lap readings exam 1

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71 Terms

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guevara main argument - socialism and the man in cuba

argues that the individual under socialism is more complete, more free, and has greater changes for self-expression than under capitalism; socialists are freer because they are more fulfilled, and more fulfilled because they are freer

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moncada attack (guevara)

castro led an attack on the moncada barracks which failed → survivors went to prison and resumed the struggle; early stage as only “the germ of socialism” = the individual as fundamental and success depended on a specific person

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operation of the guerrilla stage (guevara)

two settings: the people (had to be mobilized) and the vanguard (guerrillas who generated revolutionary consciousness)

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the mass under fidel (guevara)

mass is not a flock of sheep or sum of identical units; the mass follows fidel because he interpreted its desires and fought to keep his promises

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participation of the masses (guevara)

took part in the agrarian reform; bay of pigs; missile crisis; initiatives come from fidel or leadership

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invisible laws of capitalism (guevara)

under capitalism, individuals are controlled by a law they can’t see; the alienated human is tied to the law of value; capitalist propaganda paints Rockefeller as proof of opportunity but leaves out poverty that is required for such a fortune

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the individual and socialism (guevara)

the individual is an incomplete, unfinished product; two sides of the process include society educating directly and indirectly, and the individual undergoing self-education

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what is the key of the individual and socialism (guevara)

to build communism, you must build the new man and woman at the same time as the new material foundations

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new consciousness (guevara)

in cuba, direct representation matters more; masses absorb capitalism, and indirect education (masses influencing each other) is equally powerful

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vanguard and the mass (guevara)

individuals follow the vanguard in unity with the masses; the reward of the vanguard is the new society of “communist human beings”

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creation of the MAS (anria)

neoliberal reforms created a unifying and mobilizing force for peasants, indigenous communities, and cocaleros (closing of state mins, US war on drugs that unleashed repression and sought to eradicate coca farms), ruralization of politics with decentralization laws

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transition of MAS (anria)

spurred by expansion of water war and gas war protests into the cities that allowed the party to adopt protestor rhetoric/demands and mobilize urban support through incorporating civil society into the party through patronage that weakened their autonomy

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MAS as a hybrid party (anria)

movement party in its origin in rural areas and populist party after its expansion to urban areas and limiting the access of their original movements in decision-making while still being somewhat accountable through mobilization

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third wave of democratization (garay)

created the pressure to transform social protection systems with different levels of discretion and inclusiveness based on the role of outsiders in incumbent incentives for reelection (regime type, electoral institutions, nature of political opposition, balance of power in legislature)

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inclusive nondiscretionary policies (garay)

democracy facing resistance from outsider social movements with reelection potential

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restrictive nondiscretionary policies (garay)

democracy facing opposition by parties seeking to capture outsiders with reelection potential

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discretionary policies (garay)

authoritarian/semi-authoritarian regimes facing some opposition

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limited policies (garay)

no fear of losing power or incentive to fight for reelection

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main argument of samuels and zucco

an institutionalized, programmatic party can arise even in a noninstitutionalized party environment when top-down recruitment meets bottom-up mobilization so that partisan organization targets people who are already politically mobilized and already as unified as an in-group predisposed to support that party (PT in Brazil)

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positive partisanship (samuels and zucco)

a social identity with varying attachment intensity that develops from the partisan activation of individuals active in civil society as the in-group at the exclusion of others

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negative partisanship (samuels and zucco)

a response to the development of positive partisan identities within an in-group among those who do not fit that identifiable group and feel threatened by it (brand dilution of the PT under dilma)

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transitional justice (gonzalez-ocantos)

full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation

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experiences of transitional justice (gonzalez-ocantos)

argentina and chile - left deep legacies in norms and legal practices of transitional justice

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norms of transitional justice (gonzalez-ocantos)

recognition of right to truth and duty to investigate rights violations; showing the cracks of impunity regimes with truth commissions, loopholes

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legal changes due to transitional justice (gonzalez-ocantos)

precedent for military defendants in civilian court; standard of proof for assigning individual responsibility to command; standard of proof in an evidence-poor environment; selective prosecutorial strategy; what counts as a crime against humanity

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central question of o’donnell and schmitter

what determines whether a transition to democracy is successful

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main argument (o’donnell and schmitter)

there are hard and soft-liners within the regime, and moderates and radicals within opposition

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soft-liners (o’donnell and schmitter)

must work with the moderates for a transition to occur; accept that some electoral legitimation will be needed

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hard-liners (o’donnell and schmitter)

keep authoritarian rule, maybe behind a facade

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other facilitating factors (o’donnell and schmitter)

pacts with three moments: military, political (party leaders forego appeals to military intervention or mass mobilization in exchange for restricting outsiders and agenda), economic (bourgeoisie property rights will be protected, workers demands for compensation and social justice will be met)

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extent/responsibility of repression (o’donnell and schmitter)

the greater the repression/the more direct the blame, the less willing hard-liners will be to accept a transition

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main question of valenzuela

what led to the sept. 11 coup in chile?

