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Why does Larch distinguish short-, medium- and long-run fiscal effects in macro models?
• The short-run Keynesian model assumes fixed prices and current-income consumption, so fiscal demand stimulus can be powerful.
• In the medium run, wages and prices adjust and the central bank reacts, changing the fiscal multiplier.
• Dynamic models introduce future income and taxes, potentially reducing or reversing fiscal effects.
How are aggregate demand and the government instruments represented in the basic Keynesian model?
• In a closed economy, goods-market equilibrium is Y = C(Y − T) + I + G.
• G is government purchases, while T denotes net taxes (taxes minus transfers, including pensions).
• Hand-to-mouth households consume C = c(Y − T), where 0 < c < 1 is the marginal propensity to consume.
How are the Keynesian fiscal multipliers derived and why is spending more effective than a tax cut?
• With fixed investment, equilibrium output is Y = (I + G − cT)/(1 − c).
• The spending multiplier is dY/dG = 1/(1 − c), while the tax multiplier is dY/dT = −c/(1 − c).
• Spending enters demand in full, whereas households save 1 − c of a tax cut. With c = 0.75, the multipliers are 4 and −3.
• A balanced-budget rise in G and lump-sum T has multiplier 1.
How is the IS curve derived, and what shifts it?
• The IS curve: a combination of interest-rate/output where Y = C(Y − T) + I(Y,i) + G.
• It slopes downward because higher interest rates reduce investment and equilibrium output.
• Higher G, lower T or stronger autonomous demand shift IS right. Fiscal contraction shifts it left.
What does the closed-economy saving–investment identity imply for fiscal deficits and crowding out?
• From Y = C + I + G and C = Y − T − S, obtain S + (T − G) = I.
• Investment is financed by private saving plus government saving, T − G.
• A larger deficit reduces investment if private saving is unchanged. This is the accounting basis of crowding out.
How does Larch model the financial market, and how does it differ from the conventional LM curve?
• Larch uses a horizontal LM at the policy interest rate, which the central bank chooses by adjusting money or reserve supply.
• The conventional LM fixes money supply and lets the interest rate clear money demand, producing an upward-sloping LM.
• The horizontal version better reflects interest-rate setting by modern central banks.
Why do the real interest rate and effective lower bound matter for fiscal policy?
• The real rate is approximately r = i − πᵉ and determines the borrowing cost relevant to investment.
• Nominal policy rates cannot fall far below zero bc attractive to move from S to cash, though modest negative rates are possible.
• At the lower bound monetary stimulus is constrained, increasing the need for fiscal support after a demand collapse.
What is the risk premium in Larch’s model, and how does a rise affect the IS curve?
• Risky private investment must offer a higher expected return than safe government bonds.
• With default probability p and zero recovery, (1 + i) = (1 − p)(1 + i + x) + (p)0, giving x = (1 + i)p/(1 − p).
• x: risk premium; degree of risk aversion
• Raises private financing costs, lowers investment and shifts IS left even if the central bank keeps its policy rate unchanged.
How does fiscal expansion affect output in the short-run IS–LM model, and what determines its size?
• Higher G or lower T shifts IS right, increasing output at a fixed policy rate.
• If the central bank raises rates, interest-sensitive investment falls and partly or fully offsets the stimulus.
• The fiscal multiplier therefore depends on monetary accommodation rather than fiscal policy alone.
How should fiscal and monetary policy respond to a negative demand shock versus a pro-cyclical fiscal expansion?
• After a negative private-demand shock: expansionary fiscal policy(higher deficit) or lower policy rates can restore output.
• If fiscal expansion pushes output above equilibrium: the central bank can raise rates and crowd out investment.
• At the lower bound: the rate needed to reverse a deep recession may be infeasible, so fiscal intervention becomes essential.
Why must the short-run IS–LM model be extended with wage setting, price setting and a Phillips curve?
• Fixed prices are plausible only briefly. Higher demand eventually reduces unemployment, raises wages and pushes prices upward.
• Wage setting is W = PᵉF(u,z), decreasing in unemployment and affected by institutions z.
• Price setting is P = (1 + m)W, where m is the mark-up. Together they determine labour-market equilibrium.
How do competition, labour-market institutions and the Phillips curve determine natural unemployment?
• Lower mark-ups raise the real wage firms can pay and reduce equilibrium unemployment.
• Higher unemployment benefits or other wage-setting factors z can raise equilibrium unemployment in this simple model.
• The Phillips curve is π = πᵉ + (m + z) − αu, with natural unemployment uₙ = (m + z)/α when π = πᵉ. In output terms π = πᵉ + (α/L)(Y − Yₙ).
What does IS–LM–PC predict for a fiscal expansion from equilibrium in the short and medium run?
• Initially, an IS shift raises output and employment, with inflation increasing as the output gap becomes positive.
• The central bank raises the real rate to return output towards natural output and contain inflation.
• At the new medium-run equilibrium, output returns to Yₙ, but higher interest rates reduce private investment.
When can a fiscal expansion be useful in IS–LM–PC despite medium-run crowding out?
• After a negative demand shock, expansion can close a negative output gap rather than push output above potential.
• It supports the central bank, especially when rates are constrained by the effective lower bound.
