Social Psychology Exam 2

What might you have to say about the stability of self (using evidence from the Ram

Esparza article and the Spiegel podcast)?

The self is both stable and changeable. It is stable in relative standing but shifts in level depending on situational cues. Ramírez-Esparza et al. (2006) showed that Spanish–English bilinguals were more extraverted, agreeable and conscientious when they took the same Big Five test in English than in Spanish, which matches US vs. Mexican cultural norms (cultural frame switching). Yet scores in the two languages correlated about .80, so people kept their rank order. The Invisibilia podcast goes further: Mischel found people aren't consistent across situations, Lee Ross argues our apparent consistency comes from living in consistent situations, and Dan's change in prison shows that even serious traits like aggression can be reshaped. So the "stable self" is partly an illusion supported by stable situations.

Understand the principle of associative learning and the principle of spreading

activation and how they relate to schemas generally and self-schemas particularly

Associative learning: The strength of the link between two ideas is proportional to how often they've been brought to mind together. Spreading activation: When one idea is activated, the activation spreads to linked ideas in proportion to the strength of the link. Repeated pairings build a network of strongly linked ideas, and that network is a schema. A self-schema is the same network with "me" at the center, so activating the self automatically activates self-schematic traits. Ramírez-Esparza et al. show this: language acts as a cue that spreads activation through a culture-specific network, so bilinguals' self-descriptions shift.

What are self-schemas? Using research presented in lecture, explain the functions of self-schemas. What are some of the pros and cons of self-schemas?

Self-schemas are "cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information" (Markus, 1977). They hold specific facts ("I live in L.A.") and generalizations ("I am creative"). Functions: (1) they are activated whenever the self is, (2) they guide behavior, and (3) they make self-relevant beliefs resistant to persuasion. Markus (1977) showed that independent schematics made faster "me" judgments for independence words, so their minds were structured differently. Pros: efficiency and pattern completion. Cons: assimilation (seeing ambiguous information through the schema) and limiting possible selves (Fryberg et al., 2008). Kaplan et al. (2016) show the resistance function in the brain: identity-linked beliefs barely changed and activated self-related brain networks.

How do introspection, self-perception theory, and social comparison theory relate to self-knowledge?

They are three ways we learn about ourselves. Introspection means looking inward at our thoughts and feelings, but it's often inaccurate. Self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) says that when internal cues are weak, we infer our attitudes by watching our own behavior, like an outside observer would. Social comparison theory (Festinger,1954) says that without objective standards, we judge our abilities and opinions by comparing ourselves to others, usually similar others. Hofling et al. (1966) show the limits of introspection: nurses confidently said they'd refuse a dangerous order (10/12 and 21/21), but 21 of 22 real nurses obeyed.

Why do people with high self-esteem feel better after failure than people with low self-esteem? Why might self-esteem not always be a good thing? Provide evidence.

Self-esteem is our overall positive or negative evaluation of ourselves, both as a trait and as a state. After failure (Brown & Dutton, 1995), LSE people's feelings about themselves drop more than HSE people's. HSE people have different automatic cognitive responses to threat. Positive thoughts become more accessible after a bad mood (Smith & Petty, 1995). They persist longer after rejection primes (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002). They seek mood-repairing experiences like volunteering after failure (Brown & Smart, 1991). But HSE isn't always good: there's more ego to protect, and under ego threat HSE people become more antagonistic (rude, arrogant, unfriendly; Heatherton & Vohs, 2000)

Be able to discuss the various ways we enhance the self (e.g., downward social

comparison, self-serving attributions). Understand the concept of basking in reflected glory and when we do and do not engage in it.

We're motivated to maintain or enhance positive self-evaluations (Tesser's Self-Evaluation Maintenance theory). Strategies: downward social comparison and choosing our comparison standard; self-serving attributions (success is mine, failure is the situation's); self-serving construals (better-than-average effect, false uniqueness for our strengths, false consensus for our flaws); seeking self-enhancing feedback; and basking in reflected glory (BIRGing), associating ourselves with successful others, as when fans say "we won" (Cialdini, 1976). We BIRG when the other person's success is in a domain that is not self-relevant. When a close other outperforms us in a self-relevant domain, we compare instead, feel threatened, and may even sabotage them (Tesser & Cornell, 1988). Ramírez-Esparza et al. note that self-enhancement is stronger in individualistic cultures.

