Constitutional Law - Mini Exam 4

Describe the background of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)

The Heart of Atlanta Motel had 216 rooms near interstate highways and drew most of its guests from out of state. It refused to rent rooms to Black patrons, and it said it would keep doing so after Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned race discrimination in public accommodations. The owner sued to have Title II declared unconstitutional, arguing Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power and violated the Fifth (deprived owner of his liberty to choose customers) and Thirteenth (claimed government was coercing him into labor, essentially slavery) Amendments.

What was the question in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)?

Did Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination by a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers?

What was the Court’s decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)?

Yes, 9-0 (Justice Clark). Congress had ample evidence that discrimination discouraged Black Americans from traveling interstate, which burdened commerce. The Court said the test is whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that the activity affects commerce and whether the means chosen were reasonable. It held that Congress may regulate even if its motive is also moral. The Court also rejected the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendment arguments. The companion case Katzenbach v. McClung upheld Title II as applied to Ollie’s Barbecue, a local restaurant that bought food that had moved in interstate commerce.

Describe the background of United States v. Lopez (1995)

Alfonso Lopez, a high school senior in San Antonio, brought a concealed .38 revolver and bullets to school. He was charged under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone. The Fifth Circuit reversed his conviction.

What was the constitutional question in United States v. Lopez (1995)?

Did Congress exceed its Commerce Clause power by criminalizing gun possession in a school zone?

What was the Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez (1995)?

Yes, Congress exceeded its power, 5-4 (Chief Justice Rehnquist). The Court identified three categories Congress may regulate: (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Act fell only into the third category, and the Court said it was not an economic activity, had no jurisdictional element tying the gun to interstate commerce, and had no congressional findings. The government’s chain of inferences (violence harms education, which harms the economy) would erase any limit on federal power. This was the first Commerce Clause invalidation of a federal statute since 1937.

Describe the background of United States v. Morrison (2000)

Christy Brzonkala said two Virginia Tech football players, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, raped her in 1994. The university’s discipline process went nowhere and criminal charges were never brought. She sued under the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which created a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence. Congress had made extensive findings about the economic costs of such violence.

What was the constitutional question in United States v. Morrison (2000)?

(1) Did the Commerce Clause authorize the VAWA civil remedy? (2) Did Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorize it?

What was the Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison (2000)?

No to both, 5-4 (Chief Justice Rehnquist). Gender-motivated violence is not economic activity, the statute had no jurisdictional element, and the Court would not accept aggregating the effects of non-economic violent crime to reach “substantial effects.” Congress’s findings did not save the law, since the reasoning would let Congress regulate all violent crime and family law. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only state action, not private conduct (Civil Rights Cases, 1883). VAWA targeted private actors, so it failed.

What is the “substantial effects” test?

The substantial effects test is a legal standard used by U.S. courts to determine if Congress can regulate a local, intrastate activity under the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) of the U.S. Constitution. [1, 2]

Under this doctrine, Congress may regulate purely local activities if those activities—either individually or when aggregated with similar conduct across the nation—have a substantial and close economic effect on interstate commerce.

Describe the background of Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)

California’s Compassionate Use Act (1996) allowed medical marijuana. Angel Raich and Diane Monson used marijuana on a doctor’s recommendation, and Monson grew her own plants. Federal agents seized and destroyed Monson’s plants under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The women sued for an injunction. The Ninth Circuit ruled for them, finding the CSA likely unconstitutional as applied to purely local, noncommercial use.

What was the question in Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)?

Can Congress, under the Commerce Clause, prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana that is permitted by state law and never enters interstate commerce?

What was the Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)?

Yes, 6-3 (Justice Stevens). Relying on Wickard v. Filburn (1942), the Court held that Congress may regulate purely intrastate activity if it is part of an economic class of activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. Congress had a rational basis to conclude that exempting home-grown marijuana would undercut its regulation of the interstate marijuana market. The Court distinguished Lopez and Morrison as involving non-economic activity. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Describe the background in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)

The Affordable Care Act (2010) had an individual mandate requiring most Americans to have health insurance or pay a “shared responsibility payment” to the IRS. It also expanded Medicaid to cover more low-income adults, threatening states that refused with the loss of all federal Medicaid funds. Twenty-six states, NFIB (a small-business group), and individuals sued.

