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Waltzer on membership
He argues that membership is the primary social good that a community distributes. It is the foundation of distributive justice, as it determines who is included in the sharing of all other goods, such as security, welfare, and political power.
Without membership, individuals are "stateless," a condition he describes as one of "infinite danger".
Waltzer on neighborhood analogy
These are associations without legally enforceable admissions policies where the market determines movement.
He rejects this model for states, arguing that if states were as open as neighborhoods, they would have no enforceable admissions policies, thus local communities would feel threatened and turn into "petty fortresses" to protect their local culture.
Waltzer on family analogy
Not the strongest analogy for this author. This analogy highlights "kinship" or national affinity.
States often feel a special moral obligation to "relatives" (those of the same ethnicity or nationality) who live outside their borders, leading to "kinship principles" in immigration law.
Waltzer on club analogy
This is the most accurate legal analogy for the state. Clubs can regulate admission (choosing who to let in) but they cannot bar members from withdrawing or leaving.
He notes that while individuals may have reasons to join, those on the outside have no inherent right to be inside.
Waltzer’s opinion on closed borders
The "deepest meaning of self-determination" for this author is the power of a community to shape its own population.
He argues that stable associations of men and women require a sense of a "common life".
Without the right to exclude, communities of character could not exist as a stable feature of human life.
Communities of Character
Historically stable associations with distinct cultures (Waltzer)
Waltzer on mutual aid
Communities owe a duty to "necessitous strangers" if the assistance is urgently needed and the costs to the host are low. (refugees, asylum seekers, etc.).
Ex: instances of natural disaster in a poor country (the Haiti hurricane, the US and Canada during the Obama administration helping).
This author would say that domestic help comes first, but for people in dire need, this duty exists to provide aid to those who are not members of our society.
Duties aren't very strict, because those are reserved for citizens.
Claim of necessity
If a state like "White Australia" holds vast, empty territory while others are in need, they may be morally forced to choose between yielding territory or yielding homogeneity (Waltzer).
Waltzer’s opinion on refugees/asylum seekers
Victims of political or religious persecution make the most forceful claim for admission because their need is for membership itself, which cannot be "exported" like food or money.
Waltzer on the guest worker system
He famously argues against this, stating that a state that admits workers but denies them a path to citizenship becomes a "local tyranny" because it rules over subjects without their consent.
No democratic state can tolerate a fixed status between citizen and foreigner; if they are subject to authority, they must be potential citizens.
Wellman’s main deontological argument
He believes that every legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants, including refugees.
It is based on a theory of rights and entitlements rather than a calculation of what would produce the most happiness or best satisfy a state's interests.
Grounded in the values of freedom of association and the state’s right to self-determination
While he is sympathetic to open borders, he defends the right of states to exclude without claiming that strict border controls are the best/most humane choice.
Wellman’s central thesis
He argues that freedom of association is a fundamental moral value that necessarily includes the right not to associate.
Wellman’s marriage analogy
Individual choose their partners or religious associates, which includes the discretion to reject any suitor or remain single.
Wellman extends this logic to groups, then states, arguing that since a state is a civic association, its right to self-determination entitles it to decide whom to invite into its political community.
While marriage is more intimate, the self-determination of non-intimate groups is still vital because new members affect how a community evolves and share in the control of its future.
luck egalitarianism
The view that it is unjust for life prospects to be determined by the "brute luck" of one's place of birth.
Wellman’s response to luck egalitarianism
Argues against it through his relational equality arguments and disjunctive duties argument
Relational equality argument
He focuses on preventing oppressive or dominant relationships within a community.
While we may have duties to help the global poor, the lack of a robust political relationship between citizens and foreigners means that global inequality does not automatically necessitate open borders (Wellman)
Disjunctive duty argument
Wellman argues that if wealthy states have demanding duties of distributive justice (to help the global poor), these duties are separate from the right to exclude and do not require admitting immigrants.
He proposes that a state can either fulfill its obligations by admitting needy people or by exporting aid and "justice".
For refugees, this might involve military intervention or aid to make their homelands safe so that they no longer require asylum.
Kurds in Iraq: he suggests that measures like no-fly zones/safe havens can protect basic rights without requiring host states to absorb refugees into their political community.
He criticizes Walzer for respecting the “self-determination” of regimes that systematically fail to protect their own citizens, arguing that such regimes forfeit claims to non-intervention.
Wellman’s view on property rights (libertarian view)
He argues that property rights cannot be absolute without leading to anarchism, as states must have territorial control to function.
Because the state must treat all residents as political equals, an individual’s decision to invite an immigrant creates substantial costs for the rest of the community, who must then share political membership with that person.