Compare and contrast self-enhancement motives with self-verificationUnderstand the affective and informational consequences of these motives.

Self-enhancement is the motive to feel good about ourselves, so we seek positive feedback (affective goal). Self-verification (Swann, 1990) is the motive to be seen accurately, as we see ourselves, even when that view is negative (informational goal: predictability and coherence). Swann, Pelham & Krull (1998): if forced to choose, people want feedback on their best quality (enhancement), but if they get feedback on both, they want positive feedback on their best quality and negative feedback on their worst (verification). Swann et al. (1987): LSE people rated unfavorable feedback as more accurate (informational verification), but it still made them feel worse (affective cost). So verification drives what we believe, while enhancement drives how we feel

Compare and contrast the different models of attitude formation and change (expectancy-value, learning theory, consistency theories, self-perception theory).

An attitude is an enduring response disposition with affective, cognitive and behavioral components. Expectancy-value (Fishbein) treats us as rational calculators: attitude = value × expectancy. Learning theory says attitudes are acquired through classical conditioning (associations), operant conditioning (reinforcement and punishment), and observation (Bandura's Bobo doll). Consistency theories (balance theory, cognitive dissonance) say we change attitudes to remove inconsistency, which is uncomfortable. Self-perception theory (Bem) says we infer attitudes from our behavior, with no discomfort needed. They differ on how rational and conscious we are and on what drives change (calculation, experience, discomfort, or observation). Kaplan et al.(2016) challenge the rational model: strong, credible-seeming evidence barely changed identity-linked beliefs

Compare and contrast balance theory and cognitive dissonance theory. Be able to refer to both the lecture and the Aronson article.

Both are consistency theories: inconsistency is uncomfortable, and we change attitudes to restore consistency. Balance theory (Heider, 1958) is about consistency within social relationships. In a person–other–object triad, the relationship is balanced if the signs multiply to positive (e.g., I like you, you like jazz, I like jazz). Imbalance is resolved by changing whichever link takes the least effort. Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is about inconsistency between one's own attitudes and behaviors (or between attitudes). It produces arousal that we're motivated to reduce by changing behavior, changing attitudes, or rationalizing. It is not about relationships. Aronson's refinement: dissonance is strongest when behavior threatens our self-concept as a good, competent, consistent person. Kaplan's identity-linked beliefs and Mack's father are examples.

Understand the study and the findings of Festinger and Carlsmith. How does this study demonstrate cognitive dissonance and the insufficient justification effect?

Participants did a very boring task (turning pegs, sorting spools) and were then paid $1 or $20 to tell the next "participant" (a confederate) that it was fun. Control participants didn't lie. Afterward, $1 participants rated the task as more enjoyable (≈ +1.35 on a −5 to +5 scale) than $20 participants (≈ −0.05) or controls (≈ −0.45). The $20 group had sufficient external justification for lying ("I did it for the money"), so they felt no dissonance. The $1 group had insufficient justification: $1 couldn't explain why they lied, so the clash between "the task was boring" and "I said it was fun" created dissonance. They reduced it by changing their attitude: "maybe it wasn't so bad." The smaller the reward, the bigger the attitude change.

How do the source, the message, the audience, and the situation affect persuasion? Be able to give examples for each.

Persuasion is the process by which outside forces change attitudes. Source: who says it matters (credibility, attractiveness, certainty). Lorge & Curtiss (1936) found that the same quote about rebellion was judged differently when attributed to Jefferson vs. Lenin. Message: discrepancy (very discrepant messages are harder to accept), repetition and mere exposure (work up to a point), quality, vividness and fear. Audience: involvement, personality and need for cognition, mood, age. Situation: forewarning and attitude inoculation increase resistance, and distraction lowers it. In Kaplan et al. (2016), perceived credibility predicted belief change, and audience involvement (identity-linked beliefs) predicted resistance

Understand the article by Kaplan et al. What does it suggest about attitude change? How does the Mack podcast confirm or disconfirm what the article demonstrates?

