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Comprehensive practice flashcards reviewing all 21 lectures in Family Law, covering constitutional rights, marriage formation, spousal rights and coverture, divorce grounds and jurisdiction, marital contracts, property division, spousal maintenance, child support, child custody, and termination of parental rights.
City of Ladue v. Horn
a municipal zoning ordinance defining a 'family' strictly by blood, marriage, or adoption survives rational basis review under the police power, ruling that cohabitating unmarried couples lack the required legal commitment and perceived reciprocal obligation to qualify as a legal family.
Marvin v. Marvin
unmarried cohabitating adults are competent to enter into enforceable express or implied contracts regarding earnings and property distribution, provided the contract is not explicitly founded on meretricious sexual services.
Meretricious Relationship
a stable, marital-like cohabitation relationship where both parties know a lawful marriage does not exist, permitting an equitable distribution of property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been legally married.
Tenancy in Common Partition Rule (Hofstad v. Christie)
The legal presumption that co-tenants named jointly on a deed take equal, undivided shares, which can only be rebutted by clear parol evidence showing unequal purchase contributions AND the absence of a family relationship or donative intent.
Griswold v. Connecticut
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights create penumbras and emanations establishing protected zones of privacy, which prohibit states from criminalizing the use of or medical advice concerning contraceptives by married couples.
Eisenstadt v. Baird
under the Equal Protection Clause that the constitutional right of privacy protects an individual's right to access contraception free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, regardless of whether the person is married or single.
Substantive Due Process Test for Unenumerated Rights (Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization)
The constitutional standard requiring that any unenumerated liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Lawrence v. Texas
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty of consenting adults to engage in private, consensual sexual intimacy, establishing that moral disapproval by the majority is not a legitimate state interest sufficient to criminalize such conduct.
Free Exercise of Religion in Marriage (Reynolds v. United States)
the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs but not illegal overt practices; religious belief in polygamy cannot excuse criminal violations of anti-bigamy statutes.
Neutral Law of General Applicability (Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court)
The rule under Employment Division v. Smith that a facially neutral statute applying across all employers (such as a contraceptive health coverage mandate) does not violate the Free Exercise Clause merely because it incidentally burdens religiously motivated practices.
Loving v. Virginia
racial classifications restricting marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause under strict scrutiny and infringe upon the fundamental right to marry protected by the Due Process Clause.
Fundamental Right to Marry (Zablocki v. Redhail)
The constitutional principle that marriage is a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment; a state statute conditioning the right to obtain a marriage license on the satisfaction of past child support obligations impermissibly infringes on that right.
Common Law Marriage
A non-ceremonial legal marriage recognized in a minority of jurisdictions formed when two persons with legal capacity enter into a present, mutual agreement to be married, cohabitate, and publicly hold themselves out to the community as spouses.
Crosson v. Crosson
An Alabama decision finding a valid common law marriage between divorced spouses who resumed living together based on capacity, mutual agreement (such as asking the other to return as a wife), cohabitation, and public recognition (such as filing joint tax returns under penalty of perjury).
Proxy Marriage
A marriage contracted and solemnized through authorized agents or stand-ins acting on behalf of one or both parties who are physically absent at the ceremony.
Statutory Formalities Doctrine (Carabetta v. Carabetta)
The principle that noncompliance with a statutory marriage licensing requirement does not render a marriage void if a ceremonial solemnization occurred, unless the governing statute expressly declares unlicensed marriages to be void.
Obergefell v. Hodges
fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring all states to license and recognize same-sex marriages.
Void Marriage
A marriage that is invalid from its inception and has no legal effect (e.g., bigamy, radical underage, incest); it cannot be ratified and may be challenged collaterally by any party at any time without requiring a formal decree.
Voidable Marriage
A marriage that contains an impediment (e.g., non-radical age, fraud affecting essentials, temporary incapacity, duress, or incurable physical impotence) which is treated as legally valid until an action for annulment is brought by one of the parties during the lifetime of both spouses.
