Ch. 11 - Wrongful Death

1. Chapter 11 addresses two distinct statutory tort mechanisms: _____________ and __________. [p. 719-720]

1. Chapter 11 addresses two distinct statutory tort mechanisms: wrongful death and survival. [p. 719-720]

2. Historically, at common law the victim's personal-injury claim was __________________, while the family had _______________ for its losses. [p. 719-720]

2. Historically, at common law the victim's personal-injury claim was extinguished by death, while the family had no separate claim for its losses. [p. 719-720]

3. Lord Campbell's Act was enacted in England in __________, helping reverse the common-law refusal of death recovery. [p. 719-720]

3. Lord Campbell's Act was enacted in England in 1846, helping reverse the common-law refusal of death recovery. [p. 719-720]

4. Most modern United States jurisdictions have both a ___________________ and a ______________. [p. 719-720]

4. Most modern United States jurisdictions have both a wrongful-death statute and a survival statute. [p. 719-720]

5. Wrongful death generally compensates designated survivors for harm they suffer _________________, rather than solely for the decedent's predeath injuries. [p. 719-720]

5. Wrongful death generally compensates designated survivors for harm they suffer because of the death, rather than solely for the decedent's predeath injuries. [p. 719-720]

6. A wrongful-death action generally requires death resulting from ______________ and a statutorily eligible claimant. [p. 719-720]

6. A wrongful-death action generally requires death resulting from tortious conduct and a statutorily eligible claimant. [p. 719-720]

7. The decedent's representative often sues for the benefit of ___________________, not automatically the estate as such. [p. 719-720]

7. The decedent's representative often sues for the benefit of statutory beneficiaries, not automatically the estate as such. [p. 719-720]

8. The __________ is the person who died; ____________ are survivors designated by the relevant statute. [p. 719-720, 724]

8. The decedent is the person who died; beneficiaries are survivors designated by the relevant statute. [p. 719-720, 724]

9. The person authorized to prosecute an estate-related case is often a ___________________, executor, or administrator. [p. 719-720, 724]

9. The person authorized to prosecute an estate-related case is often a personal representative, executor, or administrator. [p. 719-720, 724]

10. _____________ commonly means legally compensable financial loss, including lost support and valuable household services. [p. 719-720, 724]

10. Pecuniary loss commonly means legally compensable financial loss, including lost support and valuable household services. [p. 719-720, 724]

11. A __________________ statute measures losses sustained by the designated survivors. [p. 719-720, 724]

11. A loss-to-beneficiaries statute measures losses sustained by the designated survivors. [p. 719-720, 724]

12. A _____________ statute instead measures losses to the decedent's estate according to its governing measure of damages. [p. 719-720, 724]

12. A loss-to-estate statute instead measures losses to the decedent's estate according to its governing measure of damages. [p. 719-720, 724]

13. ________________________ addresses loss of relationship benefits such as companionship, care, and affection when recognized by law. [p. 719-720, 724]

13. Consortium or loss of society addresses loss of relationship benefits such as companionship, care, and affection when recognized by law. [p. 719-720, 724]

14. The historical ___________________ subordinated civil claims for acts also considered felonies and contributed to the old refusal of wrongful-death recovery. [p. 719-720, 724]

14. The historical felony-merger doctrine subordinated civil claims for acts also considered felonies and contributed to the old refusal of wrongful-death recovery. [p. 719-720, 724]

15. The statutory term ___________ may be interpreted as closest blood relation rather than a person emotionally close to the decedent. [p. 725-727]

15. The statutory term next of kin may be interpreted as closest blood relation rather than a person emotionally close to the decedent. [p. 725-727]

16. A __________ wrongful-death statute may condition beneficiary recovery on the rights the decedent had during life. [p. 725-727]

16. A derivative wrongful-death statute may condition beneficiary recovery on the rights the decedent had during life. [p. 725-727]

17. A wrongful-death statute creates a vehicle for recovery by qualifying __________ when wrongful conduct causes death. [p. 719-724, 736]

17. A wrongful-death statute creates a vehicle for recovery by qualifying survivors when wrongful conduct causes death. [p. 719-724, 736]