Kaplan et al. (2016) scanned 40 strong liberals while they read 5 counterarguments to political and non-political beliefs they held equally strongly. Political beliefs barely changed (≈0.31 points vs.≈1.28 for non-political). Political challenges activated the default mode network (self-representation, inward focus). Resistance was linked to the DMPFC (emotion regulation), lower OFC activity (flexibility), and, for the most resistant people, more amygdala and insula activity (threat and emotion). Takeaway: beliefs tied to identity resist change because challenges feel like threats to the self, and emotion drives the resistance. Mack's podcast mostly confirms this: his father saw all 10 predictions fail and changed nothing but the "timeline," a reinterpretation that protected his identity. It extends Kaplan in three ways. It involves a conservative and religious person, which addresses Kaplan's liberal-only limitation. The evidence was real outcomes, not exaggerated arguments. And it shows a relationship can change even when beliefs don't. The father's small concession mirrors Kaplan's small but non-zero political change.

Distinguish comformity, compliance, and obedience

Conformity is changing beliefs or behavior to match group standards, with no direct request (Asch, Sherif). Compliance is doing what someone asks even though we may not want to, usually a peer or salesperson (foot-in-the-door; Bohns's strangers saying yes). Obedience is doing what we're asked because the person is an authority, closer to an order than a request (Milgram; Hofling's nurses obeying "Dr. Smith"). The difference is whether there's a request, and who makes it

Compare and contrast the Sherif autokinetic effect study and the Asch line experiment. What do these studies tell us about informational and normative influence?

Both studies show people conforming to a group's judgments. Sherif (1936) used the autokinetic effect: a still point of light in a dark room appears to move. The task was ambiguous. Alone, people gave varied estimates. In groups, their estimates converged on a group norm (anchoring and adjustment), and they kept that norm later when alone. That shows informational influence: the desire to be right, leading to private acceptance. Asch (1955) used an unambiguous line-length task with confederates who gave obviously wrong answers. About 75% conformed at least once, and wrong answers were given 35% of the time. That shows normative influence: the desire to be liked, which usually changes public behavior but not private belief. Informational influence is strongest when the situation is ambiguous. Normative influence works even when the answer is clear.

Understand and be able to provide examples of the different compliance techniques

(foot in the door, door in the face, that's not all, pique, low ball)

Foot-in-the-door: small request, then a bigger one (Freedman & Fraser, 1966: 17% → 55% agreed to post a "Drive Carefully" sign after first signing a petition). Door-in-the-face: a huge request that gets refused, then the smaller real request (Cialdini et al., 1975: 50% vs. 17%). Low-ball: get agreement, then reveal the hidden cost (Cialdini et al., 1978: a 7 a.m. study, 55% vs. 25%). That's-not-all: make an offer and add a bonus before the person answers ("But wait, there's more!"). Pique: an unusual request that breaks the mindless "no" script (Santos et al., 1994: 37% gave for "37 cents" vs. 23% for "a quarter").

Are people good at understanding whether they would conform

/comply/obey or not in a given situation? Use evidence from lecture and from the Hofling et al. article to support your claim.

No. People consistently overestimate their ability to resist and underestimate the power of the situation. In Hofling et al. (1966), 21 of 22 real nurses prepared a dangerous 20 mg dose of an unknown drug on a phone order from an unknown doctor. Yet 10 of 12 graduate nurses and 21 of 21 nursing students said they would refuse, and even the researchers failed to predict the result. Hofling called the nurses' self-view an "illusion. " In lecture, Farley et al. (2019) found 85% of students handed their phones to a stranger, but only 22% predicted they would, and people thought peers would comply more than themselves (41% vs. 16.5%). Experts predicted almost no one would go all the way in Milgram's study, yet 65% did. We rely on our self-image (introspection) and ignore situational forces

What does the podcast The Influence You Have suggest about our role in getting people to do what we want them to do?