What was the constitutional question in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)?

(1) Does the Anti-Injunction Act bar the suit? (2) Is the individual mandate within the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause, or the Taxing Power? (3) Does the Medicaid expansion unconstitutionally coerce the states under the Spending Clause?

What was the Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)?

Opinion by Chief Justice Roberts.

1. The Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.

2. The mandate was not authorized by the Commerce Clause, which regulates existing activity and does not let Congress compel people to become active in commerce. It was also not authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the mandate was upheld 5-4 as a valid exercise of the Taxing Power, because the payment functions like a tax (it is paid to the IRS, is not punitive in amount, and has no scienter requirement).

3. The Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive, a “gun to the head,” because it threatened existing Medicaid funding (7-2 on this point). The remedy was limiting the Secretary’s power to withhold funds, so states can decline the expansion without losing their existing Medicaid funds.

Describe the background in Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)

A 1803 Pennsylvania law required ships entering or leaving the Port of Philadelphia to hire a local pilot or pay half the pilotage fee into a fund for retired pilots. Aaron Cooley’s ship did neither and was fined.

What was the constitutional question in Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)?

Does the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to Congress bar state regulation of interstate commerce even when Congress has not acted?

What was the Court’s decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)?

The law was upheld, 7-2 (Justice Curtis). The Court adopted “selective exclusiveness.” Subjects that are national in nature and demand uniform regulation are exclusively for Congress. Subjects that are local and diverse may be regulated by states until Congress acts. Pilotage is local, and Congress had in 1789 deferred to state pilot laws, so Pennsylvania’s law stood.

Selective Exclusiveness

Subjects that are national in nature and demand uniform regulation are exclusively for Congress. Subjects that are local and diverse may be regulated by states until Congress acts.

Describe the background of Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945)

Arizona’s Train Limit Law (1912) capped passenger trains at 14 cars and freight trains at 70, citing safety. Southern Pacific ran longer trains across the state, and Arizona sued for penalties. The state courts upheld the law.

What was the constitutional question in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945)?

Does a state safety regulation that burdens interstate rail transportation violate the Commerce Clause when Congress has not acted?

What was the Court’s decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945)?

The law was struck down, 7-2 (Chief Justice Stone). The Court weighed the law’s local safety benefits against the burden on interstate commerce. The safety benefit was slight or even negative, since more trains meant more crossings and accidents. The burden was heavy because trains would have to be broken up at the border, and the state’s rule clashed with the rules of other states. The Court stressed that railroads need national uniformity. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, arguing that legislatures, not courts, should weigh safety.

Describe the background of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)

North Carolina required all closed containers of apples sold in the state to display only the USDA grade or no grade. Washington’s state apple grades were stricter than USDA’s and were a marketing advantage. Washington’s apple commission sued.

What was the constitutional question in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)?

Does a facially neutral state law that burdens and discriminates against out-of-state commerce violate the Commerce Clause?

What was the Court’s decision in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)?

Yes, 9-0 (Chief Justice Burger). The law raised costs for Washington growers and stripped away their competitive advantage, while leaving North Carolina producers unaffected. A statute can discriminate in effect even if neutral on its face, and once discriminatory effect is shown, the burden shifts to the state to justify it with a legitimate local purpose that nondiscriminatory alternatives cannot serve. North Carolina failed to do so.

Describe the background of Maine v. Taylor (1986)

Maine banned importing live baitfish to protect its fisheries from parasites and nonnative species. Robert Taylor, a bait dealer, brought in golden shiners from Florida and was charged under the federal Lacey Act. The federal district court held the Maine statute unconstitutional, and the First Circuit affirmed.

What was the constitutional question in Maine v. Taylor (1986)?

Can a state statute that discriminates against interstate commerce survive Commerce Clause review?

What was the Court’s decision in Maine v. Taylor (1986)?

Yes, 7-2 (Justice Blackmun). A facially discriminatory law gets strict scrutiny, but it survives if it serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. Maine’s purpose was real, and the district court found no reliable way to inspect baitfish for parasites. States need not wait for the harm to occur before acting on uncertain science.

