NatRes Cram

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97 Terms

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Natural resource and environmental economics

The study of the supply, demand, and allocation of Earth’s natural resources.

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Primary objective of the field

Understand the role of natural resources in the economy so they can be managed more sustainably over time.

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Resource economics

The intertemporal allocation of renewable and non-renewable resources. Input side: how we pull raw materials out of nature over time.

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Environmental economics

Residual flows and waste management. Output side: what happens after we use resources.

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Resource vs. environmental economics

Input side (extraction) vs. output side (waste).

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Production economics

Creating goods and services (output) from scarce resources (inputs).

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Four distinguishing features of resource economists

Institutions are endogenous; externalities are ubiquitous; scarcity/time (rate of use of exhaustible resources); valuations.

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Institutions are “endogenous”

They are adaptive: part of what is analyzed, not fixed in the background.

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Why externalities are ubiquitous

Overlapping utility functions or attenuated (weakened) property rights.

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Institutions

The “rules of the game”: laws, social habits, and systems (property rights, courts, money) that control how people interact.

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Douglass North on institutions

They reduce uncertainty, transaction costs, and transformation costs.

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Transaction vs. transformation costs

Costs of lawyers, contracts, security vs. costs of actually making and selling the product.

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Allan Schmid on institutions

They sort out interdependencies and provide order and predictability, like a traffic cop.

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Externality

An unavoidable side effect when people compete for the same limited resource; analyzed with facts, not moral blame.

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Scarcity

When supply can’t meet demand at a given price, so value is always relative to other goods’ prices.

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Valuation

Measuring how much people value natural resources so policymakers can design laws reflecting human values.

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Self-extinction premise

A society can grow in a way that accidentally destroys the environment or resources it needs to survive.

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Malthus (1798, An Essay on the Principle of Population)

Population grows exponentially; food grows only linearly.

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Mayan civilization (Copán)

Over-reliance on maize, farming fragile land → deforestation and erosion → starvation, infant mortality, collapse of leadership.

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Easter Island

Forests overused for housing, canoes, moving statues → erosion → food scarcity → war and collapse.

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Lesson of the Mayan and Easter Island cases

Societies can plant the seeds of their own destruction by destroying the resources they depend on.

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Three future environmental challenges

Climate change; water accessibility; water stress.

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Moderate vs. severe water stress (UN)

Using more than 20% vs. more than 40% of accessible renewable freshwater.

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Water stress projection

By 2025, about two-thirds of the world’s population in moderate or severe water stress.

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Water stress cases

Aral Sea and Lake Chad.

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Four issues in meeting the challenges

Limit of single nation-states; difficulty of international cooperation; problem of unilateral policies; solution through markets and pricing.

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Limit of the nation-state

Problems like climate change cross borders; one country can’t fix them alone.

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Problem with international cooperation

Hard to enforce; countries have different goals and there is no “world police.”

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Problem with unilateral policies

Strict green laws at home (“solve thy own problem”) make local firms uncompetitive against foreign polluters.

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Market solution

Use the pricing mechanism (carbon taxes, water pricing) instead of only laws and bans.

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Two signals of higher prices

Now: an incentive to stop wasting. Tomorrow: rewards for cleaner, cheaper alternatives (solar, EVs).

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Market incentives caveat

Profit goals don’t always match sustainability; high prices can encourage faster harvesting of rare resources.

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Positive loops (vicious cycles)

Chain reactions that worsen a trend (food shortage → hoarding, eating seed crops → collapse).

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Negative loops (balancing cycles)

Chain reactions that correct a problem (high prices → less use → balance).

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Role of economics

ools for understanding and modifying human behavior, especially under scarcity.

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Economy-environment flow diagram

Nature supplies inputs to production and consumption; both produce waste; some is recycled, some treated, the rest returns to nature.

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Net waste

Waste beyond the environment’s absorptive capacity, which degrades the environment.

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Main idea of the flow diagram

Economic activity always returns something to nature, and nature’s absorptive capacity is limited.

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Bromley’s (2008) four trends in the field’s emergence

Resource and environmental economics merged; nature built into models; welfare economics and benefit-cost analysis developed; ecological economics emerged in parallel.

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Ecological economics

A parallel field placing more emphasis on ecological limits.

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Family tree of the field

Land economics → (1) conservation and management of natural resources (water, fisheries, non-renewables) and (2) public finance.

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Public finance

Government’s role through taxes, spending, and regulation.

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Four reasons to study natural resource economics separately

Many policy issues involve resources; resources have special features (depletable, renewable, shared); externalities are everywhere; focus on dynamics.

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Property right

A bundle of powers (use, exclude, sell); a land deed is the standard example.

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Private vs. common property

Owned by one person or firm vs. shared by a defined group.

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Exclusivity

The owner keeps others out and bears the benefits and costs. Without it, incentives to conserve are weak.

