PHL281 - FINAL readings

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29 Terms

1
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Meyer

  • Truth telling, while usually generally values, physicians have to balance compassion and honesty

    • Recognizing that revealing unpleasant news may cause harm 

    • Ethical priority to communicate in a way that protects the patient, keeps hope alive, promotes treatment

    • “Do no harm” is the main idea


2
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Hooker

  • Withholding information from patients is ethically risky and unjustifiable 

    • it undermines trust

    • can backfire if discovered

    • provides little real benefit

    • and sets a dangerous precedent for further deception


3
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Cullen and Klein

  • If we respect patients as autonomous individuals, lying and decepting them is inherently unjustifiable 

    • Doctor should tell the truth, and only withhold information in cases in which temporary deception is necessary to prevent serious harm/needed for an important medical outcome

  • Deception undermines autonomy, trust, and the patient’s ability to make informed decisions, which is central to medical ethics


4
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Fan and Li

  • In Chinese/confucian medical ethics, hiding the truth is needed for the family and for the patient

    • If there is a serious diagnosis, then the family is informed and they get to decide what to tell the patient

    • There are times in which physician must lie to patient in order to align with the family’s wants

    • Family is only not allowed to make decisions for the patient if they seek to cause them harm 


5
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Herbert and Rosen

  • Informed consent → major pillar in modern medicine

    • Consent is invisible in medicine, not informed

      • Simple consent

  • Implied Consent 

    • When a patient’s behaviour/actions imply they agree with what the physician is doing

      • Ex. patient rolling up their sleeve when physician comes to take blood

    • Debated around if implied consent is sufficient → some cases in which express consent is sought out, such as areas surrounding the genitals or if the action is more risky, also if the information being asked is more sensitive 

    • Line between implied and express consent can get blurry 


6
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Brock

  • Brock argues that informed consent is essential because medical decisions involve not only medical facts but the patient’s own values, goals, and definition of well-being. Respecting autonomy means patients must actively participate in decisions, including the right to refuse treatment, and this cannot be overridden simply because the doctor believes another choice is better. Informed consent is grounded in two key values—promoting patient well-being through shared decision-making and respecting patient self-determination as an expression of dignity.

  • For consent to be valid, three conditions must be met:

    • Competence – the patient must be able to understand and reason about the decision, with higher standards required for riskier refusals.

    • Information – the patient must receive the diagnosis, prognosis, alternatives, and risks in a way they can understand, tailored to their personal values (not just what doctors usually say).

    • Voluntariness – the decision must be free of coercion or manipulation, including subtle forms like biased framing or withholding options.

  • Brock also explains that patients may waive decision-making authority, but only knowingly and intentionally—not out of ignorance or deference they didn’t choose. Informed consent serves not only individual autonomy but also broader social goals such as trust, accountability, and ethical medical practice, though it has limits in cases of incompetence or overwhelming complexity.


7
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Wicclair

  • Wicclair argues that decision-making capacity should fundamentally be based on the patient’s actual cognitive abilities related to a specific decision, not on the riskiness of the decision itself. He critiques Buchanan and Brock’s “risk-related standard,” which raises or lowers the threshold for calling someone competent depending on how dangerous their choice is. Wicclair says this approach wrongly mixes two separate questions:

    • Is the patient capable of making this decision?

    • Should we override the patient’s choice for their own good?

  • By tying competence to risk, Wicclair warns, we distort the concept of capacity and risk slipping into paternalism.


8
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Emanuel and Emanuel

  • Paternalistic model

    • Patient physician interaction ensure that patients receive interventions that best promote their health and well being, use their skills to find out and encourage – at an extreme, physician informs patients when intervention will occur

  • Informative model

    • physician provides patient with all relevant information, for the patient to select the medical interventions they want - at an extreme, patient knows all medical information relevant to their disease and available interventions, selecting the interventions that best realize their values

  • Interpretive Model

    • Understand patient’s values, and make medical decisions for them based on that, information is given to patient, obligation of making them understand the choice

  • Deliberative model

    • Help patient determine and choose best health related values realized in the situation, acts more like  a friend, indicating what the patient should or could do

    • Deliberation means that the physician and patient judge worthiness and importance of health related values


9
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Brudney and Lantos

  • Agency → capacity to decide 

  • Authenticity → living life according to one's distinct values and beliefs

    • Authenticity is more important


10
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Miles

  • Main Idea: The case of Helga Wanglie establishes a conflict between patient/family demands for treatment and medical judgment that the treatment is "non-beneficial."