Annulment
A judicial declaration establishing that a purported marriage was invalid from the beginning (void ab initio), legally wiping out its existence as though it had never occurred.
Putative Spouse Doctrine
An equitable doctrine that accords marital property division and other economic benefits to an individual who entered into a ceremonial marriage in good faith without knowledge of an existing legal impediment.
Williams v. Williams (Nevada 2004)
A Nevada Supreme Court ruling applying the putative spouse doctrine to equitably divide community property accumulated during a 27-year relationship where the wife had a good-faith belief in the marriage, while denying ongoing post-annulment spousal support absent statutory authority.
Moe v. Dinkins
the right to marry is not entirely denied to minors, but merely delayed to protect them from immature decision-making.
Consanguinity Restrictions (Singh v. Singh)
Statutory bans on incestuous marriages that apply equally to relationships of the half-blood as well as the whole blood, invalidating an uncle-niece marriage descending from a common maternal grandmother.
Mental Capacity to Marry (Edmunds v. Edwards)
The standard providing that mere intellectual disability or weakness of mind is insufficient to void a marriage so long as the individual possessed the mental capacity to comprehend the nature, duties, and responsibilities of the marriage contract at the moment of consent.
Coverture
The traditional English common law doctrine under which a married woman's legal rights and identity were suspended and incorporated into those of her husband (feme covert), preventing her from contracting, holding property, or retaining independent earnings.
Married Women's Property Acts
Nineteenth-century statutes (originating in Mississippi in 1839 and Maine in 1844) that abolished common law coverture by granting married women the right to own, manage, and control separate property and wages free from their husbands' control.
Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections
a married woman is not legally required to assume her husband's surname and may retain her birth name upon marriage for all purposes, including voter registration, absent fraudulent intent.
Henne v. Wright
parents do not possess a fundamental constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to give a child a surname with which the child has no legally recognized parental connection\
Doctrine of Nonintervention (McGuire v. McGuire)
The common law rule that courts will not intervene to resolve spousal support disputes or order standard-of-living expenditures so long as the home is intact and the parties continue to live together as husband and wife.
Fault-Based Divorce
A traditional divorce regime requiring the petitioning spouse to prove specific statutory marital misconduct by the defendant (e.g., adultery, extreme cruelty, desertion, habitual drunkenness, or imprisonment).
Cruel and Inhuman Treatment (Brady v. Brady)
A fault ground for divorce requiring proof of serious misconduct that so endangers the physical or mental well-being of the plaintiff as renders continued cohabitation unsafe or improper; in long-term marriages, transient discord or finding that a marriage is 'dead' is legally insufficient.
Innocent Spouse Requirement (In re Dube)
The statutory fault principle that a fault-based divorce decree may only be granted in favor of an 'innocent party' who is entirely free from guilt of any marital offense that would itself constitute grounds for divorce.
Recrimination
A common law defense to fault-based divorce based on the clean hands doctrine, establishing that if both spouses have committed a marital fault, neither spouse is entitled to a fault divorce.
Condonation
A common law defense to fault-based divorce asserting that the aggrieved spouse conditionally or unconditionally forgave the offending spouse's marital misconduct, typically evidenced by resumed cohabitation or intimacy.
Connivance
A common law defense to fault-based divorce occurring when one spouse actively consents to or facilitates the other spouse's commission of marital misconduct (such as consenting to or setting up an act of adultery).
No-Fault Divorce
A statutory divorce mechanism allowing marriage dissolution without proving wrongdoing, based entirely on grounds such as irretrievable breakdown, irreconcilable differences, or voluntary separation for a statutory period.
Irretrievable Breakdown (Palermo v. Palermo)
Under New York Domestic Relations Law § 170(7), a no-fault divorce ground satisfied by the subjective, sworn declaration of one spouse that the marriage has been broken down for at least six months, which does not require a factual trial or corroborating judicial inquiry.
Legal Separation
A judicial determination that establishes the financial, property, and custodial rights and responsibilities of spouses living apart while leaving the underlying marital bond legally intact.