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Open access

No one owns or controls the resource (some fisheries), leading to the “tragedy of the commons.”

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Ownership and regulation

When rights are unclear, government may step in.

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Welfare economics

Studies how much well-being people have and how it is distributed.

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Social welfare function

Weights and adds up each person’s utility to compare outcomes for society.

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Pareto optimal allocation

No one can be made better off without making someone worse off.

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Social welfare as surplus

Consumer surplus + producer surplus.

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Consumer vs. producer surplus

Buyers’ gain beyond price paid vs. sellers’ gain beyond costs.

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Where total surplus is largest

At competitive equilibrium (P*, Q*); any other point is a loss to society.

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Intertemporal decisions

Trade-offs between now and later (gold now or next year; fish now or let stock grow).

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Interest rate

The price of time; the return from waiting.

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Compounding

FV = PV(1 + r)ᵗ.

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Discounting / present value

Converting future values to today: PV = FV / (1 + r)ᵗ. Lets you compare “extract now” vs. “extract later.”


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Three features of well-defined property rights

Exclusivity, transferability, enforceability. Together they give incentives for efficiency.

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Transferability

The right can be sold or traded voluntarily.

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Enforceability

The right is protected from seizure or encroachment.

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Steel firm and resort example

The firm’s pollution costs fall on the resort, breaking exclusivity: an externality.

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MCp vs. MCs

Private marginal cost (what the firm pays) vs. social marginal cost (MCp + pollution damage).

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Market vs. efficient outcome with pollution

Market produces at D = MCp (Qm, Pm); efficient at D = MCs (Q*, P*). Market overproduces (Qm > Q*) and underprices (Pm < P*).

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Main idea of externality graph

The market ignores part of the true cost.

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Bromley’s (1991) property regimes

State property; common property; common-pool resources; open access.

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State property

Owned and managed by government, in capitalist and socialist countries alike.

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Common property rules

Can be formal (law) or informal (tradition, custom).

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Open access (regime)

First come, first served; no one can legally restrict entry.

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“Common pool” refers to

The physical nature of the resource, not who owns it.

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Ostrom’s two attributes of common-pool resources

Exclusion is costly; use is subtractable.

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Why common-pool resources often become open access

Exclusion is expensive.

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Three reasons resources stay open access

By default (can’t be fenced, cross borders); by political choice; weak enforcement.

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Scarcity rent

Income from a resource above the minimum needed to bring it into use; exists because the resource is limited.

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Scarcity rent on the graph

Total surplus, TR − TC: the gap between total benefit and total cost curves.

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Efficient effort (E₁)

Where marginal benefit = marginal cost; rent is largest.

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Open-access effort (E₂)

Entry continues while average benefit > average cost; stops at AB = AC, where total benefits = total costs.

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Two results of open access at E₂

Overexploitation (effort > E₁); scarcity rent fully dissipated.

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Bison example

Illustrates unrestricted-access harvesting driving effort to E₂.

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Two properties of public goods

Non-excludability; non-rivalry (indivisibility of consumption).

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Public goods examples

Clean air, national defense.

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Why private markets underprovide public goods

Free riding: people under-report their value, firms can’t collect revenue. Justifies public provision, regulation, or subsidies.

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Monopoly inefficiency example

OPEC.

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Monopoly rule vs. competitive rule

Monopoly: MR = MC. Competition: D = MC.

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Deadweight loss

Surplus lost because the monopolist restricts output below the competitive level.

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Government failure

Government intervention can also fail. Example: rent seeking.

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Rent seeking

Interest groups spend resources lobbying for laws benefiting only them, lowering total surplus.

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MRS

Ratio of marginal welfare: MU_E / MU_T = T/E.

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Optimality condition

MRS = MRT (welfare curve tangent to PPF).

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Interpretation of the solution

Society’s willingness to trade timber for ecotourism equals what the land can technically deliver, giving maximum welfare.

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Thomas Malthus

Population grows exponentially, food linearly. Meaning: unchecked growth outruns resources, the basis of the self-extinction premise.

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Douglass North

Institutions reduce uncertainty, transaction costs, and transformation costs. Meaning: shared rules make exchange cheaper, safer, and faster.

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Allan Schmid

Institutions sort out interdependencies. Meaning: because choices overlap, rules bring order and predictability.


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Daniel Bromley (2008)

Four trends behind the field’s emergence. Meaning: the field formed by merging subfields, modeling nature, adding welfare tools, and alongside ecological economics.

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Daniel Bromley (1991)

Four property rights regimes. Meaning: who controls a resource (state, group, no one) shapes how it is used.

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Elinor Ostrom

Common-pool resources are costly to exclude and subtractable. Meaning: their physical nature, not ownership, makes them prone to overuse.

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Vilfredo Pareto (Pareto optimality)

No one can gain without someone losing. Meaning: a benchmark for efficient allocation, such as cars vs. clean air.