  • Key Argument: Patient autonomy includes the right to refuse treatment, but not an unlimited right to demand treatment that physicians deem medically inappropriate. Professional integrity, stewardship of resources, and community standards can legitimately limit such demands.

  • Contribution: Highlights the "right-to-demand" problem, forcing a societal conversation about the goals of medicine and the limits of patient authority.


11
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Schwarz

  • Main Idea: Patient autonomy is not absolute and is rightly limited by the "limits of medicine."

  • Key Argument: Patients cannot demand treatments that are 1) non-medical, 2) scientifically futile, or 3) outside the accepted scope and ends of medicine (e.g., amputation for sin expiation or, by analogy, prolonged ventilation for PVS). The medical profession defines these limits through consensus.

  • Contribution: Provides a philosophical foundation for the Wanglie case, arguing the real question was not "who decides?" but "is this treatment within the proper bounds of medicine?"


12
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Dresser and Robertson

  • Main Idea: The orthodox legal approach (using advance directives and substituted judgment) is fundamentally flawed for conscious, incompetent patients and should be replaced with a "current interests" standard.

  • Key Argument: Pretending incompetent patients are choice-makers is a fiction that risks harm. Instead, we should directly assess the patient's current quality of life and subjective interests. This openly acknowledges the role of quality-of-life judgments and allows competing interests (like family burden) to be considered transparently, but only after the patient's own interests are accounted for.

  • Contribution: Synthesizes the critiques into a concrete, alternative legal standard, arguing for an honest, direct assessment of the value of a patient's current existence.


13
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Dresser

  • Consider patient's current well-being and interests, if they seem happy and content, decisions should aim to preserve that

    • Involve loved ones who know past and current self best

    • Weight past values, but don’t overprioritize them 

  • Advance directives

    • People misjudge what they want in the future

    • Dementia patient self still has interests

    • Identity and values can change overtime


14
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Diekema

  • The article's main argument is that the "best interests of the child" standard is the wrong and impractical threshold for state intervention when parents refuse medical treatment for their children. Instead, the author proposes using the "Harm Principle."

    • The Problem with "Best Interests": This standard is too vague, value-laden, and unrealistic. It doesn't reflect how courts and doctors actually decide cases. Parents aren't required to always choose the optimal outcome for a child (e.g., sending them to the best school), only to avoid serious harm.

    • The Proposed Alternative: The Harm Principle: The state should only intervene when a parental decision places the child at significant risk of serious, imminent, and preventable harm. This is a clearer, more appropriate, and more commonly used threshold.

    • Defining the Threshold: "Serious harm" includes risks like death, loss of a major bodily function, significant pain, or the deprivation of basic needs required for a life worth living.

  • Criteria for Intervention: The author lists eight conditions that must be met to justify state action, including that the refused treatment is necessary, proven effective, provides a clear net benefit over the parental choice, and that intervention is the least intrusive option.

  • In short: Don't ask if a parental refusal is against the child's "best interest." Ask if it exposes the child to significant risk of serious harm. That is the proper limit of parental authority and the correct trigger for state action.


15
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Shah, Rosenberg, Diekema

  • The authors argue that when doctors and parents disagree about a child’s medical care—as in the Charlie Gard case—the harm principle is a better and more ethically justified standard for state intervention than either the best interest standard or medical futility, because it is clearer, less subjective, and respects parental authority unless their decisions pose a significant risk of serious harm to the child.