Domestic Relations Exception
A longstanding jurisdictional rule that federal courts will not exercise jurisdiction over cases where the core relief sought is the issuance or modification of a divorce, alimony decree, or child custody determination.
Williams v. North Carolina (I & II)
Supreme Court decisions establishing that ex parte divorce decrees altering marital status are entitled to Full Faith and Credit based on one spouse's domicile (Williams I), but sister states retain the power to collaterally re-examine whether a bona fide domicile was actually acquired unless the absent spouse appeared and had the opportunity to litigate (Williams II / Sherrer rule).
Divorce Durational Residency Requirement (Sosna v. Iowa)
State statutory waiting periods (such as Iowa's one-year residency rule) requiring a petitioner to establish bona fide residency before filing for divorce, held constitutional under rational basis review to prevent forum shopping and avoid collateral attacks.
Comity (Perrin v. Perrin)
The judicial principle by which domestic courts recognize foreign judgments; under comity, a bilateral Mexican divorce will be recognized and cannot be collaterally attacked by a spouse who personally initiated and obtained the foreign decree with the other spouse's counsel appearing.
Divisible Divorce Doctrine (Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt)
The jurisdictional principle that an ex parte divorce court having jurisdiction over only one spouse has the in rem power to dissolve the marital status, but lacks personal jurisdiction to terminate or adjudicate the absent spouse's economic rights, such as spousal maintenance or property distribution.
Kulko v. Superior Court of California
a nonresident father's acquiescence in allowing his child to reside with the mother in the forum state does not satisfy the 'minimum contacts' or 'purposeful availment' required for personal jurisdiction over child support under the Due Process Clause.
UPAA vs. UPMAA
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983), which regulates agreements executed prior to marriage, contrasted with the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (2012), which extends comprehensive procedural safeguards (such as independent counsel, robust disclosure, and protection against unconscionable hardship) to both premarital and postnuptial marital agreements.
Scherer Test for Prenuptials (Blige v. Blige)
A standard for prenuptial agreement enforcement placing an affirmative burden on the proponent to prove the absence of fraud, duress, mistake, or nondisclosure; an undisclosed asset (such as an undisclosed cash stash) invalidates the agreement regardless of whether the other party exercised due diligence.
Duress in Premarital Agreements (Biliouris v. Biliouris)
The standard establishing that demanding a prenuptial agreement as a condition of marriage during an unexpected pregnancy does not constitute unlawful coercion or duress where the signing party retained free will, was an educated professional, and had access to independent legal counsel.
Stregack v. Moldofsky
premarital agreements waiving elective share or estate rights do not require financial disclosure to be enforceable upon death, in sharp contrast to postnuptial agreements.
Mid-Marriage Agreement (Pacelli v. Pacelli)
An agreement executed during an intact marriage under threat of divorce, subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny for coercion and fairness because one spouse's emotional commitment to preserving the family creates unequal bargaining power.
Incorporation vs. Merger (Johnston v. Johnston)
The distinction where an incorporated but non-merged separation agreement retains its independent contractual identity and remedies, whereas a merged agreement is completely extinguished into the divorce decree and enforceable solely as a judicial judgment.
Contempt Classification in Support (Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock)
The rule that contempt proceedings are civil if the sanction is remedial, coercive, and conditioned on a purge clause (such as paying support arrearages), but criminal if the punishment is fixed, punitive, and unconditional to vindicate court authority.
Equitable Distribution
A property division system used in a majority of states that classifies property as marital or separate and divides the marital estate equitably—though not necessarily on an equal 50/50 basis—based on statutory factors and contributions.
Community Property
A property regime adopted by nine states treating marriage as a shared partnership, where all property and debt acquired during the marriage through the skill, effort, or industry of either spouse is owned equally and divided equally upon divorce.
Valuation Date
The specific cutoff date designated by court rule or statute (such as the initial prehearing settlement conference in Minnesota) used to establish the fair market value of marital assets for distribution.