Since these costs are substantial, he argues that the group must decide with whom these benefits of membership be shared (since new members affect how the political community evolves and functions)
Wellman on freedom of movement (libertarian view)
He agrees that while individuals have a right to move, but this does not entitle them to enter a foreign country without permission, just as a right to movement does not allow someone to enter a private home.
He distinguishes between emigration (the right to leave) and immigration (the right to enter); emigration is a right against one's own state not to be treated as property, while immigration involves a forced association with others.
Wellman on racial/sex exclusion
He rejects the idea that states may use such criteria, but his reasoning differs from other theorists.
Rather than focusing on the insult to the potential immigrant, he argues that racist immigration policies wrongfully disrespect current citizens who belong to the dispreferred groups.
These policies send a message that those existing citizens are not equal partners in the political cooperative.
Therefore, unless a state is completely homogenous (which no modern state is), it cannot adopt discriminatory admission criteria without violating its duties to its own constituents.
Carens general argument
He challenges the conventional "state sovereignty view," which assumes that democratic nations have an absolute moral right to control their borders and exclude foreigners as they see fit.
If we take our own democratic commitments to liberty and equality seriously, we must conclude that borders should generally be open, allowing individuals the freedom to move and settle where they choose.
Open border policy, libertarian view
Carens feudalism view
In the medieval era, being born into the nobility or the peasantry was an "inherited status" that almost entirely determined one's life chances, regardless of talent or effort.
He posits that being born a citizen of a rich country like the United States or a member of the European Union functions the same way today: it is a birthright privilege that grants massive advantages while legally tying those born in poor countries to the land of their birth.
Using this, he argues that access to social positions should be determined by talent and effort, not by where one was born.
Carens underlying principles of every democratic regime
All human beings possess the same inherent moral value.
The social and political structures we live in (including states and borders) are not a "natural social order" but are created by humans and can, therefore, be changed.
Any restriction on human freedom (especially the use of "guards and guns" at a border) requires a moral justification that is fair to everyone subject to it, including those excluded.
Caren’s cantilever argument
Every modern democratic state recognizes the right of its citizens to move freely within its own borders as a basic human right.
He argues that the reasons for moving between cities are identical to the reasons for moving between countries.
Compatriot Partiality
Miller is in favor of the idea that states are justified in treating their own citizens more favorably than outsiders.
Since all human beings have equal moral worth, we must come up with a reasonable moral justification for closed borders
These special obligations arise from the intrinsic value of the relationships within a state.
It arises from reciprocity among citizens who share a multidimensional relationship of economic (citizens participating in a shared system of production, taxation, and welfare) and civic (citizens are all equal before the law) cooperation.
Strong cosmopolitanism
Suggests that the fundamental duties owed to others are identical regardless of our relationship to them or borders, effectively ruling out special concern for compatriots.
Miller argues that this is difficult to accept because it would also prohibit special concern for family and friends, which many see as essential to a worthwhile moral life.
Weak cosmopolitanism
This theory accepts equal moral worth but allows for special obligations within certain relationships.
Under this view, states must consider how their actions affect outsiders, but they may still prioritize their own citizens—provided they can give reasons for doing so.
Miller believes that this is the stronger argument
Miller’s importance of national identity
This ties a group to a specific place—its territory, landscapes, and historic sites.
It explains why a particular group belongs together in a particular place, something economic or legal cooperation alone cannot justify.
It justifies the desire for nation-wide self-determination,
Miller on human rights, citizenship rights, and what we should do to protect either
Human rights protect the basic conditions of a minimally decent life anywhere and generate international obligations.
represent a moral bedrock or threshold; they are urgent claims that create international obligations even when no prior relationship exists.
States must do whatever is necessary to protect victims, even if this places an unfair burden on them.
States are required to contribute only their proportionate share. If a state wants to do more, it should ideally have democratic consent, since extra resources could otherwise support domestic justice.
Citizenship rights are tied to membership in a specific political community.
Miller’s conclusion
Under the premise of weak cosmopolitanism, states must treat non-citizens with respect
Even when no human right is at stake, if a potential immigrant makes a claim that serves their interests, the state has a duty to seriously consider the request and provide reasons for a refusal,.
Failing to provide such reasons treats the individual as if they are of no moral significance.
He illustrates this with the example of a hiker asking to borrow a book: the owner may refuse, but must at least consider the request and give a reason.
Miller’s critique of the common earth argument
Argument: Because the earth is the common property of all humanity, it is unjust to deny anyone access to any part of it.