16
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Flanigan

  • Patients have a moral right to self-medicate, restricting drug access through prescription violates bodily autonomy 

    • Autonomy and bodily rights → if people can determine if they want or don’t want a surgery, how is this different? 

    • Patients can make informed choices → with research, people can make reasonable and informed choices 

    • Right to control risks of their own health → government allows people to take other risks, so restricting medication is inconsistent with other accepted freedoms of risk aking 

    • Gatekeeping → prescription drug laws create unnecessary barriers, harm people in urgent need, disproportionately affects marginalized groups


17
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Brandt

  • The main idea of this article is that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was not a tragic aberration or simple scientific error, but a direct and inevitable product of systemic racism within American medicine.

    • The author argues that the study’s design and continuation for 40 years were rooted in racist pseudoscientific beliefs about Black people that were prevalent in the medical establishment in the early 20th century. These beliefs held that Black people were inherently diseased, hypersexual, and biologically different from white people, making them "ideal" subjects for a study of "untreated" syphilis.

  • The study was conceived within a medical culture that believed syphilis manifested differently in Black people and that they were too ignorant or irresponsible to seek or continue treatment. This allowed researchers to justify withholding treatment as a "study in nature."

  • were told they were being treated for "bad blood," not that they were in an experiment. They were lured with false promises of treatment, given placebos, and even prevented from getting real treatment when it became available (like penicillin in the 1940s).

  • Flawed Investigation: The 1973 HEW (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) investigative report failed to grasp this historical and racist context. It mistakenly focused on the lack of informed consent and penicillin treatment rather than exposing the core racist ideology and fundamental deception that drove the study from the start.

  • science is never value-free. Social attitudes and prejudices shape professional behavior. The tragedy reveals more about the pathology of racism and ethical failures in scientific bureaucracy than it does about the disease of syphilis.

    • The Tuskegee Study was a racist experiment, enabled by medical racism, sustained by deception, and later misunderstood by investigators who failed to confront the central role of racial ideology in its creation and execution.


18
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Hellman and Hellman

  • There is a fundamental ethical conflict between a physician’s duty to act solely in the best interests of their individual patients and the goals of randomized clinical trials, which prioritize generating knowledge rather than guaranteeing optimal care. Because randomization can knowingly assign patients to inferior treatment, doctors cannot ethically act as both healers and researchers, and informed consent cannot erase this conflict. Therefore, when research is needed, non-randomized or uncontrolled studies are morally preferable in situations with no proven treatment and poor prognosis.


19
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Freedman

  • Randomised control trials are not unethical

    • A trial is ethical if there is honest disagreement amongst experts about which treatment is the best (clinical equipoise)


20
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Angell

  • Ethical standards for clinical research—especially the requirement to provide all participants with the best proven treatment—must not be weakened when studies are conducted in low-income countries. 

    • Using placebos or inferior “local standards of care” where effective treatments already exist exploits vulnerable populations and repeats the logic of unethical studies like Tuskegee. Researchers and sponsors must uphold international principles such as the Declaration of Helsinki, even if doing so is less convenient or slows down research.


21
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Barnes

  • Disabilities aren’t sub-optimal features, they are human differences, can still still be harmful in a more restricted sense

    • Disabilities are simply a difference-maker, not a negative difference-maker

    • Lower local quality of life, not overall quality of life 


22
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Savalescu

  • We have a moral obligation to genetically enhance ourselves/out children when it can improve wellbeing

    • Lazy and neglectful parents

      • Parents who fault to treat children’s illnesses are the same as parents who fail to enhance a child when they easily could 

    • Consistency

      • We already enhance ourselves through education, diet, training environment — how is this any different?


23
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Sumner

  • Sumner argues that physician-assisted death (PAD) can be ethically justified because it advances the two core values that matter most at the end of life: relief of suffering (well-being) and respect for patient autonomy.

    • First, the argument from well-being holds that suffering—whether physical, psychological, or existential—is intrinsically bad and should be relieved whenever possible. While palliative care and terminal sedation can reduce much suffering, some cases remain refractory. In such cases, PAD can prevent further pointless, intolerable suffering, making it ethically defensible. This justification can be framed consequentially (reducing great harm) or deontologically (fulfilling a moral duty to relieve suffering).