Lump-Sum vs. Pay-As-It-Comes-In (Ruggles v. Ruggles)
The two primary methods of distributing retirement benefits in a divorce: lump-sum awards immediate cash or offsetting assets representing the present value of matured benefits, whereas the 'pay as it comes in' approach distributes the non-employee spouse's share via QDRO as retirement payments are actually disbursed.
Three-Step Property Division Process (Johnson v. Johnson)
The structured judicial methodology requiring a court to: 1) identify and characterize each asset as marital or separate/nonmarital; 2) equitably distribute the marital assets; and 3) evaluate any remaining deficit to consider an award of spousal alimony.
Rehabilitative Spousal Maintenance
Short-term, transitional financial support awarded to an economically dependent spouse for a limited duration to enable them to acquire education, job training, or skills necessary to achieve self-sufficiency.
Permanent Spousal Maintenance (Rainwater v. Rainwater)
Indefinite, ongoing spousal support typically granted following a long-term marriage where an economically dependent homemaker cannot reasonably be expected to achieve self-support approximating the marital standard of living.
Reimbursement Alimony (Mahoney v. Mahoney)
A financial award designed to compensate a spouse for financial contributions made toward the other spouse's professional education or advanced degree when the marriage ends before the couple enjoys the expected financial fruits of that degree.
Professional License as Marital Property (O'Brien v. O'Brien)
A unique New York doctrine establishing that an educational degree or professional license acquired during marriage constitutes marital property subject to equitable division based on its enhanced future earning capacity.
Nonvested Pension Rights (In re Marriage of Brown)
A landmark California decision holding that nonvested pension rights represent an enforceable contractual right to deferred compensation rather than a mere expectancy, making them community property subject to division upon divorce.
Marital Debt (Hardy v. Hardy)
Any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the spouses or family, which is presumed to be a marital obligation subject to equitable allocation between the parties upon dissolution.
Cohabitation Clause Enforcement (Bell v. Bell)
A provision in a separation agreement terminating alimony upon the recipient's cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex giving the outward appearance of marriage, enforced strictly according to its plain terms even if the cohabitant provides no financial support.
Income Shares Model
A child support calculation system adopted by most states that combines both parents' adjusted actual incomes, determines a basic support obligation from a statutory schedule, and prorates financial responsibility between parents in proportion to their relative earnings.
High-Income Child Support Discretion (Voishan v. Palma)
The rule that child support guideline schedules are not rigid ceilings; when parental income exceeds the highest schedule bracket, trial courts have discretion to make awards higher than the statutory maximum to ensure the child shares in the parents' standard of living.
Educational Trust Fund Support (Nash v. Mulle)
A child support mechanism allowing an extraordinary high-earning noncustodial parent to be ordered to make child support payments into an educational trust fund during the child's minority to cover future post-secondary college expenses.
Special Circumstances Educational Support (In re Barrett)
The standard allowing a court to order a divorced noncustodial parent to contribute to private secondary school tuition upon finding the child has demonstrated a special educational/emotional need and the parent has an ability to pay.
Stepparent Child Support (Stahl v. Dep't of Social and Health Services)
The statutory rule establishing that a stepparent's legal support obligation toward a stepchild living in the family home continues through marital separation and only terminates upon the legal dissolution of the marriage.
Paternity by Equitable Estoppel (M.H.B. v. H.T.B.)
An equitable doctrine that prevents a husband from terminating child support for a non-biological child after he knowingly held himself out as the child's father for years and induced the child to emotionally and financially rely upon him.
Legal Custody vs. Physical Custody
Legal custody refers to the authority to make major decisions concerning the child's health, education, and welfare, whereas physical custody refers to the child's physical residence and daily care.
Best Interests of the Child (UMDA § 402)
The universal legal standard governing child custody determinations, requiring courts to balance factors including parental and child wishes, family relationships, community adjustment, and the physical and mental health of all individuals involved.
