Frameworks, Paradigms, Puzzles + Interests, Interactions, Institutions

Realism

framework in IR

power & security, key actors are states, dominate other states to be very powerful and gain security from other states, no centralized authority

Liberalism

framework in IR

globalization (interdependence between groups in societies), individuals/groups are basic actors, believes cooperation is possible, value of multilateral institutions for regulation and cooperation

Constructivism

framework in IR

social construct (money) influences actions, identities of actors and social practices affects IR, identities change, goes beyond material interests, socially constructed, ket actors are states and other actors, ideas, norms

Feminism

gender roles, gendered power relations, key actors are beyond states and elites to individuals and everyday life, masculine experiences treated as universal in IR

Marxism

class and economic relations, key actors are states and international institutions reflecting the interests of dominant economic classes, capitalism, produces inequality, exploitation, conflict between/within states

Polarity

the number of power centers in the international system at a given time

multipolarity (before WWII), bipolarity (cold war), unipolarity (U.S.?)

Rationalism

Actors are engaging in purposive behavior - they have a goal and will work toward it

states and other political actors as unitary, goal-oriented agents who make logical, cost-benefit decisions to maximize their expected utility (such as security, power, or wealth)

Faults with Paradigms (broad set of assumptions)

• Aren’t always useful in advancing our understanding of the world

• Focus on narrow areas can encourage extreme positions 

• Aren’t really theories 

• Tend to focus on the things they care about

• Makes them difficult to evaluate and fit into social scientific framework

Levels of analysis

Interests, Interactions, Institutions

Puzzles and Mid-Level Theory

IR as a Social Science process? Hypothesis? Theory?

Theory → Hypothesis → Empirical test → test → repeat

• Hypothesis – relationship between 2 phenomena 

• Theory – takes hypothesis and adds an explanation (answers y)

• IV - change, DV - measured, thing being caused

Models

• Theoretical and empirical

• Designed to leave something out

• Requires we make assumption 

• Aren’t right/wrong just more/less useful

What makes a good theory?

• Are falsifiable (can be proven wrong)

• Explain more (wider range)

• Explain something important

• Are parsimonious/simple

• Are satisfying

Game Theory

• Modeling strategic interactions (one party’s decision may be based on what another party does)

• SImplify interactions to highlight an important dynamic 

• Equilibrium outcome - no player can do better by switching moves 

• Is the thing left out important enough to realize the model isn’t significant to an explanation

Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

• Both stay silent - light sentence

• One talks one stay silent - talker goes free, silent prisoner gets harsh sentence

• Both talk - both receive substantial sentence 

  • Dominant strategy (defect) makes both worse off but both would be better off cooperating

• Tit for tat - cooperate on first move, if the other players defect you defect - if you interact more in the future you are more likely to cooperate

Chicken Game

• Chicken – explains escalation behavior in IR 

• Mutual concession (Swerve, Swerve): A tied, moderate compromise.

• Unilateral concession (Straight, Swerve): The firm player wins and gains the highest payoff, while the swerving player is humiliated.

• Mutual firmness (Straight, Straight): The worst possible outcome for both sides—a catastrophic "crash" or war.

• Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, there is no single best move; your optimal choice depends entirely on what you expect the other player to do.

• Brinkmanship and Signaling: States deliberately push a situation to the edge of active conflict to signal resolve and force the adversary to back down first

  • Credibility

Stag Hunt Game

• Stag hunt – dominant strategy is to cooperate and get the stag but if you don’t trust your fellow partner then it creates conflict

• The Scenario: Two (or more) players decide independently and simultaneously whether to hunt a stag (cooperate) or a hare (defend/play safe).

• Stag: Catching a stag requires full cooperation; if both choose stag, they get a large, high-value reward (payoff-dominant / Pareto optimal).

• Hare: Catching a hare can be done alone for a smaller, guaranteed reward (risk-dominant).

• The Catch (The Risk): If one player chooses the stag and the other defects to hunt a hare, the stag hunter gets nothing, while the hare hunter gets a hare.

• Stag / Stag: Both cooperate; the best possible outcome for everyone.

• Hare / Hare: Both defect; a safe outcome with a lower payoff

• The Security Dilemma: In international politics, states want mutual disarmament or global climate agreements (the stag), but fear that trusting an adversary or partner will leave them vulnerable if the other cheats (the hare).

  • Trust and assurance

Bach or Stravinsky Game

• Bach or Stravinsky - pure coordination don’t want to go alone but want to see different concerts (agreeing on international standards)

• Choices: Two players must simultaneously choose between attending a Bach concert or a Stravinsky concert.

• Preferences: Both players want to go to the same concert together more than anything else. However, Player 1 prefers Bach, while Player 2 prefers Stravinsky.

Dominant strategy

A single move that yields a higher payoff than any other strategy, completely independent of the opponent's actions

Nash equilibrium

A combination of strategies where no participant can improve their outcome by changing their own strategy while everyone else keeps theirs the same