internal enforcement

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26 Terms

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Review: if failing to agree is costly, why do deals still fail?
Two reasons: we don't trust what you say (incomplete information) and we can't trust you later (commitment problem). Fixing a commitment problem takes enforcement, either external (last class) or internal (today).
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Internal enforcement: definition
Compliance that comes from actions by members of the group who are equals and have no authority or power over each other individually (e.g., merchant coalitions punishing cheaters).
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Maghribi traders (11th century): why did they need internal enforcement?
This was before nation-states, so there was little commercial law and only non-existent or localized authority. Merchants and agents had little recourse to courts or law enforcement and no individual coercive power, so they had to solve enforcement problems themselves.
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Maghribi traders: what was the incentive to cheat?
Agents could gain the short-term benefits of cheating without the long-term costs, especially when transactions weren't immediately realized (large communities, long distances).
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Maghribi traders: what was the collective dilemma?
Agents have bad incentives, other merchants know this and refuse to trade, so there is no commerce beyond immediate transactions and everyone is worse off.
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What does a solution to the Maghribi dilemma require?
An enforcement mechanism: a way to detect and spread information about cheating, and a way to punish cheaters.
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Role of coalitions among Maghribi traders
Networks of merchants and agents shared information about past transactions (good and bad), agreed to punish anyone who cheated a coalition member, and so created incentives to cultivate a good reputation.
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Why does the reputational mechanism work?
Traders care about their reputations and believe those reputations will suffer if they cheat. The long-term benefit of membership (a premium) outweighs the short-term gain from acting badly.
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Conditions for credible punishment: what must a cheater believe?
(1) Others will have information about my actions, (2) others have a clear sense of what counts as cheating, (3) they will punish based solely on whether I cheated, (4) they will themselves be punished if they fail to punish me.
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Why does it matter that punishment depends only on past cheating?
If group members share other ties (shared features, other interactions, value each other for other reasons), they may be reluctant to punish a friend, and the threat of punishment becomes less credible.
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Why does a coalition need to punish people who fail to punish?
Punishing is costly, so if non-punishers go unpunished, nobody has an incentive to punish and the threat collapses. Punishing the non-punishers keeps the threat credible (second-order punishment).
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Criminal groups: what is the collective dilemma and why is enforcement hard?
Leaders can't observe all members, and secrecy is needed for survival. They can't go to the police, can't use state courts, and have no third-party guarantor, so disputes and bad behavior have to be regulated internally.
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Yakuza (1960s Japan): how did they enforce good behavior?
A strict code of conduct (honor, respect, trust), tattoos as indicators of membership, and reputation as a key determinant of success, with punishment and promotion based on it.
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Climate change as a collective dilemma
Warming can only be slowed if all parties reduce emissions, but reducing emissions is costly and unpleasant (domestic markets, lobbying, economic growth), so each country is tempted to free-ride. Compliance by others can be observed.
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Paris Accord: how does it use internal enforcement?
Information sharing and reporting requirements, plus letting countries set their own emissions targets. This leads to self-selection: only states that plan to comply join, and targets are ones they believe they can meet.
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Big picture: internal enforcement
It is difficult. How states, merchants, and criminal groups address enforcement shapes their strategies when they bargain, and we should ask whether alternatives exist (e.g., other ways to sustain trade, resolve disputes, or reach collective outcomes).
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how is speaker elected

Each party internally votes on a Speaker candidate

‡ Then, the whole house votes for a Speaker

‡ To win, need a majority of votes (>50%)

‡ Representatives do not need to vote fo their party’s nominee

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