Where does Government come from?

State of nature (Hobbes)

Life with no common power to keep everyone in awe. Hobbes's starting point for asking why government exists.

Hobbes and the equality of man

Men are roughly equal: "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest" by secret plotting or by teaming up with others. Equal ability breeds equal hope, so two men who want the same thing become enemies.

Anticipation

Striking first. With no common power, the most reasonable way to secure yourself is to master others by force or trickery before they master you. It is self-defense, not villainy.

Competition, diffidence, glory

Hobbes's three causes of quarrel. Competition makes men invade for gain, diffidence (distrust) for safety, glory for reputation.

The nature of war (Hobbes)

War is not only actual fighting but a known disposition to fight. Like foul weather, it is the tendency, not a single shower.

"No place for industry"

In the war of all against all no one works because the fruits are uncertain. So no farming, navigation, building, arts, letters or society. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Industry comes first because everything else depends on it.

Hobbes's introspective defense

You arm yourself to travel, lock your doors at night and your chests at home. Your actions accuse mankind as much as Hobbes's words do.

The social contract as a logical exercise

Hobbes does not claim the whole world ever lived in the state of nature. It is a thought experiment about life without government, pointing to civil war and rival sovereigns as near examples.

"No mine and thine distinct"

Without a common power there is no property, only "that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it." No justice or injustice either.

Small groups vs. large groups (Olson)

A band of 50 or 100 can keep peace by voluntary agreement because each member gains a big share from order and free riders are visible. A million cannot: the collective action problem. No large society has done it, so large-group government comes from force, not contract.

Roving bandit

Steals everything and moves on. With nothing left to keep, people stop producing.

Stationary bandit

A bandit who settles, monopolizes theft and takes a regular share as taxes. He protects his subjects and leaves them enough to produce, because their output is his future income.

Feng Yu-hsiang and White Wolf

Olson's example from 1920s China. People preferred warlord Feng, who taxed them but kept order, over roving bandit White Wolf, who plundered.

"The first blessing of the invisible hand"

Olson's phrase for the bandit's self-interested choice to settle and govern. Pure self-interest leads him to protect people and promote production.

Violent entrepreneurs

Olson's term for bandits who become rulers. They call themselves kings, emperors or lords, never bandits.

"History is written by the winners"

Rulers rewrite their violent origins as noble ones. Be skeptical of any institution's official origin story.

Encompassing interest (Olson)

A ruler who takes a share of society's total income gains when the whole economy grows, so he has reason to provide public goods. At a one-third share he provides them up to the point where each dollar of cost yields three dollars of social output.

Time horizon (Olson)

A ruler expecting to be gone next year acts like a roving bandit and grabs what he can. One expecting a long reign or an heir acts like a stationary bandit and invests in the economy.

"Long live the king"

Dynastic succession lengthens the ruler's time horizon and reduces uncertainty about who rules next. So hereditary monarchy can be socially desirable.

Conditions for a lasting democracy (Olson)

The same conditions needed for secure property and contract rights: an independent judiciary, free speech and respect for individual rights. Investors need these to trust that what they build won't be taken.

Coltan vs. gold (Sánchez de la Sierra)

Coltan is bulky and easy to tax at the mine, so a coltan price shock puts armed groups at the mines. Gold is easy to hide at the mine, so a gold price shock pushes them into villages to tax income there.

The essential functions of a state

Taxation, protection, policing, settling disputes, enforcing rules and providing public goods. Sánchez de la Sierra uses this list to show armed groups acting as states.

The NDC-R

An armed group in eastern Congo that taxes, polices, judges disputes and administers villages. A state in the making, and a modern stationary bandit.

"From bandits and pirates to kings via tax collectors"

Sánchez de la Sierra's summary of state formation: armed groups become governments by turning plunder into regular taxation.

Stationary bandit and welfare

A stationary bandit raises welfare compared with roving bandits or no order at all. Better than the alternative, not good in absolute terms.

"Why not have anarchy?" (Nozick)

The question that comes before how the state should be organized: should there be any state at all? Nozick justifies the state by showing it would arise from a state of nature through steps that violate no one's rights.

Problems of self-enforcement (Nozick)

When each person enforces their own rights, they are biased in their own case, overestimate harms and may lack power. Feuds result.

Mutual-protection associations

People first band together to defend each other. Two inconveniences follow: everyone is always on call, and any member can drag the group into a cranky or paranoid dispute. The market's answer is division of labor: paid protective agencies.

Two agencies in conflict (Nozick)

Three possibilities: one agency always wins, so clients switch to it; each dominates its own area, so territories split; or they win about equally, so they set up a common court. In all three, people end up under one system for judging disputes.

"Why is this market different from all other markets?"

In protection, value depends on being stronger than rivals. Competing agencies can't coexist at full strength, so one wins out: a virtual monopoly arises without government.

The declining spiral

Clients leave a weaker agency for a stronger one, which weakens it further, until one dominant agency remains.

Dominant protective association

The single agency that emerges as protection consolidates in an area. Close to a state, but not one yet.

Invisible-hand explanation

An explanation of a pattern that nobody intended or had in mind. Nozick's example is money, which arose through trade, not the agreement Locke described.

Why the dominant association is not yet a state

It lets independents enforce their own rights, so it claims no monopoly on force. And it protects only paying clients, not everyone in the territory.

A necessary condition for a state (Nozick)

It claims a monopoly on deciding who may use force in its territory, and punishes anyone who uses force without its permission.

How the state arises: Hobbes vs. Olson vs. Nozick

Hobbes: by contract, out of fear of the state of nature. Olson: by conquest, as a bandit settles, with no consent. Nozick: by an invisible-hand process among protection agencies, with no explicit agreement. The NDC-R looks most like Olson.