18. The action ordinarily depends on proving an underlying tort, including the applicable _______________________, causation, and death. [p. 719-724, 736]

18. The action ordinarily depends on proving an underlying tort, including the applicable duty or other liability rule, causation, and death. [p. 719-724, 736]

19. The right to recover and the persons entitled to it are controlled by the _________________________. [p. 719-724, 736]

19. The right to recover and the persons entitled to it are controlled by the applicable wrongful-death statute. [p. 719-724, 736]

20. Most wrongful-death laws identify priority classes, but their beneficiary rules ____________. [p. 719-724, 736]

20. Most wrongful-death laws identify priority classes, but their beneficiary rules vary by state. [p. 719-724, 736]

21. In ________________________, the Supreme Court recognized a general maritime wrongful-death cause of action and overruled The Harrisburg. [p. 719-724, 736]

21. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the Supreme Court recognized a general maritime wrongful-death cause of action and overruled The Harrisburg. [p. 719-724, 736]

22. The measure of wrongful-death damages is not universally compensatory: the chapter describes __________ as measuring wrongful-death damages by defendant culpability. [p. 719-724, 736]

22. The measure of wrongful-death damages is not universally compensatory: the chapter describes Alabama as measuring wrongful-death damages by defendant culpability. [p. 719-724, 736]

23. A claim under a wrongful-death statute may be brought alongside a _____________, but courts guard against duplicate awards. [p. 719-724, 736]

23. A claim under a wrongful-death statute may be brought alongside a survival claim, but courts guard against duplicate awards. [p. 719-724, 736]

24. Where one wrongful-death action encompasses several beneficiaries, the court may need to __________ damages among them. [p. 724, 729-730]

24. Where one wrongful-death action encompasses several beneficiaries, the court may need to allocate damages among them. [p. 724, 729-730]

25. Statutory enumeration matters because a court cannot simply add every individual with an important __________________ to the decedent. [p. 724, 729-730]

25. Statutory enumeration matters because a court cannot simply add every individual with an important personal relationship to the decedent. [p. 724, 729-730]

26. A wrongful-death claim requires the death of a _________________________. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

26. A wrongful-death claim requires the death of a human decedent or other person covered by the applicable statute. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

27. The death must result from an act or omission that qualifies as a _____________ under the relevant substantive law. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

27. The death must result from an act or omission that qualifies as a tortious wrong under the relevant substantive law. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

28. A claimant must fit within a designated statutory _______________, or the authorized representative must act for such beneficiaries. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

28. A claimant must fit within a designated statutory beneficiary class, or the authorized representative must act for such beneficiaries. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

29. The case must be commenced by the ___________ identified in the statute. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

29. The case must be commenced by the proper party identified in the statute. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

30. Statutory filing requirements, including the relevant _______________, must be satisfied. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

30. Statutory filing requirements, including the relevant limitation period, must be satisfied. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

31. The plaintiff must prove a legally cognizable ________________, subject to the jurisdiction's chosen damages model. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

31. The plaintiff must prove a legally cognizable measure of damages, subject to the jurisdiction's chosen damages model. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

32. The normal elements of the underlying tort must be shown because the death statute does not _________________________. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

32. The normal elements of the underlying tort must be shown because the death statute does not replace substantive tort liability rules. [p. 719-720, 723-725]

33. To identify qualified claimants, examine the decedent's __________, children, parents, and other groups named by the particular statute. [p. 726-735]

33. To identify qualified claimants, examine the decedent's spouse, children, parents, and other groups named by the particular statute. [p. 726-735]

34. A statutory beneficiary's priority can depend on whether a higher-priority class is _______________________. [p. 726-735]

34. A statutory beneficiary's priority can depend on whether a higher-priority class is living or otherwise eligible. [p. 726-735]

35. Financial dependence is required for some lower-priority beneficiaries in ___________, but not in every state. [p. 726-735]

35. Financial dependence is required for some lower-priority beneficiaries in some states, but not in every state. [p. 726-735]

36. For projected support, useful evidence includes income history, expected ________________, and mortality information. [p. 726-735]

36. For projected support, useful evidence includes income history, expected work-life duration, and mortality information. [p. 726-735]