• Expansion at full equilibrium or after a positive shock instead risks inflation and monetary offset.
How did ECB bond purchases during Covid illustrate the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy?
• Public debt and deficits increased sharply during Covid, so ECB increased bond buying to make the rise in debt possible in some member states.
• Purchases were conducted on secondary markets to preserve monetary-policy transmission, not as direct primary-market financing.
• PEPP allowed temporary deviations from the capital-key distribution, easing stress for vulnerable sovereigns.
Why did central-bank independence emerge, and what is the distinction between objective and instrument independence?
• Government control of money creation contributed to episodes of high inflation, encouraging independence from the late 1980s.
• Parliament or the legal framework sets the objective, typically price stability, while the central bank freely chooses policy instruments.
• The Bundesbank and Volcker episodes illustrate forceful anti-inflation policy, and the ECB’s independence is protected by the Treaties.
What objective does the central bank minimise, and what monetary rule follows?
• The central bank minimises L = (Y − Yₑ)² + β(π − πᵀ)² subject to π = πᵉ + α(Y − Yₑ).
• Its monetary rule is Y − Yₑ = −αβ(π − πᵀ). Inflation above target requires an output gap below zero.
• Higher β means greater inflation aversion and a flatter MR curve in (Y,π) space.
Why can monetary-policy transmission lags make the central bank overshoot after fiscal expansion?
• Fiscal expansion shifts IS right, but output responds to the interest rate with a lag.
• Inflation can therefore rise before tightening takes effect, forcing the bank to raise rates above their new long-run stabilising level.
• The bank temporarily depresses output to lower inflation, then gradually returns rates to the new stabilising rate.
How do adaptive, rational and anchored inflation expectations change the output cost of disinflation?
• Adaptive expectations follow past inflation, creating inertia and requiring output below equilibrium to disinflate.
• With rational expectations and fully credible policy, agents can adjust immediately to a new announced inflation target.
• Partly anchored expectations are πᵉₜ = χπᵀ + (1 − χ)πₜ₋₁. Lower χ means greater persistence and a larger output sacrifice. Wage indexation to past inflation also increases persistence, particularly after energy shocks.
What does the three-equation model imply about fiscal support following a negative energy-supply shock?
• An energy shock lowers equilibrium output and raises inflation, so monetary policy must adapt to the reduced supply capacity.
• Untargeted demand stimulus does not restore lost potential output and may aggravate inflation.
• Fiscal support and ECB tightening can therefore work against each other, as in Lagarde’s 2022 example.
What numerical steps should you use for Larch’s IS–Phillips curve–MR exam exercise?
• Use IS: Yₜ = A − arₜ₋₁, PC: π = πᵉ + α(Y − Yₑ) and MR: Y − Yₑ = −αβ(π − πᵀ). Check the minus sign and timing.
• With Yₑ = 100, A = 150, a = 5, α = 0.5 and β = 10, initial r = 10. A fiscal rise of 50 raises A to 200 and initially Y to 150.
• With πᵉ = πᵀ = 2, initial π becomes 27. Anchored expectations allow return to Y = 100 at r = 20, while adaptive expectations require temporary over-tightening.
How do forward-looking consumption and investment differ from Keynesian current-income decisions?
• Keynesian consumption depends on current disposable income, while the permanent-income hypothesis bases consumption on assets and expected lifetime income.
• Households smooth consumption through borrowing during low-income years and saving in high-income years, if credit markets permit.
• Investment depends on the present value of expected future profits and interest rates, not only current output and rates.
What is Ricardian equivalence, and which assumptions make the result possible?
• Forward-looking households recognise that debt-financed tax cuts imply future taxes, so they save the tax cut rather than increase consumption.
• Government bonds are not net household wealth. In Larch’s benchmark dynamic model, public spending crowds out private consumption in present value.
• The benchmark requires long horizons or altruism, rationality, perfect capital markets, lump-sum taxes and no productivity effect of government spending.
What qualifications limit Ricardian equivalence, and how does tax smoothing follow from distortive taxation?
• Credit constraints, finite horizons and distortive taxes break the benchmark. Expected future labour or capital taxes may reduce activity.
• Larch’s pure model gives a zero multiplier, while the textbook allows a positive but below-one multiplier for a temporary spending rise.
• With distortive tax costs, governments can minimise distortions by smoothing tax rates and using temporary deficits or surpluses when G fluctuates.
How do New Keynesian DSGE models reconcile the Keynesian and Ricardian extremes?
• They combine forward-looking households and firms with realistic frictions, especially credit-constrained consumers.
• Constrained households spend from current income, allowing government expenditure to raise demand despite forward-looking savers.
• The resulting multiplier depends on the model’s parameters, monetary response, expectations and timing in the business cycle.
What does Larch’s empirical evidence show about the size and determinants of fiscal multipliers?
• Estimated multipliers vary widely, roughly from zero to two, with no single universal value.
• Spending multipliers tend to exceed tax multipliers and are larger in recessions than expansions, especially at the effective lower bound.
• Country openness, exchange-rate regime, debt and risk premia affect results. The 2020 saving spike is compatible with Ricardian motives but also precautionary saving.