PHIL 279 EXAM #1

Deductive argument

the conclusion is supposed to follow necessarily from the premises (All humans are mortal. Socrates is human. Therefore, Socrates is mortal)

Valid deductive argument

If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true

Invalid deductive argument

The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises

Inductive argument:

the premises are supposed to make the conclusion probable rather than certain (Every raven observed so far is black. Therefore, all ravens are black.)

Strong inductive argument

the premises provide strong support for the conclusion

Weak inductive argument

the premises provide little support for the conclusion

voluntary action

The action originates in the person acting, and the person knows what they are doing.

involuntary action

The action is caused by force or by ignorance that causes pain and regret.

mixed action

The action is involuntary in itself but chosen voluntarily in the particular circumstances.

nonvoluntary action

The action is done because of ignorance, but the person does not feel pain or regret afterward.

actions done in ignorance

A person acts without knowledge, but ignorance is not what causes the action. Aristotle uses drunkenness and anger as examples.

actions caused by ignorance

Ignorance actually causes the person to perform the action. If the person regrets the action, it is involuntary.

ignorance of particulars - aristotle

Knowledge about the specific circumstances of an action, such as what a person is doing or who is affected.

ignorance of universals - aristotle

General knowledge about what is right or wrong or what one ought to do. Aristotle emphasizes that actions take place in particular circumstances.

responsibility of character

We are responsible for actions that stem from our character because we are responsible for forming our character. We form our character through voluntary actions that help develop our habits

aristotle’s practical syllogism: choice, wish, deliberation, universal/particular premises

Wish: “I want to be just.”

Universal premise: “Stealing is unjust.”

Particular premise: “If I take this item without permission, it is stealing.”

Choice: “Therefore, I will not take this person’s property without permission.”

Key point: Deliberation connects what we want with the particular circumstances and leads to a choice.

principle of alternative possibilities (PAP)

A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.

Frankfurt arguing PAP is false

argues you can still be morally responsible for an action even if it was physically impossible for you to do anything else.

Frankfurt’s revised PAP

A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise (did the inability to do otherwise actually cause the person to act?)

Jones 1

J1: Decisions—> Actions
-Threat has no effect
-So, J1 is morally responsible

Jones 1 decides to perform a specific action on his own. Afterward, a powerful threat (coercion) is made against him, however, Jones 1 does what he decides to do no matter the cost.

The coercive threat has zero motivational or causal effect on his behavior. He acts completely independently of the threat, as if it were never made, so he is morally responsible. Because the threat didn't force him or affect his choices, he still had alternative options (he could have chosen otherwise, though he wouldn't), meaning this case doesn't violate PAP.

Jones 2

J2: Threat—-> Action
-Forgets previous decision to perform action
-So, J2 is responsible for his decision, but not the action

Jones 2 makes a prior decision, but when a harsh coercive threat is introduced, he is completely "stampeded" by fear. The terror of the penalty causes him to entirely forget his earlier decision, and he acts solely because he is terrified of the threat. [

Jones 2 is not morally responsible. Because he was purely coerced and driven by panic rather than his own free volition, we excuse him.

Jones 3

J3: Decision—> Action
-Threat has no effect
-J3 is morally responsible

Jones 3 is a reasonable person. He faces a severe coercive threat, but unlike Jones 1, the threat impresses him. However, by pure coincidence, he happens to be acting on the exact same decision he had already made before the threat was ever issued. He isn't motivated to act by the threat, but the threat is so harsh that if he hadn't already decided to do it, he would have submitted to it anyway.

The threat did not actually cause his action, yet a restrictive condition was present in the background. Jones 3 is morally responsible because the threat played no actual role in his choice.

Jones 4

Jones decides to perform the action, but if he had decided not to, Black would have manipulated him into doing it anyway. Jones is still morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise, so Jones 4 disproves PAP.

Jones 4 decides to perform an action on his own. Unbeknownst to him, a controller named Black has a device (or chip) monitoring Jones 4's brain. If Jones 4 shows any sign of deciding to do something else, Black will instantly intervene to force him to do the action. But Jones 4 decides to do the action entirely on his own, so Black never has to flip the switch or intervene at all.

Jones 4 could not have done otherwise because Black would have forced him to comply if he tried. Yet, Black's presence played zero causal role in how Jones 4 actually made up his mind.

Jones 4 is morally responsible. Because Jones 4 acted entirely from his own internal desires without any external interference forcing the actual event, we hold him accountable—even though alternative possibilities were mathematically zero. This classic setup forms the core of modern Frankfurt-style cases against PAP

the basic argument

1: You do what you do because of the way you are.

2: To be truly morally responsible for what you do, you must be truly morally responsible for the way you are.

3: You cannot be truly morally responsible for the way you are.

4: You cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for your actions.

true moral responsibility

responsibility that would make ultimate punishment or reward justifiable

strawson’s view of moral responsibility

True / ultimate moral responsibility is IMPOSSIBLE. we cannot ultimately be responsible for our own character or motivational structure.

compatibilist objection

We are morally responsible as long as our actions come from our own standard desires and not caused by constraints (hypnosis, threats, physical force, alien desires)

Strawson’s response to compatibilist objection

this isn’t true moral responsibility, even if you aren’t hypnotized your normal desires and personality still came from forces completely outside of your own.

libertarian/ideterminist objection

The universe is undetermined. indeterminism could allow us to make ourselves responsible through our choices. Because our choices have genuine alternative possibilities, we have free will.

Strawson’s response to libertarian/ideterminist objection

How is this different from luck? If an action in an undetermined world isn't caused by the past, your character, or prior laws, then it happens purely by chance.

appeal to self objection

A person could be truly responsible because the self is independent of their character, personality, or motivational structure. even if your personality was forced on you, your independent self sits above.