37. Under a joint-life-expectancy approach, projected support is measured over the __________ of the decedent's or beneficiary's remaining lives. [p. 726-735]

37. Under a joint-life-expectancy approach, projected support is measured over the shorter of the decedent's or beneficiary's remaining lives. [p. 726-735]

38. To value relationship losses, a court may consider closeness, ________________, and shared activities, where the statute permits that loss. [p. 726-735]

38. To value relationship losses, a court may consider closeness, living arrangements, and shared activities, where the statute permits that loss. [p. 726-735]

39. The distinction between _____________ and grief is especially important where the statute excludes personal emotional anguish. [p. 726-735]

39. The distinction between pecuniary loss and grief is especially important where the statute excludes personal emotional anguish. [p. 726-735]

40. In Fontenot v. Taser, the parents' failure to support the claimed monetary value for the child's _______________ required a damages retrial under applicable law. [p. 733-735]

40. In Fontenot v. Taser, the parents' failure to support the claimed monetary value for the child's care and services required a damages retrial under applicable law. [p. 733-735]

41. The chapter contrasts expert projections of financial support with ____________ concerning family relationships. [p. 733-735]

41. The chapter contrasts expert projections of financial support with lay testimony concerning family relationships. [p. 733-735]

42. An unmarried partner is not necessarily a statutory __________; special domestic-partner rules may apply where enacted. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

42. An unmarried partner is not necessarily a statutory spouse; special domestic-partner rules may apply where enacted. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

43. Unadopted stepchildren are not automatically wrongful-death ____________; statutory amendments sometimes make exceptions. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

43. Unadopted stepchildren are not automatically wrongful-death beneficiaries; statutory amendments sometimes make exceptions. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

44. The fetal-death cases differ on whether a fetus must have been __________, born alive, or implanted. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

44. The fetal-death cases differ on whether a fetus must have been viable, born alive, or implanted. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

45. In ___________, the claim failed because there was no beneficiary qualifying under the governing Washington statutory tiers. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

45. In Tait v. Wahl, the claim failed because there was no beneficiary qualifying under the governing Washington statutory tiers. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

46. Some statutes cap ___________ wrongful-death damages, and the applicable limitations are jurisdiction-specific. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

46. Some statutes cap noneconomic wrongful-death damages, and the applicable limitations are jurisdiction-specific. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

47. Under a derivative wrongful-death approach, defenses available against the __________ may defeat the death claim. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

47. Under a derivative wrongful-death approach, defenses available against the decedent may defeat the death claim. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

48. Under the usual wrongful-death approach, wrongful conduct or comparative fault of a beneficiary can affect that ___________________. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

48. Under the usual wrongful-death approach, wrongful conduct or comparative fault of a beneficiary can affect that beneficiary's recovery. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

49. Many jurisdictions prevent an earlier judgment or release of the decedent's claim from resulting in a later _________________; the precise preclusion approach varies. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

49. Many jurisdictions prevent an earlier judgment or release of the decedent's claim from resulting in a later duplicative recovery; the precise preclusion approach varies. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

50. Tolling and accrual of wrongful-death limitation periods vary and may be dictated by the _____________. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

50. Tolling and accrual of wrongful-death limitation periods vary and may be dictated by the statutory text. [p. 725-730, 734-736, 743-746]

51. Goodby v. Vetpharm refused to enlarge Vermont's statutory wrongful-death remedy to cover a deceased __________. [p. 726-730, 734]

51. Goodby v. Vetpharm refused to enlarge Vermont's statutory wrongful-death remedy to cover a deceased pet. [p. 726-730, 734]

52. Buchert v. Newman declined to recognize the nun's religious community as ___________ despite its financial reliance on her. [p. 726-730, 734]

52. Buchert v. Newman declined to recognize the nun's religious community as next of kin despite its financial reliance on her. [p. 726-730, 734]

53. The death of a beneficiary after an action has accrued creates a question whether the recovery _________________________. [p. 726-730, 734]

53. The death of a beneficiary after an action has accrued creates a question whether the recovery survives to the beneficiary's estate. [p. 726-730, 734]

54. Start the wrongful-death analysis by identifying the _________________________. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

54. Start the wrongful-death analysis by identifying the governing jurisdiction and statute. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