Vanessa Bohns's research suggests we have far more influence than we think. When people ask strangers for favors (filling out a survey, borrowing a phone, even writing "pickle" in a library book), they predict about half as many yeses as they actually get. We underestimate our influence because we focus on the other person's freedom to say no, while the person being asked feels the social awkwardness and cost of refusing. Implications: (1) we should ask for help more, because people say yes and like helping. (2) We carry more responsibility than we realize, because our requests create pressure, especially when we have power (bosses, doctors, professors). This connects to consent and harassment and to Hofling: the person giving the order often doesn't realize how hard it is to refuse

Compare and contrast social facilitation and social inhibition and explain how task

dependency relates to each.

Both describe how the presence of others affects individual performance. Social facilitation means performing better when others are present. Triplett (1898) found kids wound fishing line faster alongside other kids. Social inhibition means performing worse when others are present. Which one happens depends on the task (Zajonc,1965, task dependency). Others' presence increases arousal, which strengthens the dominant response. On easy or well-learned tasks, the dominant response is correct, so performance improves. On complex or poorly earned tasks, the dominant response is wrong, so performance suffers. Michaels et al. (1982): with an audience, good pool players improved from 71% to 80% of shots, and poor players dropped from 36% to 25%

Understand the 3 reasons why the presence of an audience affects performance (

mere presence/arousal, evaluation apprehension, and distraction-conflict)

(1) Mere presence/arousal (Zajonc, 1965): others' mere presence is innately arousing, and arousal strengthens dominant responses. (2) Evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, 1968): it's not presence itself but concern about being judged. Cottrell found no facilitation with a blindfolded audience. Markus (1978) supported mere presence: even an inattentive person in the room sped up dressing in familiar clothes and slowed it in unfamiliar clothes. (3) Distraction-conflict (Baron et al., 1978): an audience pulls attention between the task and the people, and that attentional conflict creates arousal. It helps simple tasks (you try harder) and hurts complex ones (you llose focus)

Why does social loafing occur and w hat could you do to reduce loafing? Use lecture and information from Aggarwal and O'Brien to complete your answer.

Social loafing is the tendency to put in less effort when working collectively than alone. Ringelmann found collective effort was less than the sum of individual efforts. Latané, Williams & Harkins (1979) found people clapped and cheered less per person as group size grew. Why: people feel they won't be evaluated individually (less evaluation apprehension), they feel their contribution doesn't matter, and they can hide behind anonymity. Fixes (lecture): individual accountability, smaller groups, complex or interesting tasks, rewarding the group product, increasing loyalty to the group. Aggarwal & O'Brien (2008), surveying 420 students: loafing increased with project scope (β = .14) and group size (β =.09) and decreased with the number of peer evaluations (β = −.19, the strongest factor). Self-selecting groups made no difference. Loafing sharply lowered satisfaction with teammates (β = −.81), which lowered perceived grade fairness (β = .45). Their recommendations: break big projects into smaller pieces, keep groups small, and use multiple peer evaluations during the project.

When does social compensation, as opposed to loafing, occur?

Social compensation is working harder in a group to make up for other members. It happens when people (1) care about the group's performance (the outcome is important or personally meaningful) and (2) believe coworkers are untrustworthy or incapable of doing their share. Aggarwal & O'Brien describe it directly: students who "put in extra work to compensate for" loafers' lack of performance, but then resent sharing the grade with them. So compensation rescues the product but hurts satisfaction and perceived fairness

Label and describe the antecedents, internal states, and behavioral effects associated with deindividuation

Deindividuation is "a reduced sense of individual identity accompanied by diminished self-regulation that can come over people when they are in a large group" (Gilovich et al.). Antecedent conditions: anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, the energizing effect of others (arousal), and stimulus overload. Internal state: less self-observation and self-evaluation, less concern about others' evaluations, and weakened internal controls (less shame, guilt, fear, commitment). Behavioral effects: impulsivity, irrationality, emotionality, and antisocial behavior. The SIDE model (Reicher) revises this: deindividuation doesn't erase the self. It makes your group identity more prominent, so you follow the group's norms, whether they're prosocial or antisocial