Strawson’s response to self objection

the self would still act because of the way it is. if the self chooses based on some internal principle/reason, we loop back to where they came from (basic argument)

attributability

Whether an action or attitude reflects the person and their character.

accountability

Whether a person can be held responsible or blamed for an action.

virtue

Involves valuable targets, persistence, strength, and robustness (positive trait)

vice

either the mirror image (opposite) of virtue or a motivational failure (negative trait)

vice and cultural ignorance

individuals can be morally blameworthy for harmful actions driven by the dominant biases of their society if their lack of awareness stems from underlying moral or epistemic vices

moral-epistemic vices

A vice that affects how someone forms or maintains moral knowledge or beliefs.

moral-epistemic vices: arrogance

A motivation toward self-aggrandizement, such as seeing oneself as infallible (placing their own group, perspective, or status above others, making them closed off to other perspectives)

moral-epistemic vices: laziness

A motivation toward comfort that can contribute to cognitive biases and conformity (failure examine their moral environment / question comfortable cultural norms because doing so requires effort)

the hot hand fallacy

The belief that a player who has made several shots in a row is more likely to make the next shot because they are “hot.” —> people can mistake random streaks for meaningful patterns

the clustering illusion

The tendency to see clusters or streaks in random data and assume they are meaningful. Random sequences often do not look random, so people expect more alternation than actually occurs (player has a better chance of making a shot they just made, and worse chance if they had just missed shot)

the regression fallcy

a logical error where people assume a special cause is behind a normal statistical shift back to the average; sports illustrated jinx (when performance drops, people look for a special cause, jinx, curse)

the hidden or absent data problem

Drawing conclusions from the information available while failing to consider information that is missing or unavailable. EX: Looking only at students within a restricted range of SAT scores can hide the relationship that appears when students with a wider range of scores are included.

law of large numbers

over a large number of observations, results tend to approach the expected proportion. There is no “law of small numbers,” so short sequences do not have to resemble the expected long-run pattern.

confirmation bias

The tendency to interpret or seek information in ways that support an existing belief.

self-fulfilling prophecy

When an expectation causes someone to act in a way that changes the situation and helps produce the expected outcome.

ad hoc explanations

Explanations created after an outcome to make an unexpected or random result seem meaningful.

optional stopping

Stopping the collection or examination of information once a desired or confirming result appears. This is a problem with ambiguous data because the stopping point can make a chance result appear meaningful.

the representative heuristic

Judging something based on how much it resembles a category, outcome, or prototype. Representativeness is often useful, but its overapplication can cause people to see meaningful patterns in random events.

one-sided events

Only one outcome is especially noticeable or significant.

different asymmetries of one-sided events

One-sided events can create asymmetries in what people remember because the outcomes do not have equal psychological significance.

two-sided events

Both possible outcomes stand out and register as events.

multiple endpoints

Situations where an expectation can be confirmed by multiple possible outcomes. The more possible outcomes that count as confirmation, the easier it is to find apparent support for an expectation.

multi-faceted observations

Observations containing multiple features that can be interpreted in different ways.

endowment effect

The tendency to value something more simply because one already possesses it.

false consensus effect

the tendency for one's own beliefs, values, and habits to bias estimates of how widely those views and habits are shared by others.

lake wobegon effect

The tendency to see oneself as better than average in desirable qualities.

self-serving beliefs

beliefs that favor or protect one’s own interests or self-esteem

self-serving belief mechanisms

supported by both motivational and cognitive mechanisms, including selective attention to information and the desire to maintain self-esteem

sharpening

emphasizing or making certain details more prominent

leveling

leaving out, reducing, or simplifying other details

sharpening and leveling

describes how information becomes distorted as it is communicated from person to person, secondhand information

distortions for the sake of entertainment

People may change details to make a story more interesting

distortions for the sake of being informative

people may leave out qualifications or stretch facts to make a message clearer or more compelling.

distortions for the sake of self-serving reasons or plausibility

information may also be distorted to serve a person's interests or because a version of the story seems more plausible.

evaluating secondhand information

consider the source

trust facts, distrust projections

look out for sharpening and leveling

be wary of testimonials

exaggerated immediacy

Making an event seem more immediate or personally relevant than it really is.

5 mental habits

Recognize conclusions formed from incomplete or unrepresentative data.

consider the opposite

skeptical of secondhand accounts.

Be wary of the false consensus effect (beliefs aren't as widespread as we think)

Be wary of imputing order on random data.

deterministic sciences

Focus on outcomes that follow from specified conditions.

probablistic sciences

Study patterns and probabilities rather than outcomes that can be predicted with certainty.

Value of studying deterministic and probabilistic sciences

studying areas such as psychology and economics is valuable because they help us understand human judgment and the ways people develop and maintain false beliefs.

de dicto awareness

awareness of a label or a rule; you know that an action is wrong or against the rules

de re awareness

awareness of the real world facts or actual thing itself; you know that your action will hurt another person, regardless of whether you are thinking about if it is wrong

causa sui

self-caused

Mason and Wilson: vice and cultural ignorance evidence

Cognitive impairment: NOT BLAMEWORTHY; Ignorance may result from cognitive limitations.

Bizarre circumstances: NOT BLAMEWORTHY; Unusual circumstances may explain the ignorance.

Clear-eyed akrasia: BLAMEWORTHY; A person may know what is right but fail to act accordingly.

Ignorant through vice: BLAMEWORTHY; The person's ignorance is caused or sustained by a vice, making the ignorance potentially culpable.