Comparative Economic Wealth in Custody (Burchard v. Garay)
The California Supreme Court doctrine establishing that a parent's superior wealth or financial stability is an impermissible basis for awarding child custody, prioritizing instead emotional bonding and continuity of care provided by the primary caregiver.
Tender Years Doctrine (Johnson v. Johnson)
An obsolete common law presumption automatically favoring mothers in custody determinations for young children, rejected as unconstitutional gender-based stereotyping that undermines individualized best-interest evaluations.
Parental Physical Disability in Custody (In re Marriage of Carney)
The rule that a parent's physical handicap (such as quadriplegia) cannot serve as prima facie evidence of unfitness or justify a change of custody absent concrete proof that the condition will cause substantial and lasting adverse harm to the child.
Joint Custody Communication Requirement (In re Marriage of Weidner)
The statutory prerequisite that joint physical and legal custody requires both parents to be capable of effective communication and cooperation regarding the child's needs; persistent hostility and loyalty conflicts make joint custody unworkable.
Affirmative Duty of Custodial Parent (Schutz v. Schutz)
The legal obligation imposed on a custodial parent to facilitate visitation and encourage a positive, loving relationship between the children and the noncustodial parent; court orders enforcing this duty impose only an incidental burden on free speech.
Parental Nonmarital Cohabitation and Visitation (Harrington v. Harrington)
The rule that a noncustodial parent's nonmarital cohabitation does not justify restricting standard overnight visitation absent compelling evidence that the living arrangement actively confuses or harms the children.
Special Weight Doctrine (Troxel v. Granville)
The constitutional requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment that a court evaluating a third-party or grandparent visitation petition must accord 'special weight' to the decisions of a fit custodial parent regarding the child's care, custody, and control.
Extraordinary Circumstances Rule (Bennett v. Jeffries)
The common law standard providing that a fit biological parent cannot be deprived of custody in favor of a nonparent absent extraordinary circumstances (such as surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, or prolonged disruption of custody).
Standard of Proof for Termination of Parental Rights (Santosky v. Kramer)
The constitutional mandate under the Due Process Clause requiring states to prove parental unfitness or permanent neglect by at least clear and convincing evidence before completely and irrevocably terminating parental rights.
Prospective Analysis in Termination (In re K.A.W.)
The requirement that termination of parental rights must evaluate whether the child faces future harm at the time of the hearing, meaning past struggles or failed adoption placements cannot support termination unless convincingly linked to predicted future neglect.
Marital Presumption of Paternity (Reese v. Muret)
The statutory presumption under the Uniform Parentage Act that a husband is the legal father of a child born during the marriage, which requires a best-interests hearing before ordering genetic testing to disrupt paternity, even if the child is an adult.
Procedural Due Process for Unmarried Fathers (Stanley v. Illinois)
a state statute automatically presuming unwed fathers to be unfit upon the mother's death violates Due Process and Equal Protection; unwed fathers who raised their children are entitled to an individualized fitness hearing.
Opportunity Interest of Unwed Biological Fathers (Lehr v. Robertson)
The constitutional principle that a biological link alone does not confer substantive Fourteenth Amendment parental rights on an unwed father; the father must actively grasp the opportunity by establishing a substantial custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child and registering with the state putative father registry.
Putative Father Registry
A state statutory mechanism requiring an unmarried biological father to timely register his paternity claim in order to preserve his constitutional right to notice and consent prior to adoption proceedings.
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART)
A collective term describing medical procedures used to achieve pregnancy outside of traditional intercourse, including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo donation, cryopreservation, and gestational or traditional surrogacy.
Intent-Based Parentage (Buzzanca v. Buzzanca)
The legal doctrine establishing that when a couple initiates assisted reproduction through surrogacy and donor gametes with the mutual intent to cause the birth of a child and raise that child as their own, both individuals are recognized as the legal parents under the law.
Equitable Adoption (Lankford v. Wright)
An equitable remedy in intestate estates conferring inheritance rights on a child who was raised under an express or implied agreement to adopt that was relied upon by all parties and performed by custody transfer, despite lacking formal statutory completion.