Nuclear Weapons Definitions

Fission

The splitting of an atom

-          A neutron is fired into an unstable radio isotope which then breaks up

Radio isotope

unstable isotope

Isotope

variations of elements with different number of neutrons

Element #(bottom)

number of protons

Mass #(top number)

protos + neutrons

Critical mass

the minimum amount of radioactive material needed to sustain a chain reaction

Depends on several factors (type of fuel, temperature, shape, density, tamper)

Supercritical mass

amount of radioactive material needed to for fission to increase once the process has started

Atomic bomb(A bomb)

only nuclear fission

Theromo nucler or H bomb

fission and fusion

Fusion

The merging of 2 atoms(usually hydrogen)

-          Needs high temperatures and heat given from fission

Enrichment

: procedure for separating U-238 from the rarer U 235 and increasing the concentration of fissile material

• Involves sublimation (turning U into gas) and spinning it in centrifuges

• Threshold for crossing into “Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)” or “weapons-grade” Uranium is 20% share of U-235

-          Nuclear Energy is around 3-5 % enrichment

• Pu-239 is also manufactured from U-235 via U-238

Effects of Nuclear bombs:

1.      Direct radiation

2. Heat

3. Blast

 4. Fallout

Direct radiation

- die of radiation poisoning within the next month

Heat

- flash can cause blindness

- fireball instantly vaporizes everything to plasma

Fallout

mushroom cloud

-debri can cover miles

Nuclear Winter

• firestorms produced by nuclear exchange produces smoke and soot

• soot rises up and shields the Earth from sunlight

• surface temperature drops

 • ocean temperature drops (delayed)

• degradation of crop yield, agriculture in general, fisheries etc.

• resulting in global famine

• ozone layer destroyed

Differentiating Nuclear Weapons

1.Yield 2.Range 3.Purpose 4.Means of delivery

Short range

up to 1000 km

Medium range

between 1,000 & 3500 km

Intermediate range

between 3500 & 5000 km

Intercontinental

more then 5,500 km

Delivery Systems Air:

Strategic aircraft (“bombers”)

Advantages • relatively cheap (in comparison) • flexible targeting • can be recalled

Disadvantages • vulnerable to preemptive attack • subject to air defenses • needs to get close to target for gravity bombs

Ballistic missiles

: powered by a rocket or several in stages

Ballistic(hyperbola) trajectory

Hypersonic speed for most of flight

Cruise Missiles

unmanned missiles propelled by jet engines

Remain in atmosphere during flight

Self or manually guided

US silos

around 450 silos in the great plains, most on native land

Land/Ground Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

more reliable than bombers • overwhelming attack/response Disadvantages • cannot be recalled once launched • subject to preemptive attacks (although less likely because massive force might be needed)

Sea Leg

• also includes launches from surface ship • “sea leg” usually describes possession of SSBNs (Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear) • survivable to attack • can carry large amount of warheads Disadvantages • extremely expensive and difficult to develop

Triad

nuclear forces that combine all three legs

Dyad

nuclear force structure that only combines two legs

Advantages of combining several nuclear delivery platforms:

• flexibility in how to threaten the use of nuclear force

• ensuring that one or more legs of the nuclear force survives a preemptive attack

Coercion

influencing and adversary’s incentives so they behave in a certain way

Compellance

making an adversary do something

Detterance

making an adversary not do something

• concept much older than nuclear era

• in the simplest form: preventing someone from doing something (to you)

• criminal justice: preventing from crimes being committed • military context: preventing an enemy attack you

• making it exceedingly costly for an adversary to attack

Nuclear Deterrence

is a nuclear strategy intended to prevent an adversary from attacking by threatening (overwhelming) retaliation in advance

For Deterrence to Work , the Threat Must Be

Be 1. severe: the cost of attack must be unacceptable

2. credible a. must have the capability to retaliate b. potential attacker must believe that retaliation will take place

First strike

• pre-emptive

• often surprise attack

• overwhelming force

 Secure second strike

• meant to deter an adversary’s first strike

• response to nuclear attack with overwhelming force

• large and diversified arsenal needed

Survivability:

ability for (part of) the nuclear force to remain functional even after a nuclear attack

• enough survivable forces strengthens credibility of the deterrent

Mutual(ly) Assured Destruction (MAD)