    • Second, the argument from autonomy emphasizes that competent patients have the right to manage the time and manner of their own death in accordance with their deeply held values. A request for PAD is an exercise of self-determination, just like informed consent or refusal of treatment. Respecting such a request honors patients’ control over their own dying process.

  • However, these two values justify PAD only under certain conditions:

    • a voluntary request from the patient, adequate decision-making capacity,genuine voluntariness free of coercion, full disclosure of diagnosis, prognosis, and alternatives, and a serious medical condition causing intolerable suffering that cannot be acceptably relieved by other treatments.

  • Sumner concludes that if these conditions are met, and if both well-being and autonomy support the decision, then PAD is ethically justified. He also argues that there is no meaningful moral difference between physician-assisted suicide (patient self-administers) and voluntary euthanasia (physician administers): in both cases, the patient’s request and best interests remove the usual wrongness associated with killing.


24
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Callahan

  • Against euthanasia, claims that doctors cannot reliably judge whether a patient’s suffering makes life “not worth living”

    • euthanasia collapses important moral distinctions between killing and allowing to die

    • legalizing it inevitably leads to abuse and slippery expansion

    • pushes medicine beyond its proper role of relieving medical suffering into making philosophical judgments about the value of life itself. 

    • misuse of self-determination and distorts both medical ethics and the physician’s moral responsibilities


25
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Kious and Battin

  • The article argues there's a moral contradiction between two accepted practices

    • Physician Aid-in-Dying (PAD) allows terminally ill patients to end their lives, based on the idea that severe suffering justifies this choice.

    • Involuntary psychiatric commitment prevents suicide in mentally ill patients, based on the idea that their suffering is not a valid reason to die.

  • The authors say this is inconsistent. If suffering justifies death for terminal physical illness, it should also justify it for severe, untreatable mental illness. This creates a dilemma: either we must reject one practice, extend PAD to psychiatry, or find a way to objectively measure "unbearable suffering"—a very difficult challenge.


26
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Marquis

  • Abortion is immoral because it deprives fetuses from a future like ours (FLO)

    • Experiences, activities, goods they would value, etc. 

    • Deprives the victim of ENTIRE value of their future, as fetuses have futures of value exactly like adults 


27
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Thompson

  • Abortion is moral because ven if a fetus is a person, the right to life does not include the right to use another person’s body without their consent

    • Forcing a woman to continue a pregnancy is a violation of bodily autonomy 

    • Good samaritan and violinist argument 


28
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Flanigan

  • Compulsory vaccination is morally justified because vaccine refusal is harmful to innocent people, justified when conditions are met:  

    • The disease is contagious.

    • Those exposed to it are not liable for the risk.

    • The vaccine is effective at reducing transmission.

    • Vaccination does not violate self-defense (e.g., severe allergies).

  • No one have the right to impose deadly risks unto others, even unintentionally 

    • Unvaccinated people are more likely to get sick and transmit disease.

    • They weaken herd immunity, making even vaccinated people more vulnerable.

    • They endanger immunocompromised people and infants who cannot be vaccinated.


29
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John and Curran

  • The article argues against using Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to justify lockdowns, calling it ethically flawed. Instead, it proposes a contractualist approach based on the philosopher T.M. Scanlon’s idea that a lockdown policy is permissible if no one could reasonably reject it.

    • CBA fails because it lets trivial harms (like widespread frustration) outweigh life-and-death ones, and ignores the moral difference between disease victims and vectors.

    • Contractualism focuses on whether a policy is justifiable to everyone affected, especially those most burdened (like students or the elderly).

    • The framework starts with a strict universal lockdown as a baseline (justified as self-defense) and asks if a less restrictive alternative can be fairly justified to all.

  • In short: Don’t just add up costs and benefits. Ask which policy is fairest to those bearing the greatest burdens.