a strategic deterrence mechanism where a nation deploys a small, militarily vulnerable military force in a targeted ally's territory. Formalizes the commitment of a superpower by ensuring that any hostile attack will inevitably result in casualties that force a massive retaliatory escalation.

"The garrison in Berlin is as fine a collection of soldiers as has ever been assembled, but excruciatingly small. What can 7,000 American troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there."

Abandonment

failing to fight on ally’s behalf

Entrapment

your ally drags you into a conflict you wouldn’t have chosen

• If there’s an alliance between A and C, A may feel they can push B harder and make bigger demands and then C is left to go to war and pay the cost of one it didn’t want or abandon A and the ally becomes less credible (entrapment)

Ex: U.S. in the Taiwan situation

• U.S. allies with Taiwan but is entrapped where it doesn’t want China to attack, and at the same time has to balance helping Taiwan and their belief they can win and be independent with U.S.’s help

  
  

Emboldenment

your ally becomes more aggressive knowing you have their back

• How an alliance changes the behavior of the protected ally

  • “Because you got my back I can take more risks”

  • Ex: Taiwan and U.S. - Taiwan may be emboldened to declare independence from China with the U.S.’s help

Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat Theory (Stephen Walt)

• If one state becomes powerful others should fear domination and join together to oppose a powerful state

  • Balancing coalition

• If one state becomes powerful others should fear domination and join an alliance with the powerful state to protect themselves 

  • Bandwagoning 

• Wants to shift it from the balance of power to the balance of threat (the most threatening state may not be the most powerful)

  • What affects states’ level of threat?

    • 1. Aggregate power (economic, military)

    • 2. Proximate power (distance)

    • 3. Offensive power (attack)

    • 4. Offensive intentions (aggression)

• Ex: State A would ally in response to State B (powerful, but far away) in balance of power theory, State A would ally in response to State C (closer, threatening, but less powerful) in balance of threat theory

Balancing

• If one state becomes powerful others should fear domination and join together to oppose a powerful state

  • Balancing coalition

Bandwagoning

• If one state becomes powerful others should fear domination and join an alliance with the powerful state to protect themselves 

  • Bandwagoning 

Burden Sharing

• how much each state in an alliance contributes to the common cause 

  • Ex: U.S. wanting NATO to meet 2% benchmark for defense spending, thinking European leaders aren’t paying their fair share

• Alliances create a collective action problem

• Can be free riders

• Deterrence is a kind of public good (everyone can use it without diminishing its benefit for others)

  • Once U.S. provides defense of Europe, it is hard to exclude Belgium (spends less on defense) so Belgium has an incentive to free ride 

• What is a fair contribution?

  • No neutral definition

    • Equal dollars, equal % GDP, contribution according to capability, contribution according to threats faced/benefit 

• Burden-sharing arguments are about bargaining, not economics 

  • The ally that wants the alliance to succeed may have the weakest bargaining leverage because they know you need it and they don’t

Trump’s Bargaining Strategy

• Did ultimately raise GDP spending on defense by other countries 

• Does making an alliance commitment less certain improve the alliance (by inducing allies to contribute more) or weaken it (making deterrence less credible)

  • Incentive to free ride, countries providing defense want others to step up