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main argument (valenzuela)

chile was in an unstable equilibrium characterized by a highly polarized society that was only able to survive its majoritarian presidential system without massive resistance from the other side due to the role of third parties (no stable party but a place used to respond to incumbent)

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party system in chile (valenzuela)

neutral institutions (military, horizontal accountability institutions), highly professionalized bureaucracy tied to legislature, and bargaining tradition in the legislature that kept decision-making in moderate hands

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election of 1970 (valenzuela)

no center candidate ran, neutral institutions had been politicized, the extreme left felt like allende was compromising too much and took up arms which worried the military, and polarization reached such high levels that there was no trust between Christian Democrats and Allende which doomed their attempts at negotiation because of the commitment problem that allende could reverse policy course after getting the support

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old professionalism (stepan)

modern external threats required specialized military because they were too demanding for the military to have multiple tasks

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new professionalism (stepan)

the development of the belief that there is a fundamental connection between the military and political spheres which meant that the military should also contend with domestic political problems as they developed skills for internal security

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defining the military (stepan)

defined its primary mission in terms of internal security threats because the Cuban Revolution demonstrated that internal challenges are tied to external communist threat to sovereignty, so specialized in social and political conditions that facilitate the growth of revolution, specifically tied to development

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no single ideology…(stepan)

this theory is not tied to a specific pole; right-wing in brazil and left-wing in peru

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factors that contribute to new professionalism

size of the industrial sector = threat of left-wing mobilization; confidence of military to take over industrial production determined whether they needed alliance with economic elites; need for industrialization

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more factors of new professionalism (stepan)

private businessmen and US involvement in military colleges; immediate vs long-term threat of revolution

more confidence/better experience with politics - long lasting military regimes

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roberts (2013)

seeks to explain the variation in stability of party systems in latin america starting with kitschelt’s path dependency story but arguing that the transition from isi to neoliberalism was a critical juncture that shocked the paths of party system development based on the choice of which partisan actor enacted neoliberal reforms

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pathway of critical juncture (roberts 2013)

baseline: elite vs labor mobilizing party system; debt crisis → neoliberal push (critical juncture) → contested liberalism (led to alignment) OR neoliberal convergence (led to dealignment neutral)

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o’donnell (1994)

new type of democracy that has contestation and inclusion (dahl) but that does not have institutions that aggregate and represent the interests of discrete groups (institutionalized party systems)

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delegative democracy (o’donnell 1994)

characterized by: myth of legitimate delegation through majoritarianism → individualistic, no horizontal accountability; low chance of implementation since policies don’t have input from other parts of government

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autocratic governments (o’donnell 1994)

when they destroy pre-existing institutions, thus can’t bind the hands of an executive in the democratic period + when new democracies inherit economic crises that require immediate action, disincentivizing institutionalization that slows down government responses and encourages a view of politics where the president is entitled to govern how they see fit

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result of disincentivizing (o’donnell)

stay noninstitutionalized due to ratification of traditions of personalism, incentives of personalist executives, and lack of confidence in government (short time horizons)

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main argument (lupu)

party brands are formed based on the group prototype (shaped by political elites and party actions) and comparative fit (difference form other party prototypes), and voters make decisions based on party brands and on economic performance

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two factors for party system breakdown (lupu)

1) inconsistent behavior or convergence by parties that dilutes party brand (neoliberal bait-and-switch by left)

2) poor economic performance (since this becomes the only decision metric that retains partisan support once party brand is diluted)

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central question (weyland)

costly neoliberal reforms were supported/tolerated in some countries (ex. argentina, brazil, peru) but not others. why?

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possible answers for why costly neoliberal reforms were tolerated (weyland)

compensation hypothesis (limited resources can be distributed, targeting those most affected and compensating for losses) or rescue hypothesis

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critiques of compensation hypothesis (weyland)

rational choice assumption of the theory is misguided: people overvalue losses, so won’t feel compensated; when back in the domain of gains, compensation becomes important to retain support

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rescue hypothesis (weyland)

holds that neoliberal reforms receive support only when implemented to revert past losses or prevent further losses (in response to hyperinflation - domain of losses) - people are more willing to support risky policies

j-curve

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bare-bone populism (roberts 2006)

mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established elites

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classical populism (roberts 2006)

charismatic leadership, material and symbolic redistribution, nationalism and state development, inclusion of urban workers and the poor in political system, tension with pluralism

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classification of organic populism (roberts 2006)

mexico under cardenas (high partisan, high organization)

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classification of labor populism (roberts 2006)

peronism (low partisan, high organization)

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classification of partisan populism (roberts 2006)

APRA (high partisan, low organization)

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classification of electoral populism (roberts 2006)

velasco ibarra, fujimori (low partisan, low organization)

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economic cycles

import substitution industrialization; debt crisis → neoliberalism; asia financial crisis → turn against neoliberalism; commodity boom (coincided with left turn)

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who are the moderates and radicals in NO

rene, patricio (free-rider literature)

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who are the hard liners and soft liners in NO

hard: military (pinochet), people in the regime, minister

soft: democratic opposition

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what is the role of international actors in NO

“the gringos are with the NO” → US moves to support democracy; help reduce the risk of communist government

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what is the role of repression/justice/truth in NO

prevent share of NO campaign ads; tanks at protests; censorship on tv; justice/truth ads are jingles → dancing to experiences (easier to consume); used an emotion that would mobilize (fear does NOT mobilize)

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what changed since 1973 (NO)

1988: bigger focus on economic condition

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what happens before extrication?

war in argentina → military/Argentina loses then loses bargaining power which leads to extrication

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what are the juridicial innovations in argentina 1985

put together perceivably unbiased judges; trial itself; collection of testimonies (could not prove they were there but are responsible meaning they had to have known); use biased witnesses but had no one else to testify

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what is the role of repression in argentina 1985

cruelty has no political goal; public is afraid because they see boys dropped in public with blindfolds; public kidnappings = more fear/less talking

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what is the role of the truth commission in argentina 1985

gathering/perfectly organizing evidence and witnesses; tension between democratic justice and fear of military

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what is the role of public opinion in argentina 1985

ocampo’s mother changes her mind after realizing his work; brutal treatment (with no political goal) of children/mothers could not be defended; ocampo is there because he is part of a military family which tells the public something

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innovations present in argentina 1985

truth commission, trials, end of 1985 law (deadline to start any case); still protests/rebellions; reparations to victims; revocation of amnesty