Describe the background of Granholm v. Heald (2005)

Michigan and New York allowed in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers but made it difficult or impossible for out-of-state wineries to do the same. Consumers and out-of-state wineries sued. The states argued their laws were protected by Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment and their three-tier alcohol systems.

What was the constitutional question in Granholm v. Heald (2005)?

Does a state’s discrimination against out-of-state wine shippers violate the Commerce Clause, or is it saved by the Twenty-First Amendment?

What was the Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald (2005)?

The laws were struck down, 5-4 (Justice Kennedy). The laws were plainly discriminatory, and the Twenty-First Amendment does not give states the power to discriminate against out-of-state alcohol producers. The Amendment gives states authority over alcohol within their borders, but not in a way that discriminates against interstate commerce. States have two options: allow direct shipping for everyone, or ban it for everyone. The Court said the three-tier system is legitimate but does not justify discrimination.

Describe the background of National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023)

California’s Proposition 12 (2018) banned the in-state sale of whole pork from pigs raised in conditions that don’t meet minimum space requirements (24 square feet per breeding pig). California imports about 99% of its pork, so the law effectively regulated out-of-state farming. Pork producers sued, arguing the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge.

What was the constitutional question in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023)?

Does a state law that regulates in-state sales, but has significant extraterritorial effects on how out-of-state producers operate, violate the dormant Commerce Clause?

What was the decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023)?

The judgment was affirmed (Justice Gorsuch, in an opinion in which the Justices split on various parts). A majority of the Court rejected a broad rule that states may not enact laws with “extraterritorial effects,” reading the earlier price-control cases narrowly (they were about discrimination). The producers also did not allege discrimination against out-of-state producers. On the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test, a plurality said courts can’t weigh incommensurable benefits and costs. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan said Pike balancing is valid, but the producers had not plausibly alleged a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, would have sent the case back for a Pike analysis. The takeaway is that the extraterritoriality doctrine is narrowed and Pike balancing is weakened and unsettled.

Describe the background of the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)

An 1869 Louisiana law gave one company (Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company) a monopoly on slaughtering in New Orleans. Butchers who were shut out sued, arguing that the monopoly violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, specifically the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses.

What was the constitutional question in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)?

Did Louisiana’s monopoly violate the newly ratified Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments?

What was the Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)?

No, 5-4 (Justice Miller). The Court read the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments narrowly as aimed at protecting freed slaves. The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only rights of national citizenship (such as access to seaports and protection on the high seas), not the broader rights of state citizenship, which remained under state control. This made the clause nearly meaningless. The due process and equal protection arguments were quickly dismissed. The decision upheld the state’s police power and left the Fourteenth Amendment largely unavailable to protect economic rights, and later Courts used due process instead. Justice Field’s dissent became influential.

Describe the background in Munn v. Illinois (1877)

Illinois set maximum rates that grain elevators and warehouses in Chicago could charge for storage. Munn and Scott, who ran a large elevator, were convicted of charging more.

What was the constitutional question in Munn v. Illinois (1877)?

Does state rate regulation of a private business violate Fourteenth Amendment due process?

What was the Court’s decision in Munn v. Illinois (1877)?

No, 7-2 (Chief Justice Waite). When private property is “affected with a public interest,” it is subject to public regulation. The elevators held a virtual monopoly over a vital commercial chokepoint. The Court also said that if rates are abused, the remedy is the political process, not the courts. Justice Field dissented, warning of limitless state power. The decision was an early peak of judicial deference and was later narrowed.

Describe the background in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)

A Louisiana law barred people from obtaining marine insurance on Louisiana property from out-of-state companies not licensed in Louisiana. Allgeyer & Co. mailed a letter from Louisiana to a New York insurer to confirm coverage for cotton shipped and was fined $1,000.

What was the constitutional question in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)?

Does the Louisiana law violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty?

What was the Court’s decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)?