55. Next ask whether the decedent's death resulted from a legally actionable ____________________. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

55. Next ask whether the decedent's death resulted from a legally actionable wrongful act or omission. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

56. Determine whether the person bringing suit is the authorized _________________________. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

56. Determine whether the person bringing suit is the authorized personal representative or beneficiary. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

57. For damages, classify the governing scheme as __________________, loss to estate, or another statutory measure. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

57. For damages, classify the governing scheme as loss to beneficiaries, loss to estate, or another statutory measure. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

58. Ask whether recovery includes only _____________ or also loss of society, grief, and punitive damages. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

58. Ask whether recovery includes only pecuniary loss or also loss of society, grief, and punitive damages. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

59. Finally check defenses, past settlements, statutory ___________, and possible overlap with a survival recovery. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

59. Finally check defenses, past settlements, statutory limitations, and possible overlap with a survival recovery. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

60. In Moragne, the Supreme Court asked whether the old _________________________ remained supportable. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

60. In Moragne, the Supreme Court asked whether the old maritime no-wrongful-death rule remained supportable. [p. 719-720, 725-735, 743-746]

61. Statutory eligibility often starts with a ______________ and children, depending on the statute's classes. [p. 724-736]

61. Statutory eligibility often starts with a surviving spouse and children, depending on the statute's classes. [p. 724-736]

62. A ___________________ can file on behalf of beneficiaries even though an estate and its creditors may not be ultimate recipients. [p. 724-736]

62. A personal representative can file on behalf of beneficiaries even though an estate and its creditors may not be ultimate recipients. [p. 724-736]

63. Some statutes allow qualifying _________________________ to recover if they completed necessary formalities. [p. 724-736]

63. Some statutes allow qualifying domestic partners or civil-union parties to recover if they completed necessary formalities. [p. 724-736]

64. A __________ may qualify in a jurisdiction that has expressly added financially dependent stepchildren. [p. 724-736]

64. A stepchild may qualify in a jurisdiction that has expressly added financially dependent stepchildren. [p. 724-736]

65. Jurisdictions split sharply over the wrongful death of _____________, including viability and implantation questions. [p. 724-736]

65. Jurisdictions split sharply over the wrongful death of unborn children, including viability and implantation questions. [p. 724-736]

66. A relative's right to recovery may require proof of _________________ when a statute imposes that condition. [p. 724-736]

66. A relative's right to recovery may require proof of financial dependency when a statute imposes that condition. [p. 724-736]

67. Courts may have to allocate a single wrongful-death recovery among several ____________. [p. 724-736]

67. Courts may have to allocate a single wrongful-death recovery among several beneficiaries. [p. 724-736]

68. Where permitted, parents' lost consortium from a child's death may be a legally compensable __________________. [p. 724-736]

68. Where permitted, parents' lost consortium from a child's death may be a legally compensable loss of companionship. [p. 724-736]

69. The South Carolina and Kentucky examples illustrate how beneficiary priority and distribution turn on _____________. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

69. The South Carolina and Kentucky examples illustrate how beneficiary priority and distribution turn on statutory text. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

70. Where courts recognize spousal loss of society, a later __________ generally does not automatically reduce the award under the majority view described. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

70. Where courts recognize spousal loss of society, a later remarriage generally does not automatically reduce the award under the majority view described. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

71. Children's economic loss from a deceased parent may encompass _________________________. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

71. Children's economic loss from a deceased parent may encompass education, training, guidance, and nurture. [p. 726-730, 733-736]

72. In _________________________, a longshoreman's widow pursued a fatal maritime-accident claim, and the Supreme Court recognized a general maritime wrongful-death remedy. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

72. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., a longshoreman's widow pursued a fatal maritime-accident claim, and the Supreme Court recognized a general maritime wrongful-death remedy. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

73. In _____________, the older Supreme Court ruling rejected nonstatutory maritime wrongful-death recovery, a position later overruled. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

73. In The Harrisburg, the older Supreme Court ruling rejected nonstatutory maritime wrongful-death recovery, a position later overruled. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

74. In _________________________, the Court addressed maritime wrongful-death recovery for dependents' support, services, society, and funeral costs. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