1: Individuals have a right to take what they need to survive
Critique: Typically, grants only temporary residence rather than a permanent right to settle. Migrants, cumulatively, may actually cause harm. States have the right to open land for parks, recreation, and not give it to migrants
2: Humanity is a collective body that must jointly decide on the use of the Earth's resources.
Critique: Even Kant limited this to a right to travel for commerce rather than permanent residence. Also practically difficult to implement because there is no global mechanism to regulate such joint ownership without a world government.
3: Every person is entitled to an equal share of the earth's resources.
This is impossible to apply because there is no "neutral" metric to measure the value of land
Millers critique of the global equality of opportunity argument
Argument: it is unfair for a person's life prospects to be determined by the "accident of birth" in a poor versus a wealthy country.
Critique: We must distinguish between sufficiency (everyone having enough for a decent life) and equality.
While we have a duty to ensure everyone has the conditions for a "minimally decent life," the absolute equality argument faces problems as it doesn’t justify equalizing opportunities for those with decent lives.
While a state is responsible for treating its own citizens equally, there is no single global institution responsible for equalizing opportunities between independent states.
He warns that opening borders to achieve equality might actually widen the gap between rich and poor nations.
Miller on the human right to immigrate argument
While international law recognizes the right to exit a country, it does not recognize a general right to enter another
Argument 1 attempts to link immigration to basic human needs,.
He argues that human rights protect generic interests (e.g., the interest in having a partner or practicing a religion) rather than the specific form those interests take.
A person's rights are fulfilled if their own society provides an adequate range of life options, even if they cannot move to a specific foreign country to fulfill a particular preference.
Argument 2 suggests immigration is necessary to protect other rights, like subsistence.
He counters with the right to exit only requires that an individual has at least one other place to go, not a choice of any country.
Harms poor countries by allowing their skilled professionals (doctors, etc.) to leave, undermining the rights of those left behind.
Miller on the cantilever argument
This argues that if we have a right to move freely within a state, we must logically have a right to move freely between states,.
He argues against this, stating that states can manage the costs of internal migration through national policy and taxation, but they have no such control over international migration pressures.
He finds that internal freedom of movement is a vital check against a state trapping or segregating its own minorities (e.g., the Gulags or Apartheid).
But International borders do not "trap" people in the same way, as individuals can still seek to exercise their rights in various other places.
Individuals aren't confined under a single global authority
Abizadeh general argument
Challenges the widely held "state sovereignty view" which says that democratic states have a unilateral right to control their own borders and owe no justification for entry policies to foreigners.
Argues that the position is inconsistent with the democratic theory of popular sovereignty.
Because the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded, any regime of border control must be democratically justified to both citizens and foreigners.
Democratic theory itself necessitates an unbounded demos
Liberal Autonomy Principle
because the state's exercise of power is backed by coercion (and coercion constitutes an infringement on an individual’s freedom), such practices must be justified in a manner consistent with personal autonomy (Abizadeh)
Even when the coercion is indirect (sanctions, etc.), it still restricts people freedom by putting them under the will of the state.
Abizadeh’s three conditions for an autonomous life
appropriate mental capacities
an adequate range of valuable options
independence from the will of others.
While subjection to coercion may only sometimes undermine one’s options or mental capacities, border coercion always violates the third condition because it makes a non-citizen’s life prospects depend on decisions they have no role in shaping.
Coercive acts
Physical force that directly deprives a person of options, such as physically holding someone back from entering a territory (Abizadeh)
Coercive threats
Communicating the intention to carry out future actions (like sanctions) to prevent a person from choosing certain options. (Abizadeh)
Problems for those who assume the demos is inherently bounded (Abizadeh)
Democracy cannot specify the boundaries of "the people" in a way that is consistent with its own theory of legitimacy.
to decide democratically who belongs to the demos, there must already be a demos (a group) to make that decision
This leads to infinite regress, where democratic theory cannot justify fixed political boundaries on its own.
Borders are an exercise of power over both members and nonmembers.
Abizadeh on minority protection
This is the only argument this author finds potentially compatible with unilateral control, but only under specific conditions where it is necessary to protect a minority group from being overrun and dominated by a majority and losing its political aspirations
Abizadeh’s legitimacy gap
This author concludes that current regimes of border control suffer from this because they are a form of citizen-tyranny over foreigners
To truly be democratic, states must support the formation of cosmopolitan democratic institutions where both citizens and foreigners have a say in border policy.
Within these institutions, participation rights could be weighted according to the degree to which an individual’s autonomy is at stake. For example:
Citizens might have the greatest say.
Foreigners whose entry is necessary for them to have an adequate life would have a strong say
Casual travelers or those for whom entry is of little value would have the weakest participatory rights.