Yes, 9-0 (Justice Peckham). “Liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to enter into contracts, which is the freedom of contract. The contract was made outside Louisiana, beyond the state’s reach. This was the first Supreme Court case to strike down a state law based on freedom of contract, setting the foundation for the Lochner era.

Describe the background of Lochner v. New York (1905)

New York’s Bakeshop Act of 1895 limited bakery employees to 10 hours a day and 60 hours a week. Joseph Lochner, a Utica bakery owner, was convicted and fined for letting an employee work more than 60 hours.

What was the constitutional question in Lochner v. New York (1905)?

Does the maximum-hours law violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty of contract, or is it a valid use of the state’s police power?

What was the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York (1905)?

The law was unconstitutional, 5-4 (Justice Peckham). The right to contract is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the state may interfere only under its police power to protect health, safety, morals, or welfare. The Court found no reasonable relation between the law and public health, calling it a labor regulation. It also said bakers were not a vulnerable class and were capable of bargaining. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing the law was a reasonable health measure. Justice Holmes dissented separately, writing that the Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” and that judges should defer to legislatures. Lochner gave its name to the era of aggressive judicial protection of economic liberty.

Describe the background in Muller v. Oregon (1908)

An Oregon law limited women in factories and laundries to 10 hours a day. Curt Muller, who owned a laundry, was fined $10. The state’s defense was led by Louis Brandeis, whose “Brandeis brief” used sociological and medical evidence about women’s work and health.

What was the constitutional question in Muller v. Oregon (1908)?

Does the maximum-hours law for women violate liberty of contract under Lochner?

What was the Court’s decision in Muller v. Oregon (1908)?

The law was upheld, 9-0 (Justice Brewer). The Court distinguished Lochner because women’s physical structure and role as mothers justified special protection, giving the state a legitimate interest in women’s health and the “future well-being of the race.” The Brandeis brief’s method of using social science became influential, but the opinion’s reasoning rests on sex stereotypes and is widely rejected today.

Describe the background of Nebbia v. New York (1934)

During the Depression, New York’s Milk Control Board set a minimum retail price of 9 cents per quart. Leo Nebbia, a Rochester grocer, sold two quarts of milk and a loaf of bread for 18 cents and was convicted and fined.

What was the constitutional question in Nebbia v. New York (1934)?

Does state price-fixing violate due process, given that milk was not a business “affected with a public interest” in the traditional sense?

What was the court’s decision in Nebbia v. New York (1934)?

The law was upheld, 5-4 (Justice Roberts). The Court rejected any fixed class of “public interest” businesses. A state may adopt economic policy that is reasonable and tied to a legitimate public purpose. Due process requires only that the law not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or unrelated to its aim. The decision loosened the Lochner era’s limits on economic regulation, and the Four Horsemen (including McReynolds) dissented.

Describe the background of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)

Washington State’s 1913 minimum wage law for women and minors was challenged by a hotel. Elsie Parrish, a chambermaid at the Cascadian Hotel in Wenatchee, sued for the difference between her pay and the minimum wage. The Washington Supreme Court ruled for her. The case was decided in the shadow of President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 “court-packing” proposal.

What was the constitutional question in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)?

Does a state minimum wage law for women violate liberty of contract, given Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923), which had struck down a similar federal law?

What was the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)?

The law was upheld, 5-4 (Chief Justice Hughes), and Adkins was overruled. The Court said liberty is not absolute and may be regulated in the community’s interest. The Constitution doesn’t mention freedom of contract, and legislatures may adopt regulations reasonable in relation to their subject and adopted in the interest of the community. The Court reasoned that exploitative wages harm the community, which ends up bearing the cost of supporting underpaid workers. Justice Owen Roberts’s vote is the “switch in time that saved nine,” though he had apparently decided before the plan was announced. The decision ended the Lochner era of heightened scrutiny for economic regulation and ushered in rational-basis review.

Dormant Commerce Clause

The Dormant Commerce Clause (or "negative Commerce Clause") is an implied constitutional doctrine derived from the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

While the explicit Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, the U.S. Supreme Court inferred that this grant of federal authority also contains a silent or "dormant" restriction. This means states cannot pass laws that unduly burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, even if Congress has not passed a federal law on the subject.