74. In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, the Court addressed maritime wrongful-death recovery for dependents' support, services, society, and funeral costs. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

75. In __________________, Nebraska expanded damages for a minor child's wrongful death to cover loss of society, comfort, and companionship. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

75. In Selders v. Armentrout, Nebraska expanded damages for a minor child's wrongful death to cover loss of society, comfort, and companionship. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

76. In ____________________, an adult daughter's omission from a wrongful-death case could support a claim against the widow, but not a new tort claim against the settled defendants. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

76. In Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg, an adult daughter's omission from a wrongful-death case could support a claim against the widow, but not a new tort claim against the settled defendants. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

77. In ________________, a jury's zero damages award was upheld where the children did not establish a probable future loss of companionship. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

77. In Knowles v. Corkill, a jury's zero damages award was upheld where the children did not establish a probable future loss of companionship. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

78. In ________________, the Alabama Supreme Court allowed a wrongful-death claim concerning an unborn child injured before viability. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

78. In Stinnett v. Kenney, the Alabama Supreme Court allowed a wrongful-death claim concerning an unborn child injured before viability. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

79. In _____________, the New Jersey court refused to treat a hypothetical lost estate-tax advantage as statutory pecuniary loss. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

79. In Beim v. Hulfish, the New Jersey court refused to treat a hypothetical lost estate-tax advantage as statutory pecuniary loss. [p. 720-724, 730-732, 733-736]

80. In _______________, the Supreme Court rejected a wrongful-death eligibility distinction against a child born out of wedlock. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

80. In Levy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court rejected a wrongful-death eligibility distinction against a child born out of wedlock. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

81. In _________________________, the Supreme Court rejected a wrongful-death eligibility distinction against a mother of a child born out of wedlock. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

81. In Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability, the Supreme Court rejected a wrongful-death eligibility distinction against a mother of a child born out of wedlock. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

82. In ___________________, Maryland applied a noneconomic wrongful-death damages cap per decedent rather than per beneficiary. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

82. In Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., Maryland applied a noneconomic wrongful-death damages cap per decedent rather than per beneficiary. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

83. In ________________________, Oklahoma read its general and minor-child death statutes together to allow punitive damages in the case discussed. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

83. In Roach v. Jimmy D. Enterprises, Oklahoma read its general and minor-child death statutes together to allow punitive damages in the case discussed. [p. 727-729, 734-736]

84. The doctrinal lesson of Moragne is that long-rejected common-law rules may yield when statutory policy strongly favors ______________________. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

84. The doctrinal lesson of Moragne is that long-rejected common-law rules may yield when statutory policy strongly favors recovery for wrongful death. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

85. Moragne does not hold that every state statute has identical ____________________. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

85. Moragne does not hold that every state statute has identical beneficiaries or damages. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

86. Selders rejects valuing a modern child's wrongful death solely by projected _________________________. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

86. Selders rejects valuing a modern child's wrongful death solely by projected economic contributions minus maintenance costs. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

87. The dissent in Selders emphasized judicial restraint and the risk of _________________________. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

87. The dissent in Selders emphasized judicial restraint and the risk of unbounded sentiment-based awards. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

88. Sea-Land v. Gaudet recognizes loss of support and services as distinct from certain ________________ in general maritime law as discussed in the reading. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

88. Sea-Land v. Gaudet recognizes loss of support and services as distinct from certain relationship losses in general maritime law as discussed in the reading. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

89. Ruttenberg illustrates how an omitted beneficiary can have a claim against the person who _________________________, even after the underlying settlement. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

89. Ruttenberg illustrates how an omitted beneficiary can have a claim against the person who wrongfully excluded that beneficiary, even after the underlying settlement. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

90. The cases on fetal death demonstrate the importance of construing the statutory definition of __________. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

90. The cases on fetal death demonstrate the importance of construing the statutory definition of person. [p. 721-724, 730-735]

91. Levy and Glona show that statutory beneficiary classifications are constrained by ______________ considerations. [p. 727-735]

91. Levy and Glona show that statutory beneficiary classifications are constrained by equal protection considerations. [p. 727-735]

92. Buchert distinguishes genuine financial dependence from the statutory definition of __________. [p. 727-735]

92. Buchert distinguishes genuine financial dependence from the statutory definition of kinship. [p. 727-735]

H01 | Two sources of recovery Facts: A truck driver negligently injures Maya, who remains conscious for four days before dying from the crash. Her husband relied on her household income. Issue: Identify each possible statutory cause of action and the interest each compensates.