• military strategy based on the idea that a full-scale use of one nuclear power on another would be met with such an overwhelming retaliatory response that both the attacker and defender would be annihilated

Extended Detterance

deters attacks not only on oneself but also one’s allies

• security guarantee: pledge to help allies under attack

• pledge from nuclear state to non-nuclear state(s) is called “nuclear shield” or “nuclear umbrella”

Limitations of Extended Detterance

credible threats are costly

• proliferation incentives

• other states might want their own deterrent (horizontal proliferation)

• arms race dynamics (vertical proliferation)

• assumes rational leaders

• relies on perception

• deterrence goes both ways

Nuclear Posture

showing off your power to someone else

 In short, a state’s nuclear posture combines the • capabilities and delivery systems, • plans on how to use those capabilities (doctrine), and its • command-and-control procedures, that a state uses to operate and manage its nuclear forces to implement a credible deterrent.

Nuclear Doctrine

our own rules of how to use nuclear weapons

 “Fundamental principles forces guide by which the military their actions in support of objectives . It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”--NATO (2020), Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 Consequently, nuclear doctrine is the set of principles that guides how a state’s nuclear forces supports its objectives

Nuclear Declaratory Policy

• …is a statement (or statements) about the the role of nuclear weapons for a state’s security policy.

• …signals to adversaries when and under which circumstances nuclear weapons might be used.

• …is non-binding and depends on perceptions

Declaratory Policy: Security Assurances: Positive

pledge to protect allies (and partners) from attacks (extended deterrence)

Declaratory Policy: Security Assurances: Negative

no use against non-nuclear states that are party to, or in compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Declaratory Policy: No First Use

• commitment to not use nuclear weapons in a first strike

• a type of negative assurance

• currently made by China & India • (purported) benefits:

• improves crisis stability

• decreases hostility

• aids arms control goals

• downsides: • makes extended deterrence less credible

Declaratory Policy: Sole Purpose

• defining the role of nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attacks

• i.e. nuclear forces would not be used to deter attacks with conventional, chemical, biological weapons or cyber attacks

• often conflated with No First Use policy but is perhaps more of a doctrine

Counterforce

• targets adversaries’ military structures

• provides damage limitation

• considered more moral

• requires large and diverse force, weapons with lower yield

Countervalue

• targets population centers

• more in line with arms control goals but at the expense of targeting civilians

• can rely on a smaller, less diverse arsenal, less precise and high yield

Massive Retaliation (1945 through early 1960s)

• first official US doctrine

• threat of overwhelming retaliation to any military attack on the US

• problem: only credible when responding to a massive attack (Brodie 1959)

Flexible Response (early to late 1960s)

• massive retaliation not realistic response to smaller escalations

• wider range of options beyond all-out retaliation, including conventional and military

• viewed as more credible

• problem: issues with extended deterrence

• counterforce at first (“No Cities” speech), quick u-turn back to countervalue

Brinkmanship: Schelling (1966)

• the (foreign policy) practice of pushing crises to the brink to gain coercive leverage

• when a state knowingly challenges a commitment of another state, in the hope of compelling the adversary to back away

• exploiting the existence of uncertainty by taking steps that increase the risk of war

The Madman Theory

• belief that being perceived as “mad” can help leaders to gain coercive leverage • “madness:” acting irrational, deviating from “normal” payoffs in a way that makes the use of force more likely (McManus 2021) • perceived madness introduces uncertainty and unpredictability, thus making threats more credible

The Nuclear Taboo

is the “normative inhibition” against the (first) use of nuclear weapons, reflected in • public opinion (decreased legitimacy of nuclear threats and nuclear use over time) • international agreements and regimes • effectively a de facto prohibition: not the behavior as such but the normative belief about in/appropriate behavior

Tabboo vs norm

stronger and more developed than just a norm

• absoluteness

• taken-for-grantedness

• “unthinkingness”

Problem with tabboo idea

non-use is a “non-event” àhard to assess whether something did not happen due to a certain cause, or because it would not have happened anyway

alternative explanations: rational deterrence

self-interest (fear of nuclear retaliation)

alternative explanations: non-deterrence materialist reasons

fear of long-term consequences, shortage of weapons or delivery systems, lack of readiness etc.

vs “taboo talk

explicit references to the (perceived) taboo

logic of appropriateness it is morally wrong to do so

Main elements for nuclear weapons

Uranium 235, Plutonium 239