Suggested analysis: The representative may bring a survival claim for Maya’s viable predeath losses (including proved conscious suffering and predeath costs) if the applicable statute permits. Her eligible beneficiaries may pursue wrongful death for death-caused losses such as support, subject to local rules. The same loss cannot be paid twice. Source concepts: textbook pp. 719-720, 738-741 | Original practice hypothetical

H02 | Unrelated death Facts: A faulty machine injures Louis. Three months later he dies from an unrelated illness, leaving an unrecovered medical bill and disability loss. Issue: Can Louis’s children automatically file wrongful death? What happens to his injury claim?

Suggested analysis: The machine did not cause his death, so an ordinary wrongful-death claim against the machine defendant fails on death causation. Louis’s still-viable personal-injury claim may survive through his estate under the jurisdiction’s survival act. Source concepts: textbook pp. 719, 740 | Original practice hypothetical

H03 | The excluded sibling Facts: A state statute grants wrongful-death claims first to a spouse or children, next to dependent parents, and names no siblings. The decedent leaves only a loving adult sister. Issue: Does a close relationship alone make the sister a beneficiary?

Suggested analysis: No. Eligibility is statutory. If the statute names no category covering the sister and has no catchall, close emotional bonds alone cannot create beneficiary status. Check whether another statutory category or separate surviving claim is available. Source concepts: textbook pp. 726-730 | Original practice hypothetical

H04 | Unmarried life partner Facts: A person dies leaving a long-term unmarried partner; the hypothetical statute lists only a spouse and children. Issue: Does a fifteen-year relationship establish spousal status?

Suggested analysis: No. The text requires a spouse. A long cohabitation does not automatically meet a statutory definition. Check whether the jurisdiction recognizes registered partnership or similar formally acquired status and whether the parties fulfilled the formalities. Source concepts: textbook pp. 726-727 | Original practice hypothetical

H05 | Competing beneficiaries Facts: A decedent leaves a spouse, two minor children, and an adult daughter from another marriage. The representative proposes distributing all settlement money to the spouse. Issue: What statutory and procedural issues arise?

Suggested analysis: Identify every person in the statutory beneficiary classes, then follow rules for filing, notice, settlement consent, and allocation. Some states permit a single collective suit and judicial allocation. Ruttenberg and Wilmot warn against excluding an eligible child. Source concepts: textbook pp. 729-730 | Original practice hypothetical

H06 | Viability versus implantation Facts: A clinic negligently loses an unimplanted embryo. Parents sue under a statute protecting the wrongful death of a “person.” Issue: Is the claim necessarily available?

Suggested analysis: No universal answer follows from the word “person.” The chapter contrasts jurisdictions requiring viability or implantation with broader readings, and notes Miller v. American Infertility Group and Alabama LePage. Identify the governing statute and relevant court interpretation, including any subsequent changes before treating it as current law. Source concepts: textbook pp. 727-728 | Original practice hypothetical

H07 | Minor child damages Facts: An eight-year-old child dies in an accident. The defendant claims the child would have earned nothing until adulthood and would have cost money to raise. Issue: Apply the key lesson of Selders.

Suggested analysis: In Selders, Nebraska rejected using projected earnings minus upbringing costs as the exclusive measure. The parents could claim loss of the child’s society, comfort, and companionship under that decision. Other states and statutory schemes may differ. Source concepts: textbook pp. 730-732 | Original practice hypothetical

H08 | Companionship versus grief Facts: A statute compensates loss of companionship but says nothing about grief. A widower seeks money for both loss of the decedent’s daily care and his own despair. Issue: Which claim components are distinct?

Suggested analysis: Loss of positive relationship benefits (companionship, services, society) is distinct from the beneficiary’s emotional anguish. Recover the former if allowed and proved; the latter requires statutory or decisional authority and cannot be assumed simply because companionship is compensable. Source concepts: textbook pp. 734-735 | Original practice hypothetical